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1. Urban Europe and the European 
Union
An introduction
Virginie Mamadouh and Anne van Wageningen
On 24 June 2016 the Council of Ministers of the European Union 
met in Brussels and discussed the result of the Brexit referen-
dum the day before. Amidst the astonishment about the choice 
of the British voters, and the soul searching exercises about 
the future of the EU, the ministers also had to take care of the 
scheduled business, although most of their decisions that day 
went unnoticed. One of these decisions was the adoption of an 
Urban Agenda for the European Union with the formal endorse-
ment of the Pact of Amsterdam. The Pact had been agreed at the 
Informal Meeting of EU ministers responsible for Urban Matters 
on 30 May in Amsterdam, during the Dutch presidency. Since 
then, the European Union has off icially had an Urban Agenda.
This was the occasion to ask both Amsterdam academics 
and practitioners to share their views of the city and to com-
pile this collection of essays to ref lect the complexity of the 
roles, functions and problems of cities to address in the urban 
agenda. The aim of the volume is to contribute to the much 
needed public debate about the future of European cities. After 
decades of discussion, the role of cities in European politics 
has been formally acknowledged, but it is certainly not the 
conclusion of urban politics but on the contrary a stimulus for 
further deliberations. The sharing of knowledge and research 
insights about what makes cities what they are and how they 
function (and sometimes not) is in this context a fundamental 
step towards better cities.
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Europe: A continent of cities
A large majority of Europe’s citizens live in an urban area – 70% 
if we include cities, towns and suburbs – and this share continues 
to grow. Europe is a continent of cities, and is one of the most 
urbanised areas in the world. Cities are the engines of economy 
and social innovation and play an important role in many of the 
most pressing social and environmental challenges Europe faces: 
unemployment, social exclusion, integration, energy transition 
etc.
Cities have now been given a formal say in EU decision making 
and will work together with the Member states, the Directorate-
Generals of the Commission and other European stakeholders 
in 12 partnerships to make EU policies urban proof, to ease 
communication between EU institutions and municipalities, 
to enhance cities’ access to EU programmes and moneys and 
to improve the circulation of expertise and knowledge about 
urban issues.
This new formal position for cities in the EU is part of a 
general trend rooted in the awareness of the fact that a grow-
ing proportion of the (world and European) population live in 
cities but also in changing relations between the states and 
their cities. Many cities have developed their external relations 
to distinguish themselves in the world economy. More and 
more is expected of local authorities. Through decentralisa-
tion reforms, many European states have delegated policies 
to their municipalities, partly to dismantle an uncompetitive 
national welfare state, partly to bring policy making closer to 
the citizens and to acknowledge for local differences in needs 
and opportunities. Moreover, mayors and local governments are 
often expected to be better equipped than states and national 
governments to deal with the daily concerns of their citizens. As 
the American political scientist Benjamin Barber argues, many 
social and environmental problems would be more effectively 
dealt with, if mayors ruled the world. The United Nations has 
also acknowledged this trend and is working on the New Urban 
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Agenda, a global urban agenda to be adopted at the Habitat III 
World cities at crossroads Conference in Quito in October 2016 
to ‘guide the efforts around urbanisation of a wide range of 
actors – nation states, city and regional leaders, international 
development funders, United Nations programmes and civil 
society – for the next 20 years’. The draft document available in 
September 2016 lists paradoxically much more ambitious and 
detailed goals than the Pact of Amsterdam, but remains of course 
more performative where the Urban Agenda for the EU entails a 
change in the constitutional architecture of the EU – even if it 
went unnoticed in the light of the Brexit and the reform needed 
to address the many crises the EU has to face.
An Urban Agenda for the European Union
It took twenty years to get Member States to agree on this urban 
agenda, which was a priority of three successive Dutch presidency 
(in 1997, 2004 and 2016). Member states widely diverge in terms 
of (non-)existence of their urban policies, the competencies of 
their local authorities and the relations between municipalities 
and other state levels.
The Urban Agenda is the outcome of twenty years of discus-
sions. In the 1990s the European Commission proposed to adopt 
an Urban Agenda to tackle urban problems more eff iciently. 
At the time urban problems (unemployment and economic 
restructuring, social exclusion, housing shortage, etc.) were dealt 
with only marginally in the EU15 because they were not Com-
munity competence (and they still aren’t). They were covered to 
some extent but not systematically by the policies for territorial 
cohesion and by the structural funds.
In the course of time, it became clear that the Member 
States – especially in the post 2004 enlarged European Un-
ion  – differ widely in this regard. Some like the Netherlands, 
Germany, France and the UK were pleading for a EU urban 
policy (although different ones) while other were opposed to 
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that. Some have extensive national urban policies, other don’t. 
Moreover their cities, their strengths and their weaknesses are 
completely different. As a result they fell to reach an agreement 
about what a common urban agenda could be, but statements 
regarding cities were regularly adopted by the Council during 
successive presidencies, stressing themes that were dear to 
them.
A new élan came from the European Commission, with a 
report Cities of Tomorrow: Challenges, Visions, Ways Forward in 
2011 and in 2014 a formal initiative of the Commission, followed 
by a wide Public Consultation. With the wide support of other 
EU institutions (the Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, 
the Economic and Social Committee), the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions and the input of inf luential city 
networks such as EUROCITIES and the Mayors of EU Capital 
Cities, the Urban Agenda under construction became more and 
more a programme with cities than for cities, and with local 
authorities as the local states (called urban authorities in the Pact 
of Amsterdam), rather than only with the larger cities – hence the 
use of the term ‘urban areas’ rather than cities in the document.
The Public Consultation revealed huge divergence about what 
cities were (large cities, towns, suburbs, urban areas, etc.) and 
the importance of the relations of cities with their hinterland, as 
well as some consensus on the fact that the urban agenda should 
not be a new EU policy competence, not a new programme or 
budget line. Instead the attention was put on better regulation, 
better funding and better knowledge through an integrated 
approach both vertically (between levels of governance from 
the EU to the local) and horizontally (between policy domains). 
More specif ically it enhances the urban proofing (or the urban 
mainstreaming) of EU policies, which means taking early on in 
the decision making process the impact of the shaping policy on 
local authorities and to the direct engagement of Commissioners 
and EU civil servants with cities.
Whether the 12 partnerships between representatives of 
the Commission, the Member States, cities and stakeholders 
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– which have been established for three years to launch this 
urban mainstreaming exercise for domains ranging from urban 
poverty to circular economy through asylum seekers and digital 
transition – will be successful falls out of the scope of this vol-
ume. Instead it seizes the opportunity to draw the attention to 
the multidimensional character of European urban life and the 
many challenges it currently faces.
Stories about European cities
To mark the Dutch presidency and the preparation of the Pact 
of Amsterdam, academics and practitioners working in and 
from Amsterdam were asked to share their expertise in short 
pieces to illustrate the diversity of approaches to the city as 
socio-spatial reality. This volume thus brings together f ifty 
essays on European cities for the sake of Europeans and oth-
ers wishing to enhance their knowledge of these cities. These 
essays offer tales of European cities, Amsterdam and others, 
from a wide range of perspectives. The authors often present 
a concrete case, but the processes they discuss are at work in 
similar ways in other cities just as well. Local specif icities need 
to be acknowledged to capture the very diversity of European 
cities, but the aim of this volume is to stress the diversity of 
perspectives to study them. Most contributors are trained and/
or work in the social sciences (geography, sociology, anthro-
pology, political science, urban studies, migration studies, 
urban and regional planning) and the humanities (history, 
law, media studies). These multiple disciplinary perspectives 
offer different clues to read the city and investigate its many 
facets. The essays have been grouped in six sections dealing 
with key urban questions: citizenship, nodes and connections, 
creativity, (social) sustainability, representation and identity, 
and governance networks. This ref lects the diversity and the 
complexity of the roles, functions and problems of cities to be 
addressed in the Urban Agenda.
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The f irst theme, citizenship, is about the city and its inhabitants. 
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Fenneke Wekker get straight to the 
point: how do we feel at home in the city? They make a case for 
amicability as a common foundation that allows a diverse group 
of people to feel at home in the city and to share the city with 
each other without immediately resembling one another. The 
tolerance that goes with this and that characterises the big city, 
and Amsterdam in particular, is analysed by Thijl Sunier. Using 
the example of places of worship for new religions, he shows how 
newcomers to the city have had to f ight for their place. Another 
facet of Amsterdam’s legendary degree of tolerance – sex – is 
critically scrutinised by Gert Hekma.
In each of the chapters in this section, the city is seen as an in-
tegration machine with the mandate and the capacity to involve 
new groups in society. Jeanine Klaver and Arend Odé show that 
this integration is diff icult, even for highly educated EU citizens 
from Central and East Europe, while Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas 
and Sébastien Chauvin identify exclusion and inclusion mecha-
nisms for migrants without valid residence permits. Interna-
tional migration has steadily made the city more diverse. Virginie 
Mamadouh and Nesrin El Ayadi argue that linguistic diversity 
has become a fundamental feature of the city: multilingualism 
is now commonplace. However, as Orhan Agirdag shows in his 
contribution about schools’ language policy, not every language 
is treated equally. Urban children have a life also after school, 
but these city dwellers are often overlooked. This is something 
that Lia Karsten is trying to change. Another group that tends 
to be invisible are the city dwellers who come under pressure 
as the city changes rapidly – for example, the residents of those 
working-class neighbourhoods that are becoming increasingly 
attractive for gentrif iers. Fenne Pinkster gives the inhabitants 
of such a place a voice, some of whom feel like exiles in their 
own neighbourhood. In the f inal chapter, Guido Snel, Sepp 
Eckenhaussen and Fien de Ruiter look at Amsterdam through 
the eyes of foreign exiles. Once again, the city’s dynamism plays 
a central role here: as home base and passageway, f ixed and fluid.
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2. At home in the city?
The difference between friendship and 
amicability
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Fenneke Wekker
The home is all the rage. We see it in the media, where Ikea 
commercials and romantic movies remind us that there is no 
place quite like home; we come across it in the pamphlets of 
political parties that argue that ‘everyone should feel at home in 
the Netherlands’; and we see it all around us: everyone is trying to 
make themselves at home – in their house, in the neighbourhood, 
in the city, and in the nation. State policy is supporting citizens 
in this. Policy interventions and welfare projects ensure that 
citizens integrate, meet each other, begin to feel connected with 
one another, and identify themselves with the neighbourhood, 
the city and the country. In so doing, politics seeks to promote 
active citizenship and to encourage people to become involved 
in their neighbourhood, city and country – as if it were their 
own home.
These policies and social projects show that there is nothing 
noncommittal about feeling at home. Feeling at home is necessary 
and compulsory. There is, of course, the political hope that the 
quality of life in so-called ‘disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ will 
improve by increasing a sense of home among their inhabitants. 
Feeling at home and experiencing a sense of interconnectedness 
are seen as preconditions for a ‘good’ and livable neighbourhood 
and city. And successful neighbourhoods – characterised by 
sustainable, local networks of residents – are considered to be 
the building blocks of a sense of belonging at the national level.
More and more policymakers believe that the nation, the city 
and certainly the neighbourhood should feel like home to its 
residents. On the basis of this idea, politicians – in collabora-
tion with welfare workers and local organisations – are calling 
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upon residents to become actively involved in their ‘collective 
house’ by jointly countering deviant behaviour, by serving in 
neighbourhood committees, by participating in neighbourhood 
activities and by taking care of neighbours in need of help. The 
increased social control and social cohesion are meant to lead 
to a greater sense of security, more trust among residents and 
a livable environment that everyone can justif iably call their 
‘home’.
A livable Netherlands is a country in which everyone feels at 
home – this is what is written in countless policy documents 
produced by rural and local politics and also in the ambitious 
plans of welfare institutions and neighbourhood organisations. 
But is that even possible? Paradoxically, the will and the drive 
to make a neighbourhood a safe and peaceful ‘home’ all too 
often lead to open conflicts between residents over what that 
‘public home’ should look like and especially who should be 
able to determine what it looks like: conflicts between renters 
and buyers, between established residents and newcomers, 
between young and old, between ‘antisocial’ people and the 
‘well-adjusted’ are the order of the day in urban areas and city 
streets. As soon as one group of residents appropriates too 
much of the common or public space, the feeling of security 
and familiarity of the other residents melts away like snow. 
Accordingly, the balance between the point at which a sense 
of belonging begins for one person and ceases for the other is 
extremely precarious.
The preoccupation with home – shared by citizens, policy-
makers and welfare workers alike – is understandable. Want-
ing to feel at home is a basic human need that every citizen, 
community social worker and politician recognises. But is the 
(ultimate) aim to make everyone in the public space feel at home 
and feel connected with everybody not an overambitious ideal? 
Is it appropriate to stimulate a sense of feeling at home – and 
with it a strong degree of appropriation of the public space – if 
that brings about more conflicts and if it drives some people to 
withdraw from that space? Would it not be more desirable for 
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people to maintain a certain social distance from each other 
and to refrain from bonding strongly with their (social and 
physical) environment outside the home? In other words, is it 
possible to create an ‘open house’ out of public space? Doesn’t the 
attempt to def ine the city or city district as ‘home’ simply create 
a breeding ground for social conflicts in a society as diverse as 
the Netherlands?
Limits to feeling at home
A sense of home is a very widely shared and deeply felt emotion 
that is almost impossible to describe. There is, however, one 
thing that researchers emphasise without exception: a profound 
sense of home can only be experienced in a small circle of people. 
It turns out that we feel at home only with certain people and 
under certain circumstances. The depth of the emotion thus 
appears to lie in its selectivity: we are capable of feeling at ease 
with quite a few people and in many situations, but can we really 
feel at home with them? When ‘certain people in certain places’ 
are present, this can spoil our sense of home, our trust and our 
sense of security. It is precisely such encounters with these ‘other 
people’ that can undermine those feelings of belonging and 
social interconnectedness so sought after by community social 
workers. Perhaps a reasonably ‘good sense of home’ in an urban 
setting requires relationships that are ‘lighter’ and more aloof 
than the long-term, chummy relationships that policymakers 
would like city dwellers to cultivate.
Within a heterogeneous setting of renters and buyers, of 
different cultures and lifestyles, the only real option appears 
to be to relativise the ultimate aim – i.e. a sense of home in the 
city. Physical proximity can then be combined with keeping 
one’s social distance, which in effect means that the ideal of the 
home is primarily ‘localised’ in one’s own house. One lives in a 
neighbourhood with ‘others’, but precisely because the ‘others’ 
may be very different, social proximity is not always appreciated. 
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In order to coexist in spite of this, what should be sought is not 
a common ‘home’ but rather ‘public familiarity’.
Talja Blokland and Julia Nast posit that public familiarity is 
suff icient for urbanites. They argue that at most what is needed 
is the ability to navigate public space in order to feel that you 
are safe and that you have a certain amount of control. This 
navigating occurs en route – on your way from home to the rest 
of your life. You move through your neighbourhood, you stop in 
a shop, you stand at a bus stop, and all the while you run into 
people you know by sight or because you sometimes chat with 
them at the school playground or the park where you walk your 
dog, or because you know them from your work or school and 
they live in the same neighbourhood as you. Blokland and Nast 
claim that it would be overambitious to strive to get to know one 
another on a more than superf icial basis purely on the basis of 
the coincidence that you live in the same neighbourhood. People 
generally do not expand their networks by adding friends from 
the neighbourhood; they f ind friends elsewhere. Government 
interventions that insinuate that you really should be friends 
with your neighbours in fact generate the wrong expectations. 
After all, true friendship requires like-mindedness and a certain 
degree of homogeneity, which is by def inition rare in an urban 
setting.
Towards a ‘light’ form of a sense of home – 
the importance of amicability
In our view, Blokland and Nast are right in arguing that public 
familiarity – which they identify in terms of safety and being 
familiar with ‘strangers’ – is key to living in a city. But many 
people in a neighbourhood, district or street seek something 
more than merely living together: they want, in fact, to feel at 
home. And for that, public familiarity is a necessary precondition 
but is insuff icient – at least in the way that Blokland and Nast 
def ine it. We believe their def inition of the term familiarity is 
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too parsimonious, for familiarity not only refers to something 
that one is accustomed to, it also signif ies amicability. This 
latter aspect of familiarity denotes a friendly interaction – the 
way friends treat each other – without the depth and emotional 
weight of True Friendship. When people treat each other kindly, 
they treat each other as if they are friends and assume that they 
can trust each other. They presume that they have things in 
common, and they treat each other in a way that exudes trust 
and ease. There is trust in such a relationship unless proven 
otherwise, instead of the opposite, distrustful variant in which 
people view each other with suspicion until ‘common ground’ 
is found.
Research has shown that amicability does not mean that 
you have to be ‘the same’ in terms of a shared lifestyle, cul-
tural background or socio-economic position: the common 
denominator can be that you both have a child or a dog, that 
you both love to swim, that you visit the same church or always 
put the trash out on a Wednesday or take the same bus to the 
city centre. Amicability is more about what you do (together) 
than who you are: it is much more about activity than identity. 
This makes it also an ‘attainable’ ideal for people living in 
heterogeneous neighbourhoods. Such people probably do not 
have much in common in terms of ‘identities’ – ethnic, religious, 
cultural – but this does not mean that they have no activities in 
common with each other. Many successful social interventions 
are therefore focused on activities that residents undertake 
together: they create a form of commonality that form a basis 
for amicability.
To deal with someone amicably is somewhere between ‘ami-
able’ and ‘chummy’: it is more than simply being friendly, but it 
is not based on – nor is its aim – true friendship. It is this ‘mild 
form of friendship’, this amicability, that can fulf il the various 
needs of people to feel at home in a public space.
Our conception of familiarity goes beyond the narrow concep-
tion of public familiarity in which everything appears to revolve 
around being able to survive in the urban ‘jungle’. While Joke van 
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der Zwaard advocates a limited definition of public familiarity, fo-
cused on feelings of security among ‘familiar strangers’, we would 
adopt a broader definition that includes amicability. Amicability 
adds something that allows people to feel at home while simul-
taneously giving others space to also feel at home. A person who 
treats you amicably is giving you space and the recognition that 
you belong there. And often it is a very familiar pattern: a friendly 
relationship develops over the course of time. It is like a dance 
on the sidewalk that becomes so familiar that you immediately 
notice if something or someone is missing. Certain people simply 
belong, not because you are so emotionally connected to them, 
not because you recognise them as someone who is ‘just like you’, 
but because they actively make the neighbourhood what it is – a 
neighbourhood that everyone can call their own to some extent.
There is a ‘mild’ form of a sense of home in many boroughs 
and neighbourhoods, even in those that are mixed. Instead of 
striving for the deepest variant of this sense of home in which 
friendships are formed between residents, it would be more effec-
tive to encourage friendly relations. Such relations are not created 
from one day to the next; they require time. If a neighbourhood 
experiences a rapid change in character, such amicable relations 
will temporarily be put under pressure, but over time they will 
develop again. Striving for amicable relations appears to be a 
realistic option for residents, policymakers and social workers: 
we can learn to treat each other amicably, especially if we know 
that as a result we will feel more at home in our neighbourhood. 
Being friendly with strangers on our street and in our neighbour-
hood is an effective way to appropriate (to a certain extent) an 
area that we always share with others. By doing so, we actively 
create a place in which we can feel quite at home. In our opinion, 
this is the best that politics and social policy can and should 
stimulate. To hope for more and to arouse lofty expectations 
could lead to unmanageable conflicts between residents and to 
the exclusion of certain population groups. A public home is a 
place to which one should never be too emotionally wedded, as 
it is a place that by def inition also belongs to ‘others’.
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3. A tolerant social climate?
Questioning the validity of an overly positive self-
image
Thijl Sunier
Over the last few centuries, Amsterdam’s tolerant social 
climate has enabled it to develop into a multicultural city. 
Amsterdam currently has approximately 800,000 inhabitants 
who come from over 180 different countries.
This is what is written on the website of the Municipality of 
Amsterdam. Tolerance is often considered a hallmark of this 
cosmopolitan trading city. Tolerance – the willingness to accept 
and incorporate people from very different religious or cultural 
backgrounds – has acquired an almost mythical status. There is 
good reason, however, to question the validity of this image of 
Amsterdam as a tolerant city, particularly if we look at the way 
in which houses of worship have been established in this city in 
the past 350 years. Temples, churches, mosques and synagogues 
are all visible signs of the permanent presence of people with a 
certain religious belief. Precisely because these houses of wor-
ship are in the public domain and give shape to it, their status 
is a good indicator of the social standing of religious minorities. 
The construction and use of such places of worship are subject to 
laws and regulations, but more importantly, houses of worship 
have great symbolic signif icance. Places of worship are often 
targets of hatred and intolerance, as we are now witnessing 
once again. At the same time, the external features of houses of 
worship say something about the way in which religious groups 
would like to manifest themselves. The establishment of houses 
of worship in Amsterdam did not proceed without a struggle, for 
in general, tolerance towards religious minorities was lacking.
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Amsterdam as a safe haven
In the Golden Age, the Dutch Republic was one of the richest 
countries in the world and a place where many immigrants 
wanted to try their luck. It was also a refuge for people who were 
persecuted elsewhere in Europe on the basis of their religious 
background. In the Union of Utrecht – the treaty between the 
different provinces drawn up in 1579 and considered to be the 
founding document of the Republic of the United Netherlands 
– freedom of religion was quite explicitly mentioned as one 
of the new polity’s pillars. In the 16th century, thousands f led 
to the northern provinces of the Spanish kingdom, and it was 
among these refugees and dissidents that the uprising against 
the Spanish oppression began. In the late 16th century, Jewish 
refugees from Spain and Portugal also settled in Amsterdam. 
Almost one hundred years later, the Jews from East Europe 
came, having escaped pogroms. By the end of the 18th century, 
there were approximately 30,000 Jews in the Republic, most 
of whom lived in Amsterdam. When in 1685 the French king 
Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes – which had stipulated 
that non-Catholics could practice their religion in the (Catho-
lic) kingdom of France – the Dutch Republic became a place 
of refuge for the Huguenots, the French Protestants. Most of 
them fled to Amsterdam where they found work in the trade 
and crafts industries.
In the second half of the 20th century, this image of Amster-
dam as the standard-bearer of a tolerant Dutch political culture 
and an open attitude towards religious newcomers became more 
widespread and common. The city became known as a place of 
refuge for anyone with a deviant lifestyle. The attitude towards 
Muslims who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s 
was also in line with this picture. When Theo van Gogh was 
murdered in 2004 by a radical Muslim, the mayor of Amsterdam 
at the time – Job Cohen – also referred to this image of the city, 
stating that in his view, the murderer had violated this principle 
of tolerance.
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Houses of worship as litmus test
Although Amsterdam is undeniably a tolerant city, I would place 
caveats to the special position that Amsterdam has ascribed to it-
self compared to other European cities. To begin with, it is difficult 
to describe a city’s attitude towards religious minorities over the 
centuries using a single term. The arrangements that Amsterdam 
made with specific religious minorities were the result of political 
and economic motives, and these motives differed over the centu-
ries. Just as the policy of the Amsterdam regents in the 17th century 
cannot be directly compared with the policies of the 21st-century 
city government, we cannot put the same label on them. The policy 
pursued over the centuries was above all a pragmatic one. ‘Toler-
ance’ was indeed tolerance in the strict sense of the word: it meant a 
willingness to tolerate people of different religious backgrounds as 
long as the status quo was not affected. Religious newcomers were 
often seen as a Trojan horse. The central thread throughout history 
is not so much tolerance but rather concern about the possible 
impact of religious newcomers on society and politics.
The Republic of the United Netherlands came into existence 
as a result of the revolt against Spanish (i.e. Catholic) rule. From 
the middle of the 17th century, Protestantism was the dominant 
religion in the Republic. The public domain was regarded as 
a Protestant space. Among other things, this meant that the 
visible manifestations of any religion other than the off icial 
Protestantism were forbidden. There was freedom of conscience 
but no freedom of religion. The so-called clandestine churches 
in the capital city date from this time. Such churches made it 
impossible to see from the outside that there was a house of wor-
ship inside. The presence of people of other religious beliefs was 
condoned because it was economically advantageous to let them 
live in the city – and not because there was any understanding 
for their way of life. This is not to say that the other religions were 
always ‘invisible’. In some cases there was a deviation from the 
norm, mostly as a result of negotiation. One such case was the 
construction of the Portuguese synagogue.
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New freedom of religion...
After the Batavian Revolution in 1795, there came an end to 
the domination of Protestantism, and freedom of belief was 
‘formally’ introduced. Catholics and other religious minorities 
were allowed to establish their own seminaries and institutions. 
The inauguration in 1796 of the f irst visible Catholic church – De 
Duif on the Prinsengracht – was therefore symbolically very 
signif icant. It was only with the new Constitution of 1848 that 
this freedom of belief was enshrined in law. Nonetheless, the 
construction of Catholic churches continued to be marked by 
inter-religious tensions and endless legal battles over property 
rights into the 20th century.
Catholics had the reputation of being a f ifth column as a 
result of the 1830 secession of Belgium, which was predominantly 
Catholic; the reintroduction in 1853 of the so-called episcopal 
hierarchy which made the Netherlands an ecclesiastical province 
once again; and more generally the loyalty expressed by Catholics 
to the pope in the Vatican, a foreign power. This in turn called 
into question the Catholics’ loyalty to the Dutch nation. The 
status of Jews, who by the turn of the century had been in the 
Netherlands already for hundreds of years, also became a matter 
of heated debate. For a significant part of the Dutch population, it 
was far from self-evident that Jews should be allowed to become 
members of Parliament, for example.
...but also obstacles
One hundred years later, we see that the social position of Mus-
lims is also being put to the test. There are some noteworthy 
similarities between Catholics and Jews at the end of the 19th 
century and Muslims at the beginning of the 21st century, despite 
signif icant differences. Muslims, who began coming to the city 
from the 1960s, encountered quite a few problems in f inding 
spaces for prayer. Attempts to create such spaces were often 
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rejected on formal grounds, and churches were often unwilling 
to make their space available to Muslims, despite the fact that 
fewer people were attending church services. In 1977, Turkish 
Muslims managed to open a mosque in a former church in the 
centre of Amsterdam. The negotiations went relatively smoothly 
because, as one off icial put it, the mosque was not really ‘in 
plain sight’.
In the 1980s, it was primarily social workers who opposed 
the establishment of mosques. Muslims were accused of having 
ties with far-right groups from their own country. Mosques 
were thought to be conducting espionage for regimes in their 
countries of origin. People also believed – and still believe – that 
the establishment of Islam stood in the way of the integration 
process of immigrants and that religious leaders were trying 
to expand their influence on Muslims. In the last f ifteen years, 
the argument that mosques were breeding grounds for radi-
calisation became a reason to approach Muslim initiatives with 
suspicion. The process of establishing the Islamic religion is, 
moreover, still in full swing. While the process initially focused 
on improvised accommodation, this is now making way for the 
construction of new buildings, which has not been without 
its diff iculties. Some projects were realised only after many 
years, while other initiatives never got off the ground due to 
widespread resistance.
Tolerance, at least the way in which the term is used, 
suggests a positive fundamental attitude towards religious 
and other forms of diversity. The historical overview I have 
given here shows that it is far from obvious what the posi-
tion of religious minorities is and that religious diversity was 
not automatically considered something positive. Religious 
newcomers did not obtain their place in society just like that 
but have always had to f ight for it. Their standing in society is 
far from self-evident; it is the result of a political struggle and 
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4. Sex and the city
Room for sexual citizenship
Gert Hekma
Sex is everywhere and nowhere. Statistics show that masturba-
tion and coital sex vie for a f irst place in terms of which is most 
prevalent. When it comes to cities, however, the media give the 
impression that sex work and homosexual intercourse are most 
prevalent and that non-commercial heterosex and masturba-
tion seldom occur. ‘Ordinary’ heterosexuality remains invisible 
precisely because it sets the standard, also in cities. It is still seen 
as natural behaviour and a private matter, and this is the most 
important reason that the other forms appear more in public 
as ‘deviations’ and are discriminated against. Because sex is 
considered private and natural, politics rarely has anything clear 
to say about it.
Urban citizenship has many faces: it is about culture, sports, 
economics, politics, gender and also sexuality. The facts refute 
the idea that eroticism is not a public matter. Sexuality is in many 
ways a matter of citizenship – the most important ways in which 
this is the case are briefly summarised in the f irst part of this 
essay. The second part of this article is about the consequences 
that sexual citizenship has for cities and the policy of ‘city brand-
ing’, such as presenting the city as gay-friendly in order to attract 
creative companies and ‘pink money’.
Public life
To begin with, there are off icial institutions that make or break 
sexual citizenship. Among such institutions are the sex laws 
which until the end of the 19th century were few and included 
legal articles on rape, indecent exposure and the promotion of 
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debauchery of minors (then 21 years old was the age threshold). 
In 1886, the Dutch law was beefed up with an age limit of 16 
years and an article against pornography; in 1911, the age limit 
for homosexual contacts was raised to 21 years and articles on 
prostitution, abortion and contraceptives were introduced. The 
sexual revolution led to the abolition or loosening of the sex laws 
from 1970 onwards, but since 1990 the focus throughout the world 
has once again been directed at strengthening legislation on 
such crimes as ‘extreme’ and digital pornography, sex between 
and with young people, sex work and bestiality. In addition to 
legislation, there are regulations at the level of municipalities 
and institutions – such as the ban in the past on the wearing 
of clothing of the other sex and the rules now in place in many 
institutions against intimacy between men and women or be-
tween adults and children. Institutions create their own rules 
for ‘decent’ behaviour that mainly have to do with what kind of 
eroticism is not allowed. Institutions sometimes intervene under 
the guise of ‘decency’ without there being clear norms. There are 
rarely positive ways to facilitate discussions on the sexual rights 
of citizens (such as disabled people’s right to visit prostitutes); at 
most they are negative such as the discussions on erotic imagery. 
At one point, people proposed to abolish the sex laws given that 
there is no separate chapter in the penal code on families or 
households and that other crimes can be brought under ordinary 
crimes such as violence or abuse of power. Coercion is not very 
different in sex work than in the horticultural industry, and rape 
is essentially not very different than other types of violence.
One of the main institutions of sexuality is marriage, which 
for a long time was strictly heterosexual and was focused above 
all on regulating reproductive relations. In 2001, the institution of 
marriage was opened up to same-sex couples. Marital status has 
a number of consequences for offspring, housing, taxes, social 
security and so on that nowadays apply not only to married 
couples but also increasingly to registered partners and people 
living together. Marriage is about couples and not about rela-
tions in which more than two partners are involved. Although 
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monogamy is ingrained in our culture, there is no longer a ban 
on adultery. Nonetheless, for most people, sex, love and pairing 
belong together, even though decoupling may often be a good 
idea. But overstepping the social norm of monogamy is for most 
people simply unthinkable. This has all sorts of consequences 
regarding divorce, living and sleeping arrangements, child rear-
ing, etc.
Courtship is another public institution with many faces. 
Sex is considered to be a private matter, and we are no longer 
familiar with public forms of sexual initiation. Methods of 
communicating about sexuality in a pleasant way have scarcely 
been developed – there is no ars erotica and no places to learn 
it. Lessons on sexuality hardly suff ice because they are about 
biology and reproduction, the dangers of sex or opinions about 
sexual diversity, and not about seduction or erotic initiation, 
norforms of erotic pleasure. Schools do not offer space for sexual 
lessons of life.
Traditional housing is almost entirely aimed at families with 
two parents and children (albeit less than before) and not at 
single people or broader relationships with more than two adults. 
The bedroom is the place to have sex. Urban development in 
suburbs is geared towards families that are increasingly engaged 
solely with themselves and less with other families, neighbours 
or other people in the vicinity. The idea is that schools or associa-
tions bring social cohesion through sports and games but steer 
clear of intimate relationships that may well be better suited 
for cohesion. Urban plans do not incorporate places for erotic 
and sexual encounters. The public spaces currently available 
in cities are either too primitive for such encounters (hangouts, 
red-light districts, quiet corners in parks) or too commercial 
(bars, festivals, internet); the prevailing gender or sexual norms 
in such spaces are moreover not the most pleasant, and open-
ness and freedom of action are not always guaranteed. Lovers’ 
lanes apparently need to come into being spontaneously: in the 
architecture of homes and cities, sexual citizenship remains 
an underrepresented aspect. Sexuality plays a role in many 
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institutions: in the police force and the judiciary, in health care, 
education, the media, factories and off ices, in the hospitality 
industry and in relations between colleagues and with clients. 
How much sexual privacy do patients in hospitals get or prisoners 
in their cells? How intimate can relationships be at home, at 
school or at the off ice? How much gender and sexual diversity 
is possible? How much physical and psychological space does 
sexual citizenship get? Are skirts too short or pants too tight? 
Are there limits to the eroticisation of health care, sports or 
the school playground? Are certain advertisements, forms of 
art or pornographic images too explicit for women, children or 
religious believers? Are physical intimacies lawful, beneficial or 
actually detrimental? These are all questions to which institu-
tions have given meagre answers at best and they have rarely 
thought about spatial and citizenship aspects.
Urban sexual potencies
A city such as Amsterdam endeavours to be a gay capital but has 
become less so because the choices for homosexual city trips 
have increased and because search behaviour has moved from 
the street and the sauna to the smartphone. Amsterdam does 
not strive to be a sex capital in addition to being a gay capital, 
even though the city does have that reputation with its Red Light 
District as a major attraction. But the Dutch capital would rather 
shed this reputation than market it. And there is every reason for 
this, given the varied sexual morality of its inhabitants: homos, 
hipsters, whoremongers, headscarf beareres and all the other 
people who in their minds, hearts and actions have diff iculty 
with enjoying or discovering erotic pleasure.
Promoting sex is good for the city itself: in the f irst place, 
intimate encounters could help to cultivate social cohesion, 
because all the differences that the city commends itself for 
stimulate desires that could bring people closer together but that 
now still tend to create divisions between them. In the second 
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place, it can stimulate tourism. In addition to the freedom to 
use drugs, eroticism can tempt tourists to visit Amsterdam. The 
city is less able to distinguish itself from other European cities 
with the other features it tends to promote itself for (such as 
monuments, museums or art), as tourists can just as easily go to 
Paris or Rome for this. Sex can offer a city such as Amsterdam 
a unique appeal.
The American urban studies theorist Richard Florida argues 
that sexual freedom is good for cities: it attracts members of a 
creative class and promotes economic opportunities. In this 
respect, the Netherlands and Amsterdam have an advantage 
over other countries and cities, since most Dutch people believe 
that they are sexually free and tolerant. Whether this opinion is 
consistent with reality is questionable as long as Dutch people 
remain convinced of heterosexual, monogamous norms and of 
how men and women should behave (men: sexually active, versus 
women: passive). There is much that needs to be done with the 
inhabitants themselves and at the level of institutions that are 
responsible for sexual matters. This would enable a city such as 
Amsterdam to get much more out of its sexual possibilities, not 
only economically (as Richard Florida puts forth) or in terms 
of city branding but by creating mental and physical space for 
erotic pleasure and intimate citizenship.
In 2007, a panel debate took place with Job Cohen, the then 
mayor of Amsterdam, about ‘Sex in the City’. He spoke about 
sexuality mainly in terms of public order and policing. This kind 
of negative attitude is widespread: churches have drummed into 
their parishioners a dismissive attitude towards sex; sciences 
such as psychology, and politics with its regulation of brothels 
and sex, have not been silent on this issue; and in society, an at-
mosphere of secrecy or gossip prevails. Sexual education mainly 
deals with ‘negative’ matters such as unwanted pregnancies, 
disease, abuse, girls who must learn to say ‘no’ to importuning, 
and boys who must accept such rejections. The basic attitude 
towards sexuality can be more positive: rather than a scourge, 
sex should be a matter of pleasure.
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As has happened with ‘Pride’ groups around LGBT+ themes 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender), institutions should 
devote more invigorating and serious attention to sexual issues 
or to eroticism at the workplace and in one’s free time. This 
also holds true in the hospitality industry, in hospitals, prisons, 
businesses, shops, museums and the art world. I have demon-
strated above how institutions play an important role in this. 
Their contribution is essential for the quality of urban sexual 
life. Gradually, the social sciences are beginning to discover that 
not only gender but also sex is a core theme in society. Politics can 
move away from its basic negative attitude of treating sex as if it 
was a question of public order and of forbidding and punishing. 
Political parties could add a broad section on sex to their political 
programmes. The government can play an initiating role, just as 
with LGBTs. Sexual citizenship makes erotic practices a political 
issue that deserves recognition across the board and not only in 
terms of city branding or gays.
Sex is more often heaven than hell (and usually nothing 
special). For a city such as Amsterdam, it is more a goldmine 
than a matter of public order. Tourists f lock en masse to Am-
sterdam because of its sexual reputation. Due to the politics 
of discouragement of recent decades such as with its policy on 
prostitution, this f low of visitors is most likely steadily decreas-
ing. This is regrettable not only due to the money that could have 
been earned but also because Amsterdam can disseminate a 
positive message about sex, as it does with the Canal Parade: one 
of pleasure and human rights. The city prides itself on its many 
nationalities; let it for once track how much sexual diversity 
there is – and not only the approved alphabet soup of LGBT or 
LGBTTIQQ2SA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, 
intersexual, queer, questioning, two-spirited, asexual) but also 
for other sexual interests such as sex work, BDSM (bondage & 
discipline; dominance & submission; sadism & masochism), 
fetishism, pornophilia, public sex or the growing love for internet 
sex with Grindr and Tinder. To paraphrase the Marquis de Sade, 
eroticism deserves to be given a signif icant boost in order to 
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make a city such as Amsterdam a truly liberal, free and tolerant 
metropolis. The city can develop itself into a sexual sanctuary for 
residents, visitors and asylum seekers – into a capital not only for 
gay people but also for sexual democracy and sexual knowledge.
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5. The city as integration 
mechanism?
Active, integrated migrants require an active 
government
Jeanine Klaver and Arend Odé
Cities have traditionally been important for the integration of 
migrants, for this is where migrants can find the most opportuni-
ties for schooling, employment and encounters with the society 
in which they have settled.
This important role played by cities in the newcomer’s ac-
quisition of social standing is specif ied as the escalator effect: 
migrants arrive, work their way up and leave the place they f irst 
arrived once they have climbed a few steps up the social ladder.
According to this conception, migrants take advantage of the 
many opportunities the city has to offer and as a result are able 
to go about integrating themselves successfully into society. In 
practice, however, the integration process is trying. The experi-
ences of Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants show that many 
of these migrants have remained stuck at the bottom end of 
the social ladder and that they were never able to embark on a 
successful process of social and economic integration. As a result, 
many of them never left the place in which they f irst arrived.
New EU migrants
The current inf low of Polish migrants to the Netherlands 
is already larger than the annual number of migrants from 
Turkey, Morocco and Suriname put together. These new EU 
migrants’ average duration of stay is lengthening, and more and 
more women and children from Central and Eastern Europe 
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are coming to the Netherlands. Initially, these migrant groups 
were seen as temporary transients – commonly referred to in EU 
jargon as mobile citizens rather than migrants – who return to 
their country of origin after a period of work, but this appears to 
be changing. The relevant question for us is whether migrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe can and will benefit from the 
urban escalator effect. This question will become all the more 
relevant as migration from this region increases in importance.
At f irst glance, there appears to be no need for concern with 
regard to these migrants’ ability to integrate. There is a strong 
work ethic among these newcomes, and the share of employed 
people especially within the Polish migrant community is very 
high. In addition, the share of those eligible for welfare among 
migrants from Central and Eastern Europe is very low – much 
lower than among non-Western migrants in the Netherlands. 
And migrants from the new EU Member States are generally 
highly educated. Many of them have an academic degree, which 
of course leads to far more opportunities in the Dutch labour 
market than the low-skilled guest workers of several decades ago.
However, the relatively favourable labour market position of 
these migrants does not always lead to a successful integration 
in social terms. Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe keep 
to themselves and do not get involved in what is happening in 
their local community. This lack of ambition to integrate is clear 
from their reluctance to register with the population register 
(even among those newcomers who remain in the Netherlands 
for a longer period), from their minimal use of local facilities, and 
from their low degree of organisation. There is also a persistent 
problem with the Dutch language. For example, four out of f ive 
Polish people have diff iculty speaking Dutch even several years 
after having settled in the Netherlands.
Their interaction with Dutch society is also a sore point. 
Research has shown that, over time, the contact that Central and 
East European migrants have with native Dutch people tends to 
decline and that they feel less and less accepted by the Dutch. 
Half of the Poles and two-thirds of the Bulgarians who have 
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settled in the Netherlands in recent years say that their ethnic 
group often experiences discrimination. And the longer they 
remain in the Netherlands, the less welcoming they consider the 
Dutch to be. The frequent reports of fraud and nuisance caused 
by certain Central and East European migrants – who seem to 
be dictating this group’s image – is clearly partly responsible 
for this attitude.
The conclusion we can draw is that these groups benefit insuf-
f iciently from the urban escalator effect to be able to upgrade 
their status within society. In general, then, these migrants often 
f ind themselves living on the margins of urban society: often 
invisible or only noticed when acute problems arise. Moreover, 
these migrants are also economically vulnerable. Their relatively 
high level of education has not prevented many from losing their 
jobs in the recent economic crisis. As a result, dependence on 
unemployment benef its among Central and East European 
migrants has increased sharply in recent years.
An active local government
Local governments in particular should work actively to pro-
mote the integration of these migrants, as there are a number 
of urgent integration problems at the local level. Most cities in 
the Netherlands, however, pay little attention to this particular 
group. The Platform Integration and Society recently concluded 
that the vast majority of municipalities in the Netherlands do 
not conduct any kind of targeted policy for EU migrants, nor do 
they feel the need to have any formalised contact with these 
newcomers. Most municipalities do indicate that they are 
experiencing bottlenecks with respect to this group, but this 
generally does not seem to have led to any real policy. Only a 
few large municipalities in this country – especially the three 
main cities – are more active in this regard. They gather relevant 
information, carry out policies on different issues, and organise 
activities so that they come into contact with this target group.
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There are a number of arguments for encouraging other large 
cities to take a more active approach. Such an approach would 
allow the widely heralded axiom of full and active citizenship to 
also apply to these migrants. This is especially true for newcom-
ers from Central and East Europe who tend to quietly f ind their 
way around Dutch cities – so quietly, in fact, that municipalities 
hardly notice them. Below, we put forward three arguments in 
favour of a more active integration policy at the local level.
First, by engaging these newcomers, large cities will be more 
able to utilise their economic potential. There are many ways 
in which metropolises seek out promising inhabitants, but 
newcomers from Central and East Europe generally tend to be 
overlooked. The reason for this is not clear. As mentioned above, 
migrants in this group tend to be highly educated and very much 
geared towards the labour market – such as students from East 
Europe or well-qualified professionals in the health care industry 
or in business-related services. Nevertheless, very few of these 
migrants are involved in what is going on in their immediate 
vicinity. This can be changed by increasing the visibility of the 
local government, which would in turn prevent these newcomers 
from leaving the city.
Second, a more active policy would prevent large cities from 
losing their grip on this population group. The invisibility of 
these newcomers means that their various rights and obligations 
as city dwellers remain unknown to them. For cities, this means 
that they do not receive their share of municipal revenues from 
this group. It also means that municipalities belatedly hear about 
cases such as overcrowding and the illegal rental of rooms. Given 
that these newcomers are showing more signs of being (semi-)
permanent residents and no longer mobile citizens, it is crucial 
that these migrants participate as fully f ledged citizens. It is 
in the cities’ own interest to become more involved with this 
group – to begin with by actively encouraging them to register 
in the local population register.
And f inally, cities can facilitate these migrants’ participation 
in society. Many migrants from Central and Eastern Europe are 
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struggling with a number of concrete issues to which government 
support can be the solution – for example, knowledge of the local 
labour market, insight into various local initiatives, knowledge 
of laws and regulations, and information on opportunities for 
education and language courses. The fact that these migrants are 
searching for an answer to these questions demonstrates that 
they do indeed long to be integrated into Dutch society. Local 
governments can support this by providing relevant informa-
tion or by referring them to the proper organisation. After all, 
active citizenship thrives on a supportive government, not on a 
hands-off government.
Over the past year, the national government has initiated a 
pilot project – the Participation Statement – to encourage new-
comers to become more involved with their local surroundings. 
Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe were explicitly a part 
of this pilot project. What is striking about reports surrounding 
this pilot is how important it is for migrants to be welcomed in 
a concrete context: this makes the environment in which they 
are supposed to integrate more tangible, and they understand 
what the municipality’s intentions are with them. Instead of a 
comprehensive policy directed at target groups, this pilot simply 
coordinates the transfer and exchange of information in which 
both migrants and local governments as well as various organisa-
tions play a part. In the light of the above-mentioned threats and 
opportunities, such an initiative on the part of the larger cities 
is a promising investment.
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Between exclusion and inclusion
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Sébastien Chauvin
Irregular immigration rates high on Europe’s political agenda. 
Southern and Eastern European countries have intensif ied 
controls at the external European borders. This means higher 
and more sophisticated fences, more border patrols and more 
detentions and repatriations at the border. Border control has 
also been intensif ied at European seaports and airports. In this 
case more border control implies distinguishing tourists from 
potential immigrants before departure, making airlines and 
travel agencies responsible for checking passengers’ identities, 
and identifying foreigners by new technological means and a 
European network of immigration databases. The awareness 
that borders alone do not halt irregular migration has led to 
increased internal controls too. This includes more surveillance 
by the police, the increasing incarceration and deportation of 
irregular immigrants and their gradual exclusion from the labour 
and housing markets as well as from public services. Exclusion 
is meant to frustrate the living to such a degree that irregular 
immigrants who could not be stopped at the border or detained 
and deported afterwards will be forced to leave anyway.
Despite the serious securitisation of Europe’s borders, there 
are approximately 2-4 million irregular migrants in Europe. They 
may be detained and deported at any moment, they are not al-
lowed to work, they may face serious diff iculties to f ind housing 
and they may have restricted access to health care. At the same 
time most irregular immigrants do work, are entitled to some 
basic social services and may take part in a myriad of institu-
tions such as schools, churches, ethnic community groups and 
political associations. More generally, undocumented migrants 
live, work, shop, walk and drive among the rest of the population. 
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The incorporation of irregular immigrants takes mostly place at 
the local level: it’s precisely there where they merge and interact 
with the rest of the population; it’s also there where the practices 
of street-level bureaucrats, the support of non-governmental 
organisations and the development and implementation of 
particular local policies counteract the exclusionary effects of 
immigration policies.
The local incorporation of irregular immigrants
Research has shown that the local incorporation of irregular 
immigrants is often a consequence of the humanitarian and 
professional concerns of street-level bureaucrats, from school 
teachers and doctors to city council workers and local police. 
When immigration laws exclude irregular immigrants from ac-
cessing particular social services, professionals may adapt the 
rules. In a study of implementation practices in the Netherlands, 
Joanne van der Leun (2006) showed that the higher the level of 
professionalism, the higher the tendency to include irregular 
immigrants despite immigration laws. Conversely, the lower 
the level of professionalism, the greater the tendency to comply 
more rigorously with the law. In comparison with health care 
professionals and teachers, workers in the domains of social 
assistance and housing seem to display a much more legalistic 
attitude, thus accepting the exclusion of irregular immigrants. 
This seems to suggest that humanitarian concerns are only 
activated when professionalism is also present.
Social and migrant organisations are also key in the local 
incorporation of irregular immigrants. They often provide legal 
assistance, access to medical care and housing and language 
and vocational courses. This is particularly clear in Eastern 
and Southern European cities where NGOs and, in particular, 
Catholic organisations working in the f ield of social assistance 
started to accommodate newly arrived immigrants (many of 
them undocumented) much before the f irst local policies 
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were put in place. Most European cities also subsidise NGOs 
to provide those elementary services to undocumented im-
migrants when the city itself is not allowed to provide them. 
For instance, in the recent policy programme for 2014-18 the 
City of Amsterdam stated that it would make a budget reserva-
tion to fulf il their obligation to care for asylum seekers who 
receive a f inal negative decision, e.g. introducing a ‘bed, bath 
and bread’ arrangement. By f inancing these programmes, 
municipalities seek to give response to the need to ‘assist’ those 
residing in the city without opposing national laws directly 
and without bringing it to people’s attention or giving rise to 
political concerns.
But the inclusion of irregular immigrants also results from 
explicit and formalised local policies. Sometimes these policies 
are in direct opposition to laws and programmes defined at the 
national level. In the Netherlands, when in February 2004 the 
Dutch Parliament accepted the Minister of Immigration and 
Integration’s proposal to expel up to 26,000 rejected asylum 
seekers over the following three years, several big cities op-
posed this policy, pointing to their settlement and integration 
in Dutch society. In France in the mid-2000s, local city councils 
marked their opposition to the Sarkozy government’s repression 
of undocumented immigrants by organising ‘parrainages répu-
blicains’ in which an individual French citizen would become 
the off icial sponsor of an undocumented migrant from their 
local community.
Sometimes local policies are more inclusive than national 
policies but without necessarily opposing them directly. For in-
stance, Barcelona turned the municipal census (called el padrón) 
into the basis of what was def ined as resident citizenship. The 
basic idea is that any person registered in the city should be 
considered a legitimate citizen regardless of his/her legal status. 
In practice this means that registration in the municipal census, 
apart from giving right to health care and education (as stated 
in the law), also gives access to certain municipal services (such 
as use of public libraries, sports centres, schools and child-care 
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centres) and social benefits (such as grants funding food in public 
schools) and turn any foreigner into a target of integration poli-
cies. This is not without contradictions: for example, inclusion of 
undocumented immigrants in employment opportunity courses 
is diff icult to reconcile with the fact that they do not have a work 
permit, which is the responsibility of the national government, 
and therefore cannot work legally.
Why cities are more inclusive
Often in contrast to restrictive immigration policies and highly 
symbolic debates at the national level, local policies have been 
characterised by a rather bottom-up place-sensitive approach 
and a pragmatic logic of problem solving. Whereas this may lead 
to inclusion in some instances and exclusion in other, several 
scholars argue that local policies are more likely to provide im-
migrants with equitable opportunities, accommodate ethnic 
diversity and work with immigrant organisations, which in turn 
would facilitate a greater degree of immigrant political participa-
tion. In the case of irregular immigration, the inclusive character 
of local policies results not only from humanitarian concerns but 
also from placing other policy imperatives beforehand.
In the f ield of health care, the tension between the national 
and local levels is also palpable. While several national govern-
ments have gradually excluded irregular immigrants from 
health care services, local authorities tend to be more concerned 
with the implications that such exclusion could have in public 
health. This has led many European cities to introduce particular 
measures to cover irregular immigrants or ‘uninsured people’ in 
general. For instance, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt offer anonymous 
consultation hours to facilitate undocumented immigrants’ use 
of their services. In contrast to other Dutch cities, Rotterdam 
facilitates the vaccination of children whose parents are not 
registered by accepting them on referral by midwives, general 
practitioners or schools.
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Manon Pluymen (2008) argues that, in comparison to the 
national government, local authorities in the Netherlands 
tend to feel a higher need to provide a safety net for destitute 
migrants. This is justif ied by local authorities on the basis of 
three arguments. The first one is humanitarian: moral arguments 
on the inclusion of those residing in the municipality prevail 
over national regulations aimed at exclusion. The second argu-
ment is in terms of public health, public order and safety. In this 
case, imperatives to prevent the spread of particular diseases, 
overcrowded housing or urban decay may be of higher priority 
for local authorities than those related to immigration control. 
The third argument is in response to national policies: feeling 
burdened with the practical implications of the shortcomings 
of national migration policy, local authorities protest and try 
to persuade the government to reverse certain aspects of its 
migration policy.
Although local actions evoke a picture of protest, Pluymen 
argues that on closer consideration they show much resemblance 
and partial compliance to national rules. The reason is simple: 
municipal measures of inclusion have their limitations too. So as 
to curtail the number of destitute immigrants, whose numbers 
increase as national regulations become more exclusionary, 
municipalities have tended to limit their initiatives to particular 
target groups. Two main trends can be identif ied here. On the 
one hand, cities in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria and Germany seem to give priority to (rejected) asylum 
seekers upon more general undocumented migrants. On the 
other hand, NGOs in countries such as Italy and Spain do not 
seem to discriminate between different groups of undocumented 
migrants: priority is given on the basis of individual vulnerability.
Exclusion at the local level
Municipalities tend to be more concerned with knowing who 
resides in the city, incorporating any person into the health care 
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system or avoiding irregular housing. This has often led to a policy 
gap between national policies and their implementation locally, 
or to more direct clashes between formal policies at the national 
and local levels. However, it would be too simplistic to conclude 
that national policies exclude while local policies include. National 
law or national-level court decisions also aim at preventing the 
exclusion of minors from primary and secondary educational 
institutions and other provisions guarantee access to some form 
of health services, and in most European countries labour law 
protects all workers irrespectively of their legal status. At the 
same time exclusionary practices have also been identif ied at 
the local level. For instance, in Spain several local authorities have 
jeopardised migrants’ legal access to health care and education 
by refusing registration of irregular immigrants in the municipal 
census. In Italy some municipalities have excluded foreigners 
(with a residence permit) from subsidised rent or public housing. 
Moreover, the growth of anti-immigrant political parties and their 
presence in numerous municipalities around Europe is increas-
ingly counteracting the alleged inclusive character of local policies.
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7. From Mokum to Damsko and 
back again?
Deep language diversity and the new urbanity
Virginie Mamadouh and Nesrin El Ayadi
Language diversity is a major challenge in contemporary 
Europe, but all too often the issue is reduced to the 24 off icial 
languages of the European Union and the diff icult multilingual 
arrangements in EU institutions. A larger issue, however, is the 
language diversity in European cities, the languages that are 
spoken daily by their inhabitants and visitors. How many there 
are we do not know for certain, but certainly more than the 24 
off icial languages of EU Member States. In many cities, like in 
Amsterdam, the authorities do not keep statistics on language 
knowledge and language use, but we do know that nationals of 
almost all states in the world are represented among Amsterdam 
residents. This multilingualism is overwhelming but nonetheless 
carelessly overlooked. In contrast to the government’s policy 
on the Dutch language, there is as yet no targeted government 
policy on multilingualism. Dealing with this language diversity 
is diff icult – perhaps not as explosive as dealing with religious 
or sexual diversity but just as controversial. While some fear 
that language diversity leads to fragmentation, segregation and 
conflict, and that it therefore forms a threat to social cohesion, 
others celebrate this diversity as the foundation of urbanity and 
a symbol of the richness of metropolitan culture. By mixing and 
exchanging, new language forms are created. City dwellers bor-
row words from each other, and many residents of Amsterdam 
have adopted the foreign names for their city without necessarily 
speaking the language from which the name originates. Yid-
dish is rarely spoken in Amsterdam anymore but Mokum (after 
Mokum Aleph what means ‘safe city A’ in Yiddish) is still the 
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city’s nickname, and not everyone who refers to Amsterdam as 
Damsko speaks Sranan, the Creole language of Suriname.
Territorial integration and cities
Cities are by def inition a meeting place for people with differ-
ent cultural, socio-economic and geographical backgrounds 
who come to the city for various reasons. Urbanity is therefore 
multilingual, but this multilingualism is structured by power 
relations. The linguistic landscape of a city is determined by 
dominant representations of languages and by the correct 
and appropriate use of language. Not all languages, language 
variants, dialects and sociolects are equal, and they are also not 
considered suitable to be spoken by everyone, at every moment 
of the day, in every part of the city and on every occasion. One 
language or language variant – the dialect of a certain region, city 
or neighbourhood; the sociolect of a particular class, profession 
or age group – is associated with more power and prestige than 
the others: those speaking it (and those entitled to speak it) have 
more power than those who have not mastered it. Speaking such 
a language is equivalent to exercising power.
In the past, it was not unusual for different professional groups 
(such as peasants, noblemen, merchants, soldiers and clergy-
men) in the same region to speak different languages. But in 
the modernisation process that took place in Europe with the 
Enlightenment in the 18th century, the industrial revolution 
and urbanisation in the 19th century and nationalism in the 
20th century, the existing political entities evolved into modern 
territorial states. A distinctive part of that process was the form-
ing of a national language. A single idiom was elevated above 
the others and became the language for the activities of the 
state: the city council and city administration, the police, the 
army, the judiciary and later education and sometimes also the 
national church. The formalisation of the chosen language (the 
creation of a grammar and the spread of strong normative beliefs 
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in the national educational system about correct language usage) 
and the harmonisation and homogenisation of language usage 
within the territory of the state led to monolingualism in most 
states: one language for the collective. In some cases, the national 
language pushed down the other languages present in the com-
munity – sometimes violently but usually by persuasion: those 
who wanted to get ahead in life had to speak the language, which 
gave them access to knowledge, jobs, relationships and friends, 
money and prestige. They in turn encouraged their children to 
do the same. In other cases, certain groups that spoke a different 
language demanded political autonomy in the region where they 
were in the majority. Some states formalised several languages 
(Switzerland, Finland) or several language variants (Norway), but 
these remained exceptions. Still others (Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire) tried to do this but failed to become multilingual countries 
and were pulled apart after the First World War to form smaller 
nation-states with one dominant national language.
Over time, in this context of ideological monolingualism, 
multilingualism came to be distrusted – both individually 
and collectively. People with a knowledge of other languages 
were suspected of having ties with the communities that spoke 
this language; as a result, they were considered less loyal than 
monolinguals. These people often lived in peripheral areas that 
were poorly integrated into the nation-state or in cities where 
they came into contact with foreigners and where diplomats, 
merchants and other foreigners lived. As a result of globalisation, 
international migration has increased in the last 50 years, which 
has dramatically augmented the diversity in cities. New informa-
tion and communications technologies have made it easier for 
migrants to maintain contact with people elsewhere in the world 
and to keep alive one’s foreign language skills. European integra-
tion and the mobility stimulated within the EU also contribute to 
this: think of the Erasmus exchange students, labour migrants, 
tourists, retired people and others embracing the freedom of 
movement that gives EU citizens the right to pursue happiness 
in any other Member State of the Union.
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Multilingualism in contemporary European cities
This enhanced mobility highlights the fact that languages fulfil 
different social functions and that not all functions need not be 
served by one and the same language. One can use a different 
language at work than on the street, online than in the pub, at 
home than in the shop, in a house of worship than in a hospital. 
At a more abstract level, we can also distinguish between the 
two social functions of language. On the one hand, language is a 
means of communication that makes it possible to interact with 
others; on the other hand it can be used to strengthen relation-
ships within a group that shares the same language and thereby 
to intensify that group’s segregation from others. More language 
diversity in a city could mean more communication problems 
when its inhabitants do not always – or do not immediately – 
share a common language. This could lead to the emergence of 
linguistic islands in which others can quickly feel excluded if 
they do not know the language. But language diversity can also 
be a collective resource and can be used to make contact with 
people elsewhere in the world, and everyone can enrich his or her 
intellectual life through culture in all kinds of languages without 
having to travel across the city or country or having to spend the 
night in a different bed.
The benefits of language diversity are taken for granted. Some 
kind of policy would be most welcome though, to further develop 
language skills (for even if you speak Chinese, Russian, Turkish 
or Portuguese at home, that does not automatically make you a 
professional interpreter-translator) and to encourage the enjoy-
ment and exploration of other cultures. The disadvantages of 
language diversity, by contrast, are widely discussed, as many are 
concerned that it could lead to the breakdown of social cohesion 
and to identity crises. There are different estimations given to 
different languages and language variants: some languages are 
considered well-placed to be a (global) means of communica-
tion because they have a large and powerful social base that 
gives them prestige, while other languages are associated with 
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small and/or marginal groups. Mastering and speaking the f irst 
kind of language is applauded as tolerant and open-minded, but 
mastering and speaking the others is framed as narrow-minded 
and a denial of modernity. The distinction is sometimes arbitrary, 
and some ‘major’ languages are deemed to be insignificant out of 
pure ignorance. One example is Portuguese, which is worldwide 
a much larger language community than German. But consider-
ing certain languages and language variants as obsolete and 
dispensable due to the small number of people who speak them, 
is missing the other social functions of language, namely its 
roles to identify and give meaning to the world or to express 
an identity or strengthen relationships within small groups of 
people.
Deep language diversity and connections
Global cities, but other European cities just as well, are charac-
terised by deep language diversity and thus have to contend with 
three major challenges that deserve the attention of cultural and 
political organisations, including the government. It might be 
uneasy and inconvenient to have to deal with these challenges, 
but we can develop an ethic that would allow everyone to be 
accepted for who they are while at the same time limiting com-
munication problems.
The f irst challenge concerns connections within the city. 
How can we provide a welcoming and inclusive public space 
where everyone can feel at home? The national language can 
be a binding factor if it is a shared language. But if there is a 
constant influx of newcomers and guests, or if there are people 
who do not (yet) know the national language or do not learn 
it because they are visiting (as tourists, exchange students or 
expats who are sent to the country for a short period), then this 
is not suff icient and measures must be taken to reach out to as 
many people as possible. This is often by default the language 
of globalisation: international English. In the Netherlands, 
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the hospitality industry provides English menus, shops have 
English-speaking assistants, and businesses and universities 
use English as the common language in the workplace. Public 
utility companies, public transport and the government often 
do not systematically relent to this norm – they even do that less 
than they used to in the 1980s when folders in the language of 
the new migrants were customary, but their employees switch 
to English informally when needed. English as a second lan-
guage has become natural. While tourists used to be considered 
polite if they f irst asked if someone could speak English before 
they struck up a conversation, they now get an offended look 
in return if they ask. This shadow function of English is more 
dangerous in the long term for the stature of the Dutch language 
in our daily life than all the other languages put together. 
English-speaking migrants (not necessarily people for whom 
English is the f irst language) often complain that they are not 
given the opportunity to learn and practise Dutch because 
everyone immediately switches to (Dutchif ied) English. As a 
result, they feel foreign and excluded in the Netherlands. It is 
for that matter important not to allow language diversity to 
grow wildly at the expense of the local sound of a city. If that 
happens, then diversity is no longer the sound of the city but 
begins to sound like exclusion: native city dwellers no longer 
identify with their city because too often they cannot under-
stand conversations they overhear between their neighbours 
or among passers-by.
The second challenge relates to connections with other 
cities in the world. Here, too, English is too often and wrongly 
perceived as a panacea. As inheritors of a trading nation, the 
Dutch should realise that it is important to speak the language 
of your customer. It is therefore crucial from an economic point 
of view to be prof icient in German and French. Chinese, Rus-
sian, Turkish and Portuguese are also becoming more and more 
important. Bilinguals (who are not necessarily people whose 
roots lie abroad) are also important cultural and political links. 
Discussions about politics and society are increasingly being 
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fuelled by American and British debates, while knowledge 
from other language areas, societies and cities could be more 
inspiring. How different would our perceptions of contemporary 
problems be – for example the refugee crisis, the euro crisis or 
climate change – if we were better able to follow the debates 
occurring in the affected areas?
Finally, the connections between cities and the surrounding 
countryside are a point of concern. There seems to be a widening 
gap between multilingual and multi-ethnic cities and the rest 
of the country with its monolingual and mono-ethnic society 
in which fellow citizens do not feel welcome: the gap between, 
say, North Amsterdam (the very diverse northern district of 
the city) and Volendam (the former f ishing harbour located 
further North known for being closed to national and foreign 
newcomers). Are the two worlds drifting further and further 
apart – culturally, but also politically? And what impact could 
this have? Will Europe become an archipelago of multilingual 
cities – islands in a hostile sea of conservative national com-
munities that close their doors to those who speak another 
language? That is not an inviting prospect! Or is it inevitable 
that diversity can only be tolerated in metropolitan areas and 
that the best we can hope for is that Amsterdam tries to live up 
to its Yiddish name?
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8. Schools in the multilingual city
Not every language is equal
Orhan Agirdag
European cities are becoming more and more diverse in terms 
of language. Multilingualism is also increasingly evident in 
the classroom in the Netherlands, as more and more students 
speak another language than Dutch at home. Moreover, the mass 
media and the internet have familiarised many young people 
with English already before they receive any formal instruction 
in that language.
While linguistic diversity enriches society and the educa-
tion system, it also poses new challenges. On the one hand, 
multilingualism is promoted by the EU as a crucial catalyst 
for citizenship, education and the economy. But this policy is 
only partially incorporated at the national and municipal level. 
While languages such as English, and to a lesser extent French 
and German, are increasingly valued in education, immigrant 
languages are seen as the ultimate obstacle to integration. This 
essay is about the paradox of multilingualism.
EU and Member States in favour of multilingualism
According to the EU, multilingualism is something fundamen-
tally good that should be encouraged. EU policymakers cite four 
reasons why they promote multilingualism. Multilingualism is 
supposed to boost intercultural dialogue, stimulate citizens of 
the Member States to cultivate EU citizenship, offer new pos-
sibilities to citizens to study and work abroad, and open up new 
markets for EU companies that want to do business outside of 
the EU. In other words, multilingualism is seen as a stimulus to 
the EU economy, to educational mobility and to civic education.
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For these reasons, the EU is trying to protect linguistic diver-
sity and to encourage its citizens’ knowledge of languages. The 
goal is for all Europeans to learn at least two other languages 
besides their mother tongue, preferably from a very young age. 
The objective of ‘mother tongue plus two languages’ (1+2) was 
laid down by government leaders at the summit of Barcelona 
in March 2002. It should be noted that the EU itself does not 
have authority in the area of education, but it does promote 
language education, multilingual education and exchanges 
between different educational systems in different languages 
through a number of programmes.
The endeavour to promote multilingualism is also gaining 
acceptance within various Member States. To date, most Member 
States’ educational systems have been monolingual. This does 
not mean that no other languages are taught in these schools 
as a separate subject but rather that the instruction of regular 
subjects is typically given in one language. Even in bilingual 
regions (such as Brussels), parents must choose whether to send 
their children to a monolingual Dutch or French school. EU 
Member States are nonetheless trying to introduce multilingual 
education as a result of the European directive of 1+2 languages. 
Although still a recent phenomenon, in 2015 around 130 schools 
in the Netherlands offered multilingual education. This means 
that about half of the lessons at such schools – including regular 
subjects such as maths and geography – are given in English. In 
other words, not only is English (as a subject) taught at school, 
the students are also taught in English (language of instruction). 
Since 2014, multilingual education is no longer only possible 
in Dutch secondary education: various primary schools have 
launched bilingual education at the initiative of the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science. According to State Secretary 
Sander Dekker, all primary schools should be given the op-
portunity to use English, French or German as the language of 
instruction for up to 15% of their teaching time. In the future, 
Dutch children will earn a living in a world in which it is more 
important than ever that they speak English well, in addition to 
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Dutch. It is therefore crucial for students to begin learning the 
language at the earliest possible age.
More recently, Minister Lodewijk Asscher of Social Affairs 
and Employment said that he wants to make multilingual after-
school care available for children from ages 0 to 6 in English, 
French and German. In a letter to the Lower House, he argued 
that multilingualism is an advantage for young children because 
they become aware of language comprehension and learn to 
deal with differences already from an early age. In short, the 
Dutch government is clearly of the opinion that multilingualism 
(English, French, German) offers cognitive, economic and social 
added value.
Why multilingualism at school?
The positive view of multilingualism and multilingual educa-
tion is based on important scientif ic evidence. A majority of 
linguists argue that concepts and skills that are developed in 
one language are transferred to a second language through a so-
called ‘common underlying proficiency’. Multilingual education 
would therefore not hinder but actually stimulate the learning 
of the Dutch language.
From a neurological perspective, bilingual children are said 
to develop cognitive mechanisms with which they constantly 
control which language they speak. This cognitive controlling 
takes place in the brain. The earlier a child begins with the train-
ing of this cognitive controlling mechanism, the better its brain 
will develop. The brains of bilingual children are therefore better 
trained than those of monolingual children. This difference is 
even measurable when people grow old: bilingual people are 
on average affected by Alzheimer’s disease much later in life.
Also from a sociological perspective, multilingualism is a plus. 
This is the case for all students but particularly for minorities. 
For them, the knowledge and the preservation of their mother 
tongue can function as ‘multicultural capital’, for their native 
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language plays a crucial role in the development of communica-
tive and emotional ties with their families and the community. 
Due to such social relations, cultural and economic resources 
within the community are deployed in order to improve the 
educational performance of the children. One example is the 
homework assistance that is being organised by many associa-
tions of ethnic-cultural minorities.
There are also many (international) studies that have exam-
ined the effectiveness of multilingual education. The results are 
summarised in various metastudies, and without exception they 
demonstrate that multilingual instruction has beneficial effects 
on the educational achievements of foreign-language-speaking 
students, although the magnitude of the effects is modest.
One type of multilingualism is not like the other
Although the positive effects of multilingualism and multilin-
gual education are not in dispute, not all multilingual repertoires 
are valued in the same way. For example, in 2013 a student at the 
Metis Montessori Lyceum (then known as the Cosmicus Mon-
tessori Lyceum) in Amsterdam was suspended because he had 
repeatedly been ‘caught’ speaking Turkish at school. The student 
brought the issue to court, but the judge ruled that the school was 
justif ied in suspending the student. The judge also concluded 
that the school’s rules of conduct requiring the use of Dutch as 
the working language both within and outside the classroom was 
not in conflict with the principle of non-discrimination. Accord-
ing to the judge, the ban on speaking one’s mother tongue was 
justif ied because the school in this way minimised the formation 
of groups according to ethnic background.
In this verdict, the added value of multilingualism is not 
only forgotten but actively devalued. Multilingualism is seen as 
something that leads to the formation of groups – something that 
impedes civic education. How the judge can reconcile the ban on 
speaking one’s mother tongue with Article 30 of the Convention 
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on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is a big question, because the 
CRC states that: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child 
belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of his or her 
group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his 
or her own religion, or to use his or her own language’.
This is not an isolated incident; it is consistent with the current 
zeitgeist. From the beginning of the 21st century there has been 
a clear anti-immigrant attitude discernible in the Netherlands. 
In many Dutch schools, it is implicitly or explicitly forbidden to 
speak immigrant languages; nor would they be included in the 
curriculum as is the case with English, French and German. 
In 2004, an end was even put to two important initiatives for 
immigrant children: Education in One’s Own Language and 
Culture (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur, OETC) and Educa-
tion of Immigrant Living Languages (Onderwijs van Allochtone 
Levende Talen, OALT). Since then, the government has not taken 
a single structural initiative to enhance the value of immigrant 
languages such as Turkish or Arabic in the education system.
On the contrary, when referring to the multilingualism of 
non-Western population groups, people often speak in terms 
of a handicap. Students from these groups are seldom spoken 
about in terms of multilingualism but rather in terms of their 
def iciency in the language of their adopted country. It almost 
seems as if these students have less rather than more cultural 
baggage due to the fact that they speak an extra language. But 
how is it that the discussion has suddenly changed from ‘good’ 
to ‘bad’ multilingualism when it comes to immigrant languages?
It’s not the economy, stupid!
One could argue that the paradox of multilingualism can be 
understood from an economic perspective, for is it not logical for 
languages that have economic value to be given more attention? 
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This argument rests on the assumption that immigrant lan-
guages have no economic value, but this assumption is incorrect.
Research indicates that immigrant languages do indeed have 
economic value. Immigrants who master their mother tongue 
earn more than those who forget their mother tongue. Anyone 
walking through the streets of Amsterdam Southeast or New 
West would understand perfectly why this is so, for the thriv-
ing ethnic micro-economies revolve to a large extent around 
these languages. Even outside these ethnic enclaves, immigrant 
languages have economic value. Almost every month I receive 
an email from a colleague looking for a foreign-language pollster, 
data encoder or translator.
Immigrant languages are also relevant for the international 
economy. Trade between the Netherlands and Turkey has tripled 
in the past decade. The Netherlands is one of the most important 
investors in Turkey. Numerous Dutch companies have a branch 
in Turkey, primarily in the food, energy and technology sectors. 
Within these sectors, knowledge of the Turkish language is 
invaluable. And yet according to the Court, a school may suspend 
you if you speak this language in the classroom.
White and black languages and institutional racism
The social and political estimation of a language clearly does not 
correspond with the economic added value of that language. The 
ethnic association we attach to these languages – the ‘colour’ of 
these languages – offers a better explanation for the apparent 
paradox of multilingualism. There is in effect a distinction we 
can make between white and black languages. White languages 
are languages of white population groups (English, French or 
German), while black languages are those of coloured population 
groups – languages such as Turkish, Kurdish and Sranan. And 
to paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu, a language can only be worth as 
much as the speakers of the language are worth in the political 
and social space.
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In other words, the fact that black languages are less valued 
– and even actively devalued – can be understood as an expres-
sion of institutional racism. Institutional racism should not be 
confused with individual racism. This is not, after all, about 
individuals who (consciously) discriminate, nor is it about the 
intentions of individuals. The exclusion of black languages often 
occurs with the best of intentions – for example, in the hope of 
counteracting delays in the learning of Dutch among immigrant 
children and of preventing the formation of ethnically based 
cliques. But if colonialism has taught us anything, it is that the 
good intentions of a civilising offensive do not make up for the 
negative consequences of our actions.
What is institutional racism, then? It has something to do 
about the rules of the game played by institutions such as the 
education system and politics. Institutional racism occurs when 
the rules of institutions are systematically to the disadvantage 
of coloured population groups. One example of this is the way 
in which the Dutch education system valorises the linguistic 
repertoires of Dutch, English and even Frisian students but takes 
no positive action on the language of Turkish students.
Conclusion
Before we can speak about citizenship and civic education, we 
must f irst ensure that we as citizens are equal. By excluding the 
linguistic and cultural repertoires of a specif ic ethnic minority, 
we implicitly give these fellow citizens the message that they are 
second-class citizens. One way in which we can move beyond 
institutional racism is to reinterpret Europe’s policy of a mother 
tongue plus two languages (1+2). When people refer to a mother 
tongue in relation to the EU, they tend to think of the national 
language of the Member State. But in cities such as Amsterdam, 
many children have a non-European mother tongue. In other 
words, one’s mother tongue can also refer to black languages 
such as Turkish, Sranan, Kurdish or Arabic. The European city 
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of tomorrow will most certainly be multi-coloured and multi-
lingual. If we want to fully exploit the potential of linguistic 
diversity, we must ensure that all the colours of multilingualism 
are valorised in our schools, and not only the white languages.
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9. City kids and citizenship
Lia Karsten
Children and citizenship
From a political point of view, children are not citizens: they have 
no voting rights. However, there are laws and treaties that deal with 
the rights and duties of children. In the Netherlands, for example, 
school attendance is compulsory and children are prohibited from 
working. At the international level, the citizenship of children is 
enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, a UN treaty that has also been signed by the Netherlands.
There are differing views on the relationship between chil-
dren and citizenship. One school of thought says that children 
are not yet adults and that childhood is simply preparation for 
citizenship at a later date. In this view, citizenship is a status that 
is attained. Children must learn how to behave as democratic 
citizens and should be taught this at school. A second school 
of thought sees the citizenship of children as a social practice. 
Those who adhere to this school do not make any fundamental 
distinction between children and adults: both age categories 
continually put citizenship into practice. The emphasis on 
social practice presumes a dynamic and relational process that 
is referred to as doing or practising citizenship. Putting citizen-
ship into practice presumes at the least a visible presence in the 
public domain and involves the practices of dealing with ‘the 
other’ and the processes of inclusion and exclusion. Who is left 
out and who is allowed to join in? Who determines the rules 
and who can change them? This article will follow this second 
notion of citizenship, with an emphasis on urban public spaces 
as a representation and practice space. In what ways are children 
present in these spaces? What kind of children are they? And how 
much leeway do they have for their behaviour? But f irst we will 
examine the demographic position of urban children.
76  
The demographics of children in the city
Children have always lived in the city, but they began to disap-
pear starting from the 1960s due to mass suburbanisation, as 
it was especially families with children that left the city and 
moved to the suburban areas surrounding the large cities. The 
city became the domain of young, childless households. The 
image of the city as an unsuitable living environment for children 
persisted for a long time. But more recently, new groups of fami-
lies have come to live in the city. First came the migrant families 
that quickly f illed up the deserted neighbourhoods in the city 
(which were uninhabited as a result of suburbanisation). There-
after, from around 2000, new, middle-class households arrived 
that remained in the city even after having children instead of 
moving to suburban areas. Both groups have contributed to the 
growing share of children in the city today. This is a development 
that we are seeing in more cities in Europe: the city is once again 
popular as a place for families. And with the growing popularity 
of the city for families, the urban citizenship of children is once 
again on the agenda.
Children and urban outdoor public spaces
Urban public space is important for children for two reasons: to 
be able to play outside and to be able to move from one place 
to another. When children play outside, they are competing for 
space with other citizens – especially adults – but also with other 
functions, mainly vehicle traff ic and parking. The space in front 
of the door is the place where this competition is most visible. 
While playing outside was something that used to be largely 
taken for granted by children in the decades after World War 
II, today this is no longer the case. Many children have become 
‘inside children’, playing mostly indoors. ‘Outside children’, who 
can still be found outdoors practically every day, have become 
a minority.
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In terms of children’s movement through public space, there 
has been a sharp decline in the autonomous freedom of move-
ment of city kids. While almost all children used to walk (or, 
less frequently, bike) independently to school or to the football 
club, this has now become the exception, certainly for children 
under 10 years of age. Children are now continually brought to 
school and picked up from school: the backseat generation has 
become a widespread phenomenon. In large cities, children often 
take the bike or walk when they go out but almost always in the 
company of one of their parents. The idea that you cannot let 
your child go somewhere alone has become part of a discussion 
about responsible parenting. While this discussion was at f irst 
largely a middle-class matter, now we are seeing this cultural 
heritage penetrating the lower socio-economic class. In practice, 
this means that escorting and transporting children through 
urban public space requires a signif icant investment of time on 
the part of the parents and that children are rarely allowed to 
make their own way independently.
Both developments – the decline in the number of children 
playing outdoors and the reduced autonomous freedom of move-
ment – mean that children have become less visible as small 
citizens on the street and in outdoor urban spaces in general. 
This could lead to a situation in which the citizenship of children 
is undermined. After all, citizenship in the sense of practising 
citizenship is all about the ability and the right to explore the 
space outdoors. If children remain indoors or are kept inside 
the house, they cannot practise the skill of interacting with 
one another and with ‘other’ neighbourhood children or fellow 
townsmen.
Children and the new urban consumption sites
The above-mentioned increase in the number of children in the 
city has meant that children are receiving more attention as 
consumers. The recent rise in middle-class families in the city 
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in particular has not gone unnoticed by commercial interests. 
The presence of families that can afford to live in the expensive 
city has all sorts of consequences for the way in which the city 
develops. The new rich urban families have become a significant 
market factor.
While children play outside less often than was the case in the 
past, they now have a much fuller schedule. Children today have 
on average more after-school activities than in the past: they are 
more often members of a club and also at after-school childcare 
facilities. But there is another activity that has gained quite some 
signif icance: the family outing. Families consume the city, just 
as many adults without children do. Urban consumption sites 
such as museums, restaurants and festivals are frequented by 
families as well. We are talking here about activities in which 
parent escort and adult supervision are an integral part. This new 
development of families that consume the city is not a general 
phenomenon but one that is prevalent mainly among the (upper) 
middle class.
What does the growing importance of the family outing mean 
for children and citizenship? On the one hand, it demonstrates 
that children nowadays are present everywhere, not only in their 
own neighbourhood but also in restaurants with an urban repu-
tation or in coffee shops in the centre of the city. Children have 
become visible as citizens in places where they were formerly 
rarely seen. On the other hand, it is clear that we are talking 
about a specific group of children and that they are merely guests 
at these new places: the activities, the supervision and the rules 
are organised by adults. The children are given only limited space 
to bring their citizenship into practice.
To conclude: The city as a meeting place
What is the signif icance of the developments we have described 
for the urban citizenship of children? In the f irst place, it has 
become clear that youth experiences are extremely varied. 
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Children’s lives differ, and the class position of one’s parents 
makes a distinctive difference. Here we focus on three groups: 
to begin with, the small group of children who still do play 
outside, who explore the neighbourhood on their own and are 
streetwise. These children no longer encounter outdoors the 
diversity of other children that used to be quite common. This 
has consequences for the extent to which they can learn to 
interact with ‘the other’. Moreover, these outdoor children are 
frequently mentioned as a source of public nuisance. Children 
who play outdoors make lots of noise, occasionally shoot a ball 
through a window or play pranks on the local shopkeepers. They 
are not always granted the right to use the outdoor urban space 
– or only under the conditions prescribed by the new middle 
class. The second group consists of the indoor children who play 
mainly at home – alone or with a brother or sister or friend. 
This is the group that no one considers problematic and who 
are consequently overlooked. But this group also has a limited 
amount of interaction with ‘other’ children. And f inally, there 
are the children of the backseat generation who pop up in many 
places in the city but always under the watchful eye of adults and 
often in the company of like-minded (read: same social class) 
children.
All three groups of children thus have little experience with 
urban public space as a practice space for citizenship. Play-
ing, biking or just being outside with many different types of 
children, without any parental guidance or adult supervision, 
has been marginalised. All three groups have limited opportuni-
ties to build up what is referred to as bridging social capital 
– the skills needed to establish relations outside of one’s own 
group. Urban policymakers need to devote more attention to 
the everyday citizenship of children. Unfortunately, a formal 
document such as that of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child can only be of limited assistance in this. It is diff icult 
to make the practising of citizenship legally binding, but it can 
be facilitated by more child-friendly spatial planning. Initiatives 
involving child-friendly cities (the European Child Friendly 
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City Network, or CFC) must be seen in this light. In the Dutch 
context, CFC policy should not only focus on specif ic provi-
sions for children but mainly on keeping urban public spaces 
accessible for children. Children are generally well taken care 
of in the Netherlands, but there is increasing segregation in the 
large cities. This is the case not only at schools but also on the 
streets and in extracurricular clubs, even though one of the 
great qualities of the city is that it is home to so many different 
groups. The city should be a meeting place for children where 
differences can be bridged and where even children can build 
up bridging social capital. An example of this would be giving 
priority to broad sidewalks as meeting places for all children in 
the neighbourhood (and adult neighbours) and the creation of 
safe traff ic routes along facilities that are often used by children. 
In countries such as Sweden and Germany, many more children 
move around autonomously than in the Netherlands. More 
European research could identify why this is the case. And we 
should also ask the children themselves what they think a child-
friendly city should look like, as this also cultivates citizenship. 
In the Netherlands, child participation in urban planning is still 
not widely applied, but in Norway, municipalities are required 
by law to appoint an off icial responsible for involving children 
in urban planning issues. With the help of interactive digital 
maps, children are invited to think about new urban projects 
to be developed. European countries could learn much from 
each other. Stimulating European cooperation and information 
exchange in the area of child studies and child participation 
deserves to be supported more (also f inancially).
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10. Those who feel left behind
Fenne M. Pinkster
European Cities are changing. Newspapers write extensively 
about the creative class working on their laptops in hipster cafés 
and about middle-class families returning from the suburbs and 
exchanging their cars for cargo bikes to transport their children 
around the city. This reassessment of the city – as the playground 
of a new urban middle class – is clearly visible than in Amster-
dam, which perhaps more than any other Dutch city resembles 
the success story envisioned by the Dutch government in their 
newest urban agenda Celebrate the City (2015). Gentrif ication, 
active citizenship and do-it-yourself urbanism are celebrated 
as core values of this new, postmodern city. But not everyone is 
celebrating and some people feel left behind.
Working-class neighbourhoods
This sentiment is felt particularly in the working-class districts 
of yesteryear such as Higher Blackley in Manchester, the 8th 
arrondissement in Lyon, and Marzahn-Hellersdorf in Berlin. 
These neighbourhoods are the domain of an urban working class 
who chose to remain in the city in the 1960s and 1970s – during 
the peak of suburbanisation. A well-known Dutch example is the 
neighbourhood of Betondorp (literally translated as Concrete Vil-
lage, from now on the Village), which is known for its exceptional 
architecture – it was the f irst neighbourhood in the Netherlands 
where concrete was used to construct social housing – and for its 
famous former residents: football player Johan Cruijff and writer 
Gerard Reve. The neighbourhood was designed as a garden city 
following the principles laid out by the English urban planner 
Ebenezer Howard, who felt that workers in the city had a right to 
a green and village-like setting. It was built in the early 1920s by 
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housing associations aff iliated to different labour unions and to 
this day Betondorp is described by its residents as a working-class 
district with a strong sense of community. More than 90% of 
the housing stock consists of social housing, the average income 
of residents is relatively low, and a relatively high number of 
elderly live in the neighbourhood. Interviews with residents and 
with urban professionals (such as professionals working for the 
municipality, housing associations, welfare organisations and 
the police) provide a picture of a residential area composed of 
an ‘old guard of true Amsterdammers’. This group of Villagers 
speak with much affection about their neighbourhood as it used 
to be, but at the same time perceive a process of creeping change, 
which they experience as a process of decline.
Neighbourhood decline
Long-time residents see the decline of their neighbourhood in 
the closure of the community centre, the departure of neighbour-
hood managers of two housing associations, the relocation of 
the local police off icer to a district off ice elsewhere and the 
disappearance of shops on the village square. This loss of local 
services and facilities is attributed to ‘the government’ – an um-
brella term used to refer to different institutions working in the 
neighbourhood. Dissatisfaction over the alleged abandonment 
of the neighbourhood by urban managers and policymakers – 
who used to be very much present in the neighbourhood – is 
expressed via service desks, hotlines, the local television station 
AT5 and in city council meetings. Many urban professionals, 
however, regard the claims of these residents on government 
services as anachronistic, no longer bef itting this day and age. 
In today’s participation society, they argue, some degree of self-
organisation and active citizenship should be demonstrated. In 
this respect, residents not only experience a growing physical 
but also a psychological distance between themselves and the 
professionals who are in charge of ‘their’ neighbourhood.
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In addition, these Villagers observe signs of decay in the gar-
dens, which are not as well maintained as they used to be, and 
in the physical dilapidation of streets and parks due to litter and 
dog mess. Here too the finger is pointed at the government, which 
according to residents should guard the maintenance of public 
spaces more strictly. The Villagers also trace the dilapidation of 
the gardens to the influx of ‘other’ tenants in the social housing. 
In the past, most of the dwellings were allocated to those born 
in the Village, but this changed when local housing associations 
were absorbed into city-wide associations in the 1990s and the 
housing allocation system was regionalised in 2001. As a result, 
now anyone could move to the neighbourhood. Moreover, housing 
associations made a relatively large number of houses available to 
priority candidates, such as people with health disabilities, histo-
ries of addiction or those with psychological problems. Tenants 
‘with a blemish’ is how some residents euphemistically describe 
them. The village-like character of the neighbourhood and the 
close-knit local community were thought to offer such people a 
safe environment. But given that the houses are noisy and people 
live very close to each other, differences in lifestyles are quickly 
noticed and magnif ied. New tenants, with different lifestyles, 
therefore easily become a nuisance. In addition, long-time Vil-
lagers interpret the arrival of these ‘other’ tenants as a symbol of 
the declining status of the neighbourhood within the Amsterdam 
housing market. In this respect, they show a clear awareness of 
the socio-spatial dynamic in the city in recent decades and of the 
fact that the revaluation of the centrally located neighbourhoods 
has contributed to the relative degradation of others.
The arrival of gentrifiers
In the meantime, the strong upgrading wave experienced in 
Amsterdam as a whole appears to have now reached the Village. 
A new group of highly educated people is starting to move into 
formerly social housing units which were either sold or rented out 
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to market prices. These changes in the neighbourhood housing 
stock reflect a broader process of privatisation and deregula-
tion of the Amsterdam housing market. According to long-time 
Villagers, the resulting influx of ‘yuppies’ has eroded the com-
munity spirit and this sometimes leads to tensions between the 
two groups. As one resident says of his new neighbour: 
‘Such an antisocial, individualistic type. The f irst thing he 
told me was that they were changing the fence between our 
gardens. He just told me, he didn’t ask my opinion. Well, to 
me the message is loud and clear: he want nothing to do with 
me, I want nothing to do with him.’ 
While the back garden had previously served as a public domain 
where neighbours kept each other informed of the goings-on in 
the neighbourhood, it was now effectively privatised. And yet 
some of the older residents are hopeful about the arrival of young 
families, believing that they will bring new life to the neighbour-
hood. Most of the houses are, however, too small for families 
and are more suited to the young urban professionals who are 
celebrated by public policy: the highly educated first-time buyers 
in the housing market for whom the city is a playground and the 
neighbourhood of little importance.
Estrangement
The result of these social, material and institutional changes in the 
neighbourhood is that the members of ‘the old guard’ in Betondorp 
are experiencing a growing sense of alienation and estrangement 
in their everyday environment. It is becoming increasingly dif-
f icult for them to use their neighbourhood in the way they were 
used to. What is striking in their stories about neighbourhood 
change is that, above all, they associate internal changes with 
processes that are shaping up outside of the neighbourhood, in 
particular due to actions of ‘the government’. As a result, their loss 
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of belonging in the neighbourhood itself translates into feelings 
of dissatisfaction and neglect that go far beyond its boundaries. 
This may also explain the high share in the neighbourhood of 
both non-voters and voters for the Socialist Party and the Party for 
Freedom, both of which promote a strong government. Precisely 
because long-time residents identify so strongly with their neigh-
bourhood, they see their loss of control over ‘their’ neighbourhood 
as symbolic of their own marginalisation within society.
At home in the city
Betondorp is not an isolated case. Similar processes can also be 
observed in other working-class neighbourhoods in European 
cities. Feelings of dissatisfaction about urban change are ex-
pressed by working class residents who very consciously chose 
to stay in the city at a time when virtually no one did. Now they 
see their familiar environment changing due to processes of 
post-industrialisation, neoliberalisation and rescaling, and new 
styles of urban governance. While in many other European cit-
ies, processes of gentrif ication lead to the direct displacement 
of long-time residents, in the Netherlands it is often assumed 
that there is little to worry about given regulations about ten-
ant protection and rent control. And yet older city dwellers do 
experience a sense of political and cultural displacement. Their 
loss of ‘home’ not only leads to disagreements and sometimes 
overt tensions amongst different types of residents within the 
neighbourhood, but is also scaled upwards to the level of the 
city and the wider society. The danger is that changes in the 
everyday environment translate into a sense of estrangement 
and alienation from society as a whole, which may ultimately 
threaten the social sustainability of the city. It is therefore 
worrying that some politicians and urban professionals appear 
to write off these residents’ experiences as anachronisms and 
as a nostalgic longing for the city of the 1960s and 1970s. Most 
Villagers will admit that the city is now in much better shape 
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than it was then. However, it is no longer their city. This raises the 
question of how the celebrated city can reserve space for other 
forms of ‘feeling at home’ than those of the new urban middle 
class. The challenge for urban governance is then to stimulate the 
economic potential of the city and attract the new urban middle 
class without marginalising other groups of city residents.
The author
Fenne Pinkster is urban geographer and assistant professor at 
the University of Amsterdam. A central theme in her research 
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11. Exiles in the city: A triptych
Guido Snel, Sepp Eckenhaussen and Fien de Ruiter
The best way to see Amsterdam is through the eyes of 
an exile
Guido Snel
In the middle of what has come to be known as the ‘refugee 
crisis’ in the summer and autumn of 2015, a seemingly simple 
twist took place in the public discourse over the f igure of the 
refugee as a result of one photo – a boy washed up on a beach. 
Until that point, the response to the eternal ambivalence towards 
the ‘newcomer’, the ‘migrant’, the ‘immigrant’ – what Georg 
Simmel suggestively characterised around 1900 as ‘the one who 
comes today and stays tomorrow’ – had degenerated into blunt 
rejection. Those who risked their lives on the Mediterranean 
Sea in order to reach the EU – preferably Germany or the United 
Kingdom – were at best economic refugees but in most cases 
simply fortune-hunters. But now national TV evenings for the 
refugees are organised and the entire nation sympathises with 
the train of refugees, as it did before with the starving people in 
Ethiopia or in other misery-ridden countries.
Traditionally, the counterargument to xenophobia is that 
migrants are good for society, that they expand the ways of life of 
a city or a country, that a wider variety of food becomes available 
in supermarkets, that we would all be less inward-looking and 
become more cosmopolitan. It is an argument that has proven to 
be vulnerable since 11 September 2001 and the ensuing debate on 
Islam. Not all residents of Amsterdam believe they have thrived 
as a result of the globalisation that has transformed the city 
since the 1990s into one of the cultural and business centres of 
Europe. In a certain sense, Amsterdam is indeed a segregated 
city. Districts and schools are monochrome (sometimes ethni-
cally, always socially) and there is no equal opportunity for 
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everyone, whatever politics claims. The University of Amsterdam 
also engages in segregation. The Faculty of Humanities attracts 
the vast majority of its students from that part of the population 
that does not have its origins in the waves of immigration of the 
20th century. The great migration to Western Europe – which 
began some f ifty years ago with the wave of labour migrants 
and that was preceded and later intensif ied by post-colonial 
migrants – can be considered the most significant social develop-
ment of the last half century in our part of the continent and 
demonstrates that the university is no longer f irmly rooted in 
society. In short, the claim that migration is good for our city is 
not only vulnerable; such a claim may very well be the social 
privilege of liberal, cosmopolitan intellectuals such as myself. 
We need – and it may even be a basic need – a diverse society. 
We stand on the productive side of social diversity; we reap the 
rewards.
The privilege of the exile
And yet, we who speak about migration from our privileged 
position do so not (or not only) ex cathedra. Inspired by personal 
experiences with exiles, I decided to develop a course of study 
around them. In the 2014-15 academic year, Bachelor students (in 
music, philosophy, European studies, literature, history and the 
Dutch language) examined their own city, Amsterdam, from a 
surprisingly large number of disciplines.
My studies in Serbo-Croatian at the University of Amsterdam 
were not only instructive because of my teachers and the courses 
but because at the time I was placed in the cultural infusion of 
Yugoslavian (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian) immigration as a result 
of the language. I learned to speak the language f luently in a 
few months. I learned to listen to peers who just like me were 
building up their lives but unlike me and my fellow students had 
had to overcome unimaginable hurdles. I penetrated the circle 
of immigrants and came to know people in their 30s and 40s 
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who had had a life in their country of origin (often an impressive 
career, because unlike the refugee the exile is privileged) and 
who, once in Amsterdam, had seemingly effortlessly picked 
up from where they had left off in Sarajevo or elsewhere. From 
among these people, I would like to put one in the spotlight here 
because he, the exile, showed me – born and bred in neighbour-
ing Amstelveen – the true potential of Amsterdam like no other 
person could.
Dragan Klaić arrived in August or September of 1991. He be-
came director of the Dutch Theatre Institute on the Herengracht 
in Amsterdam. The job interested him only partially. He was a 
writer and a scientist and above all a theatre maker. He accepted 
the job because he knew that he had to escape Yugoslavia with 
his family, and the position in Amsterdam had presented itself 
to him. Later he wrote that he had been ‘practising’ his exile for 
years before coming to Amsterdam by moving with his family 
to London and then on to Yale, thereby casting out his social 
network further and further. But perhaps this is a romanticised 
version. Exiles tend to romanticise their choices and dilemmas 
like no other, in a reality that is bleak and stark. In any event, 
his exile was exemplary. He was crazy about Amsterdam, but 
most probably he considered Dutch culture – including the 
theatre – covertly provincial. He had simply seen too much of 
the rest of the world. This alone taught me to put my own city 
in perspective. And then there were the famous dinners at his 
house. He was a good cook (in London he had worked in a French 
restaurant when he was a student, learning both fluent English 
and the basic techniques of the famous French chef Escoff ier). 
On a weekly basis, the most diverse groups of people joined him 
for dinner: fellow exiles passing through, colleagues from foreign 
universities, but mainly Amsterdammers, bien étonnés de se 
retrouver ensemble. Because although Amsterdammers may have 
the reputation of being hospitable, in practice they will defend 
their own social sphere with tooth and nail. At Dragan’s place, 
you got to know half the people in the Amsterdam cultural com-
munity within a year. In the meantime he travelled a lot, worked 
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very hard and slept so little that he regularly closed his eyes when 
at the head of his table, without any sense of embarrassment.
If I had to summarise what his friendship meant to me, then it 
would be learning to look at things in perspective – the perspec-
tive of an outsider. For while a true urbanite may be proud of his 
city, city chauvinism is not for him. The true urbanite knows 
that other cities have more of the same and always to a greater 
degree. The true quality of a city is its complexity which exists 
in the endless links that the city – as an organism of steel and 
stone – maintains with other metropolitans elsewhere, beyond 
the country’s borders. And in that unbelievably complex organ-
ism, one is always in more than one place at the same time. 
An exhibition, a f ilm, a new novel, the political issues of the 
day – things that cause people to feel that distinctive, f leeting 
excitement in their own city – everything that one experiences 
goes through the prism of the urban experience, which always 
makes everyone somewhat of an outsider. In exile, this experi-
ence is condensed (sometimes leading to unbearable pressure).
The exile’s part
The pain is often for the exile, while the satisfaction of curing 
is for the receiving city. And the city has a selective memory. It 
honours the memory of famous exiles – the Spinozas – but all 
the other hundreds and thousands are forgotten or at least not 
remembered. And yet they contribute to the texture of the city.
This is why I gave the students the following assignment: search 
for exiles in archives, via the internet, everywhere, and see who 
you come across. This not only led to the creation of an inventory 
(which was partly based on coincidence), it also mapped out the 
most obvious structures in which exiles are remembered. The 
output was prodigious. Research was conducted on famous exiles 
in Amsterdam such as Yuri Egorov, the pianist who escaped 
the Soviet Union at the end of the 1970s, and his compatriot 
Andrei Amalrik, who received shelter from the writer Karel 
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van het Reve. These were well-documented exiles: in Egorov’s 
case there were concert recordings, a documentary and a novel 
based on his life. And the research on Amalrik even uncovered 
questions about him that came up in a parliamentary session. 
But also the less well-known cases came into view. A number of 
students looked into the lives of Indonesian intellectuals and 
artists who fled Suharto’s regime. Basuki Resobowo – painter, 
writer and communist – chose to waste away in self-imposed 
misery in a basement near Oosterpark. The exiles’ university, it 
was discovered, was an important refuge for them, for example 
for Sorin Alexandrescu in literature and Dubravka Ugrešić in 
Slavic studies (she testif ied to this in a roman à clef). Chilean 
writer Ariel Dorfman taught at the University of Amsterdam in 
the 1960s, and two students reconstructed his network with great 
precision. They found out that the university had kept no records 
of the content of the lectures that Dorfman had given there.
And the networks of the students themselves? The ex-cathedra 
approach was quickly disavowed. Dorfman turned out to have 
lived in the same street as one of the students who researched 
him, and her family members turned out to know people in Dorf-
man’s network. One student, who taught Dutch as a volunteer to 
so-called illegals, made a convincing plea to also include one of 
her students – hereafter referred to under the pseudonym Ahlam 
– with her own definition of exile. Ahlam is one of the refugees 
who, having been refused asylum, has been wandering the streets 
of Amsterdam since 2012. The acuteness of her case was cause for 
despondence, but her combativeness gave hope. The course I was 
teaching had suddenly been hurled into current events, similar to 
when I ended up, albeit via a language, in the heart of Amsterdam 
as cosmopolitan city in the 1990s. The two essays below are about 
the exiles Basuki Resobowo and Ahlam. They show that exile is 
no guarantee for cosmopolitan citizenship. The one exile, suf-
focating in bitterness or hubris, led an invisible life; the other is 
f ighting for her own rights and those of her compatriots and is 
thereby strengthening the city. But both of them hold up a mirror 
to Amsterdam for those who want to see it.
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A man without a country and without a city
Sepp Eckenhaussen
It must have been when he was seventeen that Basuki Resobowo, 
the son of a shoemaker, born in 1916 in Sumatra, decided not 
to tread the beaten path. He dropped his training to become a 
primary school teacher and enrolled instead in the art academy 
in Bandung. He became friends with famous contemporaries 
such as Soedjojono. With their expressionistic painting, they put 
Indonesia on the world map as a culturally developed country. 
Armed with drawings and paintings, these nationalistic world 
revolutionaries travelled throughout the country during Indo-
nesia’s f ight for independence (1945-49) to support the cause.
After the war of independence, Resobowo became active in 
national politics. He became well-known at the national level. He 
stood for election for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) but 
never made it into parliament. He was, however, appointed ‘head 
of the department for f ine arts’ of the LEKRIS, a left-oriented 
institute aff iliated with the PKI that focused on the cultural 
development of the people. In addition, Resobowo worked in the 
(communist) f ilm industry as an actor and a painter of decors. 
Because almost all Indonesian-spoken f ilms just after the war 
were Chinese productions, Resobowo often travelled back and 
forth between the two countries.
The road to Amsterdam
On 30  September 1965, the notorious Indonesian coup took 
place in which six generals were killed in one night. In the cha-
otic power vacuum that followed, a surviving general, Suharto, 
grasped the reins of power. Suharto put the blame for the six 
murders on the PKI and unleashed a communist witch hunt that 
cost the lives of half a million people. At the time of the coup, 
Resobowo was in China supervising f ilming and decided to bide 
his time there. He was quickly stripped of his citizenship. From 
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one day to the next, Resobowo went from having a vibrant social, 
political and cultural life in the centre of power to being thrown 
back into the margins of society.
The artist-cum-politician was forced to settle in a refugee 
camp for PKI members in China. Frustrated by his own situation, 
Resobowo became irritated by the other inhabitants of the camp. 
Later he wrote that the leaders of the PKI in exile were guilty 
of ‘self-satisfaction, lack of discipline and ideological superf i-
ciality’. This resulted in a total absence of a ‘framework for the 
continuation of the [political] struggle’. What especially irritated 
Resobowo about daily life in the camp was the narrow-minded 
sexual morality. To make matters worse, Resobowo was ‘forbid-
den to leave China (by the foreign PKI leaders) because there 
was a suspicion that the PKI was planning to move to Eastern 
Europe. If this happened, it could damage relations between the 
host (the Communist Party of China) and the PKI because there 
were strong differences of opinion between Moscow and Peking.’
After seven years in the PKI camp, Resobowo’s luck changed 
for the better: in 1972, relations between the Communist Party of 
China and the PKI deteriorated to such an extent that members 
of the PKI were no longer welcome in China. Resobowo seized 
this opportunity to travel to Europa. Through Germany, he 
arrived in the Netherlands. After receiving political asylum, 
Resobowo settled in a one-room apartment facing Oosterpark in 
Amsterdam. According to eye witnesses, his house was shabbily 
furnished and was like ‘a cave smelling of excrement’. However, 
Resobowo was not dissatisf ied with his hometown because 
‘Holland [was] known for its generosity towards the Indonesian 
people (…) [and] mastering the language [eased] his life and 
undertakings in his new domicile.’
Adjacent to Oosterpark
In China, Resobowo’s creative activities had been put on the 
back burner, but in Amsterdam they began to blossom again. 
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In his basement adjacent to Oosterpark, canvases and pots of 
paint (partly f illed with cigarette butts) took up most of the 
space. Various young, unknown artists of Indonesian descent 
visited Resobowo’s house. Nothing is known about his social life 
in Amsterdam. The only academic literature in which Basuki 
Resobowo is mentioned is a description of the Indonesian f ilm 
industry before 1965. In Dutch newspaper archives, the artist is 
nowhere to be found. None of Resobowo’s paintings are found in 
any famous Dutch collections, let alone in a museum. The house 
adjacent to Oosterpark, where Resobowo lived for more than a 
quarter of his life, was demolished long ago.
And yet Resobowo did leave some traces of himself. After hav-
ing lived in the Netherlands for more than a decade, he began 
to write. Between 1986 and 1991, he wrote three books which 
included a three-part autobiography and a discourse on art 
theory. These works are kept in the archives of the International 
Institute for Social History (Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale 
Geschiedenis, IISG) in Amsterdam and are accessible to everyone. 
Resobowo published all his books on his own, which makes the 
‘books’ appear at f irst glance to be thin periodicals or pamphlets. 
But once opened, their richness immediately comes across. In ad-
dition to the text, they are filled with reproductions of Resobowo’s 
pen drawings and caricatures. It is clear from these publications 
that in 1991 Resobowo had in no way shaken off his idealistic 
plumage. In Tentang seni-lukis Indonesia, there is a picture with 
the following caption: ‘What is the difference between Sukarno 
and Suharto? Both stand on top of a pile of bodies of the people.’ 
In the same chapter he hits out at his fellow exiles – former PKI 
members who had withdrawn to a ‘safe and tranquil stage’ – the 
PKI’s government in exile, and ‘medieval’ Indonesian society. One 
by one, Resobowo alienated himself from his former allies and 
carried on as a ‘single f ighter’, as he described himself.
Both the caricatures and the written text are in Bahasa Indo-
nesian. The only traces that Resobowo left in the Netherlands 
are thus very poorly accessible without knowledge of Bahasa 
Indonesian. Because Resobowo spoke Dutch well by his own 
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account, he must have consciously chosen not to target a Dutch 
audience. Resobowo’s involvement was, even after all those 
years, still completely reserved for Indonesia. His use of the term 
‘single f ighter’ ref lects his resignation to or even embrace of 
his (ideological) isolation in the Netherlands. It is in fact not so 
surprising that there are so few traces of Resobowo.
Successive events in 1998 brought an end to this status quo. In 
May of that year, Suharto’s reign came to an end. Soon thereafter 
Resobowo travelled to Indonesia to set foot on native soil for the 
f irst time in 33 years. It was as if he had put off his death in order 
to experience that moment. On 5 January 1999, Basuki Resobowo 
died, 83 years old, in Amsterdam.
In the 33 years of Resobowo’s absence, Indonesia had undergone 
many changes. Resobowo’s idealism turned out to be focused on a 
homeland of bygone days. Coming back to his homeland no longer 
felt to him as coming home. Most probably this is what ‘exile’ 
effectively means: to f ind oneself in an ‘intermediate country’. 
Since 1972, Resobowo’s identity had been based neither on the 
Netherlands nor on the ‘actual’ Indonesia. Yet it was precisely this 
‘being in between’ that offered him a new self-image as a single 
f ighter. From this identity he actively reflected on his situation 
and shaped it creatively: ‘Luckily I was able to paint and now I 
try the best I can to write. I try with all my heart with my art and 
my writing, even if it is perhaps meaningless, and I can set myself 
a good objective to f ight for.’ It is clear that Resobowo had made 
the identity of the isolated single f ighter so much his own that he 
no longer felt connected to the actual Indonesia after returning. 
The intermediate country had become his homeland.
Excluded in the middle of the city
Fien de Ruiter
A woman with an ochre-yellow headscarf wrapped around 
her head is on her bed speaking on the phone in Somali. On 
the other side of the room, a woman hidden under a mountain 
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of clothes is staring out of the window. Everywhere there are 
pieces of fabric hanging to demarcate areas and to keep the 
room somewhat warm. There is a heater in the middle of the 
room. Against the wall there are eight beds, all strewn with 
pillows and blankets. On the f loor is a Dutch secondary-school 
mathematics book. African music is playing in the background. 
Ahlam sits cross-legged in the middle of the room, looking at an 
old TV that is showing the livestream of a parliamentary debate 
on the Dutch government’s integration policy. Whenever she 
doesn’t understand a particular word, she looks it up on her 
telephone.
Shelter
At the end of May 2015, the ‘Vluchtgebouw’ (the ‘refuge building’) 
on the Jan Tooropstraat in Amsterdam was evacuated. The three 
women that were in the room described above were forced to 
move out and f ind lodging elsewhere, together with approxi-
mately seventy other residents. Their new residence became the 
former district off ice of New West Amsterdam, which had been 
empty for some time. As has often happened when refugees 
ended up on the street, a group of squatters had helped them 
f ind a new building. This was not likely to be the last building 
the refugees were to settle in. The group of residents are all part 
of the organisation called We Are Here. This group was formed 
in 2012 when a number of asylum seekers whose requests for 
asylum had been rejected came together and chose to unite in 
a tent camp in Osdorp. The tent camp was evacuated but the 
group moved on. They settled in the Vluchtkerk (refuge church), 
the Vluchtf lat (refuge f lat), the Vluchtpark (refuge park), the 
Vluchtkantoor (refuge off ice), the Vluchthaven (refuge port), 
the Vluchtgarage (refuge garage) and the Vluchtgebouw (ref-
uge building). They recently moved again, after having been 
kicked out of the twentieth building they had squatted In the 
meantime the group has expanded to include more than one 
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hundred refugees with rejected asylum requests, spread out over 
Amsterdam. The constant wandering about for a new shelter is 
wearing the refugees out.
Via protests and lectures in Amsterdam, the escape group 
wants to generate more publicity for their problems. On the 
We Are Here website, there is a bank account number where 
donations can be made. But most of the help comes from local 
residents who bring food. It is not much food, but most of the 
days they have enough to survive on. If it is really too little, they 
appeal for help on Facebook or ask for help in other ways. They 
also f ind many useful things along the side of the road. In the 
Vluchtgebouw, one strip of f lowery wallpaper was hung up that 
a resident had found on the street.
In this way, Ahlam and the others have been able to create 
their own micro-community, despite the fact that it has been 
made exceedingly diff icult for them to participate in the society 
in which they live. In the lodgings there are different rooms, 
usually divided by nationality so that the residents can com-
municate with each other. Ahlam sleeps in a room with some 
f ifteen other women, all of Somali descent. They usually cook 
and eat together. When someone comes to visit, such as a police 
off icer monitoring the building’s f ire safety, they are always 
willing to offer him or her a cup of tea or a plate of couscous. 
Ahlam almost always has a smile on her face. Despite all the 
setbacks she has experienced, she remains positive.
Besides her warm personality and her perseverance, there is 
something else that stands out about Ahlam: her overwhelming 
need for knowledge. After coming to the Netherlands when she 
was 25 years old, she tried to learn the Dutch language as quickly 
as possible. Because she was not allowed to work or study, she 
spent her days in the library surrounded by Dutch books. After 
f ive years, a shaky start with numerous moves and language 
lessons given by volunteers, she now speaks decent Dutch. She 
can make herself understood and have a conversation about 
diff icult topics such as the procedures of the policy towards 
asylum seekers in the Netherlands. In this way she is able to 
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translate important information for people who can only speak 
Arabic, Somali or English. Ahlam often goes to the city hall with 
those living in the same squatters’ building in order to help them 
with paperwork. She is also very active within the We Are Here 
organisation. One of the important tasks she has there is to 
address the media.
Constantly roaming
Ahlam came to the Netherlands in November 2009. She was born 
in Saudi Arabia, the country to which her parents had fled from 
Somalia. She went to primary and secondary school there. She 
had a happy childhood. When the authorities found out that the 
family no longer had a valid residence permit, they threatened to 
send them back to Somalia, a country that was still torn by civil 
war. So the family fled to Yemen. Even though they were living 
illegally in Yemen, her father did everything possible to give 
Ahlam a good education. The result was that Ahlam graduated 
cum laude with a degree in medical studies. Medicine is her 
great passion. She often talks about it and cannot wait until she 
can work in a hospital and continue learning. In Yemen, she was 
only able to work as a doctor for a short period of time because 
circumstances forced her to flee the country in haste, leaving 
her mother and brothers behind. Her father had already passed 
away by then.
What is certain is that it is not going well for Ahlam in the 
Netherlands. After more than f ive years of living in this country, 
she has yet to procure a residence permit and has ended up on 
the streets after her request for asylum was rejected. In the 
meantime, the refugee situation in the Netherlands has changed 
drastically, in particular as a result of the influx of refugees from 
Syria. This has, however, no direct effect on the situation of the 
refugees of the We Are Here group. They are all still here, illegally, 
in the squatters’ buildings in Amsterdam.
 101
Under current regulations, a refugee whose request for asy-
lum has been rejected must return to his/her country of origin. 
Because Ahlam’s parents come from Somalia and because they 
resided illegally in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Ahlam is off icially 
considered Somalian. This means that Ahlam would not be sent 
back to Yemen or Saudi Arabia but to Somalia, a country she has 
never been to.
Ahlam has f iled a new request for asylum and is waiting 
for a decision by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service. 
She often dreams of what she would do if she f inally receives 
a residence permit. She would go back to university as soon as 
possible so that she can work in Amsterdam as a heart surgeon. 
When she tells me that she wants to come home to a house 
where a husband and two children wait for her, a smile appears 
on her face: ‘And then he would of course already have dinner 
ready!’
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The quotes in the section on Resobowo in this essay are from 
Bercermin dimuka kaca: seniman, seni dan masyarakat, or Mir-
ror images: artist, art and society (1986) and were translated 
from Indonesian by Sepp Eckenhaussen.
For more of Resobowo’s story and other stories about exile in 
Amsterdam, see the website www. amsterdam-in-exile.nl/
basuki-resobowo-schrijver/.





The second theme of this volume, urban nodes, is about both 
nodes in the city and the city as a node in urban networks. 
Núria Arbonés Aran makes a plea for a new urban node: she 
would like to swap competition for cooperation, and she shows 
how cooperation can offset the negative effects of our current 
system of economic competition. Arie van Steensel looks back 
at the urban networks that existed in medieval Europe and Zef 
Hemel advocates a new metropolitan network as the answer to 
the anti-urban sentiment that has traditionally characterised 
Europe and an alternative to the megacities emerging in other 
parts of the world.
But even within cities, some places are more central than 
others. Urban nodes act as concentrates of urbanity. Jan Rath and 
Wietze Gelmers explore the role of trendy coffee shops where 
everyone wants to be seen. Guy Geltner shows us the evolving 
position of prisons – nodes in the (criminal) city where no one 
wants to be seen and that no one wants to see.
The other contributions in this section address interventions 
in the city. Tim Verlaan explains how Amsterdammers rose up 
in opposition to the sell-out of their inner city when they put a 
stop to the plans of real estate developers to revamp the Klein-
Gartmanplantsoen square. Stan Majoor predicts the end of large-
scale urban projects (such as the Zuidas project in Amsterdam) 
and discusses the preconditions for better small-scale urban 
projects. Finally, Marco Bontje argues that it is misguided to 
consider creative cities and shrinking cities as opposites, and 
that they should be seen in relation to each other as parts of 
urban networks with different roles.
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12. Hub Cities 2.0 for the 21st century
Núria Arbonés Aran
In recent years, cities such as Amsterdam have used the term 
hub city to def ine themselves in a global context. Hub cities are 
cities that play – or aspire to – a crucial role in the international 
and globalising economy. As such they form a hub, a ‘node’ of 
relevant traffic. What exactly is meant by this is open to different 
interpretations.
Port City 2.0
In the beginning, the term hub city appeared to be primarily 
intended to indicate an upgrade of old international port cities 
with their booming open economies. The main difference was 
that today’s hub not only referred to the physical connections 
with other important hubs but also the virtual ones. Tangible 
signs of this shift were the old commercial areas and industrial 
zones in Western cities that had been largely rehabilitated as 
legacies and serviceable for more high-quality manufacturing 
industries and services in accordance with the digital age. These 
places received names with symbols such as @ or # as a reference 
to their upgrade to new urban economies. Hub cities can also be 
recognised by their metropolitan character: they are cities with 
an important, appealing and advanced spatial and functional 
infrastructure; an international look and feel; a certain grandeur; 
and a concentration of a cosmopolitan populace and culture.
Competition
To be able to compete, hub cities must have a differentiated and 
communicable identity as its brand. Many cities in the Western 
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world have presented this identity with symbols related to ports 
of which the hallmarks are openness, prosperity, tolerance, 
hospitality, a melting pot of cultures, inventiveness, freedom 
and safety, and a port of connectivity. This also f its perfectly 
the classic def inition of port cities as prosperous commercial 
enclaves whose success was mainly due to their ability to trans-
form primary goods and ideas into commercial value. Port cities 
were seen as places where needs and trends could be identif ied 
more quickly, where diversity was a guarantee for plenty of 
ideas, and where commerce yielded an inexhaustible source of 
industriousness and prosperity. Since the 1970s, Amsterdam has 
often used this image to define an important part of its character 
as a progressive city. This allowed Amsterdam to recover its 
image of openness, entrepreneurship and tolerance that had 
characterised the city, not only because of its tradition of trade 
but also due to the ideas of philosophers such as Spinoza.
The allegories of port cities such as Amsterdam are that they 
were a welcoming environment because the city’s commercial tra-
dition had an egalitarian effect on society. This can be explained 
using what Jane Jacobs calls the morality of commerce – a morality 
characterised by tolerance, integrity, resourcefulness, optimism 
and trust. In contrast to the morality of guards who had to defend 
the borders of territories, this morality was not designed to f ight 
or mislead others but rather to engage in honest transactions 
and interactions: weigh merchandise carefully, sell no defective 
material, take part in untainted competition, offer a fair price 
for honest food and drink, etc. Based on this morality, port cities 
became open, tolerant and safe for innovation and differences 
in opinion. Well-known city experts such as Max Weber, Jane 
Jacobs and Saskia Sassen have shown that such things as science 
and critical art have been able to thrive as a result of this climate.
At f irst, the hub city appeared to be an upgrade of the tolerant 
and commercial allegory of the port city in the context of the 
21st century. But it soon became clear that with this upgrade, 
the signif icance and legitimisation of the port city had shifted. 
Somehow the hub was given carte blanche to bid in the contest 
 107
for the best place in a globalising world. A certain kind of rhetoric 
has become common practice in this contest, and it is a rhetoric 
that resembles the monopolistic doctrine of strategic manage-
ment striving for total market conquest. In this contest, anything 
goes. This is also the so-called ‘business-as-war strategy’, full 
of militant language inspired by quotes from Attila the Hun, 
Machiavelli and General Patton.
The business-as-war theories can be described as pessimistic 
because they assume that man is by nature bad. Their refer-
ence point is that it is permissible to grab anything that can be 
grabbed before anyone else does. The idea is also that goods in 
the world are scarce, just as talent is, and that it is therefore one’s 
duty to conduct oneself in a combative manner in the world and 
to enter into strategic alliances. Business-as-war theories also 
hold that it is perfectly legitimate to mislead the competition in 
order to reach the higher goal: victory.
In these competitive business-as-war theories, the strategic 
forces of the city become like dependent units with the pur-
pose of acquiring scarce resources. This simplif ies the ultimate 
function of the hub city to its most basic level: to swiftly amass 
enough incomes, investors and the targeted populace – the right 
students, the specif ic talent in each sector, the proper tourists. 
Eat in order not to be eaten and grab whatever you can grab be-
fore it’s too late. This has resulted in a kind of militant language 
in which immoderate self-praise is seen as a virtue.
It would be laughable if it were not for the fact that such strate-
gies have been used for a long time as if they were synonymous 
with commercial and economic thought. While it may not be im-
plemented wholeheartedly, it is widely accepted as an unavoidable 
human evil. This is a shame because it has gone so far that even 
educational institutions have begun calling their students ‘clients’ 
that ensure liquidity. This is why the focus on international talent 
is seen as a lucrative tool and a necessary instrument to be able to 
survive in times like these. In this line of thought, it is no longer a 
contradiction to extol certain target groups as very welcome even 
as they are mainly seen as sources of income.
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Discomfort
This discrepancy might explain why the language that hub cities 
have come to use feels increasingly discomforting. Evidently in 
major cases such as the globalising city, it is diff icult to f ind the 
right balance between on the one hand pure informative language 
and on the other hand propaganda. Hub cities have apparently 
felt compelled to go along with a somewhat crazy, self-flattering 
declaration of their character. When one repeatedly hears that 
Amsterdam is in its very DNA a hospitable, open and tolerant 
city with well-educated citizens who are open-minded and know 
many foreign languages, one recognises this as the making of ‘hub 
city’ propaganda. For the record, it is not that Amsterdam is not a 
nice city with nice people – on the contrary – but the self-evident 
manner in which such virtues are claimed is striking.
Values such as these are not innate and they are certainly not 
exclusive to specific peoples. The teachings of Spinoza, tolerance, 
international orientation – these things are not something you 
can inject into genes and they are also not magically inherited. 
Those with a capacity for foreign languages have learned and 
practised these languages themselves and the same goes for 
tolerance and openness. That is simply the way it is. This is also 
the reason the reputation of places is not a fact that is f ixed for 
eternity. A credible, self-proclaimed, positive reputation can only 
be distilled from genuine substance that is continually moulded 
with great care. A good reputation is something that one must 
continuously live up to.
Hub City 2.0
It turns out in the long run that hub cities that base their legiti-
macy and strategy on business-as-war theories can prove that 
they are by def inition diverse, open and tolerant. But in fact, 
these strategies encourage the troops to f ight for a future in 
which competitors are eliminated and in which prosperity is 
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preserved for their own city and tribe. Openness and honesty 
towards the other – the competitor – are by definition ruled out.
In recent years, a number of city marketing experts and prac-
titioners have begun to doubt the legitimacy of these competitive 
strategies. The international academic literature on the subject has 
also been critical about the substance and usefulness of interpreta-
tions that rank cities and regions into winners and losers on the 
basis of a number of confusing criteria. The time is ripe for us to 
investigate the effect of economic scripts such as these and to write 
new ones. It appears that the moment has come for us to reconsider 
serious elementary issues with regard to so-called hub cities.
For what if, as the mayor of Paris said a few years ago, the city 
dares to recognise its mistakes and decides to blur the physical 
boundaries of the city with its banlieues, purely for the sake of 
all its inhabitants? What if a hub city follows not the theories of 
competitive strategists such as Michael Porter but instead phi-
losophers such as Baruch Spinoza? What if a hub city embraces 
the allegories of a genuine metropolis in the original sense of 
the word – a ‘mother city’? The city as a loving mother, a refuge, 
who loves her children with all their talents but also all their 
imperfections, fears and nightmares. What if a hub city is not 
driven by the amassing and hoarding of money needed to finance 
a hypothetical future as an all-dominating city but instead is the 
place where all sorts of people can earn their money in the here 
and now, trading freely and safely on the basis of a commercial 
morality? What if hub cities start working together for the sake 
of humane laws and the interconnection of commerce, science, 
friendship and love? Wouldn’t hub cities and their inhabitants 
stand a much better chance if they were genuinely modest of 
being more prepared for the 21st century – our century?
The author
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Applied Sciences. Through her research on image formation of 
places and people, she hopes to contribute to a more nuanced 
and realistic urban governance and opaque city marketing.
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13. Competing cities and urban 
networks in medieval Europa
Arie van Steensel
City branding today goes beyond merely a slogan. Cities present 
themselves as a brand in order to attract people, investors and 
companies. It is crucial for a city to distinguish itself from other 
cities through its architecture, social policies, public facilities 
or f iscal arrangements. Intercity competition is, however, some-
thing that goes back further in time: the earliest cities tried to 
create an attractive environment for migrants and merchants 
to settle in, which in turn contributed to the development of 
durable urban networks.
Cities and urban networks
Approximately one thousand years ago, the European continent 
entered a new phase in urbanisation. A complex interplay of 
demographic, economic and political factors led to the emer-
gence of new cities that gradually grew in size and developed 
into regional and international nodes for f lows of people, goods 
and information. The centre of gravity of these networks lay 
f irst in the middle and northern part of the Italian peninsula, 
where maritime cities such as Amalf i, Genoa, Pisa and Venice 
were the f irst to prof it from the revival of trade contacts in the 
Mediterranean world in the 11th century, after which cities such 
as Milan and Florence blossomed into important commercial 
and industrial centres. A second centre of gravity emerged in 
the 12th century in Northern France and the southern Nether-
lands, where trade flows from the Rhine, the Mediterranean, the 
North Sea and the Baltic Sea came together. Itinerant merchants 
initially met each other at annual fairs that were always held 
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in the same order, but from the end of the 13th century, Bruges 
emerged as a trade metropolis where foreign merchants settled 
more permanently, after which Antwerp took over this role some 
two hundred years later.
During the Middle Ages, polycentric networks of larger cit-
ies and smaller urban centres emerged in certain regions that 
performed regional and local administrative, economic and 
service-related functions. This was the case in Flanders for ex-
ample, where in addition to the three large cities of Bruges, Ghent 
and Ypres, dozens of smaller towns gave shape to the urban 
network. This network reinforced the economic integration and 
geographical interdependence of the smaller units, as a result of 
which cities became increasingly connected to each other and 
to their hinterland. The dominance of the major cities did not 
result in a distinctly hierarchical urban system in Flanders, in 
contrast to Tuscany where the city of Florence gradually brought 
the surrounding smaller cities and rural communities under its 
authority and regularly waged war against other city states over 
the control of ports, markets and production areas. In England, 
London – which was in effect the capital of the kingdom by the 
end of the Middle Ages – acquired a very dominant place in the 
urban network. Around 1500, the city had effectively become 
the gateway of England, the port city through which the most 
important import and export f lows went. The demographic 
balance between the English cities reflected this shift from vari-
ous regional urban networks to one network dominated by the 
capital. At the beginning of the 16th century, London already had 
almost f ive times as many inhabitants as Norwich, the second 
largest city of England.
Urban prosperity and urban decay
The urbanisation process in medieval Europe appeals to the 
imagination because the cities that arose then still shape the 
landscape. For example, old city centres are popular tourist 
 113
attractions, and many city halls have their origins in medieval 
times. Moreover, new forms of political participation, economic 
cooperation and social cohesion emerged in medieval urban 
communities. Cities have since been the drivers of socio-political 
changes, economic innovation and cultural creativity. In com-
parison with the degree of urbanisation in today’s Europe, at the 
end of the Middle Ages the continent was in general still primar-
ily an agricultural society. Around 1500, the average degree of 
urbanisation is estimated to have been around 10 percent – only 
in certain regions in Italy, on the Iberian peninsula and in the 
Netherlands was this percentage higher. In the province of Hol-
land, for example, around half of the inhabitants lived in cities 
and towns in the 15th century, much more than in the rural 
eastern Netherlands.
Few European cities experienced permanent demographic 
growth and economic prosperity in the period between 1000 and 
1500. From the second quarter of the 14th century, the growth of 
most cities stagnated; socio-economic inequality and political 
polarisation had already increased signif icantly in urban soci-
ety. The Black Death – the plague that swept through Europe 
between 1346 and 1351, taking the lives of an estimated one-third 
to one-half of the population – was an unprecedented blow for 
many cities, which took them one and a half centuries to recover 
from. The adaptability of cities was further put to the test by the 
changing political and economic circumstances of the 14th and 
15th centuries.
For medieval city councillors, it was not easy to respond ef-
fectively to the consequences of these external factors. There 
were also noticeable differences among the cities: one city was 
more resilient in absorbing the demographic and socio-economic 
shocks than the other. It is diff icult to determine in retrospect 
what exactly made for a successful recipe for urban recovery 
and how the urban network was of influence. One comparison 
that can be made here is with the European industrial cities that 
fell into a state of decay in the second half of the 20th century. 
The attempts by politicians and government off icials to give 
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these cities a boost were rarely successful. Even today, a standard 
recipe for urban renewal simply does not exist because policy and 
investment must be tailored to local circumstances and cities 
must at the same time adapt to external factors such as global 
economic developments or national political circumstances.
Medieval councillors had just as diff icult a task in safeguard-
ing the prosperity of the urban community (the bonum commune) 
in times of economic downturn or increasing competition from 
other cities, but recent historical research shows that they tried 
to strengthen the competitiveness of their cities in various ways. 
Competing against each other, cities in late-medieval England 
developed aggressive strategies to attract merchants and work-
ers. And cities such as London, York and Norwich invested in 
administrative and economic institutions and public facilities 
in order to build up their reputations as reliable marketplaces 
and attractive business locations.
Another option was to seek the support of the monarch. This 
was what cities in the Netherlands did, such as when Bruges 
welcomed the emperor-to-be Charles V in 1515 with elaborate 
ceremonial displays. Business in Bruges had been poor for some 
decades already, the city having rebelled against Charles’ grand-
father and experiencing much competition from Antwerp. Using 
tableaux vivants (living paintings), the city’s past prosperity 
and the acute crisis it was undergoing was brought to the new 
monarch’s attention in the hope that he would give the city a 
boost in his capacity as ruler of a global empire. The foreign 
merchants from the Hanseatic cities, Italy and Spain who were 
present at the festivities also subsidised the cost of the spectacle. 
Nonetheless, Charles V failed in turning the tide for Bruges.
International trade moved to Antwerp in the last decade of the 
15th century after the city had received the monarch’s political 
support to offer traders attractive trade and business conditions. 
For international merchants, access to markets was essential; 
they moved their operations easily from one port and market-
place to the other within the urban network of the Netherlands. 
To maintain their position within this network, cities competed 
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with each other by adapting their institutions to the require-
ments of the merchants. The importance of good political and 
economic governance is illustrated by the example of two cities 
in Zeeland. In the 14th century, Zierikzee was a flourishing port 
acting as a hub for Flanders, Brabant and Holland, but in the 15th 
century Middelburg took over this position. The latter enjoyed 
political stability and economic growth in this period and at-
tracted migrants from not only the surrounding countryside 
but also more distant cities and countries. In contrast, Zierikzee 
fell into conflict with the monarch in the second half of the 15th 
century, as a result of which it lost its privileges for an extended 
period of time; the impoverished city endured depopulation 
and rising vacancy rates and also suffered disastrous f ires and 
floods. The core of the problem, however, lay in the fact that the 
councillors and inhabitants of Zierikzee failed to adequately 
react to economic and political changes.
Institutional diversity
Shrinking cities in the Middle Ages did not always succeed 
in turning the tide, but usually the consequences of this were 
limited to demographic and economic shifts within the urban 
network. Urban networks were more robust, and their resilience 
was based largely on the institutional diversity between cities. 
This allowed cities to compete with each other, and the urban 
network was as a whole less vulnerable to the effects of structural 
changes. Moreover, these networks had a polycentric character – 
cities benefited from being close to each other and f illed various 
economic, social and cultural functions within the same region. 
Networks between cities could be of a political, economic or 
cultural nature without necessarily being complementary or 
tied to specif ic territorial boundaries.
Needless to say, these historical insights do not easily translate 
into the complex 21st-century context in which cities have in-
creasingly become part of ‘global assemblages’. From a long-term 
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perspective, however, institutional diversity, functional com-
plementarity and polycentric networks should def initely be 
included in an urban agenda that aims to further the interlinking 
of European cities.
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14. Beyond anti-urban sentiments
Towards a new metropolitan European family
Zef Hemel
Unlike in continents such as Asia, America or Africa where large 
cities are normal and accepted phenomena, in Europe anti-urban 
sentiment is still very dominant. This sentiment has had a long 
history. Whenever cities became too large or powerful, European 
rulers yielded to the temptation to destroy them or to establish 
new cities in order to undermine the power of existing cities. 
The French historian Fernand Braudel describes how the latter 
was a tried and tested means of maintaining the precarious 
balance of power especially in Middle Francia, which after the 
death of Charlemagne was sandwiched between France and 
Germany and also included the Low Countries. Cities in Europe 
are consequently on the small side.
Anti-urban sentiment
This European state practice of curtailing and splitting up cities 
took on a whole new meaning during the industrialisation pe-
riod. In many parts of Europe, the early stage of industrialisation 
coincided with rapid urban development as an impoverished 
population was drawn en masse to the city. This mass move-
ment alarmed the powers that be who feared that it could lead 
to revolutions, anarchy and socialism. In the beginning, this 
unprecedented process of urbanisation was countered with 
utopian ideas of garden cities, especially in the nation-states of 
France, Germany and England. The idea was that the people had 
to return to the countryside. The f irst examples of garden cities 
were soon followed up with notions of regional decentralised 
urban designs that were interconnected by a thick web of railway 
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infrastructure and harmoniously interwoven with nature and 
the untouched landscape of villages and farmland. According to 
the utopians and the elite, London and Paris in particular had to 
take the lead because these metropolises were seen as inhumane 
monsters that had to be tamed using all means possible given 
their size. But also in the coalf ields of Wallonia, Silesia, the 
Ruhr region and the Midlands, the spreading urbanisation was 
viewed with great suspicion. At the end of the 19th century, this 
modern planning project culminated in the acclaimed regional 
plan of Ebenezer Howard, who enjoyed great success from 1913 
with his foundation, the International Federation for Housing 
and Planning, which focused on spatial decentralisation. In the 
20th century – and certainly after the Second World War – the 
core focus of spatial planning in many European countries was 
determined (largely by the winners) to be controlling the size 
of cities by the state. Every effort was made to limit the size and 
scale of existing settlements and to prevent the coalescence of 
towns and cities. Europe became a champion in designating 
and maintaining buffer zones, building new towns, stimulating 
well-ordered processes of suburbanisation, designating new 
growth centres, promoting urban networks and containing and 
confining the metropolis.
From Europe, this anti-urban sentiment initially spread to 
North America, where it was articulated in a unique way by 
the hugely popular philosopher Henry David Thoreau in his 
book Walden. However, due to the dominant ideology of civil 
liberty – an ideology Thoreau also adhered to – as well as the 
weak tradition of state planning in the New World, this senti-
ment never gained a foothold other than through unrestrained 
suburbanisation. As a result, Europe stands alone in its aim to 
contain urban growth. Within most European states, urban 
networks are still primarily regarded as a means to divert urban 
growth to less urbanised regions and not as a growth strategy for 
existing metropolises. Recently, the French artist Yona Friedman 
(b. 1923) expressed just this point in Métropole Europe (2008, but 
based on his Continent-City Europe from the 1960s). By building 
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a high-speed rail network, he argues, the cities of Europe would 
be transformed into one huge decentralised metropolis of 40 
million inhabitants. He concludes: ‘Un “Grand Paris” ou un 
“Grand Londres” n’est pas la solution pour l’avenir’ (A “Great 
Paris” or a “Great London” are no solution for the future). Fried-
man once again touched a sensitive chord. His anti-mégalopole 
corresponded to the old European way of thinking that prefers 
to keep cities small. But it also did justice to the existing spatial 
configuration of cities in Europe that is indeed unique in a cer-
tain sense. It is thanks to Europe’s topography and history but 
above all the prevailing view of proper spatial planning that no 
other continent has such a rich and spread-out urban structure.
Restricting the growth of cities certainly has its advantages. 
Usually the advantages mentioned include quality of life, pres-
ervation of rural areas, balanced growth and a just society. But 
it would be wrong to attribute these and other qualities entirely 
to cities whose sizes have been restricted. Much relates to one’s 
convictions. It is simply inherent in everything that has become 
a key component of one’s own culture and is no longer called into 
question. And yet there is still room for discussion. Moreover, the 
drawbacks, which certainly exist, are too often trivialised by the 
dominant culture. Indeed, the policy of containing urban growth 
is often justif ied by listing the disadvantages of unrestrained 
growth. These disadvantages are then greatly exaggerated, 
while the advantages are explained away and the protagonists 
of growth discredited. The arguments for metropolitanism are 
the economic strength, diversity, sustainability and dynamism 
that increase almost without exception together with the size 
of cities. Globalisation, moreover, is increasingly confronting 
Europe with new urbanisation patterns in which mega-regions 
and megacities dominate. Take China, where metropolises of 
100-150 million people are developing and partly being planned 
in the deltas of the Yangtze and the Pearl River but also in the 
more northern areas, around Beijing (named Jing Jin Ji). In Asia, it 
is understood that the formation of metropolises is necessary in 
order to ensure long-term economic growth. European cities are 
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at risk of becoming Lilliputians, even compared with metropo-
lises that are growing uncontrollably: Istanbul (moving towards 
23 million inhabitants), Moscow (20 million) and Cairo (already 
20 million). To continue asserting that the European pattern of 
many relatively small cities is preferable in terms of quality of 
life can in these circumstances turn out to be mistaken, peculiar 
or even unwise.
Towards new forms of metropolitanism
The good news is that also within Europe a new pattern of con-
siderably large cities is forming. As far as is known at present, 
this future metropolitan pattern appears to be partly the result of 
economic processes that thrive in so-called post-industrial ‘crea-
tive cities’ and partly related to changing demographics – one 
of a future decline in population as Japan is now experiencing. 
Young people are once again being drawn to the big cities, and 
immigrants are joining them. A few already large cities will thus 
once again grow considerably, beginning with the largest, most 
internationally oriented cities: London and Paris. Other, mostly 
industrial cities will, on the contrary, stagnate or shrink. The 
circumstances for urban expansion appear to be the most favour-
able in the centre of the continent – in Switzerland, Austria and 
southern Germany (Vienna, Zurich, Munich, Basel, Geneva). 
Cities with important airports are also doing well. Intellectual 
centres with renowned universities have outstanding creden-
tials. But young talent can be demanding and they make their 
choices deliberately. The largest and most diverse cities with a 
hub function, an international climate and good universities 
are in any case on the winning side. Within the nebulous urban 
f ields that Europe currently comprises, new urban centres of 
gravity are forming into dense spaces of unprecedented human 
activity, benefiting from enormous advantages of agglomeration. 
As a network, these cities could even develop into a new family 
of cities that could bring the European project further, more so 
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than the current struggling nation-states can. But there are no 
guarantees. In the current process of globalisation, Europe must 
not get in the way of this selective growth. Europe would be well 
advised to subdue – this time from Brussels – the anti-urban 
sentiment that keeps rearing its head and instead to give the 
major, vital cities plenty of space to flourish. A strong alliance 
between the European Union and the major cities could give a 
positive twist to the crisis in which Europe currently f inds itself.
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15. Trendy coffee shops and urban 
sociability
Jan Rath and Wietze Gelmers
The number of coffee shops in Amsterdam is growing explosively. 
Does this mean that Amsterdammers have suddenly come to love 
coffee more? The fact is that the rapid spread of what are known 
as specialty coffee bars is by no means restricted to Amsterdam. 
In many cities around the world, such coffee shops are springing 
up like mushrooms, whether it be Vancouver, Istanbul, Moscow 
or Kunming. This is partly the result of the emergence of creative 
economies, the corresponding concentration of highly educated 
individuals with a lifestyle focused on consumption, and the 
development of new forms of modern urbanity. But what exactly 
goes on in these coffee shops?
A plain cup of coffee
The older ones among us know the typical ‘brown coffee shops’ 
of Amsterdam where it was allegedly always convivial and 
where the coffee was in a hot container waiting patiently to be 
consumed avidly. ‘Due to its great success, coffee is being served 
again today,’ quipped a mischievous owner of a popular canteen. 
There was even a separate category of ‘coffee houses’ back in this 
period, most of which were simply furnished establishments, 
where alcohol was taboo but coffee, tea or milk were served, and 
where the hungry client could also order a fried egg on toast or 
a salted meat sandwich. For those who ordered a cup of coffee, 
it was natural that they would sit at a table to enjoy their shot 
of caffeine. The assortment was limited: there was black coffee 
and there was coffee with milk, both with or without sugar. For 
such an order, very little expertise was needed.
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Café gourmet
How different it is today. It is almost impossible to find percolated 
coffee anymore because the coffee is freshly brewed practically 
everywhere you go – sometimes with a modern, designer ma-
chine made of chrome; at other times with a cheaper machine, 
but always made to individual order. The introduction of this 
newfangled machinery has been accompanied by a genuine 
improvement of quality, or at least the pretention thereof, and an 
unprecedented fragmentation of tastes and preferences. Those 
who order the ‘brown gold’ begin an extended conversation with 
numerous implicit and explicit choices, usually conducted us-
ing Italian- or American-sounding idioms. Is the coffee for here 
or to go? Because coffee is no longer something you can only 
drink while sitting at a table. And how much coffee would you 
like? Should it be a tall, grande or venti – or a small, medium or 
large – with or without an extra shot? Would you like milk with 
it? And if so, whole milk, semi-skim milk, skim milk or perhaps 
soy milk? Would you like primarily milk or just the froth or a 
bit of both? A nice accessory is that the waiter – excuse us, the 
barista – feels the unsolicited urge to unleash his/her creativity 
in the form of cappuccino art or latte art. Ordering a plain cup of 
coffee has thus become an exciting artistic exercise. Those with 
a sweet tooth can dilute their coffee with a vanilla, hazelnut or 
orange-flavoured syrup. The real coffee lovers would, of course, 
turn their noses up at such flavours and deliberately choose an 
exquisite doppio based on the distinctive beans of the Zambia 
Peaberry Terranova Estate, Organic Ethiopia Sidamo or the Blue 
Mountain Triage. The coffee corner thus provides us not only 
with a view of a hitherto unknown world but also a podium to 
showcase one’s in-depth knowledge and ref ined and developed 
taste.
Many coffee shops and coffee houses now provide customised 
coffee, but often this results in an indifferently served weak brew 
with washed out foam. Much more interesting – and tastier 
– are the numerous specialty coffee bars that are appearing 
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everywhere in the city. Some are a bit hidden, for example in a 
shop with designer clothing or in the back of a barbershop.
On the one hand, there are the coffee bars that are part of 
larger national or international chains such as Starbucks, Coffee 
Company, Bagels & Beans and so on. They each represent their 
own brand and exude a high degree of exclusivity but ultimately 
provide just a pricey cup of confection coffee. On the other 
hand, there are the one-off operations, the independent coffee 
bars often owned by hipster entrepreneurs with beards and 
tattoos, usually with very modern furnishings such as walls 
where the stucco work has been carefully chipped; tables made 
of raw scaffolding wood; shelves f illed with diff icult books 
and funky glossies; and, of course, on the counter an array of 
muff ins, gluten-free brownies and organic soy milk. These 
are relatively approachable places for certain types of people: 
students, urban professionals and trendy, creative types that 
are constantly online via Wi-Fi, communicating with the rest 
of the world.
Aloofness or sociability
But how do people behave in public spaces such as these spe-
cialty coffee bars? In his 1963 book Behavior in Public Places, the 
famous sociologist Erving Goffman emphasised the importance 
of structural circumstances such as anonymity and frenzy. Most 
people, he argues, would like to freely abide in a public space 
without others noticing them or interfering with them. Everyone 
is, of course, aware of the presence of others but chooses to 
give them their space. No eye contact is sought – certainly no 
staring – conversations are avoided, and so on. Goffman (1972) 
introduced the concept of civil inattention to explain this polite, 
civilised and superf icial but very recognisable behaviour. If 
Goffman is right, in coffee bars we would tend to see individuals 
enjoying their coffee alongside each other but independent of 
one another.
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But this is not entirely self-evident. For years, Starbucks has 
been advertising itself as a ‘place for conversation and a sense of 
community. A third place between work and home’. The coffee 
multinational took the concept of third place from the American 
sociologist Ray Oldenburg who in his classic book The Great 
Good Place introduced the third place as a general term for an 
abundance of public spaces – not being home ( first place) or 
the workplace (second place) – where individuals regularly, 
voluntarily, informally and happily get together. Such spaces 
are fundamentally open and exist without respect to visitors’ 
social class, age, gender, etc. The main activity is conversing and 
experiencing camaraderie. If Oldenburg – and not Goffman – 
was right, Starbucks and all the other coffee houses would be 
bastions of sociability in an otherwise cold, anonymous urban 
world.
Participatory observation
To f ind out which sociologist was right, we visited dozens of 
coffee shops with our students and spent hundreds of hours 
observing. Contrary to what Starbucks claims in its optimistic 
and somewhat nostalgic marketing, Oldenburg’s ideas about the 
third place were not entirely applicable. Numerous customers 
talked with each other, but such conversations were usually lim-
ited to friends, colleagues, fellow students and business partners 
who had explicitly chosen to visit the coffee bar together. The 
conversations that took place were among fixed groups of people 
who already knew each other. But even within these groups we 
noticed that they repeatedly withdrew from the social world to 
dive into another world: the digital world. Mobile telephones and 
tablets were always within easy reach and were used intensively. 
Indeed, f idgeting with electronic devices, checking email, writ-
ing text, sending tweets, tracking social media and keeping in 
touch with what is happening outside the world of the coffee bar 
appeared to be common practice. Whether or not it was because 
 127
all these devices took up so much of their time, customers did not 
interfere with strangers whatsoever, even if they were very much 
aware of each other’s presence. In this sense, civil inattention 
was the order of the day.
Do we then need to throw away the concept of the third 
place into the dustbin of urban sociology? This seems to us a 
little premature, if only because some bars and coffee shops 
can certainly be distinguished as third places. But what is more 
interesting for us was to see that many customers were still in 
close contact with others, albeit not physically and not on site. 
To be able to describe and elucidate this specif ic and apparently 
non-place-related form of sociability, we actually need a new 
vocabulary. We could perhaps call this a fourth place, in reference 
to the sociability of social media.
Fourth place
To research our hypothesis of a possible fourth place, we con-
ducted f ieldwork in a number of coffee houses in Amsterdam 
and Vancouver. It turns out that today’s specialty coffee bars are 
characterised by a complex duality of social interaction, one that 
alternates between the actual and virtual domains. There is a 
hypersensitive, continuously changing social atmosphere that 
is formed by interactions that take place in real life as well as 
online. Although it is often as quiet as a mouse in coffee houses, 
visitors are extremely busy exchanging information – f irst with 
a few other partners in conversation, then with larger groups, 
or sometimes even with anyone who wants to see or read the 
information. The use of laptops, tablets and smartphones ena-
bles people to function alternatively in the private, public and 
parochial domains. On their own, they practice civil inattention 
towards those who are around them in the coffee house, and at 
the same time they maintain intensive contact with acquaint-
ances and strangers who are not present. This mix of various 
interactions with people who are present in different domains 
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means that the social atmosphere in public spaces such as coffee 
houses presents itself in a new and alternative form. To suggest 
that online interaction itself undermines the social atmosphere 
is an oversimplif ication: it would appear that it is more likely to 
result in a modif ication and possibly even an enrichment of the 
social atmosphere. An example is the conversation we overheard 
between two women in one of the coffee bars which was the 
result of a WhatsApp conversation held at that time with an 
acquaintance who was not present.
Conclusion
Now that online interaction has become an undeniable part of 
human behaviour in urban public spaces, our conceptualisation 
of ‘social interaction’ and ‘social atmosphere’ may need to be 
revised. Our research shows that an explanation of this kind of 
sociability in simple terms such as civil inattention or third place 
no longer covers the social reality. Rather, one could speak of a 
fourth place, even if that raises questions about the word ‘place’ 
when referring to interactions that occur in virtual, abstract 
domains. In any case, our research has shown that today’s coffee 
houses are clearly prodigious social spaces – even though the 
contrary appears to be the case – and thus have an important 
social function. And f inally, we must not forget to mention that 
in many of these coffee houses they also serve delicious coffee. 
And that is perhaps just as important.
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16. A quiet transfer
The disappearing urban prison, Amsterdam and 
beyond
G. Geltner
Golden Age Amsterdam played a key role in the history of West-
ern punishment. For centuries beforehand, penal incarceration 
and purpose-built prisons were already integrated into European 
penal practices and common constituents of the European city-
scape. Yet Amsterdam’s elders in the 16th century founded a new 
type of institution, a workhouse designed to retrain convicts and 
help them become productive members of society. The men’s 
Rasphuis and the women’s Spinhuis, established in 1596 and 
1597, respectively, were built on former convent grounds within 
the city and operated as small factories that disciplined both 
their inmates and the population at large, in ways reminiscent 
of the era’s hospitals, almshouses and mental asylums. Political, 
religious, social and economic forces certainly took their toll 
on the founders’ lofty ideals, but the institutions they set up 
continued to run for centuries, inspiring later reforms in and 
beyond the continent.
Premodernity
In the Western imaginary, Rasphuis and Spinhuis inmates are 
transitional f igures, partaking in experiences that are both 
quintessentially medieval and recognisably modern. For, on the 
one hand, they were subject to signif icant physical hardships, 
including corporal punishment; and on the other, their strict 
routines and harsh conditions were also meant to be normalizing 
and rehabilitative rather than merely retributive or deterrent. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly in the context of this 
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volume, their punishment took place at the physical heart of 
a bustling city, indeed a world capital at the time. Thanks to 
their prominence and central location, Amsterdam’s workhouse 
prisons served the moral and political needs of the community 
around them effectively, not least by announcing a formidable 
presence of municipal institutions with strong claims on main-
taining urban order. For better or worse, prisons, like law courts, 
reif ied local justice systems for centuries to come.
Present-day urban dwellers, however, would probably f ind the 
vicinity of prisons troubling rather than comforting. In part this 
has to do with prisons’ national rather than municipal admin-
istration since the late 18th century, when central governments 
took over criminal justice duties that previously fell under the 
remit of cities. Since then, neither inmates nor the crimes for 
which they serve sentences are by default local or even provin-
cial. Prisons’ situation within the urban social fabric was thus no 
longer obvious, let alone politically desirable. That, along with 
pressures on municipalities to broaden their tax base, promoted 
the so-called amicable divorce of cities and punishment in late 
modernity. The process allowed urban centres to keep the courts 
and tasked suburbia or more preferably the countryside with 
hosting prisons.
The departure of prisons from cities is a lamentable devel-
opment. Lamentable in the f irst place because it succumbs to 
a Nimbyism that hides its chief concerns regarding property 
value under the rhetorical guise of public health and safety; and 
because it serves neoliberal agendas of decreasing the state’s 
visibility, but not necessarily the prison system’s size, brutality, 
costs or complicity in private-sector prof iteering from what is 
effectively becoming the warehousing of an urban underclass. 
Beyond its hypocritical underpinnings, moreover, the process 
is dangerous since it reduces urban populations’ tolerance to 
social diversity and promotes ignorance about criminality’s 
sources and consequences. Last but not least, the process further 
victimises prison inmates and their families by severing them 
from the urban environment they mostly came from and to 
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which they will most likely return. However we choose to exile 
or camouflage our prisons, we accelerate inmates’ social death 
rather than take active responsibility for their fates. In doing 
so, we weaken ourselves as a society and drain the remaining 
meaning from a democratic system of justice.
The quiet transfer in Amsterdam
Amsterdam is a case in point. At the turn of the 19th and 
20th  centuries the city housed one major detention centre 
(Huis van Bewaring; founded 1850) and one prison (1890); the 
f irst just off the Weteringschans, the second on the Havenstraat. 
A third facility, carved during the early Nazi occupation out of 
the Lloyd Hotel, near the Entrepothaven, signalled an initial 
move of such spaces away from densely populated areas as well 
as a new desire to render them less conspicuous. A pronounced 
suburbanisation began in 1978, when the f irst two facilities men-
tioned above were replaced by a new one, built in a new south 
eastern neighbourhood just within the city’s ring road. Seeking 
to humanize inmates, calm local residents, or both, architects 
of the Bijlmerbajes (‘the Bijlmer slammer’), as the site came to 
be known, excluded window bars from the buildings’ original 
design. But even this facility was comparatively short-lived. In 
2016 the quiet transfer of Amsterdam’s prisons will be complete, 
with the opening of the PI Zaanstad, a massive new facility with 
a capacity to hold up to 1000 inmates, located in an industrial 
park across the IJ and towards the North Sea.
The city’s recent history of complicity in government efforts 
to move prisons away from the centre or disguising them within 
it undermines its reputation as a tolerant and inclusive place. In-
deed, it highlights how much Amsterdam has become unoriginal 
and uncreative about dealing with deviance and diversity. Still 
worse, Amsterdam is typical of the country as a whole: many 
prison facilities in the Netherlands are either already situated in 
sparsely populated areas or are fast en route to the countryside. 
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Most of those that are not (or not yet) can only generously be 
described as suburban, a remarkable fact in one of Europe’s most 
urbanised countries. The process is slow but steady, and without 
understanding what is socially and politically at stake in allow-
ing it to run its course, myopic politicians and opportunistic 
urban planners will likely continue to boast their efforts to 
make urban environments safer (read: less diverse ethnically 
and socio-economically), or at least wealthier.
Beyond Amsterdam
From a cultural-historical perspective there is something forced 
if not outright disingenuous about such claims. In the United 
States, where incarceration is a veritable epidemic, prisons evoke 
a combination of shame and fear. Shame about a broken penal 
system and fear of its products scaling the prison walls to become 
a menace in our midst. US prisons moreover are historically 
more rural institutions (and, as such, large employers of eco-
nomically depressed communities), which means that Nimby 
support is all but guaranteed when it comes to ruralizing prisons 
or battling plans that would bring such facilities near any but 
the poorest urban neighbourhoods. In Europe, by contrast, 
municipal prisons have a far stronger civic tradition, associated 
with city liberties (hard-earned from popes, bishops, counts and 
kings) often dating back to the continent’s f irst major wave of 
urbanisation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In subse-
quent eras prisons’ urban location in or near major government 
compounds rendered them focal points of social and political 
protest and helped crystalize their image as local and national 
lieux de mémoire. Europeans’ relations with urban prisons are 
thus historically more ambiguous, given that the latter were 
welcome administrative burdens and their edif ices served as 
an accoutrement of state apparatuses.
Yet even in Europe active prisons are now viewed with in-
creasing unease as a blemish on an otherwise attractive urban 
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landscape, an obstacle on the road to gentrif ication. True, 
older penitentiaries are sometimes saved from demolition, 
even celebrated, but usually with the proviso that they must 
be decommissioned, at which point the sky is truly the limit: 
shopping malls, boutique hotels, museums, schools, galleries, 
ateliers… Social progress and economic development appear to 
be epitomised in the transformation of such sites, and it is ironi-
cally often the most effective way to preserve prisons’ memory 
and physical fabric. (Of course, few bother to ask how the reloca-
tion actually impacts inmates; presumably, progress benef its 
everyone equally.) But when a detention centre is still active, who 
would regale their guests with a tour of the local prison to show 
them how we deal with criminals and how important it is for 
us to impress our social values upon those built environments? 
But what if we were actually comfortable with the penal system 
in ways that are at least comparable to our basic faith in our 
justice system? Considering they are one and the same, the very 
dichotomy seems odd.
One explanation for late-modern urbanites’ aversion to 
prisons is that they are usually exposed to them through the 
mediating lenses of blockbuster movies and TV drama. Designed 
for popular consumption with at best a dash of social critique, 
series like Oz, Prison Escape, and, most recently, Orange is the 
New Black, emphasise inmates’ (and guards’) sexuality, corrup-
tion and violence, often at the expense of other human vulner-
abilities, social structures and disabling political agendas that 
could collectively bridge between rather than separate detainees 
and the world at large. Without critical, f irst-hand knowledge, 
however, our generation sees prisons as an ultra-violent world 
unto itself and likely f inds socially aff irmative institutions 
such as Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail (founded 1773) and the 
Mettray Penal Colony (founded 1840), let alone the Rasphuis and 
the Spinhuis, diff icult to fathom. Faith in social deviants’ ability 
to act differently given the right environment and incentives and 
a conviction that they should be allowed to acquire the necessary 
skills to reintegrate are rare commodities today, at least outside 
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Scandinavia. And even among our northern neighbours, rehabili-
tation usually takes place in a rural and fairly secluded context, 
despite the overwhelming urban profile of Scandinavian society.
Stopping the silent transfer of prisons from cities, let alone 
reversing the trend, is a hard sell. It is expensive and it may not 
reduce crime or recidivism rates in the short term. Yet there is 
much to gain socially and politically from prisons’ reintroduc-
tion and integration into cities in creative ways that do not put 
residents at unnecessary risk. At the very least, it will raise 
awareness about social deviancy, its diverse origins, and the 
complexities of dealing with it in an open, democratic society. 
The alternative is to allow civic apathy to continue operating by 
default against the same communities that are already margin-
alised by off icialdom, a process that over time will constrict and 
constrain our capacity for empathy and inclusivity. Whatever 
our positions on dealing with crime may be, we cannot afford 
to be too complacent about our legal experts’ capacity to make 
crucial and sometimes irreversible decisions about what is best 
for our society. Before we know it, our justice system will cease 
to be ours. Or was that, too, an illusion?
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17. Build something different for a 
change!
How the people of Amsterdam resisted the sell-
out of their city centre
Tim Verlaan
The last few years have seen an undermining of the liveability of 
European inner cities. Residents and small businesses are rapidly 
being replaced by international mass tourism. With the rise of 
low-cost airlines, the worldwide growth of the middle class and 
the irrepressible home-sharing economy, an end to the growing 
tourism flows is still not in sight.
Amsterdam too has lost its balance. Since the turn of the 
century, tourists have been taking possession of the city’s canal 
belt and hotels are springing up like mushrooms. Policymakers 
are encouraging the tourism flows ever further, or at best are 
responding with a half-hearted ban on hotels. The functional and 
socially diverse city centre is making way for a tourist reservation 
with unaffordable rental and hospitality prices. Local residents 
often feel powerless. Amsterdam citizens complain bitterly about 
the increasing pressure, but at the same time rent out their f lats 
via popular websites such as Airbnb.
It seems as if Amsterdam has forgotten that a hard battle was 
once fought to defend its beloved inner city against the urban 
planners of the 1960s. At that time the threat came from modern-
ist off ice and hotel complexes, shopping centres and motorways. 
In the 1970s critical citizens turned against the goals and methods 
of large-scale urban renewal, which formed the foundation 
for such developments. Assisted by a shaky economy and the 
changing wishes and demands of residents, in the 1980s willing 
politicians and critical citizens were able to transform the inner 
city into an affordable place to live, work and enjoy leisure time.
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If this unique character of the Amsterdam inner city is to be 
preserved, the city needs to regain the ability to defend itself 
as it did during the 1970s. If history repeats itself, as historians 
often claim, then we must also be able to learn from it. And so 
this article examines how the people of Amsterdam over the 
1970s succeeded in resisting the city’s hotel and business sector.
The end of Paradiso
The current hotel boom has its origins in the urban crisis of 
the 1960s and 1970s, when tens of thousands of residents and 
hundreds of businesses left Amsterdam for the surrounding 
region. In a spiral of impoverishment and decay, the slowly 
increasing tourism trade was one of the few glimmers of hope 
for the city’s economic future. Municipal politicians were thus 
major advocates of more hotel accommodation in the inner city. 
With the growing number of hotels and catering establishments, 
from the start of the 1970s onward central areas slowly but surely 
shifted from production environments to consumer environ-
ments. Social encounters and hotel stays became increasingly 
associated with culture and entertainment.
As a result, investors and property developers grew interested 
in the development of hotel accommodation. During the 1960s 
and 1970s the most high-profile plans were put forward by the 
hospitality entrepreneur Nicolaas Bouwes, who hoped to build 
a huge hotel complex on the Leidseplein. This would involve 
demolition of the buildings known today as Paradiso and De 
Balie. After years of unsuccessful negotiations and rejected 
designs, in 1974 Bouwes presented a plan with a f loor area of 
49,000 square metres consisting of a 300-room hotel, a car park, 
shops and catering establishments. The complex, grouped in 
several blocks measuring 25 metres in height, was linked to shops 
in the P.C. Hooft district via a pedestrian bridge.
The city council felt little enthusiasm for the form and func-
tion of this project. Council members described it as a ‘piece 
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of Manhattan’, developed in order to earn as much as possible 
using the minimum of space, and accused the architect of 
an inf inite lack of imagination. A council majority felt that 
the central location on the Leidseplein necessitated a wider 
discussion about whether Amsterdam needed Bouwes’ mass 
luxury tourism. The press was f iercely critical as well. De 
Groene Amsterdammer described it mockingly as ‘a piece of 
Hoog Catharijne’ (a large brutalist shopping centre in Utrecht) 
in Amsterdam; Het Parool spoke of the danger of the inner city’s 
diversity being replaced by a single type of architecture with a 
single type of atmosphere.
The PvdA alderman for Urban Development, Han Lammers, 
defended the project bitterly. He compared the decision-making 
process of the day to a moving train which council members 
should jump onto: ‘It is advisable not to remain on the rear ob-
servation deck, but to walk through to the driver’s cabin without 
‘An unrealised plan by Bouwes, involving preservation of Paradiso (1965)’ Source: 
Amsterdam image archive
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pulling the emergency brake on the way.’ According to Lammers, 
what was good for Bouwes was good for the city: He would clear 
up a piece of dismal architecture and prevent the Leidseplein 
from decaying into a desolate, rotting site.
The purport of Lammers’ reaction as a politician is something 
often heard since then: Tourism is important to the city’s economy 
and a shortage of hotel rooms is deadly for local business. It is an 
argument that gives little consideration to the liveability of the 
inner city and the sensitivities of residents.
A democratic-cultural alternative
Although Bouwes modif ied the design and ultimately spared 
Paradiso, the scale of the complex was the least of the problems 
for opponents of the project. It was the undemocratic and elitist 
nature of his plan that led to resistance. Protectors of monu-
ments, architects and neighbourhood action groups said that 
their city should not be sacrificed to the self-aggrandising project 
of a property developer. In early 1975 the opponents united in 
an action group called Bouw-es-wat-anders, a play on the name 
Bouwes roughly meaning ‘Build something different for a 
change’. The group was generally known by its abbreviation: 
bewa. More important than the counter-arguments provided by 
bewa was its democratic planning alternative, which envisaged 
the most extensive public participation process in the history 
of Amsterdam. If the Bouwes plan went ahead, the soul of the 
Leidseplein would be lost, or as the action group described the 
square’s highly diverse nightlife crowd:
It’s the artists and their art bums, the voyeurs and their 
exhibitionists, the rowdies and their sociologists, the free-
loaders and their rich patrons, the silent drinkers and the 
screaming drug users, the beautiful crazies, the silly poofs, 
the deadly serious gays, the f ilm fans, the night owls and the 
daydreamers.
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Bewa aimed to capture this diversity in a counterplan that would 
give space to flats for young people and the elderly, small-scale 
catering and shopping facilities, workplaces and a cultural cen-
tre. Buoyed by these alternatives, the Leidseplein would remain 
the city’s multifaceted and convivial living room, furnished by 
a wide range of citizens, architects and investors. According to 
bewa, Bouwes had put the future of this inner-city living room 
at risk. Despite encouragements by the Municipal Executive, 
Bouwes refused to take the alternatives seriously. A mixing of 
his intended public and the visitors to Paradiso was unthinkable, 
triggering him to state this central location deserved better:
Does public housing really need to be provided in this exact 
part of Amsterdam? I don’t mean that in a derogatory way, 
you know, but then you’ll see the washing hanging out on 
Monday, and so on (…). If this plan doesn’t get realised it’ll be 
a disaster for Amsterdam.
The resignation of Lammers as alderman in summer 1975 de-
prived the property developer of his most important ally. Lam-
mers’ replacement Cees de Cloe ultimately ditched the plan. It 
was not market dynamics, business consultation or information 
monopolies, but instead the primacy of the political body that 
determinen the future of Amsterdam’s inner city, on the Leidse-
plein and elsewhere. On 27 April 1977 the city council forced the 
Municipal Executive to draw up a new package of wishes and 
requirements for the building plot, giving due attention to public 
housing and cultural facilities. Consequentially, Bouwes threw 
in the towel and left the redevelopment to bewa and its partners.
The right to the city
The discussion about the future of the Leidseplein demonstrates 
that inner cities have always been crystallisation points for soci-
etal developments. Political ideas about the future, the influence 
144  
of market players and social unrest always show themselves most 
strongly in the heart of our cities. What can administrators and 
citizens learn from the 1970s? Although today’s Max Euweplein is 
a dubious result of the negotiation process between both parties, 
the activities of bewa show that market forces in the centre of 
Amsterdam need not present a fait accompli. The compromise 
that we now see on the Leidseplein, with retention of Paradiso 
and De Balie, is certainly a more accessible and pleasant place 
than the hotel colossus Bouwes wanted to build. Bewa showed 
through its actions that citizens can claim their right to their 
city by making themselves seen and heard in both political and 
spatial terms.
There is little use in looking back on such actions with a sense 
of nostalgia. Veteran activists tend to accuse younger genera-
tions of inner-city inhabitants of political apathy and laziness. 
But they forget that carrying out political action has become 
an unaffordable luxury, exemplif ied by current rental prices 
and study debt legislation. Moreover, Amsterdam’s current hotel 
boom is less visible than the wholesale redevelopment efforts 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Repurposing of historical buildings now 
involves restoration and refurbishment instead of demolition, 
meaning Amsterdam residents experience the process of inner-
city transformation less consciously.
Politicians should be sensitive to the events and feelings in 
their city. Disturbances caused by tourism are not just a question 
of perception. Amsterdam will not become a second Venice, 
or so today’s council members reassure, not wishing to return 
to the ‘empty’ and ‘poor’ inner city of the 1970s. Seen from the 
perspective of the crisis in which the city found itself then, plans 
such as those of Bouwes were at least understandable. However, 
nowadays the city would have no difficulty whatsoever in surviv-
ing without a total abandonment to mass tourism, as might be 
proven by growing population f igures and a diverse economy.
What’s more, other European cities show how things can be 
done differently. Bruges has applied a strict hotel moratorium for 
years; in summer 2015 Berlin announced a rental cap in response 
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to the growing tourism. In Barcelona, a city struggling with in-
creasing visitor numbers as well, the tourist limit introduced by 
the new Mayor proves that political engagement can still be the 
key to citizen’s right to their city. Only if citizens organise them-
selves and city administrators protect them against the volatile 
dictates of the market, can something of the socio-culturally 
mixed inner city be retained. In fact, Amsterdam citizens owe 
it to bewa, and to the countless other action groups that fought 
for this ideal in the 1970s, to make a stand now.
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18. Big is beautiful?
Small-scale urban projects for a new century
Stan Majoor
All over Europe in the past three decades, the trend has been 
towards large-scale urban projects. The aim of these system-
atic interventions, developed in close collaboration between 
governments and large private investors, has been to strongly 
direct spatial, economic and social developments in specif ic 
sections of cities. Major construction programmes have been 
implemented around strategic locations in former port areas 
and at (new) transport nodes, especially those of the growing 
European high-speed train network. These programmes have 
involved a combination of off ices, hotels, housing, retail, cul-
ture, entertainment and new public spaces. Notable projects 
in the Netherlands have included the Zuidas and the southern 
bank of the river IJ in Amsterdam and Kop van Zuid in Rot-
terdam. Comparable goals are being aimed for in projects such 
as HafenCity in Hamburg, Rive Gauche in Paris, Docklands in 
London and Donau City in Vienna. A discourse of globalisation 
and competition has naturally played a major role among the 
politicians and economic elites who initiated such transforma-
tions. They have emphasised the need for positioning cities better 
as a good place to live for new (and wealthy) residents and for 
accommodating high-value economic and cultural functions 
that would otherwise go elsewhere. In short, they have pointed 
to the importance of strengthening the nodal function of cities, 
especially in the service economy.
Have these large-scale spatial transformations in the recent 
past been successful? This is an important question, but in view 
of the large number and diversity of the projects, one that is not 
easy to answer. Moreover, one is always faced with the tricky 
methodological and political question of how success can be 
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measured. Generally speaking these projects have delivered 
what could be expected in view of their goals. The transformed 
city districts have indeed been enriched with high-quality resi-
dential and office space, facilities for consumers and (sometimes) 
culture. They have become vehicles for large-scale property 
investments, and some cities have been able to improve their 
position in economic networks – obviously at the expense of 
losses for others. In terms of urban planning, architecture and 
programme they have often reflected a fairly elitist view of the 
city. Many of these projects have not been fine examples of demo-
cratic participation in the development of their concepts and 
decision-making. Closed processes that depoliticised projects 
have been more typical. After all, according to their proponents 
the usefulness and necessity of the projects were beyond any 
doubt. But precisely this point is open to criticism. The profits 
have often gone to private developers, investors and owners, 
while the government authorities were the parties who made 
major preliminary investments and took risks.
Changing conditions and crisis effects
Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to see what the future value 
of such ‘urbanisation solutions’ is in the light of changing condi-
tions and evolving societal values. Many large-scale projects in 
the recent past have strongly emphasised the creation of colossal 
(and speculative) office complexes in expensive market segments. 
However, a wide range of technical and societal developments 
are causing these traditional workplaces of the service economy 
to rapidly lose importance. There is a comparable degree of 
uncertainty about the future of large shopping centres. On the 
other hand, many areas still have a shortage of ‘urban living’ 
for a wide range of target groups. The city is currently popular 
as a place to live and work among business starters and (small) 
families, while older people too can f ind the amenities they need 
here, as well as something to do. These groups are seeking mixed 
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neighbourhoods with amenities and space for small-scale busi-
ness activities. In accordance with this idea, modern cities should 
realign towards a more f inely meshed structure of economic 
functions and an accessible housing market.
Besides this changing demand we are also seeing a develop-
ment in thinking about how major urban transformations come 
about. The global f inancial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 
once again showed that real-estate markets are growing ever 
more interlinked with international f inancial systems and 
have thus become more volatile. Due to their speculative and 
growth-oriented nature, major urban projects have contributed 
strongly to real-estate bubbles. The large property developers 
and f inanciers behind these projects have become more vulner-
able and thus also more cautious. Another problem is that they 
often offer standard solutions that consumers experience as 
oppressive. The crisis, together with the partial stagnation of 
the traditional development model in many cities, has fuelled a 
shift towards a more participatory model of urban development 
that has slowly but surely been growing for some time. Residents 
and entrepreneurs are seeking control over their own (spatial) 
environment and are creating opportunities through innovative 
forms of spatial use and reuse or at locations where traditional 
developers and f inanciers see no potential.
Towards new urbanisation solutions
Urban transformation through such smaller-scale initiatives, 
closer to the end users, is an attractive perspective in a situation 
that involves, on the one hand, uncertainty and criticism of the 
one-sided results of many projects and, on the other, a need for 
more ownership – in a broad interpretation of the term – of 
urban space. The economic crisis has created opportunities 
for this. On many (temporarily) disused sites, possibilities are 
being granted to collectives of private persons for temporary 
functions. Projects commissioned on a private (collective) basis 
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in the housing market give groups of residents more control over 
the development of future living environments.
How can European cities of the 21st century enable such 
initiatives to grow into full-f ledged elements that can replace 
the mostly large-scale, systematic projects of recent decades? 
One important challenge is to link the principles of small-scale 
approach and private initiative to larger societal, spatial and 
ecological transitions that are now facing cities. These transitions 
are wide-ranging, such as issues of inclusivity of neighbourhoods 
for all levels of society. How can we live and work together while 
retaining our diversity? How can we achieve high or higher 
density without a loss of quality? And what about the necessary 
energy and mobility transitions, in which cities must play an im-
portant role? The challenge is to enable small-scale approaches 
and private initiatives to also achieve collective goals, without 
becoming trapped in large-scale, systematic project planning.
Facilitating the small-scale approach
Government authorities in particular will need to change their 
approach. While in the recent past they have focused on col-
laboration with major f inancial institutions in designing cities, 
now a new role is required. Facilitating small-scale private 
initiatives feels counter-intuitive for many ambitious spatial 
planners who base their work on traditional control models. 
The origin of contemporary urban planning – both its ideas and 
its implementation in various planning guidelines and legisla-
tion – lies chiefly in government intervention in and regulation 
of ‘spontaneous’ development by individual owners and users. 
This is of course accompanied by all kinds of noble intentions 
for more fairness, more eff iciency and more democratic control. 
Can spatial planning develop in a direction that remains in line 
with (or renews) these goals while offering more space for private 
initiatives? Can a new balance be found in the city between 
private initiative and controlling conditions?
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For government authorities this will mean not determining 
everything themselves but instead trusting the creativity of the 
city and its players to take on responsibility. At the same time 
requirements will still have be set, for instance in the area of 
accessibility and affordability. Democratic legitimisation of the 
direction taken by the urban development will also remain an 
important task of the authorities. Sometimes public (pre)invest-
ments will be needed, for instance in ‘difficult’ locations, or to give 
society a small push in the right direction. After all, not all urban 
nodes are taken up by private parties. This does not automatically 
mean large spatial goals will have to be abandoned: an accumu-
lation of small steps can sometimes more effectively achieve a 
transition than changes that are imposed top-down and often 
prove diff icult. Examples from Germany and the Netherlands 
show that recent (collective) self-construction projects for housing 
often offer much greater perspectives for an energy transition 
than do laborious rounds of negotiation between authorities and 
the business community at national and European level. In this 
way, urban policy has the potential to become not only more 
dynamic, but perhaps also more progressive and effective.
Is this picture overly optimistic? The small-scale approach 
is certainly not a panacea for the new city. Nor will it do away 
with inequality, conflict and sometimes merciless economic 
processes of elimination. Rather, it is a way of thinking and 
acting in order to deal with these issues in a pragmatic way, an 
approach for realising new futures and practices in the city, off 
the well-trodden path that in recent decades has mostly involved 
facilitating large-scale area development by institutional players. 
And so it is also a quest for new f inancing models that dispense 
with speculation and are implemented directly by the owners 
and users. The biggest problem lies with the planners and politi-
cians themselves: they are still far too accustomed to the idea 
that only their (large-scale) interventions can change society 
and urban space in a positive way. For them, a new era means 
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19. Creative cities and shrinking 
cities: False opposites?
Marco Bontje
The European Union sees towns and cities, and especially the 
major cities, as a ‘motor of growth’. At the same time, the EU 
recognises that many towns and cities are not growing, and 
‘shrinking cities’ also occupy a prominent place on the Euro-
pean policy and research agenda. Shrinking cities do not f it 
the principles of European (or national) policy. They do not, 
for instance, meet the principles of the European model for 
sustainable urban developments: shrinking towns and cities 
are usually not ‘attractive places’ or ‘motors of growth’, they 
do not usually exhibit ‘social progress’, they are not ‘powerful 
regional centres’ and they are often situated in economically 
underperforming regions. Policymakers, not only in Brussels 
but also at the national, regional or local levels, usually wish to 
combat shrinkage with measures to return to growth as quickly 
as possible. One of the development concepts that often raises 
strong expectations is ‘the creative city’. But isn’t the creative 
city above all a policy concept for ‘winners’, for growing cities? 
Or do shrinking cities perhaps also have creative opportunities?
Shrinkage need not be a disaster
Before exploring possible answers to this question, we need to 
question the obsession (not only in Europe) with population 
growth and economic growth. Population shrinkage is not by 
definition a disaster for a city. There are different types of shrink-
age: shrinkage occurs in all kinds of forms and degrees. Before a 
population forecast leads to panic in a city, one should f irst take 
a close look at what is really happening and whether there are 
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real reasons for concern. Elements that should be considered are 
whether just the number of city residents is decreasing or also the 
number of households (and linked to this: are houses standing 
empty or not), which population groups are shrinking and which 
may also be growing, whether the shrinkage is long-term and 
structural or only incidental, and above all the extent to which 
the population shrinkage is accompanied by economic shrinkage 
or stagnation. In this context cities also need to realise that many 
European towns and cities already have a shrinking population 
and that in the coming decades this will apply to many more 
European cities. Unless Europe becomes much more generous in 
admitting migrants (which is unlikely) or European birth rates 
rise strongly (which is also unlikely), population shrinkage is set 
to become ‘the new normal’. Not only in rural areas but certainly 
also in a large number of European towns and cities.
Creativity as salvation of cities?
Every city would like to be a creative city. The term creativity has 
a positive connotation – not only among policymakers – espe-
cially when it involves forms of creativity that enable money to 
be earned and let a city put itself on the map. Since the 1990s the 
creative industry has been one of the fastest-growing economic 
sectors, and it also seems to have a promising future in the coming 
years. Museums, theatres, festivals, creative clusters, incubators 
and architectural landmarks have become important weapons 
in the international struggle between cities for investments and 
highly trained talent. But there is also a downside to a strategy 
aimed at the creative city. Not every city can be a creative city and 
not even all city inhabitants profit from such a strategy: it is often 
a strategy with relatively few winners and many more losers. The 
most successful creative cities are often cities that were already 
doing well economically and already have a long tradition as 
centres of culture and knowledge: this is usually not a new success 
‘that came from nowhere’ but instead built on existing success. 
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Shrinking cities that need creativity as a means of rescue will 
unfortunately often f ind themselves grasping at straws.
Nonetheless, there are some examples of shrinking cities in 
Europe that, thanks also to a flourishing creative industry, have 
begun growing again after decades of decline, both demographi-
cally and economically. Leipzig for instance: after seven decades of 
dramatic shrinkage, which actually seemed to be accelerating in 
the 1990s, the population began growing again from 2000 onwards, 
quickly followed by a remarkable economic recovery. The creative 
industry seems to have played an important role in this recovery, 
including the art of the New Leipzig School as a successful export 
product, a growing media sector and crowd-pullers such as music 
festivals and game industry fairs. A growing knowledge cluster in 
the life sciences, the formation of a new automobile cluster and the 
superbly renovated city centre have also contributed to Leipzig’s 
recovery. Comparable stories from the last ten to f ifteen years 
can be told about Dresden (rebuilt historic centre as a tourism 
magnet and successful high-tech industry) and Manchester (from 
industrial to creative knowledge city).
But for the time being these seem to be exceptions. Having al-
ready been centres of culture, innovation and knowledge earlier 
in their histories, these cities can now successfully reference this 
tradition after spending several decades trapped in a temporary 
vicious cycle of decay due to an unlucky combination of circum-
stances. They are prof iting from a more general ‘back to the 
(big) city trend’ that we have seen in many European countries, 
including the Netherlands, in recent years. Moreover, their recent 
growth is at the expense of their surrounding regions, which 
are growing much less strongly or even shrinking. Part of the 
new urban growth in these formerly shrinking cities is due to a 
reduction in the exodus from the city to the surrounding areas 
(less suburbanisation and people remaining resident in the city 
for longer) and an increase in the influx from the surrounding 
region to the city. Smaller shrinking cities and towns usually 
do not have these possible sources of new growth: they are not 
and never were centres of culture, innovation and knowledge, 
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and their surrounding regions are usually thinly populated, or 
they themselves are situated in the shadow of a larger city that 
attracts people from these smaller cities and towns.
Creative opportunities for shrinking cities?
How can these smaller shrinking cities and towns nonetheless 
play a role in an economy that is increasingly focused on creativ-
ity, innovation and knowledge? If we could develop the ‘creative 
city policy strategy’ in a rather more diverse and inventive way 
than has been the case in Europe up until now, then smaller 
shrinking cities should f ind opportunities as well. The nature of 
these opportunities depends partly on the location of these cities 
with respect to the dominant creative centres. Small shrinking 
cities and towns that lie close to major creative centres, and 
perhaps are shrinking precisely because of this proximity, may 
be able to augment the regional creative economy. They might 
be able to offer what the large creative city does not have (or no 
longer has): room for affordable working and living environments 
and free spaces for creative starters and marginal creativity. 
Commercially successful creative companies often arise from 
small businesses that are not prof itable in their f irst years, or 
require these small businesses and freelancers as suppliers 
or project partners. The more large, commercially successful, 
creative businesses there are in a city, the bigger the chance that 
precisely these small start-ups and freelancers can no longer f ind 
an affordable place in the city. Then smaller cities and towns 
close to the big creative city may present an alternative start-up 
environment. An environment that still offers space (literally and 
f iguratively) to experiment – with experiments that can also fail 
from time to time without this obstructing new opportunities.
Smaller shrinking cities and towns that lie further from the 
major creative centres will need to come up with something else. 
They could, for instance, see whether there are niches in the crea-
tive industry that are not, or hardly, represented and in which 
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the smaller cities could play a pioneering role. An exploration 
of local and regional traditions may provide inspiration: what 
do we have that others don’t, or what are/were we good at? This 
can also include the valorisation of creative craftsmanship or old 
trades, or a combination of creative ideas and a more sustainable 
economy and society. Another option, separate or supplementary 
to the above, is to explore possibilities for creating alliances with 
the large creative centres or, on the other hand, with players in 
a similar position (other smaller shrinking cities and towns) to 
f ind growth options under the motto ‘united we stand’.
Growth-shrinkage partnerships
The fastest growing cities in Europe often grow at the expense 
of other areas: either the rest of their own urban region, or other 
parts of the country. This raises questions about which kind of 
development is ultimately the most desirable at national and 
European levels: placing all bets on the fastest growers with the 
most competitive strength, or putting an emphasis on mutual 
solidarity between growing and shrinking parts of Europe? Two 
recent projects explore possibilities of helping, as a growing 
urban region, to solve the problems of shrinking regions. Under 
the title ‘The Responsible Capital’, Amsterdam has entered into 
a partnership with three shrinking towns and their regions at 
the edges of the Netherlands: Delfzijl (north-east Groningen), 
Sluis (Zeelandic Flanders) and Heerlen (South Limburg). This al-
liance includes knowledge exchange on urban development and 
cooperation in cultural events. A European project with similar 
principles was the Interreg IVC project ‘Urban-Rural Partnerships 
in Metropolitan Areas’ (URMA, 2012-2014). Led by researchers at 
the HafenCity University Hamburg, an international consortium 
worked on knowledge exchange on, and possible improvement 
of, partnerships between urban and rural regions. These projects 
are congenial in nature and certainly contribute to discussions 
that deserve a higher place on the European policy agenda. But 
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the concrete results of these partnership plans remain mod-
est for the time being and such projects also raise questions 
about whether the shrinking regions really benefit from this, or 
whether it is the growing urban regions that ultimately prof it 
the most. Nonetheless, they are a possible start for a new type of 
urban and regional development programme that creates better 
opportunities for shrinking parts of Europe.
Creative cities do not necessarily have to be growing cities; 
shrinking cities and towns can also play their part in a creative 
economy. A European urban policy that focuses exclusively on 
cities as ‘motors of growth’ threatens to exclude a large propor-
tion of European cities and towns, or to impose a forced ‘back to 
growth policy’ with a major chance of failure. European urban 
policy should be a policy for all European cities and towns, not 
only for the growing and/or most creative ones and also not 
only for the most creative and/or highly educated parts of the 
population.
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The third topic, creative cities, focuses on the innovative na-
ture of cities – and not just in the economic sense. Joost Jonker 
provides a historical account of the creative destruction and 
economic recovery of cities. Claartje Rasterhoff explores the 
way that technological development can be seen as the symbol 
of the creative city, while Frank Kresin argues that citizens 
should become involved in developing and using technological 
innovations: smart cities need to cherish their smart residents.
The other contributions focus more on political and cultural 
innovation. Robert Kloosterman warns of the dangers of overly 
sanitised urban spaces: a tamed city is not a creative one. Moritz 
Föllmer also makes a case for the importance of unpredictability. 
In cities, this can also take the form of collective action and 
urban social movements, such as neighbourhood action groups 
and squatters. The Amsterdam squatting movement once had 
a lot of influence, but the large squats were cleared or legalised, 
vacancy rates are lower and squatting has been made illegal. Jaap 
Draaisma explains how the City of Amsterdam has attempted to 
preserve and harness the creativity of the squatting movement 
through the so-called ‘creative-incubator policy’ (broedplaatsen-
beleid), an initiative to provide affordable studio spaces. Finally, 
Arnold Reijndorp discusses the opportunities inherent in new 
cities.
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20. The creative destruction and 
recovery of cities
Joost Jonker
According to the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, capi-
talism is a continuous process of creative destruction. Economic 
growth is driven by innovation, as entrepreneurs continually 
create new products. However, these new products replace 
existing products and manufacturing processes, resulting in 
capitalist society being in a constant process of innovative 
destruction.
As hubs of economic activity, cities are particularly affected 
by these processes of profound capitalist transformation. Time 
and again, economic activities – or entire sectors – disappear 
from the scene, with cities f inding themselves needing to re-
cover from the fallout. How they do this varies greatly from one 
city to the next, as does the degree to which government policy 
is able to make a successful contribution to economic recovery. 
Some local authorities endeavour for years to help their city 
recover from the disappearance of an entire industry – a sad 
fate that has befallen the cities of Liège, Lille, Liverpool and 
the cities in the German Ruhr Area, for example. Others are 
relatively quick to bounce back after one of these economic 
shocks, sometimes by deliberately changing tack to a com-
pletely different sector. By attracting companies in a targeted 
way, Rennes was able to build up a pharmaceutical business 
community, a sector which had not been represented at all in 
the city previously. In the case of Brussels, coincidence and 
location were key. The city was able to more than compensate 
for the loss of its role as an inland port and distribution centre 
when a host of different European bodies decided to make it 
their home.
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The ability to adapt
A city’s ability to adapt is determined by a range of very diverse 
factors. Obviously, cities with a central location and varied 
functions are quick to recover. You could say that London, for 
example, is in a constant process of transformation. Certain 
activities are lost and replaced by others seemingly effortlessly. 
Even recovering from the substantial bomb damage of the Blitz 
caused no signif icant upheaval. With a similar combination of 
a central location, a role as the seat of central government and 
high-quality services, Paris is also highly adaptable. However, 
the latter was unable to compensate suff iciently for the loss of 
its labour-intensive business sectors, like the automotive indus-
try, which resulted in the establishment of suburbs with high 
unemployment rates and deep-rooted social problems. Location 
can make a city very resilient. Both Rotterdam and Hamburg 
were relatively quick to recover after the bomb damage of the 
Second World War thanks to their strong connections with the 
hinterland – in contrast with Coventry, where the process took 
a lot more time and effort because this city was also struggling 
with encroaching industrial decline. However, location alone is 
not enough. Liverpool’s location – roughly comparable to those 
of Rotterdam and Hamburg – did not do the city much good 
when the process of de-industrialisation began to gather pace 
in England in the 1960s.
In order to arrive at a good understanding of these processes 
of creative destruction and recovery, then, we are better off 
studying cities which do not have clear advantages in terms of 
location or a key central function. Take Bonn, for example, which 
is still feverishly attempting to compensate for the departure 
of the German central government to Berlin, by establishing a 
number of brand-new conference facilities among other things. 
Amsterdam also f its into this category of cities which do not 
boast any obvious advantages.
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Amsterdam
Amsterdam likes to see itself as the centre of the world, or at least 
of the Netherlands. But, of course, it is not. Truth be told, Amster-
dam’s off-centre location is logistically impractical, which means 
that the city is forced to rely on other, less clearly identif iable 
factors, such as the position it has established for itself, its social 
and economic infrastructure or its range of appealing cultural 
attractions. This introduces a certain amount of unpredictability 
into the pattern of urban economic development.
There have been a number of signif icant periods in Amster-
dam’s history in which existing patterns of activity disappeared 
and new ones had to be found to replace them. The interesting 
thing about studying these periods is that they do not provide 
an unequivocal answer to the question as to how exactly the city 
recovered from these processes of creative destruction. The same 
thing that achieved results in one period barely made a differ-
ence, or even had a detrimental effect, in the next. Sometimes 
the government was required to provide a signif icant impetus 
to the economy, while at other times the economy bounced back 
more or less of its own accord. Where in one sector substantial 
investments by local authorities yielded little or no returns, other 
sectors thrived and flourished without any signif icant f inancial 
intervention at all.
The f inal quarter of the 17th century is a good example of the 
city successfully managing to adapt to changing circumstances 
as a result of joint efforts between the local authorities and the 
business community. At the time, more and more international 
trade was withdrawing – partly as a result of protectionism 
abroad and partly because the emerging competition elsewhere 
saw the Amsterdam warehouse as a detour. French wine was no 
longer carried across the Baltic Sea primarily on Dutch ships, but 
on French, English, German or Danish ones instead. Instead of 
continuing to trade goods themselves, merchants diversified into 
supplying a highly-developed, comprehensive package of ser-
vices – encompassing transportation, insurance and commercial 
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credit – to their foreign customers. Due to specialisation and 
volume, those services were much cheaper in Amsterdam than 
elsewhere. This transition enabled foreign trade to remain very 
buoyant until the f inal quarter of the 18th century. The local 
government contributed to this success by giving the Bank of 
Amsterdam the new role of seamlessly supporting the merchants 
in their endeavours.
Government policy and Amsterdam’s adaptability
A comparable shift at the beginning of the 19th century failed, 
when trade had to be built up from scratch after the Batavian-
French era (1795-1813). The cause of this can be found in the 
conflicting views that existed about the city’s economic future. 
Merchants were bending over backwards attempting to win 
back Amsterdam’s function as the distributor within Europe, but 
it had been lost forever. At the same time, King William I was 
pushing through a series of measures which, while well-intended, 
incited animosity within the city and its business community, 
as they were either superfluous or counterproductive: the es-
tablishment of De Nederlandsche Bank in 1814, the Netherlands 
Trading Society in 1824 and the construction of the Entrepotdok 
warehouse complex in 1827. In all, it took more than two decades, 
until roughly 1835, before the Amsterdam economy began to 
get back on its feet and new forms of economic activity, such 
as mechanical engineering, steam-powered sugar ref ining and 
mechanical rice husking, began to emerge.
Amsterdam has found itself at loggerheads with central 
government on many occasions since then, but in these cases it 
has usually been about money or the allocation of f inancial re-
sources, rather than over a fundamental difference of economic 
opinion. However, a consensus of opinion does not necessarily 
make policy more effective. During the 1960s, the city and central 
government agreed on the necessity of large-scale planning, 
urban development and getting the population to move to new 
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housing in peripheral municipalities. However, in trying to 
implement these plans, they were faced with dogged opposition 
from residents, with the result that the city ended up retaining 
its unique, small-scale, historic character. In the meantime, 
persistent attempts to establish a petrochemical cluster at the 
Port of Amsterdam fell f lat, again partly due to opposition from 
local citizens, and partly because the industry ultimately did 
not consider this a viable move.
The economic downturn of the 1970s marked the beginning 
of a diff icult period for Amsterdam. The local authorities tried 
their best to prevent the loss of labour-intensive industries like 
shipbuilding and automotive manufacturing, but they ended up 
disappearing all the same, and without new industries taking 
their place. Due to problems with accessibility, more and more 
businesses opted for a location outside of the city. The city 
centre visibly deteriorated as a result, as high unemployment 
and depopulation meant that the middle classes had insuf-
f icient disposable incomes. It was only in the mid-80s that the 
tide f inally began to turn, partly thanks to municipal policy. 
Under the powerful leadership of Alderman Jan Schaefer, an 
urban regeneration programme once again made Amsterdam 
an attractive place in which to live and situate your business, 
and the development of a new, large-scale off ice zone on the 
southern outskirts of the city brought about the necessary 
expansion in capacity for internationally oriented f inancial 
service providers.
However, it is striking that key developments that contrib-
uted to this economic recovery were not, or were only barely, 
the result of municipal policy. Schiphol Airport became a major 
source of employment in the region without the local authori-
ties having to do much at all. In addition, the combination of 
frequent links to all corners of the world and the improved 
urban environment led a number of major multinationals to 
decide to move their head off ices to Amsterdam, as it enabled 
them to offer their world-class staff the kind of working en-
vironment that places like Eindhoven, Arnhem or Zaandam 
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lacked. As a result, the population’s purchasing power began 
to grow, which in turn stimulated the emergence of a highly 
varied retail and hospitality sector. This also drew day trip-
pers from the surrounding area, as Amsterdam now once again 
had something unique and distinctive to offer. While the City 
Council injected millions into the Port of Amsterdam – with 
varying success – the city owed its economic recovery in part 
to the intimate urban fabric that had almost been destroyed 
thirty years before. The expensive container terminal was a 
f lop, and the innovation ended up coming from the existing, 
partly historical urban facilities. Bearing this in mind, the bil-
lions that Amsterdam is seeking to invest in new locks on the 
North Sea could perhaps be better spent on developing and 
fortifying those facilities.
Conclusion
Processes of creative destruction are completely unpredictable. 
Once it has become clear that a struggling industry can no longer 
be salvaged, even the entrepreneurs that are driving innovation 
are often unsure what direction things will go in next. Microsoft 
founder Bill Gates did not initially think that the internet had 
much of a future, even during the height of its boom. Steve Jobs 
dismissed smartphone apps as a fun extra and initially failed 
to recognise their tremendous economic potential for Apple. 
That is why it is often very diff icult for cities to replace lost 
economic activity, especially if it concerns a city that boasts no 
clearly identif iable benef its. What works in one period yields 
no effect in the next, though the reason behind this subsequent 
failure remains unclear. One thing, however, is clear. Cities, like 
entrepreneurs, need to tirelessly search for economic innovation 
and accept the fact that some of these efforts will be fruitless 
– without being able to know which from the outset. After all, 
sitting still is even more fruitless, and much riskier from a social 
point of view as well.
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21. Visions and symbols of the 
creative city
From the patroness of the city to the 3D Print 
Canal House
Claartje Rasterhoff
North Amsterdam is home to the 3D Print Canal House, a pres-
tigious ‘research-by-doing’ project that involves constructing a 
typical canal side property using 3D printing. If the architects 
and sponsors involved in the initiative have their way, this ex-
periment will be the city of the future in microcosm: sustainable, 
socially-conscious and creative. Perfectly reflecting the zeitgeist, 
it is also an exhibition and event space, where the public can con-
tribute ideas and watch live as a huge printer, the KamerMaker 
(RoomBuilder), produces the new building materials and designs. 
Artist’s impression of the 3D Print Canal House
Source: DUS Architects, Amsterdam
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The project is also a symbol of the Amsterdam Economic Board’s 
ambition of being Europe’s number one creative metropolis by 
2020. Why has it set itself this goal? Because urban creativity 
attracts and promotes economic activity and innovation, which 
in turn benefits the city and its residents. At least, that is the 
idea behind the creative city. Amsterdam policymakers are not 
the f irst to have big aspirations for their city, nor are they the 
f irst to bank on art and culture to make these goals a reality. 
But is it possible to plan a creative city? Or is wishful thinking 
ultimately the best that you can do? History suggests the latter. 
The question is whether that is such a bad thing.
Art and trade
Is it a coincidence that the 3D Print Canal House is on the very 
same site that was used, four hundred years ago, by cultural 
entrepreneurs avant la lettre Claes Jansz. Visscher and Pieter Bast 
to represent the city’s grandeur – right on the bank of the river IJ 
across from the current location of Amsterdam Central Station? 
On this print from 1611, we see the Amsterdam city skyline from 
the north, looking east to west. Recently, the cityscape had un-
dergone significant changes as a result of the first drawing-board 
plans for urban expansion becoming a reality, giving shipping 
and trade in particular more space reaching both eastwards and 
westwards. The image is dominated by the IJ, the city’s artery, 
with countless ships bobbing along on its surface. Also striking 
are the exotically-dressed foreigners offering their goods. The 
city’s buildings are prominently featured, with iconic sites and 
institutions such as the recently-established Stock Exchange, 
Dam Square and the Fish Market (Vismarkt). The patroness of 
the city of Amsterdam sits in the centre, holding the city’s coat 
of arms and a model ship in her hands. She receives her guests 
among an array of cultural artefacts, including a globe, nautical 
instruments, sheet music, a painter’s palette, silver and glassware 
and a copy of the New Testament. In the accompanying texts, we 
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can read about the library, where books in all languages could 
be consulted, about the presence of scholars and schoolteachers, 
about the many maps of places all over the world and about 
artistic prints by the greatest masters.
The emphasis on art, culture and science in this print symbol-
ises the city’s status as a patron of the arts and centre of human 
creativity. At the same time, the print represents art and science as 
being the foundations of urban development, referring to what we 
would now call cultural entrepreneurship and spill overs. Art and 
science served as both a honey pot and a fuel, and were invaluable 
tools in promoting the city and legitimising its administrative and 
policymaking decisions. For example, we can read the following 
words in Latin: ‘Piety, trade, art, science and government spread 
Amsterdam’s name all over the world.’ The makers of this 1611 
print were appealing to the egos of the new administrative elite. 
They did not only depict the city as they saw it, but also its future: 
Amsterdam as it could be, or even as it should be. And lo and be-
hold, their visions became a reality, as evidenced by the impressive 
commercial and artistic achievements of the Dutch Golden Age.
About half a century after this print was made, the patroness 
of the city was once again prominently depicted. Her seat, the 
new city hall – now known as the Royal Palace of Amsterdam 
Detail uit Profiel van Amsterdam, 1611, Claes Jansz Visscher, Pieter Bast
Source: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
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– was constructed between 1648 and 1665. Its marble floors are 
inlaid with maps that depict Amsterdam as the centre of the 
cosmos, the world and world trade. This display of the wealth and 
power of the city government was intended to send a clear signal 
to other local authorities: good luck trying to come up to this 
level! Although Amsterdam boasted a prominent commercial 
position by then, this colossal building could also be seen as a 
dream of the future. Unfortunately, the second half of the 17th 
century did not bring the grandeur that the city government 
had been hoping for. It turned out that many economic sectors 
had reached the limits of their growth, while other European 
cities were on the rise. While Amsterdam managed to retain 
its position as a signif icant trade hub and f inancial centre for a 
long time, the country entered a period of relative stagnation. For 
example, the eastern part of the city, which had been prepared 
for construction for the envisaged urban expansion of 1662, 
remained strikingly empty until well into the 19th century.
Art and manufacturing
It was not until the mid-19th century that the city truly began 
making new plans for urban expansion and improvement again. 
All over Europe, cities were working on parks, boulevards and 
public facilities. Of course, Amsterdam could not lag behind. 
New buildings, new streets and entire new neighbourhoods were 
constructed. At the same time, the city’s economic, social and 
cultural foundations were also subject to change and transforma-
tion. The new plans for Amsterdam were developed during a time 
characterised by frequent complaints about there being a lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit and innovative drive in the Netherlands, 
with people arguing that its past achievements had led the coun-
try, the city and the economy to become complacent. However, in 
the eyes of urban planner Samuel Sarphati, who was the driving 
force behind a number of large-scale urban construction projects, 
it was not a lack of drive among merchants and manufacturers 
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that was holding back Dutch progress so much as an overall 
lack of knowledge and capital. A series of new initiatives were 
undertaken with the intention of changing this. The Paleis voor 
Volksvlijt (Palace of National Industry) – which burned down in 
1929 but was recently put back on the Urban Agenda by Dutch 
artist Wim T. Schippers – was supposed to play a crucial role in 
this. Sarphati dreamt of an unrivalled building which would 
promote and showcase progress in trade, manufacturing, art 
and science:
[A building] that, in its dimensions, exceeds all other build-
ings in this city, a forecourt bigger than Dam Square, with 
a fountain, candelabras and tasteful planting, f lanked by 
two rows of large, elegant houses facing onto streets more 
than twice as wide as Reguliersbreestraat and longer than 
Kalverstraat, will create such a vista that many other capital 
cities will envy us.
Opened in 1864, the palace ended up being built on Frederiks-
plein, at the site that is now the location of De Nederlandsche 
Bank, and its completion marked the dawn of a new era. Like 
London’s renowned Crystal Palace, this impressive palace of 
industry was constructed out of glass and cast iron, and was 1,5 
time the size of the Royal Palace of Amsterdam, with a dome 
that towered high above the rest of the city.
Like the print from 1611, the palace represented both the ideal 
and the reality. In this period, the relationship between culture 
– including urban culture – and economy was re-examined. The 
dominant belief was that, like the classical Mercator Sapiens, 
merchants and manufacturers should not strive for economic 
gains alone, but should also invest in society, in particular in 
art and science – not just for their own consumption, but for the 
benefit of society as a whole. This resulted in the construction of 
showpieces such as the Concertgebouw (home of the Amsterdam 
Philharmonic), the Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam and the Paleis 
voor Volksvlijt. These projects were driven by civilising ideals 
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– art to educate the public – but also by economic motivations 
– art as a stimulus for industry and trade. People often felt that 
machine-made products were ugly, and increasingly began to 
call for the integration of art and industry. The idea was that it 
was possible to gain an edge over competitors by having good 
designs and beautiful decoration. Industry, science and art had 
to be developed jointly, through exhibitions and associations 
for art and industry, such as in the Paleis voor Volksvlijt. This 
would make it possible to develop the public’s taste by presenting 
the rewards of progress, while at the same time stimulating the 
demand for products.
From the mid-19th century, employing culture, art, science 
and innovation began to play a more prominent role in the 
competition between cities and countries through, among other 
things, large-scale buildings and exhibitions. The Paleis voor 
Volksvlijt itself was a particularly f ine example of promotion for 
the city. In spite of the drive of the initiators and the palace’s 
success as an impressive feat of architecture, the domains of art 
and industry ended up drifting further apart during the course 
of the 19th century. The use of art and creativity in industrial 
production largely remained limited to style and embellishment, 
partly as a result of an increasing, newfound appreciation for 
craftsmanship and decoration. Industrial design would not really 
get off the ground in the Netherlands until the 20th century. And 
it turned out that it was diff icult to make the palace itself profit-
able, and as a result the emphasis in its programming shifted 
from industrial exhibitions to trade exhibitions and a role as a 
venue for events. Thanks to this increasing consumer function 
and the prominent location in the city, it ended up becoming an 
important part of Amsterdam as a cultural city after all.
Creative industry
Art, culture and science had an important place in the pre-
industrial and industrial city, just as they do today. Whether they 
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were tools for marketing the city, legitimising administrative 
and policymaking decisions or product differentiation, art and 
culture were taking shape in tandem with urban society, and 
helped to put cities on the map. At the end of the 20th century, 
this utilitarian approach was formalised in the concept of the 
‘creative city’. For post-industrial societies, it turned out that it 
was diff icult to compete with low-wage economies based on 
labour and raw materials. What industrialised cities could use 
to set themselves apart was knowledge, information, highly-
developed skills, cultural heritage and the ability to give scope 
to individual creativity. The only thing that was missing was 
a way to get access to, and extract, these new raw materials. 
Working with policymakers, academics considered the question 
of the conditions that were needed for creativity to f lourish and 
be transformed into commercial products. It turned out that 
cities offered all sorts of benefits compared to the countryside, 
such as a developed infrastructure and demand side, while 
social and geographical proximity strengthened the exchange 
of knowledge and cross-pollination that are the prerequisites 
for innovation and growth. The 3D Print Canal House is not 
one isolated project, but makes up part of the IJ bank, a centre 
of creative production and consumption by tourists, knowledge 
workers and creatives with relatively high incomes, including 
institutions such as the EYE Film Institute Netherlands, new 
media and technology hub A Lab, the new A’DAM tower and 
the Amsterdam Theatre School.
There is nothing neutral about the countless def initions 
and typologies that populate the domain of the creative city. 
The creative city with its creative industry, populated by the 
creative class in creative incubators – these are terms loaded 
with policy ambitions. Just like Visscher’s print and Sarphati’s 
palace, the 3D Print Canal House is a symbol of the interrela-
tion of culture, creativity and economy that is particular to 
a certain moment in time. In addition, these symbols, as in 
previous times, are strongly inf luenced by wishful thinking. 
We want the previously rather grey bank of the IJ to become a 
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thriving hub of creativity. But will it? Back in 1611, Visscher and 
his contemporaries could not have suspected that they were 
on the brink of what would come to be referred to as the Dutch 
Golden Age. The builders of the Royal Palace of Amsterdam 
did not anticipate decay. Sarphati and his peers could not have 
predicted that their time would herald a separation between 
art, science and industry. If historical research into the rela-
tionship between cities and creativity tells us anything, it is 
that there are no guarantees and no recipes, and that nothing 
is f ixed from the outset. Creative cities do not develop in a 
linear way; they do not change in the short term, and they do 
not operate in isolation.
However, this does not mean we should all sit back and wait 
for things to take their course. People give shape to the city, 
oftentimes with grand ideals and good intentions. Who knows, 
maybe Wim T. Schippers’ grassroots initiative will be successful 
in returning the Paleis voor Volksvlijt to Frederiksplein? Mayor 
Eberhard van der Laan is already on board with the idea. And will 
DUS Architects actually usher in the future of innovative urban 
planning with the 3D Print Canal House? For now, it serves as a 
great ‘PR coup’ for the city, as evidenced by the visits by Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte and US President Barack Obama. What 
these examples do show is that every urban society – then and 
now, in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe – gives rise 
to a different kind of creative city. And all these cities deserve 
tailor-made policies, and should not be forced into some one-
size-f its-all mould based on what is supposed to constitute a 
‘creative city’.
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22. Smart cities value their smart 
citizens
Frank Kresin
Over the past few years Amsterdam has been doing everything 
in its power to become ‘smart’. Like all other signif icant big 
cities, it is working hard to f ind innovative ways to make life 
more pleasant, safe and sustainable. It is positioning all sorts 
of sensors and collecting large amounts of data to help it make 
better decisions, and in so doing, automating society. Oftentimes 
this involves casting an envious eye on a number of smart ‘model 
cities’, such as Songdo in South Korea and Masdar in the desert 
of the United Arab Emirates. Here, large-scale pilot projects have 
been launched, full of impressive tech, sensors and screens that 
make life easier. Another attractive example can be found in 
Rio de Janeiro, where IBM has built a huge, futuristic command 
centre to regulate traffic as efficiently as possible, serve tickets for 
traffic violations and predict and respond to emergency incidents.
Smart cities 1.0
There are some flaws to this approach. The f irst generation of 
smart cities tries to provide their residents with all the comforts, 
but see them exclusively as consumers. Technology and data 
provide previously unheard-of possibilities for surveillance – 
criminals can even be identif ied before having committed a 
possible crime. In this context, every citizen becomes a potential 
offender who has to be kept in check. In the ultimate smart city, 
residents are anything but conscious agents who play a part in 
shaping their living and working environment. This smart city 
is a machine that needs to be optimised, with no consideration 
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or understanding of the organic reality. It wants to maximise 
eff iciency and avoid friction, so it simply and non-negotiably 
imposes top-down, non-transparent technological solutions.
The paradox is that, by doing this, the smart city ends up 
stifling innovation. Citizens f ind themselves faced with increas-
ingly complex systems that affect their lives profoundly, but 
that they have less and less understanding of. The same is true, 
incidentally, for politicians and policymakers; they tend to be just 
as removed from the innovations that they are promoting. The 
net result of this is that cities render their residents passive and, 
by doing so, leave their tremendous potential untapped. That is 
a great shame, because it is their experience, engagement and 
energy that are essential in identifying and addressing social 
issues. In short: the smart city urgently needs an upgrade – with 
citizens being the f irst link, rather than the last, in the chain of 
innovation.
This is especially vital because citizens are, in fact, rapidly 
getting themselves prepared for a new and active role. They are 
becoming more proficient in the use of new technologies than 
the governments that serve and monitor them. They are also 
up-to-date on the problems and opportunities within their city, 
neighbourhood and street. They are often willing to volunteer 
their knowledge, time and experience to improve the city they 
live in, are coming together in new kinds of associations (such as 
repair cafes, energy cooperatives, city villages, and car-sharing 
and house-sharing initiatives) and are not invested in old bu-
reaucratic solutions that stand in the way of innovations. They 
are highly educated and have access to an inf inite amount of 
information, which makes them valuable, clued-up conversa-
tion partners. The second-generation smart cities understand 
this, and are making every effort to actively promote smart 
citizenship.
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An example: The Amsterdam Smart Citizens Lab
One of the complex issues that the modern city f inds itself 
faced with is air pollution. More and more people worldwide 
are living in cities, and their health and well-being are to a great 
extent dependent on their living environments: on the quality 
of air, soil, water and noise. Recent research demonstrates that 
even small amounts of pollution can have an impact on life 
expectancy. No less than 90% of urban residents are exposed 
to f ine particles and ozone which, according to the World Health 
Organization – a specialised health agency that forms part of the 
United Nations – are harmful to their health.
Municipal services, the Netherlands National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (known as RIVM) and vari-
ous interest groups have traditionally made meticulous measure-
ments as a way of gaining insight into this problem. Based on 
their f indings, the political arena makes decisions, such as, for 
example, instituting a low-emission zone, lowering the maxi-
mum speed limit or introducing bus lanes. However, the off icial 
environment-monitoring network is necessarily very limited as 
to the number of monitoring points and data-gathering intervals, 
while major differences exist from street to street, house to house 
and day to day. This can now be remedied thanks to the arrival 
of new, cheap sensors. With some help, engaged citizens worried 
about pollution can take measurements themselves and f ind 
answers to their questions.
In 2014, an experiment took place in Amsterdam which in-
volved the distribution of a hundred Smart Citizen Kits: small 
and cheap sensors that, unfortunately, yielded only mediocre-
quality data. The participants, however, were very enthusiastic, 
the technology continued to evolve and partners presented 
themselves, including the City of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Smart 
City, the RIVM, Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences and 
the SenseMakers community. The Amsterdam Smart Citizens 
Lab was established in 2015 by Waag Society together with these 
partners. Here, citizens, social institutions, research institutions 
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and central government have all joined hands to get more insight 
into the environment, identify any problems and work on future 
solutions. Citizens’ questions, concerns and input are central to 
this initiative.
Approximately sixty participants were found via social media. 
They immersed themselves in the complex issues. Armed with 
new knowledge, together with experts, they looked for the best 
way to collect relevant data. They formulated research questions, 
selected and tested sensors, or created them themselves where 
necessary. They then went on to collect data – which they are 
currently analysing – after which they will arrive at conclusions 
and, where necessary, take action. This could take all sorts of 
forms: changing their own behaviour, mobilising neighbours and 
local businesses, or involving the political sphere and proposing 
and/or demanding that measures be put in place.
Of course, the self-monitoring citizen still faces a lot of ob-
stacles and challenges. This kind of engagement requires a high 
level of knowledge, and participants f ind themselves faced with 
technical issues and can get stuck trying to interpret the data. 
But it is already clear even at this stage that the lab is very much 
worthwhile. It actively involves citizens in their own city and 
makes them better informed. It enables them to enter into a 
dialogue on an equal footing with the government and other of-
f icial bodies. In addition, the RIVM and the Community Health 
Service (GGD) can benefit from the new citizen data, which can 
be fed into their own models. The result: greater insight, better 
regulations and a clean, healthy and liveable city.
The participants are enthusiastic and there is a lot of inter-
est in the initiative, both in the Netherlands and beyond. The 
universities of Wageningen and Delft are studying the lab in 
order to devise a generic approach to urban problems in which 
the concerns and innovative capacity of their residents can 
take centre stage. The f irst results are promising and suggest 
that this different approach could work. The f indings are 
being distributed as widely as possible. Vienna, Barcelona, 
Manchester and Helsinki all have plans to establish their own 
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Smart Citizens Labs based on the Amsterdam example. The 
EU too, has woken up to the approach, and is creating scope 
for similar initiatives with its Collective Awareness Platforms 
programme.
Smart cities 2.0
Back to the smart city and its smart citizens. Technology undeni-
ably can and will play an increasingly prominent role in solving 
urban problems. Applications are getting more powerful, smaller 
and cheaper every year. They will provide us with new insights 
and – whether automatic or not – will improve the flow of traffic, 
air quality, energy management and waste processing. This will 
almost certainly result in healthier living environments, cost 
savings and eff iciency gains.
At the same time, it will become apparent that intensive civic 
participation is an essential ingredient of radical and sustainable 
innovation. Citizens are able to contribute truly new insights, 
and will only be willing to get involved in implementing solu-
tions if their voices have been heard during the development 
stage. That is why second-generation smart cities are opting for 
a bottom-up approach to innovation, strengthening connections 
and embracing and encouraging the creative friction that results 
from this. This ensures that the new infrastructures that are cre-
ated promote openness, transparency and reciprocity – making 
contributing to innovation something that is accessible to many. 
The smart city 2.0 is no longer a one-dimensional machine, but 
a multiform organism that, provided it is nurtured properly, can 
grow and flourish like never before.
The author
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23. The dangers of a tamed city
Robert C. Kloosterman
The Asian tourists visiting Amsterdam are obediently trailing 
after their tour guide, who is holding up the sign for the group. 
They stop at the Oudezijdskolk canal at the top of the Zeedijk and 
crowd around the tour guide, who begins to describe the wild 
history of the area to them. Somewhat further away, a hipster on a 
bicycle is attempting to weave his way through the many tourists 
and day trippers who have ventured off the beaten track hoping 
to see something different from Dam Square or the Rijksmuseum.
And the Zeedijk is definitely still different. For example, there 
is a shop specialising in latex fetish wear that you are not likely 
to f ind on the Damrak or Kalverstraat. But the days when this 
street was the domain of the homeless, drug addicts and other 
representatives of the fringes of urban society are long past. The 
prostitutes strutting their stuff, the Surinamese addicts shivering 
in the cold Dutch winter, the drug users leaning against shop 
windows to smoke crack, the glass from smashed car windows 
underfoot and the noisy altercations and arguments that may 
or may not lead to physical violence – those were the types of 
scenes that typif ied the Zeedijk’s image a quarter of a century 
ago, so much so that ‘the top of the Zeedijk’ was known virtually 
nationwide as being a gateway to the fringes of the big city.
Sanitised city
With just a hint of exaggeration, you could say that the cleaning 
up of the Zeedijk is representative of the transformation of the city 
of Amsterdam as a whole. In the 80s, the city suffered from high 
unemployment rates – off icially, nearly a quarter of the working 
population was unemployed around 1985 – squatters’ riots and a 
relatively large population of drug addicts. To quote Simon Kuper 
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(2014), columnist for the Financial Times: ‘When I was growing up 
in the Netherlands in the 1980s, Amsterdam was for hippies, drug 
addicts, prostitutes, penniless bohemians, students, a native white 
working class and gays fleeing intolerant Dutch small towns.’ The 
latter category still has a strong presence in the capital city, but 
there seems to be little left of those other subcultures that were 
such visible features of the urban landscape back in the 1980s.
It is difficult to pinpoint an exact turning point, but from the 
mid-1990s it became increasingly apparent that Amsterdam was 
going through a striking transformation. It has gone from being a 
city with a considerable number of members of the working class 
to increasingly being one for highly educated people (the largest 
proportion of the working population in Dutch cities). Where in 
the late 1980s the city was still characterised by high levels of urban 
decay with dilapidated and boarded-up properties, today’s property 
prices (per square metre) in the capital are among the highest in 
the Netherlands. For the first time since the Second World War, 
the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) is not represented in the Municipal 
Executive with Democrats 66 (D66) having become the biggest 
political party in the city. The pressing shortage of hockey pitches 
reported by daily newspaper Het Parool as a result of growing 
interest in the sport is a telling development in this context – after 
all, hockey has traditionally been the sport of choice for the up-
per middle classes. This transformation is also reflected in the 
changes that are taking place in the hospitality industry, where 
the traditional pubs (the so-called ‘brown cafés’) are losing more 
and more ground while ‘third spaces’ such as cafes, restaurants 
and coffee corners, sometimes with heated terraces, where people 
can also have a bite to eat, meet up and, increasingly, work on their 
laptops, are on the rise.
However, these highly educated citizens, in particular those 
who live within the ring road, are increasingly required to share 
their city with others. Nowadays these are no longer drug ad-
dicts and homeless people, but tourists and other visitors. In 
2000, around four and a half million foreign tourists came to 
Amsterdam; by 2014, this f igure had increased to nine million. 
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And this change is clearly apparent in the crowds walking from 
Amsterdam Central Station to Dam Square every day; the long 
queues in front of the city’s museums; and the many tourists 
that pay a visit to the red light district, including the Zeedijk. 
Complaints by residents about disturbances caused by tourists 
are increasing – but so are jobs and revenues in the tourist sec-
tor. The urban experience economy (there are more festivals on 
average than there are days in the year) thus fulf ils a crucial role 
in Amsterdam. But this success also brings new problems, which 
have less to do with residents’ complaints about disturbances 
and overcrowding and more with the diversity of the urban 
environment.
The self-destruction of diversity
An ever-present danger associated with any successful sector of 
economic activity is what Jane Jacobs called ‘the self-destruction of 
diversity’, a process of homogenisation whereby one set of activities 
ends up pushing out the others. This phenomenon is increasingly 
occurring in those parts of the city centre where facilities aimed 
at tourists – ranging from tourist shops to Airbnb’s – become 
more and more dominant. This homogenisation not only affects 
the quality of life for many residents in the short term, but also 
increases the city’s vulnerability to crises. In the medium term, 
there is the risk that a dip in tourism due to, for example, a reces-
sion in China, rising oil prices or an imminent threat of terrorism 
will hit the capital’s economy hard if that economy is too one-sided.
There is also a problem in the long term. When, in the 80s, 
Amsterdam was going through an economic rough patch, there 
was an abundance of cheap residential and commercial proper-
ties. As a result of the city’s economic boom since 1990, slowly but 
surely those spaces were all laid claim to; the rough edges were 
smoothed away and given a new lick of paint and inevitably, as a 
result, prices rose. Jane Jacobs also pointed out the importance of 
accessible spaces: new ideas mainly take shape in old buildings. 
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New initiatives still need to prove their worth, and are dependent 
on affordable spaces. The economic success and the rise in prices 
in the housing market undermine the physical conditions that 
are required for the existence and emergence of new ideas and 
innovations. This could have a detrimental impact on the city’s 
economic foundation in the long run.
This process is far from unique to Amsterdam. In cities such as 
New York and London, this phenomenon of rising property prices 
can also be seen. In her book The Warhol Economy, Elizabeth 
Currid described how New York was able to house musicians, 
visual artists and fashion designers in the 1970s and the f irst half 
of the 80s due to the economic crisis and low prices – and not just 
provide them with housing, but with affordable spaces located 
close to one another where the possibilities for meeting each 
other and, by extension, for the cross-pollination of ideas, were 
plentiful – a classic agglomeration economy. People could meet 
in the street, in nearby cafes and clubs and immerse themselves 
in the atmosphere of the city. The successive locations of Andy 
Warhol’s famous Factory, with its eclectic entourage of real and 
would-be artists, were all in Manhattan, surrounded by a host of 
different amenities. With the self-destruction of diversity result-
ing from New York’s economic boom, the possibilities for these 
types of experiments have been pushed to the city’s periphery 
and sometimes even beyond city boundaries. Elizabeth Currid 
considered this to be a real threat to New York’s economy. On the 
outskirts and especially outside the city boundaries, the condi-
tions allowing people to meet each other – both intentionally 
and fortuitously – are less favourable, which means there is also 
less chance of the spill over of knowledge and, by extension, of 
innovation taking place.
However, it seems that this view is too pessimistic. The scale 
of New York City is such that there are still parts of the city where 
property is relatively cheap. However, the timescale seems to be 
shrinking, with processes of gentrification taking place at an ac-
celerated pace. Williamsburg in Brooklyn is a case in point. With 
some exaggeration, you could say that where only yesterday this 
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area was a haven for artists, now it has transformed into a ‘hipster 
Disneyland’, with property prices having shot up accordingly. We 
also see this acceleration in London, where similar developments 
are taking place on the south bank of the Thames. The role of artists 
as pioneers of gentrification has come to be so well-recognised that, 
in many cases, their arrival alone will drive up property prices.
Like New York and London, Amsterdam has lots of space for 
new initiatives ‘on the other side of the river’. But Amsterdam too 
has to think carefully about ways to safeguard innovation. This 
acceleration of urban processes of transformation also offers op-
portunities, for example pop-up spaces in former retail properties, 
schools, off ices or other venues. It is also possible to combine dif-
ferent functions under one roof, for example by combining bars, 
restaurants and nightlife with studio spaces. There can be greater 
flexibility in terms of time and space. This requires changes to 
the regulations and the mentality of administrators, users and 
residents. One should keep in mind, however, a fully-tamed city 
is not just boring – it also ends up being a stagnating city.
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24. Cities and creative 
unpredictability
Moritz Föllmer
The current rhetoric surrounding European cities places consid-
erable emphasis on creativity. Local authorities strive to make 
their cities competitive by attracting investors, tourists and 
‘creative elites’. Nowadays, artists, designers and music producers 
tend to play a central role in what is increasingly an economic 
approach to urban policy – and are simultaneously expected to 
counterbalance this. More exciting than lawyers or accountants 
and cleaner than factory workers, they f it into a culture of trendy 
cafes, clubs and cultural centres. Creativity complements the 
intelligent and smooth planning that is often equated with the 
European character of cities like Amsterdam or Copenhagen 
– unlike London, which is dependent upon its f inancial sector, 
Naples with its traff ic chaos or Warsaw, where socialist heritage, 
patriotic displays and competitive individualism coexist.
On the face of it, it is diff icult to disagree with this view. After 
all, Amsterdam and Copenhagen are well-governed cities with 
a high quality of life. Here, cultural institutions, independent 
stores and bicycle paths abound. Social conflict does not seem 
to exist and an atmosphere of tolerance prevails. Without 
doubt, they are places that a lot of ‘artistic’ people feel drawn 
to. Nevertheless, there is also an important flipside to the cur-
rent discourse and practice of creativity. The dual emphasis on 
intelligent planning and economic growth makes urban life more 
and more predictable, which means that there is less and less 
room for experimentation. In addition, this approach ties into 
an underlying fear of things falling apart, which has its roots in 
a specif ic conception of European cities: they are seen as distinc-
tive because of their social harmony and good citizenship, but 
these very qualities appear to be under threat from the looming 
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forces of globalisation and individualisation. This is why local 
authorities are crying out for creativity, while at the same time 
wanting to control and restrict it.
While the emphasis on creativity as a priority in urban policy 
may be recent, the fundamental tension between experimenta-
tion and regulation is not. In the 1950s and 1960s, governments in 
all of Western Europe tried to put an end to the unpredictability 
that had come to characterise cities during and in the period im-
mediately after the Second World War. Thanks to growing levels 
of wealth and signif icant public expenditure they were able to 
expand housing and infrastructure on an unprecedented scale. 
However, this development went hand in hand with nagging 
doubts that were expressed by artists and intellectuals. Was 
this relatively sterile urban modernity really the be-all end-all it 
purported to be? Were those high-rises and suburban homes not 
stifling human expression in favour of a nondescript uniformity?
Criticism of capitalist project developers, modernist urban 
planners and consumerist city dwellers became an important 
topic in the culture of the 1960s. Writer Georges Perec dissected 
the materialistic lifestyle of a young middle-class couple in Les 
choses (‘Things’, 1965); in Playtime (1967), director and actor 
Jacques Tati played a bumbling provincial who gets lost in the 
maze of a Paris off ice building; and in Il ragazzo della via Gluck 
(‘The Boy from Gluck Street’, 1966), singer Adriano Celentano 
reminisced about a run-down street in Milan that had once been 
home to poor southern Italian immigrants but was now being 
completely redeveloped. Bohemians who belonged to move-
ments such as the Internationale Situationniste in Paris, the 
Provos in Amsterdam, the SPUR group in Munich or Subversive 
Aktion in Berlin took this criticism of functionalist modernity 
one step further, creating a playful, absurd alternative. They 
organised happenings, street concerts and other artistic provoca-
tions – and in so doing provided the media with a steady stream 
of sensationalist headlines.
After 1968 the radical left, which had soon begun to focus 
on local activism instead of trying to bring about a worldwide 
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revolution, gave this protest a political dimension. It presented 
capitalist project developers, modernist architects and social 
democratic politicians with a signif icant challenge. In some 
neighbourhoods, this movement gave rise to an entire landscape 
of alternative cafes and bookshops, squats and ‘autonomous’ 
cultural centres. But in the 1980s and 1990s, what had begun 
as radical opposition became, bit by bit, integrated into a new 
kind of urban life. Capitalist economies became more flexible 
as the signif icance of established businesses decreased, markets 
opened up and consumers began to look for new experiences. 
At the same time, local governments were trying hard to pacify 
previously heated conflicts, project a new image to the outside 
world, and look for alternatives to industry. This resulted, among 
other things, in not-previously-seen cafes with terraces, organic 
food stores, subsidised youth centres, music festivals and art-
house cinemas. Soon ethnic and sexual diversity were publicly 
recognised rather than denied. The very idea of the creative city 
derives from this mainstreaming of cultural critique, political 
protest and bohemian lifestyles.
For us today, all of this is old hat: nowadays we cannot even 
imagine cities like Amsterdam or Copenhagen without the 
customary mix of bars, restaurants and cultural institutions. But 
this familiarity also places boundaries on creativity – if indeed 
creativity is associated with experimentation. It results in a mild 
but recurring sense of boredom. And that is precisely why, ever 
since the nineties, so many Europeans with an interest in culture 
have been fascinated by post-reunif ication Berlin. Berlin shows 
that history can sometimes take surprising turns and that cities 
can go through unpredictable changes. The unoccupied spaces 
and low rents that the city had to offer (and still offers today, 
although gentrif ication increasingly limits this) enabled artists, 
musicians, designers and computer programmers to try out more 
new things than elsewhere. And although cities like Beijing or 
Detroit do not draw as many visitors, reports from these cities 
reveal a similar fascination with radical innovation and areas 
in which experimentation is taking place.
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Of course, the outlook and atmosphere of Berlin – much 
less of Beijing or Detroit – cannot be replicated elsewhere. 
But Amsterdam, for example, is clearly lacking an awareness 
that things could again develop according to a different logic 
from that prevailing today, and that this does not have to be a 
bad thing. Local politicians and administrators can hardly be 
expected to stimulate unpredictability, but they might consider 
offering more fertile ground for it to take place. They could set 
aside buildings for cultural activities instead of selling them to 
project developers – accepting the risk of economic loss without 
wanting to call the shots on what ends up happening there. This 
would contribute toward keeping alternative options open 
instead of closing off future horizons. It could facilitate a broad 
and experimental approach to creativity, instead of a narrow, 
economically-motivated one.
By that same token, local authorities should acknowledge the 
importance of activists, from a purely urban perspective and 
separate from their respective agendas. After all, these activists 
not only end up unwittingly creating opportunities for city mar-
keting, i.e. enabling the city to project a tolerant, harmonious im-
age (as the Mayor of Amsterdam recently conceded following the 
occupation of the Maagdenhuis, the University of Amsterdam’s 
main administrative building, in 2015). Their primary signif i-
cance is in the unexpected and surprising developments they 
herald and the counterbalance they provide to the rhetoric of 
municipal public relations departments. In addition, the cultural 
dimension of activism suggests that creativity is not limited to 
one sector, but ultimately forms part of our broader vision for the 
city. An underlying fear of disintegration and a predominantly 
economic focus do not tend to facilitate attempts at new and 
sometimes radical things. In this context, the geographer Ash 
Amin rightly argued that if there is such thing as a ‘good city’, 
it cannot be considered a community, a kind of neighbourhood 
writ large. Instead, the good city should be seen as a space for 
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25. Cultural Incubators: The squats 
of the 21st century?
Jaap Draaisma
In 2015, ‘50 Years of the Provo Movement’ was one of the high-
lights that city-marketing organisation I Amsterdam came up 
with. The international campaign was a proud look back at the 
activism of f ifty years ago, including the squatting that took 
place back then, under the so-called White House Plan: ‘Come 
to Amsterdam, the international birthplace of free-thought and 
creativity.’ Meanwhile, on 25 March 2015, the Snake House (De 
Slang) was cleared. The house on Spuistraat, right behind the 
Royal Palace of Amsterdam, had been a squatting location for 32 
years. And not only this property, but the entire block – twelve 
properties in all – were cleared by the police, marking the disap-
pearance of the last substantial surviving example of ‘alternative 
Amsterdam’ from the capital’s cityscape.
Squatters save the city
The Provo movement’s White House Plan, dating from 1966, is 
considered to have marked the beginning of the squatting move-
ment in Amsterdam. Following a court ruling in the early 1970s, 
the squatting of properties that had remained unoccupied for 
more than a year was no longer considered to be illegal. Around 
1980, with the city’s population in decline and the world in the 
throes of an economic crisis, the Amsterdam squatting scene grew 
into a mass movement with significant political, economic and 
cultural influence. It was partly due to pressure from the squatting 
movement that the City of Amsterdam was able to secure billions 
in funding from central government in order to renovate the old 
districts in the course of the 1980s. The legalisation of thousands 
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of squats, along with the preservation of the social and cultural 
infrastructure that had been established by the squatters, formed 
part of this. This infrastructure ranged from childcare centres to 
concert venues, from neighbourhood theatres to local cafes. Jan 
Schaefer, the left-wing politician who was the driving force behind 
the urban regeneration that took place during this period, made 
no secret of the fact that it was the squatting activity that enabled 
him to get his way to such an extent with central government. Not 
all squats were legalised: many were evicted as well, which often 
involved riots and clashes between squatters and the authorities. 
One part of the squatting movement strived for legalisation, while 
the radical squatters were actively seeking confrontation with the 
government. In the mid-1980s, these differences of opinion led to 
a veritable reign of terror by the radical wing, which significantly 
weakened the movement.
Amsterdam, booming city
From 1985 onwards, Amsterdam’s population began to grow again 
– due initially to the large-scale expansion of social housing; but 
from the mid-1990s, the emphasis shifted toward owner-occupied 
homes and attracting wealthy residents. Amsterdam is one of the 
f irst cities in the world where the Urban Renaissance began to 
take shape – aided by a classical European city layout which had 
remained intact (partly thanks to the squatting activists), an inter-
national atmosphere with, since the 1960s, a large American and 
British population, and a lively counterculture with lots of room 
for experimentation and a large network of low-threshold spaces.
Cultural incubators as the answer to the evacuations of 
the 1990s
The explosion in property prices and commercial project de-
velopment in the 1990s led to a wave of evictions of squats, in 
 201
particular squatted properties along the banks of the IJ, in the 
former port area, and warehouses that were suddenly called 
‘iconic’, after the fact that they were being squatted had saved 
them from demolition in the f irst place.
In 1998, the evacuation of another large property on the IJ led to a 
manifesto, with a huge number of signatures, being presented to the 
city council: ‘Amsterdam is losing its DNA as a city of experimenta-
tion, subcultures and free spaces; already, many people are moving 
to other cities, and Amsterdam is at risk of losing its international 
appeal.’ Much to the surprise of the squatters, the city council took 
these words to heart, and a motion was passed stipulating that the 
City of Amsterdam must develop a policy to preserve affordable 
spaces for subcultures and experimentation. The local authorities 
decided that Amsterdam’s success should not become its downfall. 
This realisation gave rise to an active government policy – running 
counter to market trends – of creating affordable living and work-
ing spaces for culture and counterculture. In 2000, the so-called 
‘creative-incubator policy’ (broedplaatsenbeleid) was launched.
The Amsterdam ‘cultural incubators’ are similar to squats in 
a lot of ways: they are low-rent spaces with their own distinct 
character, connections with the surrounding neighbourhood 
and independent collectives, with cultural activities making 
up a signif icant part of their role (at least 40%), aside from the 
freedom to f ill it in as they see f it. The municipal label of ‘incuba-
tor’ makes it possible to receive a seed grant as well as legal and 
other support. In principle, anyone can apply, but in reality it is 
primarily artist collectives and non-profit organisations that are 
developing and running the cultural incubators.
No culture without subculture
Although cultural incubators are an answer to the eviction of 
squats, of course they are not squats. Squats tend to be part of 
a movement exploring the idea of a different type of society; 
they are more prominently about social and cultural values, 
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and sidestep the process of seeking formal permission from the 
property owner and the authorities.
During the f irst few years following the launch of the creative-
incubator policy, a number of squats were legalised, and the City 
of Amsterdam took the lead in developing a number of proper-
ties. The redevelopment of the massive NDSM shipyard into a 
cultural hotspot became part of the policy. Mayor Schelto Patijn 
made the slogan of the creative-incubator policy – ‘no culture 
without subculture’ – the title of his New Year’s speech in 2000.
In 2004, Richard Florida, the self-proclaimed guru of creative 
urban policy, visited Amsterdam, and the creative-incubator 
policy was incorporated into the Amsterdam Creative City Arts 
Plan (Amsterdam Creatieve Stad, Kunstenplan 2005-2008). One of 
the principles was that those characteristics of the cultural in-
cubators that were particular to Amsterdam would be retained.
The economic signif icance of cultural incubators for the crea-
tion of jobs in the new global creative economy, of which art and 
culture make up a key component, was widely recognised. It 
turned out that the squatting movement, with its subculture, 
alternative entrepreneurship and the closely-linked hacker 
movement, was at the cradle of the new economy. It led to the es-
tablishment of the f irst internet service providers in Amsterdam 
back in the early 1990s, and ten years later it was here that the first 
successful apps were created as part of the Appsterdam initiative. 
Cultural incubators became Amsterdam’s international calling 
card, with half the world visiting to see the phenomenon with 
their own eyes, and talented people from all over the world 
flocking to the Dutch capital en masse. After f ifteen years, in 
2014 the new city council once again ratif ied and extended the 
creative-incubator policy for another four-year term.
Cultural incubators versus start-ups
A lot of start-ups and artists start out in cultural incubators. 
Twenty- and thirty-somethings are seizing the opportunity to 
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establish their own businesses here, amid young companies who 
are turning to cultural incubators for affordable workspaces and 
the chance of being immersed in a creative environment. All this 
new activity is not solely focused on the economic benefit, but 
also has a cultural, artisan, social, ecological, culinary or some 
other dimension. Cultural incubators create a broad founda-
tion, a substratum of the sort of affordable, lively cultural spaces 
which underpin a successful city and are the wellspring of a lot 
of talent. In spite of all the rules and regulations that they are 
subject to – unlike squats – incubators serve as cultural free 
spaces and facilitate experimentation – a process of trial and 
error. They fulf il a real ‘testing ground’ role within the city.
This makes them fundamentally different from the incubators 
and accelerators that have strong commercial backing and that 
help start-ups to scale-up and market their product or service 
as quickly as possible. At the entrance of B.Amsterdam, one of 
the successful projects for creative start-ups, you will f ind the 
slogan ‘Connect creativity with the corporate world’. This is 
about quick f inancial gains, conquering markets and f inding 
investors. The idea has to be successful in no time at all, or the 
game is over. Participating in the corporate world is the goal. 
Nowadays, these types of incubators and accelerators can be 
found in all cities – often established by project developers, local 
authorities or venture capitalists, sometimes in conjunction with 
universities or IT companies. The Amsterdam incubators are 
fundamentally different, being far more focused on cultural, 
subcultural and social values – even though they also welcome 
economic success.
Both incubators and start-up spaces tend to be based in special 
properties that have been repurposed, such as former factories 
(Moscow, London, Rotterdam), slaughterhouses (Madrid, Casa-
blanca), army barracks, hospitals and other iconic buildings. A 
lot of creative hubs – creative factories – in the Netherlands are 
a mixture of a relaxed ‘creative environment’, in which cultural 
and social values play a role as well, with the characteristics of 
more demanding, economically oriented start-up environments. 
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Examples of this are the Witte Dame (‘White Lady’) complex in 
Eindhoven and the Maassilo building in Rotterdam.
Cultural incubators as a driving force in gentrification
Cultural incubators also play a role in the process of urban 
development. The incubator established in the derelict NDSM 
shipyard put this site back on the map. In spite of its remote 
location, MTV, Hema, publishing company VNU and others 
established offices there, and property prices shot up. Incubators 
can serve as quartermasters, preparing the ground for the upper 
middle classes to discover neighbourhoods like De Baarsjes, Bos 
en Lommer or the Van der Pek district. An incubator that starts 
out in an empty school building does not drive anyone out, but 
its presence – like that of the coffee bar and the trendy restaurant 
– tends to make the neighbourhood more attractive to higher-
income urbanites. These venues do not appeal to low-income 
residents, who f ind themselves culturally displaced from their 
own neighbourhood. The sale and demolition of social housing 
does the rest. This is how the inner city ends up spreading to 
also encompass the surrounding neighbourhoods, which then in 
turn also become unaffordable for artists and the lower middle 
classes, who are once again forced to venture still further af ield 
as this next round of gentrif ication takes its course.
Some incubators are trying to play a different role in this 
process. They want to play an important role for local residents 
with low incomes and serve as social centres, with community 
services, community initiatives and art for the neighbourhood.
More of Amsterdam up for sale?
There are about sixty cultural incubators in Amsterdam, most 
of which have been established, with the City of Amsterdam’s 
support, by artists and ‘creative entrepreneurs’ such as Urban 
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Resort in order to retain culture, subculture, artists and 
cultural and creative start-ups in Amsterdam. The creative-
incubator policy made it possible for new projects such as the 
NDSM Wharf, the Volkskrant building (the former building of 
the newspaper), OT301, Pakhuis de Zwijger and A Lab (to be 
established). In addition to the new iconic cultural buildings 
that have sprouted up in every self-respecting city over the past 
f ifteen years – such as the EYE Film Institute Netherlands, the 
concert hall Muziekgebouw aan ’t IJ (‘Music Building on the IJ’) 
and the DeLaMar theatre in Amsterdam – in that same period 
a wholly new infrastructure of affordable, low-threshold build-
ings for cultural production came into being. Will this enable 
Amsterdam to hold on to some of its reputation for creativity 
after all?
After the lull caused by the 2008-2014 crisis, Amsterdam is 
once again booming. The city’s popularity among highly educated 
young professionals from all over the world continues unabated. 
Following twenty years of slow gentrif ication, property prices 
are once again going through the roof. Seemingly overnight, the 
character of entire neighbourhoods has changed completely, 
and this is sure to happen to many more neighbourhoods in 
the years to come. In addition to the sale of social housing, the 
new city council, which took off ice in 2014, has also announced 
the planned sale of the majority of the properties and land in 
its possession.
Amsterdam’s cityscape is rapidly transforming into a uniform 
vista of international chain stores, cute little vintage boutiques, 
pedestrianised squares and streets, expensive coffee shops for 
trendy MacBook users and exclusive flagship stores represent-
ing big-name brands. Entire neighbourhoods are sanitised and 
romantically refashioned into the mini-cities that Jane Jacobs 
predicted, where the only ‘mixed use’ is that of expensive housing 
existing alongside expensive amenities. The clichéd image of 
the historical European city so beloved by the United States is a 
reality here. However, Amsterdam’s dual nature as a city that is 
both chic and shabby is fast disappearing.
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Amsterdam, Magic City: fact or faked?
In the 1960s, the Provos dubbed Amsterdam the ‘Magic City’. The 
Provos, the squatters and the alternative movement developed an 
attractive city which was embraced – much to their dismay – by 
the new middle classes: cycling instead of using the car, childcare 
facilities in the city, city squares as public spaces in which to meet, 
warehouses saved from demolition, a strong cultural infrastructure.
Amsterdam still has the ‘bohemian quality’ that Florida con-
siders to be so important. The network of ‘alternative’ properties, 
projects, businesses and initiatives is to a large extent still in place 
and, in spite of all the squats that have been cleared, has even built 
in strength over the past decade, thanks both to incubators and to 
cultural entrepreneurs, with places such as the Westergasfabriek 
cultural venue and Amsterdam nightclub Trouw.
Somehow, straddling the conf lict inherent between gen-
trif ication on the one hand and affordable workspaces on the 
other – of corporate culture and subculture – the Amsterdam 
creative-incubator policy has enabled a wide range of cultural 
and social initiatives to come about. It is vital to the city’s well-
being in the future that this trend continues.
In 2015, a wide range of activities were organised to com-
memorate the 50-year anniversary of the Provo movement, but 
contemporary activism, resistance and counterculture did not 
form part of the programme. They can be found in a host of 
different ‘free spaces’ and incubators – and, above all, on the 
street, like in Spuistraat on March 2015.
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26. New cities as testing grounds for 
a new urbanity
Arnold Reijndorp
If you think of ‘the European city’ you tend to think of an old city. 
Only rarely is this term associated with the new cities that devel-
oped half a century ago and that at the time were considered to 
be the European answer to both the congestion of the old cities 
and the resulting suburbanisation. The old cities attract millions 
of visitors every year. They are centres of culture and recreation. 
The fact that Euro Disney is situated in Marne-la-Vallée does 
not contribute to the popularity of this new city itself; for most 
people, it is f irst and foremost Disneyland Paris. The old cities 
are also the engines of the new economy, driven by knowledge, 
creativity and innovation, and are the old continent’s best hope 
in its efforts to compete with the ‘emerging markets’.
The urbanity of the European city is tremendously popular, 
and over the past years the focus of this interest has shifted from 
the busy commercial city centres to the surrounding districts, 
the creative living and working environments. These small-scale, 
multifunctional urban villages – city districts with an almost 
village-like quality, along the lines of Jane Jacobs’ Greenwich 
Village – are increasingly the destinations of city trips. This 
typical type of urbanity has grown to represent the ultimate 
benchmark in urbanity, one that every other place in Europe’s 
urbanised landscape is measured against.
In addition to the old cities, Europe has a number of new cities 
which were designed in the 1960s, and realised in large part in the 
following decades. The new cities are clearly distinct from the ur-
banity that characterises the old city. Where once they were the 
embodiment of an urban ideal that was intended to transcend 
the flaws of the old city, they now seem to have become the black 
sheep of the urban family. They are even depicted as having been 
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a planning failure which contributed to the decline of the old city 
and formed an obstacle to growth and regeneration. However, 
the question is whether the old cities can survive without the 
capacity for innovation that has characterised the new cities 
since their conception.
Metropolitan landscapes
The statistic is repeated ad nauseam: as of 2014, more than half 
of the global population lived in cities, and by 2050 this will 
have increased to two-thirds. But what does that tell us? The 
map of global urbanisation shows a number of metropolises 
that the major European cities – let alone the cities in the Neth-
erlands – pale in comparison with. Some view the Netherlands 
as a densely-populated country with many small cities, while 
others view it as one single, sparsely-populated city – a city that, 
at nearly seventeen million inhabitants, still is nowhere close to 
being able to count itself among the major world cities.
What is true for the Netherlands is also true for many regions 
in Europe that are made up of an agglomeration of bigger cit-
ies, smaller towns, villages and suburban areas, connected by 
roads with ribbon development, motorways and railway lines, 
surrounded and separated by rural and recreational landscapes. 
The bigger European cities, such as London and Paris, also have 
this kind of fragmented structure, which rarely conforms to 
the familiar blueprint of a densely-concentrated city centre 
surrounded by more quiet residential districts ringed, in turn, 
by suburbs and leafy, affluent homes and neighbourhoods.
From a social point of view, suburbs can feel a lot more urban 
than many inner-city neighbourhoods, which will sometimes 
have a markedly suburban character. The fact that not every 
city dweller is an urbanite, that some urban neighbourhoods 
share many of the qualities of villages, and that the suburbs 
are in fact home to many urbanites has already been pointed 
out by many human geographers and urban sociologists. The 
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everyday reality of the urban landscape will often bear little 
resemblance to the original plans for the city. However, this 
European city – spread-out, but compact in comparison to other 
world cities – is the result of recurring attempts to create an 
attractive city for its residents.
The city as a residential town
Of course, the city is more than just a place to live – it is also 
a place to work and a centre for culture, both of which are 
also important draws for new groups moving to the city. Few 
economists would deny that the quality of life that a city offers 
is an important prerequisite for the f lourishing of the urban 
economy. However, that this is a key element of a city’s identity 
is less evident than might be expected. Of course, the city always 
has people living in it – after all, there would be no city without 
a population – but for many, all the city really offers them in this 
regard is a roof over their head.
The city as a residential town does not come about as a result 
of the people that move there permanently, but in reaction to 
the departure of those who can afford to be based outside the 
city. In 1868, the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted 
wrote that ‘No great town can long exist without great suburbs,’ 
but Central Park in New York – which he designed together with 
Calvert Vaux – was also conceived as a way of retaining wealthy 
residents in Manhattan.
Successive attempts at uniting urban and suburban qualities 
have effectively made the major European cities into metro-
politan landscapes. They are the result of an ongoing process of 
seeking out and heightening those qualities that make the city an 
attractive place to live – which always partly occurs in response 
to suburbanisation, which kept flourishing in new forms. That 
search focuses on def ining the nature of urbanity, a quicksil-
ver concept that resists def inition and continually changes 
meaning. Sometimes, it stands simply for bustle, diversity and 
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liveliness – with the obvious apparent contrast with the dull 
suburbs – while at other times, urbanity is thought of as being 
virtually synonymous with culture, civility and community, 
which renders it at odds with the reality of urban life.
New cities
In these metropolitan landscapes, the new cities created in the 
UK, France, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and various countries 
in Eastern Europe forty to f ifty years ago take up a special place. 
Examples are the Villes Nouvelles (including Marne-la-Vallée, 
Cergy-Pontoise, Évry) surrounding Paris; Milton Keynes between 
London and Birmingham; Zoetermeer, Almere and a number of 
smaller so-called growth poles (or satellite towns) in the Nether-
lands; Nowa Huta near Krakow in Poland; and Hoyerswerda and 
Eisenhüttenstadt in the former German Democratic Republic. 
They were intended as a solution both to the congestion and 
lack of quality of life in the existing cities, and to the increased 
suburbanisation that was expected as a result of growing wealth 
and increased car ownership. The spectre of the unbridled sprawl 
of the US loomed, but this was not the only type of suburbanisa-
tion people were afraid of. Paris’ banlieues, with their endless sea 
of small houses (pavillons) interspersed with high-rises (grands 
ensembles) represented just as much of a spectre – and one that 
was altogether closer to home. In the early 1960s, the French 
president De Gaulle f lew over the Paris conurbation together 
with the urban planner responsible for its design and spoke the 
memorable words: ‘Clean that mess up!’ Not long after that, a 
plan for f ive new satellite towns in the greater Paris area was 
on the table.
The damage to the landscape that could result from subur-
banisation left unchecked, was – and still is – on the agenda. 
However, the new cities are also the umpteenth attempt to create 
a form of urbanity that could bring together the benefits of both 
urban and suburban living – all the benefits of the city without 
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the drawbacks, not just on a spatial and physical level. Socially, 
the new cities were intended to square the circle between indi-
vidualisation and community. With this goal, they symbolise the 
ideals of urbanity and collectivity as an alternative to the chaotic 
disorder of the periphery and the my home is my castle mentality 
of the suburbs. These ambitions and ideals help def ine the new 
cities as a ‘modern’ project, perhaps the last major project to 
embody the modernity that def ined post-war European urban 
planning. Around 1980, just at the point that architecture and 
urban planning were falling under the spell of postmodernism, 
the German philosopher Habermas described modernity as 
not a f inished, but an ‘unf inished project’. Only a portion of 
the promises and expectations of this modern project ended up 
coming to fruition. This is also true for the new cities, which are 
quintessentially modern in character.
The new city as an unfinished project
The large 1960s high-rises on the outskirts of the major cities 
have assumed the role previously played by the inner city as 
the setting for crime novels and thrillers. If anything, the few 
novels or literary accounts of the new cities (for example Hoy-
erswerda, Évry, Cergy-Pontoise and Lelystad) are characterised 
by a sense of disappointment: about the failure of ideals and the 
puncturing of expectations. During the construction of those 
new cities, those expectations were adjusted on the hoof, to the 
extent that no new city would ever be able to meet them. Long 
before they neared completion, the ideal of the new city had been 
jettisoned in favour of a newfound appreciation of the old city. 
Urban regeneration and the transformation of the existing city 
became the new credo.
This newfound appreciation of the city coincided with the 
demise of the old economy. The major industries disappeared 
from the cities, and old industrial estates and port areas were 
transformed to better reflect an economy based on services and 
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knowledge. New museums and theatres were constructed to 
make the city attractive to a demographic of knowledge workers 
and large groups of visitors. In the wake of these developments, 
the ‘creative city’ arose, populated by a new creative class, in 
whom creativity was coupled with a low income. In view of this 
new urbanity, the still-incomplete new cities were immediately 
rendered obsolete. Where several years previously they had been 
prototypes of progress, now they were hangovers from the era of 
the organisation man, as William Whyte described the economy 
of large-scale industries and organisations. The new cities went 
from representing ideal examples of a new suburban urbanity 
to symbols of the anti-city.
What is striking is that this new urban ideal led to feverish 
attempts to also make the new cities more ‘urban’ – based on the 
somewhat limited conception of urbanity that lies at the heart of 
the concept of the creative city. But just as, back in Jane Jacobs’ 
time, Greenwich Village could not function without the diversity 
and cultural exchange facilitated by the scale of New York City 
as a whole, the creative city cannot exist without the new cities. 
Together they form part of agglomerations that are, effectively, 
the real new cities. Within these structures, the original new 
cities are home to the broad middle class, without whom the 
urban economy – and the urban system as a whole – cannot 
function, but who are increasingly unable to f ind affordable 
housing in the old city. The emphasis on the creative economy 
fails to recognise diversity as a key component of the vitality that 
enables a city to reinvent itself and shapeshift time and again. 
Currently, this vitality expresses itself in initiatives promoting 
self-organisation on different levels: from collective self-build 
projects to home care for the elderly, from the self-management 
of public space to the development of new meeting spaces, 
and from energy generation to urban agriculture. This is also 
referred to as ‘the new city-making’. These initiatives are not 
restricted to the creative districts in the old cities. The new cities 
in particular provide opportunities for an innovative approach 
in these areas. Suburban urbanity is an ideal environment for 
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the self-management of new public space, collective energy 
generation and urban agriculture.
Suburban urbanism
The relationship between the old and the new city is not static. 
The new cities are no longer suburban living areas exclusively 
for the middle classes. Socially, they are changing from being 
relatively stable environments into what might end up being the 
most dynamic of the conurbations. New groups of immigrants 
moving to the city settle there, alongside the more established 
immigrants who are improving their economic and social posi-
tion and leaving the old city. While the new city is becoming more 
socio-economically and socio-culturally heterogeneous – and 
therefore more urban – the new ideal of urbanity actually seems 
to be ‘suburbanising’ the old city on a social and spatial level.
The ‘urban’ preference of new, highly educated urban families 
for the old city neighbourhoods has markedly suburban char-
acteristics: sheltered urbanity, as urban geographer Lia Karsten 
describes it. This gives rise to a striking contrast between old 
cities that are suburbanising and new cities that are urbanising. 
It is time to breathe new life into the idea of suburban urbanity, 
which may in fact be the def ining feature of the European city 
– not just to make the old city a more attractive place to live for 
those who can afford to settle there, but above all to return the 
‘unf inished projects’ that are the new cities to their original 
position as testing grounds for a new urbanity.
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The fourth theme is sustainability, in the broadest sense of the 
word, devoting attention to public health, social cohesion and the 
environment. In their examination of the social sustainability of 
European cities, Sako Musterd and Jan Nijman underline the role 
of government (national, local and European) in many aspects of 
the social sustainability of cities. This has been an issue where, 
up until now, European cities have fared exceptionally well in 
comparison to cities in the rest of the world. Two contributions 
focus on major public-health issues: Gemma Blok looks at the 
struggle against public drunkenness, and Coosje Dijkstra and 
her co-authors at the struggle against obesity and the promo-
tion of a healthy lifestyle, especially among city children. The 
importance of more physical exercise is also reflected in Marco 
te Brömmelstroet’s contribution on cycling in the city. However, 
his research is more about the cycling city than the cyclists as 
he considers the question: how can a cycling city be created and 
maintained?
One major point of concern is social cohesion in the city. 
Sako Musterd shows that socio-spatial segregation is growing 
in European metropoles, albeit slightly less in Amsterdam, and 
that changes in the role of government are leading to reduced 
mitigation of socio-economic differences. Jeroen Slot and Laure 
Michon look at the price of success and the future of Amsterdam 
amidst further growth and overexploitation. Who are the losers 
here? And what is the relationship between Amsterdam and 
the other municipalities in the conurbation? Examining the 
housing market, Arie van Wijngaarden reveals the limited access 
to the city for newcomers, while Jeroen van der Veer and Dick 
Schuiling explain the changing role of housing associations: 
there is a smaller social rented housing sector, but also less 
money for maintenance, renovation, and investments for social 
and environmental sustainability. The last issue in this section 
is spotlighted by Matthijs Hisschemöller in his contribution on 
a bottom-up energy transition and the role that neighbourhood 
initiatives can play here.
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27. The social sustainability of 
European cities
The importance of local government
Sako Musterd and Jan Nijman
The European Union is the result of political processes at national 
and international levels in which national states agree to relinquish 
power and influence to the Union. The consequences of European 
integration can however mostly be seen and felt at the regional and 
local levels. Because the European population is highly urbanised, 
this is especially true of the cities and towns. About three out 
of four Europeans currently live in cities and towns, and in the 
Netherlands and Belgium this figure is actually more than nine out 
of ten. In the cities, one might say, the consequences of European 
integration can be seen under a magnifying glass.
The influence of European integration on the urban environ-
ment is exerted directly through policy and regulation – one 
good example is the internationalisation of cities resulting from 
free mobility of capital and labour. But we can also identify an 
important indirect influence in the form of the dominant free-
market ideology that steers the process of integration: an ideology 
that is shared at the national levels and that trickles down to, 
and has an effect on, the urban environment. In the case of the 
Netherlands we see this, for instance, in the growth of the private 
housing market as compared to the social housing sector, or in 
the influence of increasing – ideologically tolerated – income 
disparities on the urban environment and residential segregation.
Urban culture is formed historically and often has local roots, 
certainly in a country like the Netherlands where the urban 
population has been in the majority for almost four hundred years. 
But urban culture is increasingly subject to international influ-
ences. To an increasing extent, the urban environment reflects the 
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political spirit and policymaking at European level. As a result, the 
social sustainability of our cities and towns is increasingly at stake. 
Social sustainability refers to the ongoing viability of urban society 
as formed in a historical-geographic context. The concept of social 
sustainability forces one to reflect on the nature of urban society 
as desired (at a local level), and about democratic urban policy.
This should not necessarily be understood as a criticism of 
European integration. There are many arguments in favour of its 
major political significance. Moreover, European integration can 
provide a major economic stimulus for certain cities and regions. 
But this can be at the expense of other towns, cities and regions. 
Even if a particular city benefits as a whole, as measured in terms 
of economic growth, this can go in hand in hand with economic, 
social and spatial restructuring. The point is that the effects of 
European integration (and globalisation in general) can present 
a challenge to local social structures and democracy.
The Netherlands and its towns and cities are doing relatively well, 
certainly when compared to regions in the south and the east of 
Europe. But in terms of subjective wellbeing it is of little significance 
for the local urban population of, say, Amsterdam to consider how 
the citizens of Lisbon or Athens are currently faring. What is much 
more important for the citizens of Amsterdam is how today’s and 
tomorrow’s situation compares to that of yesterday – in Amsterdam.
We will confine ourselves here to three urban challenges fac-
ing local policymakers in the Netherlands (but also in France, 
Germany and Belgium, for instance): problems of growth and 
shrinkage in the Dutch urban landscape, the importance of 
diversity of the urban population, and the need for social cohe-
sion in the intended participatory society.
Growth and shrinkage in the dynamic European 
landscape
The accelerated global economic dynamism can lead to relatively 
drastic new growth and development of urban areas. We see 
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such growth occurring above all in metropolitan regions that 
are well-anchored in the international economy and that offer 
optimum ‘classical’ location-determining factors (accessibility, 
infrastructure, presence of higher education). Growth is not only 
a physical urban or economic phenomenon, but is also linked 
to an increase in social capital, with the ability to participate 
in society. In the Netherlands this can be seen above all in the 
Randstad conurbation, in particular the Amsterdam region. 
However, this growth is accompanied by shrinkage and decline 
in neighbouring regions. While the old regional-economic 
concept of ‘cumulative causation’ was mostly used to explain 
ongoing spatially concentrated growth in strong regions, we now 
also need to consider ‘cumulative shrinkage’. Certain regions and 
towns or cities are confronted with a downward spiral: unem-
ployment and ageing of the population are increasing, invest-
ments are falling, amenities (such as schools and hospitals) are 
disappearing and social engagement is coming under pressure.
Growth and shrinkage are usually mutually related. The 
population departing from shrinkage areas usually heads for 
the growth areas, increasing the growth in locations to which 
they move, but also exacerbating the shrinkage in the places 
they are leaving. In line with this, Amsterdam and Eindhoven 
are welcoming the young people whom the regions of Zeeuws 
Vlaanderen and Limburg are losing. Research shows that some-
times the population is the decisive factor in shrinkage regions, 
but that in other cases it is actually economic developments 
that trigger the shrinkage. Growth and shrinkage can lie far 
from each other in spatial terms, but usually they are very close 
together (city and surrounding region). The term ‘periphery’ 
is thus a scale-sensitive and relative term. Parkstad Limburg, 
a region dealing with shrinkage, is sometimes described as 
peripheral (with respect to the growing Randstad), but seen 
from another perspective the region is actually very close to 
growth areas such as Aachen and Maastricht. The economic 
and social decline of specif ic towns, cities and regions usually 
affects formerly well-developed industrial areas that, since the 
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1980s, have not been able to make the transition to the post-
industrial era. The American experience, strongly determined 
by a large-scale free market and without substantial local or 
regional policy corrections, provides a warning: in that country, 
the consequences of shrinkage have proved disastrous for cit-
ies such as Detroit and Cleveland, and for large urban areas 
in metropolitan areas such as Miami and Philadelphia. In the 
Netherlands we have been able, so far, to prevent such exces-
sive trends and spatial polarisation through central taxation 
and redistribution through resources such as the Municipal 
Fund. This has made it possible to guide cities with a relatively 
one-sided industrial structure, such as Enschede, Tilburg and 
Rotterdam, through a diff icult phase of economic restructuring. 
But nonetheless shrinkage has rapidly increased in recent years 
and will increasingly need to be combated by means of multi-
level governance. Public administration plays an important role 
in regional steering to retain amenities in selected locations 
where this intervention will prove most eff icient, and where it 
will also have a positive influence on private investments and 
on employment.
Diversity and sustainability
The classic urban sociologist Louis Wirth stated that the essence 
of urbanism is found in a social dynamic based on a population 
concentration of a minimum size, density and heterogeneity. 
The combination of density and heterogeneity, said Wirth, is 
the most important condition for dynamism and social renewal. 
Therefore, it also lies at the root of the sustainable strength and 
resilience of an urban society. In some American cities this 
dynamism is undermined by extensive suburbanisation and 
sprawl. Dutch and European cities are, for the most part, more 
compact and have a higher density. But now the heterogeneity 
here is coming under increasing pressure, especially in the inner 
cities.
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Urban economy, entrepreneurship, creativity and innova-
tion are to a great extent conditioned by diversity among the 
urban population. Social, economic and demographic diversity 
contributes to social dynamism and diversif ication, as well as 
renewal of economic activities. This diversity is currently under 
pressure in many (inner) cities – something well-illustrated in 
Amsterdam. The area within the Amsterdam ring road has rap-
idly gentrified and internationalised. The current workings of the 
housing market leave little opportunity for lower income groups, 
the social housing sector is ‘locked down’ and the higher prices 
in the private sector block access by young people and recent 
graduates to the housing market in this area (which constitutes 
half the city).
This is an important demographic cohort – also including the 
creative entrepreneurs and middle-class citizens of tomorrow 
– that is currently having huge diff iculty in acquiring a place 
in the city. The current poor workings of the housing market 
could lead to an economic backlash in the future. The private 
market currently provides no way out: the strong demand and 
the limited supply of housing in the private sector are pushing 
up prices even further. It is up to politicians and local authorities 
to take the long view and to create access to the housing market 
for starting entrepreneurs, young people and those with medium 
(and lower) incomes, thus creating a sustainable dynamism in 
the urban economy.
Social cohesion in the urban society
The recent Scientif ic Council for Government Policy (WRR) 
Survey 28 examines the moral and instrumental aspects of social 
inequality. The report explains the negative effects of extensive 
social inequality in, for instance the realms of welfare, economic 
opportunities, health and chances of survival. Research shows 
that social inequality in urban society generally goes hand in 
hand with socio-spatial segregation. The ‘big sort’ (spatial sorting 
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that leads to segregation and polarisation) usually attributed 
to American cities is now also increasingly showing itself in 
Europe – and the Netherlands.
Inequality and segregation are, in turn, associated with 
disaff iliation: certain sub-classes in the population becom-
ing estranged or alienated from each other. This begins with 
light segregation, but experiences in Europe, North and South 
America and Asia show that this can lead to strongly segregated, 
fragmented and polarised cities in which the middle classes 
increasingly and literally distance themselves from the lower 
classes and where forms of cocooning occur, in the area of hous-
ing and – as research shows – also in other areas such as work, 
education and modes of transport. Inequality in access to 
amenities and facilities, housing and work can generate social 
tensions and political conflict about ‘the right to the city’. In 
the Netherlands such trends have long been avoided, but this 
no longer seems to be the case.
Increasing inequality, spatial segregation and disaff iliation 
are undermining the social cohesion of society in urban regions 
of the Netherlands. Social cohesion and a sense of community are 
not only important for the living quality of the city, but also for 
the eff icient functioning of the market and political sectors. And 
social cohesion is actually essential for the success of the desired 
participatory society (consider informal care, for instance). The 
participatory society, necessitated by a reduction in the welfare 
state, is all about citizenship, a sense of community, solidarity 
and social capital. And precisely these qualities seem to be in 
increasingly short supply.
This too therefore constitutes an important task for local 
authorities. Because the welfare state no longer guarantees the 
funding of certain amenities and facilities, it is up to public 
administrators to facilitate the alternative in the form of the 
participatory society. Promoting spatial and social diversity 
and integration is an important resource here, not so much 
involving the promotion of economic equality, but rather a sense 
of community. ‘Citizenship and participation,’ says the Dutch 
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sociologist Evelien Tonkens, ‘is not just about redistribution, 
but also about recognition. Citizenship is a moral-emotional 
practice.’ Citizenship is essential to an everyday urban sense of 
community and to sustainable social cohesion.
‘Europe’, in the sense of citizenship and identity, is still a 
distant abstraction for many people. European integration 
implies a certain shift of political power and decision-making 
from national to supranational level, but it also means greater 
freedom of action for subnational regions and cities. The role 
of local government is further emphasised by decentralising 
tendencies inherent to the neoliberal course of national govern-
ments, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the European 
Union.
The importance of the way that citizens experience their own 
local environment has been dramatically highlighted by the 
refugee crisis: supranational and national policy are important, 
of course, but it seems that citizens are above all affected and 
moved by the local confrontations with asylum seekers, with 
local relief and accommodation facilities and with the policy 
choices of their municipalities. This is just one current illus-
tration of the structural role played by local authorities in the 
development of cities and regions.
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28. Bothersome and besotted
The struggle against public drunkenness in urban 
space
Gemma Blok
‘The scandal of our society.’ That is how the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron described British drinking culture. 
It seems that tolerance of excessive drinking has been rapidly 
decreasing in several European countries in recent years. Gener-
ally speaking the approach to alcohol abuse in the Netherlands 
and Western Europe has evolved from a period of repression 
(1890-1960) to steadily increasing tolerance after 1960. Now the 
tide seems to be turning once more. Over the past decade the 
problem of public drunkenness has received a high position on 
the agenda of several European cities. Rotterdam, for instance, 
has been participating in a partnership with various French, 
Belgian and German cities since 2011, with the aim of studying 
alcohol abuse by young people in public spaces and learning to 
manage it better. This project, entitled ‘Safer Drinking Scenes’, 
is being co-funded by the European Commission.
In 2012 the Mayor of Amsterdam, Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA), 
also joined the struggle against public drunkenness in his city. He 
felt that alcohol use among young people was becoming a serious 
problem. On Queen’s Day 2012, ambulances were called out 575 
times in the capital to pick up binge drinkers. ‘This involves major 
costs for society,’ said Van der Laan, and he recommended that 
drunken ambulance clients should pay a f ine. The Mayor also 
wanted binge drinkers to pay the costs of their hospital admission 
and for any necessary police action. This plan has not been imple-
mented for the time being, but the tone was set. Now, as a survey 
by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reveals, 81% of Dutch people think 
that young people engaging in excessive alcohol use should pay the 
costs of their related hospital treatment in part or in full.
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In English cities too, ambulances and hospital casualty de-
partments work overtime on weekends and during certain public 
holidays. The city of Bristol chose an original approach: during 
Christmas 2014 a mobile Alcohol Recovery Centre went out on 
the streets. This specially equipped bus picked up blind-drunk 
Bristolians from the streets to examine them and see if they 
needed treatment. This type of bus is now planned for ten English 
cities. They are popularly known as ‘drunk tanks’, a reference to 
the cell blocks where drunkards used to be forced to sleep it off 
in the countries of the Eastern Bloc.
Sustainable alcohol policy
Binge drinking (known in Dutch as komazuipen) has become 
an established term in recent years, although of course it is 
not new. For centuries, European cities have experienced the 
phenomenon of alcohol-soaked public festivals and sozzled pub 
customers staggering through the streets. Students have also 
traditionally been hard drinkers. But now that downing a series 
of shots (small glasses of spirits) during a night out seems to be 
becoming far more widespread, social protest is growing as well. 
Cities have become veritable consumer Valhallas, with extensive 
nightlife venues. Young people now have more money and leisure 
time. Nowadays the ‘public festival’ takes place every weekend.
However, binge drinkers are a relatively small cost item for 
society. One out of f ive Amsterdam citizens drinks too much, 
researchers estimate, and this generates substantial medical and 
social costs. For some years there have been rising numbers of 
people over 55 who contact addiction care organisations. The 
most persistent, chronic alcoholics drink themselves to death 
at home; this group is seen as beyond recovery and is provided 
with palliative care by a host of care providers.
A look at the past may help in formulating a sustainable 
alcohol policy, which certainly deserves a place on the European 
Urban Agenda. What can we learn from the past? First of all, 
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that the effects of repressive measures in the past were minimal, 
or at least diff icult to measure. Secondly, that a repressive ap-
proach brings a major danger of stigmatising vulnerable groups 
in society. Cities should thus take a less one-sided approach to 
the problems associated with alcohol consumption in public 
spaces. This is the most visible aspect and requires the most acute 
interventions, more so than drinking at home. Nonetheless, cities 
should broaden their perspective and strive for an integral policy 
on drinking.
Blacklisting
In 1886 the Dutch government made public drunkenness a 
punishable offence in the new Criminal Code. Citizens who were 
regularly guilty of public drunkenness (‘habitual drunkards’) 
were now sent to a state labour institution. Alcoholics in Am-
sterdam mostly went to the state labour institution in Hoorn, but 
sometimes also to the one in Veenhuizen in the distant province 
of Drenthe. In these special prisons they were to be transformed 
into self-controlled and hard-working citizens. They worked long 
hours each day and slept in iron cages. On Sunday they had to 
visit church. Those who misbehaved ended up in the punishment 
cell on a diet of bread and water. Intensive use was made of the 
state labour institutes, but they did not prove a great success. 
Many men reverted to their alcohol misuse after their sentence 
expired and the institutes were soon full of repeat offenders.
An alternative then arose in the form of addiction care in 
the ‘Health Clinics for Alcoholism’ as they were known. The 
f irst clinic was set up in Amsterdam in 1909, and dozens more 
quickly followed in the Netherlands. If convicted of public 
drunkenness, men could now choose between being sent to a 
state labour institute or living for several years under the control 
of one of these agencies, which managed their incomes. The 
men’s wages, pension or welfare money were then paid directly to 
their wife or the landlord, no longer to the drinkers themselves. 
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This milder form of coercion resulted in few total abstainers, to 
the disappointment of the addiction care providers. But it was 
very effective in protecting the families of alcoholics against 
economic and social degradation.
In practice, the aforementioned measures mostly affected the 
older, chronic problem drinkers. Greater success among younger 
men was achieved with ‘blacklisting’ alcoholics, based on the 
English model and introduced at the start of the 20th century 
in a growing number of Dutch municipalities. The blacklist was 
managed by the police, and it included drinkers who caused 
problems or whose families requested inclusion. The list was 
displayed in a prominent position in all the inns and cafes in 
the municipality. A f ine was imposed on anyone serving beer to 
people on the list. Owners of establishments received a personal 
letter from the Mayor when someone was placed on the list.
At the end of the 1950s there were some 380 Dutch municipali-
ties – mostly villages and smaller towns – with a blacklist of this 
kind. The media referred to the blacklist as a ‘pillory in modern 
form’, and it was. But the pillory did have a useful effect, as 
stated by researchers of the day. Not on the incorrigible chronic 
drunkards: they were still able to get hold of their drink, for 
instance by going to another municipality to drink or turning 
to methylated spirits instead. But the lists had a deterring ef-
fect on beginning problem drinkers. Imminent placement on 
the blacklist was regarded as a major social disgrace by one’s 
immediate social circle.
It is possible that all these stricter and milder forms of coercion 
did indeed have some success, because alcohol consumption fell 
sharply in the Netherlands after 1900. Between 1920 and 1960 it 
reached a historic low of less than three litres of pure alcohol 
per head of population per year. By way of comparison: in the 
mid-19th century the consumption was at over eight litres. But 
the conclusion that a strict approach with regard to alcoholics 
leads to lower alcohol abuse is hard to make in a broader perspec-
tive. In many countries with a stricter alcohol policy, such as 
America and Russia, the consumption of alcohol is relatively 
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high. And in the Netherlands too, alcohol consumption rose 
rapidly again after 1960, despite all repressive measures. As 
prosperity increased, so did drinking. Around 1980 the Dutch 
were drinking a well-oiled nine litres of pure alcohol per head 
of population. This is why many historians of alcohol and drug 
use currently state that the use of intoxicants depends on other 
factors than measures imposed from above. They point to the 
presence of social inequality as a background for substance 
abuse. The stress associated with urbanisation and migration 
also seems to promote the misuse of alcohol and drugs. In addi-
tion, group behaviour and social rituals concerning drink (and 
drugs) also play an important role. Many historians estimate 
that policy measures have a relatively small influence on the 
use and misuse of intoxicants.
Civilising offensive
There is no doubt that a tougher approach with regard to alcohol-
ics is often accompanied by stigmatisation and marginalisation 
of certain groups of users. A century ago, male workers were the 
scapegoats, accompanied by the stereotypical cry of ‘Oh, father! 
Please drink no more.’ These irresponsible drinkers were said 
to beat their wives and reduce their families to penury. In those 
days, disciplining these alcoholics was linked to a wider project: 
the elevation of the ‘lower classes’. Alcohol abuse was said to 
facilitate poverty, prostitution, crime and unemployment. There 
was no place for this kind of ‘anti-social’ behaviour in the orderly 
city envisaged by the bourgeoisie.
In practice, the target group for the judiciary and for addic-
tion care organisations was selective and confined to problem 
drinkers from working-class environments or the lower middle 
class, who created visible problems in the city or at their work. 
It was all right for rich people of independent means to drink 
themselves to death, such has always been the attitude in the 
Netherlands – as long as no one else is inconvenienced. Separate 
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neighbourhoods arose in Amsterdam and many other cities for 
‘anti-social families’, including many families where alcoholism 
was a factor. In these ‘schools for living’ (which existed up until 
the 1960s) they had to learn to live a decent life under the supervi-
sion of inspectors. The main result was that the inhabitants of 
these ‘schools for living’ were heavily stigmatised.
Now it is the binge drinkers – who include many younger 
girls – who are seen as the black sheep in the spotless white 
herd. Here too, the approach to these binge drinkers f its inside 
a wider civilising offensive. In Amsterdam and other Dutch cit-
ies, increased decency in public spaces is a 21st-century trend. 
Prostitution is being forced out of neighbourhoods where it was 
long tolerated. The number of ‘coffee shops’ (actually cannabis 
cafes) has been falling for years. In some parts of Amsterdam 
there are prohibitions on the public and shared consumption of 
alcohol and drugs. In short, the liberal city that has formed since 
the 1960s is slowly being cleaned up. In this process, the young 
binge drinkers form the ultimate symbol of the negative heritage 
of the 1960s. But the ideals of freedom and happiness propagated 
at that time never intended this result, did they? Scantily clad 
young women out on the streets with unsteady gait and slurred 
speech, ending the evening by puking in the gutter... Bah!
However, if cities take a tougher approach to binge drinkers, 
they will chiefly end up targeting certain groups with their disci-
plinary measures: people who are already in a socially vulnerable 
position. Research shows that risk groups for binge drinking in 
Amsterdam are mostly to be found among Antillean/Aruban and 
Surinamese young people, young people in Amsterdam-Zuidoost 
and young people with an educational level lower than senior 
general secondary education. In addition, binge drinking is twice 
as frequent among children who do not live with both parents 
as among children whose parents do live together.
When formulating a sustainable alcohol policy, European 
cities should not only take visible disturbance in public spaces as 
a point of departure, but also try to move beyond the front doors 
of the many home drinkers – both solitary persons and those 
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living with others, and from all social environments. Instead of 
a punitive approach they should prioritise an approach aimed 
at limiting harm: one aimed at preventing the mental and social 
damage caused by alcohol misuse for the individual and his 
or her direct surroundings. As the temperance campaigners of 
yesteryear already said: as long as we all enjoy our recreational 
tipple and the hospitality trade and the state earn plenty from 
this, we owe solidarity to those who cannot handle alcohol well.
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(Taste Green / Test Green)
A healthy diet can also be tasty and sustainable
Coosje Dijkstra, Jutka Halberstadt, Jaap Seidell and 
Arnoud Verhoeff
The child exclaims in amazement: ‘He’s actually eating that radish!’ 
when the school garden teacher in Amsterdam-Zuidoost pulls a 
radish from the ground and puts it in his mouth. The other children 
hesitate, but then most of them follow the teacher’s example and 
the children find that their self-harvested school garden salad does 
not need any dressing, because it is already really tasty!
This is just one observation from the ProefGroen (‘Taste 
Green’/‘Test Green’) study by VU University Amsterdam on how 
a school garden affects consumption of vegetables by children 
in deprived areas of Amsterdam. This kind of study is vital, be-
cause just one percent of Dutch children aged four and above eat 
suff icient amounts of vegetables, according to f igures from the 
Dutch National Food Consumption Survey. What’s more, one in 
eight children in the Netherlands are overweight or obese and in 
big cities such as Amsterdam this is actually one in f ive children. 
Obesity forms a typical urban problem in the rest of Europe, too, 
and occurs most frequently in deprived neighbourhoods. The 
lower the income and education levels, the greater the chance of 
obesity and other health problems. In Amsterdam, poor residents 
enjoy an average of f ifteen fewer years of good health than their 
fellow urban residents with higher incomes. These differences 
are caused in part by different eating habits. Scientif ic litera-
ture shows that healthy nutrition reduces the chance of many 
diseases: less obesity, cardio-vascular diseases, type 2 diabetes, 
joint problems, depression, dementia and some forms of cancer. 
This is why people are advised to eat lots of fruit and vegetables. 
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Over the last ten years, however, food prices in these food groups 
have risen by 40 percent, in contrast to a strong drop in the price 
of sweet and fatty foods. Hence it is not surprising that families 
having to cope on a minimum wage or even lower also have less 
money to buy healthy food for their children.
Those who eat insufficient vegetables and fruit as a child have 
a greater probability of less healthy eating patterns as an adult, 
too. Making lasting changes in nutritional behaviour is complex. 
An individual’s diet is influenced by a wide range of factors such 
as income, education, culture, taste preferences, upbringing, 
age and sex. We are also influenced by the availability level of 
healthy foods, good examples and support from educators and/
or people in one’s surroundings, or conversely by an abundant 
supply and intensive marketing of unhealthy products.
The government is trying to persuade people to eat more 
healthily through all kinds of information campaigns, such as 
the Dutch Food Pyramid (Schijf van Vijf, literally the Wheel of Five) 
and slogans like ‘two hundred grams of vegetables and two pieces 
of fruit a day’. But such campaigns have so far failed to solve the 
problem. In fact, in 2006 the Health Council of the Netherlands 
concluded that lifestyle campaigns have a minimal effect. It 
therefore advised: combine information campaigns on healthy 
behaviour with concrete measures in the living environment, 
such as healthy school or sports canteens, more playgrounds 
or less confectionary and soft-drinks machines in places often 
frequented by children. It is hard for parents and children to 
resist the temptations to which they are exposed every day. What 
can help is when the surroundings invite one to make healthy 
choices or, as the slogan goes, ‘make the healthy choice the easy 
choice’. But this is not self-evident for children in large cities such 
as Amsterdam. Deprived neighbourhoods have an above-average 
number of fast-food outlets and supermarkets with a limited 
range of healthy food. However, in recent years the rising trend 
of agriculture and other green initiatives in the urban environ-




One long-established and excellent example of the ‘green’ ap-
proach in Amsterdam is the school garden programme. Since 
1920, school gardens have been a popular facility in Amsterdam. 
Shortly after the First World War there was a chronic food 
shortage in the city. School gardens were opened to mitigate 
the situation, and these gardens brought children into contact 
with healthy food that they otherwise would not have eaten due 
to the high poverty levels at that time. Growing food was a key 
issue and the children only worked in the gardens after school 
hours. Starting in 1945, teachers began giving biology lessons 
in the school gardens as well. From the 1950s onwards these 
lessons took place only during school hours, as fully f ledged 
biology teaching matching the core goals and curriculum of the 
f ifth and sixth grades, also incorporating geography and even 
language and arithmetic.
Currently the Municipality of Amsterdam has thirteen 
school garden complexes in the city, where each year 6800 
pupils engage in gardening, each with their own little gar-
den of ten square metres. A total of 25 full-time education 
workers and 13 full-time gardeners work here. The round-
the-year programme offered in Amsterdam is unique in the 
Netherlands. During 25 lessons, each lasting 90 minutes, the 
children cultivate and process vegetables and herbs and they 
grow f lowers. Before the outdoor lessons begin, the children 
learn about the soil and make careful contact with worms. 
They sow garden cress in trays and observe the growth from 
seed to plant. From April onwards the children look after their 
own garden, where they grow vegetables, f lowers and herbs 
which they harvest themselves and take home. In spring the 
pupils harvest lettuce and radishes for the f irst time. After the 
summer holidays they can have fun harvesting, preparing and 
sampling their self-made school garden soup. The pupils pick 
large bunches of f lowers and make colourful bouquets to take 
home. They can often hand-harvest half a bucket of potatoes, 
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although they planted just one seed potato. And every year the 
new carrot champion is proclaimed – who grew the heaviest 
carrot this year?
The school garden programme is a partner of Voedselwijs 
(‘Food Wise’), the Amsterdam food education programme for 
children. Other Voedselwijs programmes are farm education, 
discovery trails in the Hortus Botanicus, cookery workshops 
or a no waste-lunch. In this way primary school pupils can 
experience the many aspects of food: where our food comes 
from nowadays and how they can grow it themselves, what is 
involved in commercial food production and processing and how 
they can put together a tasty, responsible and sustainable meal. 
Such initiatives are not conducted in isolation. Recently, more 
than one and a half million people signed the petition in which 
the British cook Jamie Olivier called on the British government 
to make food education a compulsory subject in schools. Besides 
the school garden programme, in recent years Amsterdam has 
seen an increase in all kinds of urban agriculture projects, such 
as growing vegetables on rooftops, food from the local vegetable 
gardens, keeping chickens in an off ice district and organising 
local farm-produce markets.
This positive development can be seen in various cities in 
Europe. The idea behind such projects is: let people experience 
where their food comes from, where it grows and how it tastes. 
Let them dig in the ground themselves, eat vegetables in a fun 
way, develop broader taste preferences and cook together in the 
neighbourhood. The aim is not to ensure food supplies within 
the urban area – that would require different measures – but 
to allow children and their parents to encounter healthier 
food and healthier city life in a positive and challenging way. 
This appears to lead to better attitudes, knowledge and prefer-
ences regarding vegetables and fruit. In turn, this ensures that 
children eat more vegetables and fruit, and get more physical 
exercise by working in the garden. This also promotes social 
cohesion within a class or neighbourhood and school achieve-
ment is positively inf luenced. Other green projects include 
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green schoolyards and green playgrounds in the neighbour-
hood. These play areas promote focused attention, physical 
exercise and wellbeing among children. Moreover, all these 
green initiatives can lead to improvements in the urban en-
vironment. People with more green in their environment feel 
heathier, visit the family doctor less often and have a greater 
sense of security in their neighbourhood. More green in the 
surroundings is particularly benef icial for vulnerable groups 
such as people with low incomes and education, children and 
the elderly.
The Amsterdam approach
ProefGroen is a study in harmony with the spirit and approach 
of Dr Samuel Sarphati (1813-1866). Sarphati is often remembered 
for his Paleis voor Volksvlijt (Palace of National Industry), a large 
exhibition hall that burned down long ago. He also aimed to 
improve public health in the city. As a doctor for the poor and 
a visionary entrepreneur, he was able to influence municipal 
policy regarding the endemic diseases of the day to such an 
extent that the health of many Amsterdam citizens improved 
signif icantly, especially in the weaker groups. In 1847 he was 
granted permission to collect waste and in 1855 he founded a 
bread factory that offered bread at 30 percent below the bakery 
prices, so that poor people too could eat better food. Such efforts 
resulted, around 1870, in a rise in the average life expectancy 
in Amsterdam. Sarphati brought many benef its to the city of 
Amsterdam with his interdisciplinary approach to the issue of 
poverty.
Inspired by this approach, in 2015 a partnership arose between 
the Municipality of Amsterdam, VU University Amsterdam, VU 
Medical Centre Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, Amster-
dam University of Applied Sciences and the Academic Medical 
Centre, united in Sarphati Amsterdam, Research for Healthy 
Living. Sarphati Amsterdam is a unique multidisciplinary and 
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interdisciplinary Amsterdam infrastructure for research in the 
f ield of public health. It contributes to effective and sustain-
able prevention of diseases of aff luence through innovative 
interdisciplinary research. First and foremost, the focus is on 
one of the most acute lifestyle diseases: childhood obesity (in 
both its milder and more serious forms). The Amsterdam city 
authorities have formulated ambitious policy goals for promot-
ing healthy behaviour and the quality of life among the city’s 
youth in the programme Amsterdamse Aanpak Gezond Gewicht 
(Amsterdam Approach for Healthy Weight). The mission of this 
approach is ‘to get all Amsterdam children to a healthy weight 
by 2033’. The programme aims to promote healthy behaviour 
in various environments: in health care, schools, sports clubs 
and neighbourhoods. It is vital to know what actually works in 
order to implement sustainable and effective policies.
Sarphati Amsterdam aims to make a contribution to chang-
ing obesity-related behaviour by conducting research in a way 
that does justice to the complexity of the issue. The unique 
infrastructure and high-level expertise will serve to attract 
students, researchers, policymakers and companies from all 
over the world. This will enable Amsterdam to further establish 
its reputation as a city of knowledge. But all this can only be 
achieved through collaboration with the citizens: it requires 
research with, for and by citizens. Only in this way can society 
be made healthier for present and coming generations.
Amsterdam, just like many other large European cities, is 
faced with major socio-economic health differences, caused 
partly by unhealthy lifestyles. ProefGroen, Sarphati Amsterdam 
and the Amsterdamse Aanpak Gezond Gewicht bring together 
research, policy and practice, in close collaboration with the 
citizens of Amsterdam. All parties must work together on sus-
tainable solutions for a healthy and vibrant city from which the 
citizens and administrators of other European cities can also 
benefit. Amsterdam can thus become a scientif ic testing ground 
for Europe, a place where solutions can be found to the epidemic 
of lifestyle diseases. For now and in the future.
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30. Cycling is an acquired skill
A cycling city is created through trial and error
Marco te Brömmelstroet
European cities such as London, Paris and Munich are outdoing 
each other with plans for bicycle highways, under the motto 
‘going Dutch’. But doesn’t this simplify things too much?
Cycling is increasingly being embraced as a crucial ingredient 
for sustainable mobility in European cities. The Dutch are often 
praised as an inspiring example. At f irst sight the simplicity 
of the bicycle is very appealing: it is a relatively simple means 
of transport that can serve a wide range of complex purposes. 
However, growing interest from various academic disciplines is 
increasingly revealing that this image ignores the mutual links 
between cycling and all kinds of social, cultural, economic 
and spatial processes. This raises important questions. Cycling 
requires more active attention and examination, not only in non-
Dutch cities where cycling needs to grow beyond its marginal 
position, but also in the Dutch context. This chapter covers a 
number of striking connections. But f irst of all, let us examine 
why bicycles are seen as a partial solution to the classic mobility 
dilemma.
Mobility dilemma
Mobility can be def ined as the possibility for moving people, 
goods or information. Professor of Transport Planning Luca 
Bertolini states that it creates a fundamental dilemma between 
the dependence on mobility and its negative effects.’ On the 
one hand it is a condition for economic development as well as 
civic engagement and social emancipation: it enables people 
and businesses to participate in activities relevant to them. But 
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on the other hand mobility is producing ever more visible nega-
tive effects: energy consumption, air pollution, noise pollution, 
fragmentation of landscapes and cities, lack of safety, use of 
space, etc. Consequently, urban mobility policy is increasingly a 
balancing act. Cycling seems to have the best credentials to date: 
it considerably increases the action radius compared to walk-
ing, without creating the aforementioned negative effects for 
society. What’s more, cycling is often associated with a spectrum 
of bonus effects: major health benefits, broad accessibility and 
even increased interaction among people and between people 
and their surroundings. In turn, these effects are associated with 
social capital: with happy, socially equitable and fair towns and 
cities. It is perhaps no coincidence that cycling is a very popular 
activity in the Netherlands (27 percent of all journeys are made 
on the bicycle) and that, according to the United Nations, Dutch 
children are the happiest in the world.
‘The Dutch miracle’
So no wonder that cities increasingly aim to copy this success. The 
Dutch Cycling Embassy, a platform for Dutch bicycle expertise, 
states that it receives more than seventy inquiries a day. While 
Amsterdam alone received around 140 delegations in 2015. Cities 
that have put all their eggs in the car basket are now grinding to 
a standstill. Even successful public transport cities are f inding 
themselves confronted with the limits of the system. They often 
seek inspiration from Dutch cities. But the quest for the Dutch 
recipe often leads to disappointment. The f irst myth to quickly 
bite the dust is that bicycles have always formed a key element of 
the mobility system in the Netherlands. It often comes as a huge 
surprise that f ierce popular revolt and even urban warfare were 
needed to halt the rise of the automobile system around 1975. 
Moreover, the following four decades did not see an application 
of a clearly def ined masterplan by an enlightened leader either. 
Even today the progress of the Dutch cycling system is chiefly the 
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sum of many small interventions by a large number of crucially 
important individuals. Just consider the recent and f ierce debate 
about whether the passage under the Rijksmuseum should be 
reopened to cyclists.
Moreover, many important interventions were never directly 
intended to promote the use of bicycles. To give one example, the 
‘peripheral retail facilities policy’, also known colloquially as the 
‘hypermarket act’, ensured that the Netherlands was spared the 
global triumph of international shopping centre conglomerates. 
The resulting f ine-meshed distribution of relatively small super-
markets proved to be an ideal environment for urban cycling. 
This is why cycling historian Professor Ruth Oldenziel has called 
our modern bicycle success an accident of history. The hope 
that remains for a policymaker in search of new approaches, 
following a visit to the Netherlands, is that a transition is possible 
but that there is no silver bullet to fall back on. It requires a 
consolidated series of small, context-sensitive interventions in 
various domains and over a longer period in order to move away 
at least partially from a high degree of automobile dependence. 
It is revealing here that a city like Amsterdam has only very 
recently issued its f irst policy plan on cycling, which is still 
largely responding to, instead of boosting, growth in cycling. 
True cycling policy is contained in many other policy domains. 
This brings us to the complexity of the seemingly simple cycling 
system.
Complex feedback
So what makes cycling so complex? Why it is not enough to sim-
ply create cycling paths in line with the famous Dutch standards? 
To understand this, we have to unravel so-called secondary and 
tertiary effects. As mentioned, cycling is linked to various urban 
processes. What makes things tricky is that these relationships 
are 1) often reciprocal, so that cycling is both a cause and an 
effect, 2) non-linear, meaning that small changes can have large 
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effects, and 3) mutually influencing, so that unexpected effects 
can occur. Below I illustrate this using two examples.
Mobility has reciprocal relationships with the spatial form of 
urban regions. Take for instance the example of the car. Its speed 
and freedom of movement allowed people to live far from the city 
and also made it attractive for amenities and employers to cluster 
in order to use economies of scale. Over time this mechanism 
led to an expanding urban structure in which distances between 
functions increased (secondary effect). In turn, these increased 
distances limited the mobility choices of individuals for linking 
relevant activities within a constant travel-time budget, as a 
result of which they increasingly had to rely on the car (tertiary 
effect). The same logic applies to cycling, although more in a 
more diffused way. In urban areas in the Netherlands where a 
majority of potential customers cycle (for instance the inner city 
of Amsterdam) it is more attractive for entrepreneurs to open 
and maintain multiple smaller branches. This is for instance 
reflected in the spatial structure of banks (and their cash ma-
chines), supermarkets, schools and day-care centres, which are 
thus able to serve as many people as possible (secondary effects). 
Because of this structure it is easier to link complex activities 
patterns of families by using the bicycle and increasingly hard for 
other modes (tertiary effect). This is further reinforced because 
families with a preference for cycling are increasingly choosing 
to settle in such urban areas.
The second example relates to the social and cultural status 
of cycling. In many countries bicycles are historically seen as 
poor man’s transport. In Germany and England, for instance, 
the bicycle was chiefly a means of getting workers to the factory 
more quickly. Something that is embraced on a broad scale 
by socialist parties, who saw an important emancipatory role. 
In the Netherlands the bicycle was absolutely not a negative 
status symbol. Indeed, the bicycle is widely supported because 
it is used by all strata of the population. In the Netherlands 
no one will look twice if they see a prime minister on a bike 
on his way to an audience with the king, who is also happy 
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to have his photo taken on a bike to emphasise that he is so 
‘ordinary’. Giselinde Kuipers, Professor of Sociology, refers 
to this as ‘conspicuous non-consumption’. Because both the 
managing director and the cleaner cycle to work, this ‘national 
habit’ is further reinforced (secondary effect). Dutch television 
commercials, even those for cars, regularly use the bicycle as 
a vehicle for appealing to a large target group. In f ilm classics 
such as Turkish Delight, the rogue hero played by Rutger Hauer 
becomes ‘extra Dutch’ because he mostly gets around by bike 
(notably, in a f ilm sponsored by the British Leyland Group, an 
automotive conglomerate).
The cycling challenge
So it would seem that the success of cycling in the Netherlands 
is partly due to it having become a background issue. It is so 
mundane that we now hardly give it any conscious thought: 
you ‘just get your bike’ and off you go. But this is also the danger. 
Recent dynamics in the cycling system requires much more 
explicit attention. Firstly, the secondary and tertiary effects 
are creating places where cycling suddenly increases strongly, 
as in some town and city centres and especially to and from 
train stations. This raises new allocation issues: from space on 
the road to parking capacity and waiting times at traff ic lights. 
Choices in these areas that were made years ago now need to be 
reconsidered in the light of new developments.
Secondly, there are also spatial and social processes that 
have a negative effect on cycling in the Netherlands. The spa-
tial, cultural and social structure of, for instance, the western 
garden cities in Amsterdam is leading to a gradual decrease in 
cycling and an explosive increase in mopeds, especially among 
young people. This not only leads to noise nuisance, air pollu-
tion and increased subjective and objective lack of safety. It is 
also displacing the bicycle on cycling paths, and this in turn 
reinforces other self-reinforcing spatial and social processes 
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that may be negative for the bicycle, such as location decisions 
by entrepreneurs and status (secondary effect). How should 
policymakers act or respond with respect to such developments? 
How can they prevent such a carefully developed cycling system 
from quickly disappearing again and prevent another ‘accident 
of history’?
Challenges being encountered outside the Netherlands chiefly 
involve the questions of how and where one can overcome self-
reinforcing, automobile-dependent tendencies. Recent mobility 
data show that ever more cities are recognising that the tide is 
turning and that they actually already have a growing cycling 
culture. It is then necessary to transform these often strong 
subcultures into the mainstream. At the same time, physical 
measures need to be taken to discourage car use in the city and 
to offer cyclists safety and comfort: a package of ‘carrot and stick’ 
measures – such as parking charges (stick) and cycling paths 
(carrot) in places where this is possible – around spatial struc-
tures that encourage short journey distances. This means one 
should not begin with a cycle highway from nowhere to nowhere 
(automobile logic), but instead with something like safe junctions 
in the highly built-up inner city. Preferably close to train stations 
with high quality cycling parking facilities. Cities have the best 
chance of getting a cycling system off the ground if they aim for 
interaction with the regional public transport system. The public 
transport plus cycling system in the Netherlands shows that the 
synergistic qualities of this (a rapid and high capacity alongside 
a f inely meshed and flexible capacity) can be very competitive 
in comparison with the automobile system. In fact, as shown 
by Roland Kager, each of the two systems would seem to be a 
prerequisite for the functioning of the other.
While the rest of Europe can learn from the Dutch experience 
in all its complexity, the Netherlands must not forget to continue 
further work on maintaining its success. Our famous swarms 
of cyclists are the result of a gradually evolved ecosystem that 
continues to evolve – but which also continues to remain vulner-
able and easy to destroy.
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31. Growing socio-spatial segregation 
in European capitals: Different 
government, less mitigation
Sako Musterd
Social contrasts between residential environments in the capi-
tals of European countries are increasing everywhere, albeit to 
different degrees. This is one of the most important conclusions 
of a large-scale comparative study recently completed by a trans-
national team of urban geographers. The study was conducted by 
local teams of urban specialists, acting simultaneously and ac-
cording to the same methods, in Amsterdam, Athens, Budapest, 
London, Madrid, Milan, Oslo, Prague, Riga, Stockholm, Tallinn, 
Vienna and Vilnius. Together these cities represent Northern, 
Southern, Eastern and Western Europe.
This comparison of the development of socio-spatial inequal-
ity, as it is known, covers the period 2001-2011. The researchers 
applied as much as possible the same measuring instruments in 
all cities to establish inequality between the neighbourhoods and 
districts of the capitals. They focused on differences in income 
and profession. The accompanying graph, representing one of the 
results and using an established measure for this purpose, sets 
out the unequal distribution over the city between the lowest 
and highest classes of social groups.
The levels of segregation are still modest if we compare them 
with cities in North and South America, for instance, or in Africa. 
The segregation levels in Eastern Europe are generally a little 
lower than in the rest of Europe. However, the Eastern European 
cities are now quickly ‘catching up’ with the rest of the continent. 
In fact one can see an increase everywhere. In the supplied ex-
ample, Amsterdam would seem to be an exception to the rule. 
However, a closer analysis of the dynamism in this city before 
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and after the outbreak of the f inancial and housing market 
crisis shows that this involves a temporary effect. The crisis put 
a brake on the buyers’ market and many middle-class households 
postponed a planned move. As a result they unintentionally 
promoted the social mixing in the areas where they continued 
to live. This led to lower segregation. The dynamism before the 
crisis shows that the segregation will once again increase when 
the housing market picks up again.
Negative effects of segregation
The described development of increasing segregation – the 
increasingly separated residential distribution of poorer and 
richer parts of the population in important European capitals 
Closer analysis of the levels and development of socio-spatial 
segregation of the lowest and highest socio-economic categories in 
European capitals, in 2001 and 2011 (the scale of the dissimilarity index 
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‘Inequality and rising levels of socio-economic segregation: lessons from a pan-
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– demands a response. After all, both residents and local and 
national governments, and even the European Commission 
itself, regularly express their rejection of the threat of increas-
ing segregation. This is because negative effects are expected. 
There is a danger that the differences between rich and poor will 
become increasingly evident in the daily urban environment. 
In the case of very large differences this can lead to problems, 
especially if the inequality takes the form of a sharp division of 
the residential areas. We can see this, for instance, in the shape 
of gated communities: more or less closed-off residential environ-
ment cocoons comprising relatively prosperous households who 
wish to separate themselves from the rest of the population. 
In contrast, neighbourhoods with concentrations of the least 
prosperous can arise, where many other social groups no longer 
dare show themselves. A development like this would result 
in alienation and discontent. The alienation can lead to false 
images of others and discontent is the basis for social unrest 
and ultimately brings conflicts or riots. This situation ultimately 
also damages the economy. Naturally, no democracy wishes for 
such consequences.
Segregation also has unhappy associations for many other 
reasons and is thus seen as something negative. It is expected to 
cause adverse effects in many areas. It is assumed, for instance, 
that growing up in a relatively poor neighbourhood has an in-
hibiting effect on the individual development of young people: 
because there are few or no socially successful residents living 
close to them, but many who are less successful, young people 
mostly receive the ‘wrong’ role models. It is also thought that 
people have less chance of upward social mobility because the 
educational ambitions in poor neighbourhoods are said to be 
lower. Furthermore, it is expected that people in such areas will 
not be able to f ind the right networks, for instance to help them 
get a job. Although no conclusive evidence has yet been found 
for these supposed effects, they do generally cause worry among 
various levels of government and prompt them to intervene to 
turn the tide of segregation.
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Factors causing segregation
In order to turn around the growth of segregation, it is essential 
to understand the factors responsible for the growth. This brings 
us to the theory behind the segregation. How does segregation 
actually come about? If we have the answer to this question, then 
it leads us to starting points for targeted intervention, which 
can help to combat the negative effects. Simply working against 
segregation as a symptom is of course also an option, but that 
costs a lot of money and – if the causes are not well understood 
– the effects of such symptom-countering can quickly evaporate. 
So in order to interpret the differences in the development of 
segregation between different cities, one must f irst examine the 
theory relating to segregation.
The previously referenced European study examined several 
dimensions of explanation. Firstly, the influence of the changes 
in the welfare state and, above all, the changes in the housing 
market. Secondly, the relationship with the degree to which the 
cities are connected to the networks of the global economy and 
the extent to which they have achieved a successful economic 
restructuring. Thirdly, the association with the level of social in-
equality in the countries in which the cities are located. Fourthly, 
the historical development of the cities. For the last of these four 
factors, the specif ic local historically developed context of the 
cities was examined in broad terms. It seems increasingly likely 
that this context can in itself have an important impact on the 
development of segregation.
All the aforementioned factors play a role and are in fact inter-
related. In cities that are well-connected to global economic 
networks, for instance, we see a development in which many 
activities take place that require many highly educated and 
specialised workers. This results in a stratum of the popula-
tion with a relatively high income and a prestigious profession. 
Simultaneously in these cities we see an upturn in the consumer-
oriented services sector, which often employs less highly edu-
cated people. The social inequality manifesting itself here tends 
 255
to translate into socio-spatial inequality: segregation. Another 
influential factor is the neoliberal wave that has been washing 
over Europe for a while now. This shows itself in a changing role 
for governments, which are devoting less attention to ‘broad-
based policy and redistribution’; they are actively removing 
broad-based subsidies. The housing market has less and less 
space for social rented homes. As a result, this sector becomes 
increasingly the exclusive domain of low-income households, 
thus increasing the chance of stigmatisation. On the other hand, 
the government is devoting ever more attention and money to 
‘stimulating economic activity and market forces’. This shift of 
regime has probably contributed to the increase in social and 
spatial inequality.
The paradox of the post-socialist transition
It is hard to gain a solid understanding of segregation because 
some time often lies between the possible causes and the devel-
opment of the segregation. This is best illustrated using experi-
ences in Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, globalisation, 
neoliberalisation and large-scale privatisation – together with 
the restitution of former property to the owners from the time 
before the Second World War – were given a relatively free hand 
in the countries seeking accession to the European Union. The 
results f irst became visible in and around the capitals. Following 
the change of regime, which took place almost immediately after 
1990, the social inequality quickly increased, most strongly in 
the more liberal Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and 
less so in the post-socialist and corporatist Visegrad countries 
(including the Czech Republic and Hungary). But socio-spatial 
segregation did not occur immediately. This was because first the 
old and decayed, but potentially valuable central city districts 
were refurbished and because middle-class households seized 
the opportunity to acquire a home in the suburbs. This had still 
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been impossible under socialism. This dynamism did not initially 
lead to an increase in segregation; in some locations an initial 
drop was even recorded, for instance because more households 
with higher incomes moved to the previously poor inner cities, 
temporarily leading to a greater social mix. This can be called 
a ‘paradox of the post-socialist transition’: a strong increase in 
social inequality, but initially without a corresponding strong 
increase in segregation. It was only in the new millennium that 
the inequalities slowly became visible through increasing socio-
spatial segregation. The modelling of the housing market on 
the liberal section of Western Europe clearly began to have its 
effects. In the longer term this will also lead to a weaker position 
of the large-scale residential districts with standardised housing 
blocks, which in the socialist era still enjoyed high status and 
offered high living standards.
The mitigating effect of government intervention
The experiences in Eastern Europe show in a compact form how 
economic reforms and the transition to another model of the 
welfare state can have effects in terms of social inequality and 
socio-spatial segregation. On the basis of these experiences we 
should consider that most European cities still have relatively 
strong welfare state systems. Despite all the changes and the 
differences between European states with a more liberal, social 
democratic or corporatist nature, many cities have reasonable 
levels of social security, devote considerable attention to ensur-
ing access to and affordability of housing for wide sections of 
the population, and have a broadly inclusive policy in areas such 
as education and health. Such government interventions serve 
to mitigate the negative effects of globalisation and economic 
restructuring. This seems to be the most important reason why 
the levels of segregation in European cities are still lower than 
those in, for instance, North America.
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Historically developed, context-specif ic differences also play 
a role, of course, as well as those relating to the welfare state 
model and the evolved economic structure. It seems that social 
networks and family links can take over many tasks of the gov-
ernment, and can also contribute to mutual solidarity and a more 
balanced distribution of social and economic capital. This can be 
seen in Southern Europe and was reality in Europe at the start 
of the 20th century, when Europe was still strongly rural. But if 
such safety nets come under pressure, or if we consider the fact 
that in many places these structures have been transferred to the 
state in times of prosperity, then it becomes clear that a further 
withdrawal by the government in the aforementioned areas will 
bring considerable risks. The consequences will probably become 
visible in increasing social inequality and will lead, albeit with 
some delay, to sharper socio-spatial segregation.
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32. The future of the city
Amsterdam between growth and 
overexploitation?
Jeroen Slot and Laure Michon
Amsterdam is doing well. The population is growing, the 
economy is picking up, and prosperity is increasing. Since 
Glaeser’s Triumph of the City (2011) and Barber’s If Mayors 
ruled the World (2013) the self-assurance of policymakers and 
administrators has grown with respect to the future of the city. 
So much so, in fact, that success seems a foregone conclusion. So 
much so that little attention is given to the downside of success. 
So much so that it is hard to initiate a discussion about which 
future city is the most desirable. Even if the city were to have 
a population of two million and free zones for start-ups in the 
foreseeable future, and were to receive many more tourists – 
meaning that it remains successful in the eyes of many – this 
discussion remains relevant. Currently, it is too easy to think 
that all ongoing changes (new lifestyles, developments in the 
housing market and labour market) will by themselves lead the 
way to the optimum city of the future. However, these changes 
can lead to overexploitation: the city and urban society can also 
lose much that is valuable.
Three questions need to be addressed in this discussion on 
the future of the city. The f irst question relates to the sustain-
ability of the success: how certain is it actually that the current 
success will continue? The second question is whether enough 
attention is being devoted to the downside of the growth 
scenarios. And f inally, how will we all decide about the future 
of the city? In other words: what is the democratic basis for 
the discussion about the future of the city, which also aims 
to be a responsible capital and which also plays an important 
regional function?
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The success of Amsterdam
Who, at the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, could have 
predicted the current success of Amsterdam? The outdated hous-
ing stock, the rise of the car and the decentralisation policy were 
at the time leading to suburbanisation. The city was emptying 
and at its low point had a population of around 675,000. This is 
now over 830,000, and Amsterdam is one of the fastest-growing 
cities in the Netherlands.
The growth of the population in Amsterdam is due to two related 
causes. Since the crisis (in the housing market), fewer families have 
been leaving the city. In addition, more people in their twenties and 
thirties are coming to the city to study or work. These groups are 
relatively well-off and the level of prosperity in the city has risen 
in recent years. But that also means that the increase in prosperity 
has taken place mostly among the more highly educated.
Besides the resident population, the number of tourists visit-
ing the city has also grown strongly. This too has influenced the 
local economy positively. The crisis has had consequences for the 
economy and above all for the job market, but the developments 
in Amsterdam are more positive than in the other larger cities 
and in the Netherlands as a whole. Unemployment fell a little in 
2014 and the housing market is picking up again.
However, one must ask how sustainable Amsterdam’s success is. 
Firstly, there is a good chance that groups which remained in the 
city in recent years will now, prompted by the recovering housing 
market, leave the city again in search of space and green surround-
ings. In particular, those with lower-middle incomes find it hard 
to find a place to live in the city; relocating may be the only option 
for them. Moreover, housing preferences do not change overnight.
Furthermore, will growth in line with the trend of recent years 
essentially change the character of the city? Today’s Amsterdam 
citizens have a close relationship with their city: eight out of ten 
Amsterdam residents feel attached to the city, and this feeling is 
strong across all population groups. How will this sense of con-
nectedness be influenced by the further growth of the city? The 
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many expressions of dissatisfaction with the urban squeeze can 
be seen as a signal: for some Amsterdam residents, it has become 
less pleasant to live in the city. The attraction of Amsterdam is 
not one-dimensional: if certain groups move to the city (even 
more than was previously the case), then a completely differ-
ent dynamic will be created. The recent news that ever more 
foreign investors are buying buildings for speculation purposes 
is one example of this. Apart from the question of whether this 
is desirable – and new dynamics are certainly not automatically 
negative – it is important to realise what the downside and pos-
sible negative impact of this may be.
The downside of success
Not everyone can benefit to an equal degree from the success 
of the city. It is mostly the more highly educated and people in 
employment who benefit from the current developments. But 
they too are unhappy with the pressure created by the strong 
population growth in the city and by the increased tourism. 
Moreover, the housing market serves only part of this group. So 
there is a realistic chance that precisely the families who lend Am-
sterdam’s growth a special character (middle- and high-income 
families) will in part leave the city again, either from choice or 
necessity – certainly if the housing market stabilises further.
The big question for groups who benefit less from the growth 
of the city is: will there still be space for them in the future? 
Developments in the housing market play a primary role here. 
Rises in house prices and in rents are already making it impos-
sible for people on low incomes to move to the centre of the city, 
and accessibility is coming under pressure in other parts of the 
city as well. Other issues also play a role, such as: will amenities in 
the city remain attuned to their needs or will investments mostly 
be made in what the more successful (potential) city residents 
f ind attractive? This question concerns the consequences of 
gentrif ication and segregation.
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Comparisons with other European cities are often made both 
with regard to this issue and to tourism. To what other situations 
should and can Amsterdam compare itself? Which cities form 
shining examples for emulation, or conversely can be seen as 
horror stories?
London, Berlin and Paris are at the top of the European league. 
It is hard for Amsterdam to measure up to these cities. The popula-
tion of London is almost ten times that of Amsterdam. Due to their 
scale and their much stronger economic (and tourist) functions 
these cities cannot be compared to the Dutch capital. Moreover, 
as seats of national government they hold strong regional, national 
and European positions of power. Nonetheless, the cases of London 
and Paris in particular can be taken as a warning when it comes to 
urban segregation and gentrification. Both cities are characterised 
by great wealth but also by huge differences and by conflicts (for 
instance the riots in Paris in 2005 and in London in 2011).
Resident population (in 2015) and overnight stays (in 2012), x 1.000
Resident 








London 7,556 37,500 37,813
Paris 2,138 34,000 44,167
Berlin 3,426 25,000 24,854
Barcelona 1,621 16,000 28,447
Amsterdam 822* 9,800 37,779
Source for residents:  *OIS, other cities: World Population Review
Source for overnight stays: MasterCard Index of Global Destination Cities
Source GDP/resident: Eurostat. Expressed in Purchasing Power Standard, to correct price 
differences between countries
When it comes to tourism, Venice holds a f irm place as the horror 
story: a city floundering under tourism. In the historic centre of 
Venice, the number of residents halved between 1990 and 2009, 
falling from 120,000 to 60,000 (although very few tourists stay 
overnight in Venice). It is hard to imagine that Amsterdam would 
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go down this path. Indeed, quoting this horror story actually kills 
the debate: the discussion of the future of Amsterdam should 
thus not be about Venice.
A more realistic example for comparing urban developments 
(including tourism) is Barcelona. This city is slightly larger than 
Amsterdam and attracts more tourists. Recently the city has 
mostly been in the news due to the tensions created by the strong 
increase in tourism. The new Mayor aims to reverse the trend: 
no new hotels should be opened in the city centre and tourists 
should be distributed more evenly across the city. This seems 
to strongly resemble the solutions sought by Amsterdam. In 
Barcelona, the tensions between tourists and residents seem 
much stronger than those in Amsterdam. So it also forms a 
warning: tensions should not be allowed to rise so high that 
polarisation occurs.
Both the issues of tourism development and of segregation and 
gentrif ication revolve around the question: who makes the city, 
and for whom is the city? Displacement is the spectre in both 
debates. It should also be said that on both fronts there is no 
clear recipe for balancing the interests of various city residents 
and users. This requires a dialogue. At the moment we often see 
a stalemate where the concerns of one group are swept away 
by the ambitions of the other group, and vice versa. Moreover, 
this discussion on the future development of the city not only 
concerns Amsterdam, but the entire metropolitan region.
Who makes decisions, how and on what basis?
The downside of the success can also be seen in the region. While 
the city used to attract young people, who then left the city again 
for the surrounding urban regions after they had completed 
their education, found work and started a family (the city as 
escalator), this group of prosperous residents now departs from 
Amsterdam less frequently. Moreover, the city is growing less and 
less accessible for less privileged groups. As a consequence, the 
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traditional growth poles, such as Almere, are seeing shrinking 
populations and becoming less prosperous.
The issue of the relationship with the region brings us to 
an overarching problem, namely that of urban and regional 
democracy. The region does not have a say in deciding on the 
developments in Amsterdam, but the impact of these develop-
ments nonetheless affects the entire region. More generally, 
there are three problems. Firstly, there is a democratic shortfall: 
only half of the Amsterdam citizens voted in the last municipal 
council elections, and in some parts of the city this was less than 
a third of the residents. Lack of interest, barriers to participation 
in the democratic process (such as language) and cynicism are 
all obstacles to a good decision-making process.
Secondly, there is a democratic vacuum: Amsterdam decides 
about Amsterdam and in part also about what happens in the 
region, but which influence do municipalities in the region have 
on what happens in Amsterdam and the region as a whole? There 
are of course contacts and agreements between neighbouring 
municipalities, but there is no framework for discussion on 
the developments in the region in relation to the future of the 
city. This is not an appeal for a new administrative layer at 
(sub)regional level. Nothing will be solved by more elections. 
However, as a responsible capital, Amsterdam can ensure that 
this discussion is conducted jointly. This is an interesting task 
for reinforcing the success of Amsterdam: not only attention 
for and interest in what is already going well, but also ensuring 
positive developments in all parts of the city and success outside 
the city boundaries.
Here, attention will need to focus on the way the debate 
is conducted. This is the third problem in the current situa-
tion: there is no substantive basis for the debate. There is no 
lack of opinions, or forums, but people are talking past each 
other instead of with each other. According to some, the urban 
economy should be developed to full f lowering by making the 
city even more attractive to tourists, to companies (above all 
the promising innovative companies) and to investors. Others 
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fear that precisely this approach will threaten what has made 
Amsterdam a special and attractive city up until now. But the 
various parties fail to arrive at a joint analysis and resulting 
task. It is not necessary to describe how this discussion can 
be conducted in practical terms here (e.g. a citizens’ summit, 
a G1000 or another form of broad-based assembly); the main 
thing is that the discussion should be broad-based and con-
structive. And that it should involve an exchange of questions 
and logical, fact-based arguments. What are the current trends? 
What results do they have, also in the longer term, as regards 
prosperity and welfare? To what extent can these trends be 
influenced? What results can interventions have, and what are 
the costs? And for whom exactly? In and around Amsterdam, 
we can see developments that are also taking place in Europe 
as whole: the people of Germany and Greece cannot pretend 
that they can make decisions on the future separately. The 
same goes for the people of Almere, Diemen and Amsterdam.
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33. Welcome to Amsterdam! 
Well, not really
The right to the city requires a city in balance
Arie van Wijngaarden
Cities attract people, and big cities attract even more people. 
This is happening on a large scale all over the world, and in the 
Netherlands too. In particular, people are moving to the major 
cities of Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. The right to live 
wherever one wants in principle gives everyone the possibility 
to move to the big city.
The attractiveness of the city
The big cities in particular have a number of attracting factors, such 
as the possibility of f inding a job, the presence of higher educa-
tion institutions, cultural amenities, the short distance to these 
amenities and the many possibilities for interaction. There are also 
less attractive aspects: the difficulty of finding a place to live and 
its high price, and the increasing pressure and bustle of the city. 
Health-related factors such as air pollution currently receive less 
attention, but they are also less serious than they were thirty years 
ago thanks to better technology and stricter emission standards.
Amsterdam is growing again
Following the exodus to the growth poles (suburban satellite towns) 
in the 1960 and 1970s, Amsterdam’s population began growing again 
from the 1990s onwards, with a spurt in growth beginning in 2006. 
As of in 2015 the city had a population of 827,000, and the forecasts 
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by Statistics Netherlands and the Projectbureau voor het Leefmilieu 
(project off ice for the living environment) indicate continuing 
growth. Every day in 2014 in Amsterdam there were, on average:
 30 births;
 14 deaths;
 98 people moving from other parts of the Netherlands;
 96 people leaving for other parts of the Netherlands;
 80 people moving from other countries;
 67 people leaving for other countries.
The most important growth factors in that year were the birth 
surplus and the surplus of people moving from other countries, the 
latter also caused by the increase in the number of asylum seekers.
However, the growth of the housing stock has not kept pace 
with the growth of the population. The urban housing building 
programme is seriously lagging behind. In the period 2009-2013 
a population increase of 65,926 persons was paralleled by a net 
increase in the housing stock of 9,355 dwellings. Following a long 
period of decrease in the average home occupation (the number 
of people sharing a home together), this f igure increased again.
Stayers versus newcomers
It is diff icult for newcomers to the city to f ind their niche – there 
is often inequality between established and new residents. The 
established residents have advantages over the newcomers, both 
regarding access to housing and also the price they have to pay 
for this housing. In addition to better knowledge of the local 
market, established residents until recently had an advantage 
in seeking a home in the social housing sector: residents of 
Amsterdam could have the length of their residence considered 
in their application for such a rented home. The social indicators 
that grant priority in allocation of social rented housing (such as 
the family situation or a f ire in the previous home) tend to favour 
established residents more than newcomers.
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Both private landlords and many housing associations are 
now raising the rents of newly vacant homes towards the legal 
maximum. As a result, newcomers (and also Amsterdam resi-
dents relocating within the city) have to pay considerably more 
for the same home than residents who have had a rental contract 
for a longer period.
Housing shortage
The principle on the housing market is that there is suff icient 
supply for those people who have suff icient private funds to pay 
for a private-sector rental home or an owner-occupied property. A 
search for a rental home (apartment or house) at the property site 
Funda.nl at the end of August 2015 delivered the following results:
Maximum rent limit Number of dwellings on offer
Up to €1,000 46
Between €1,000 and €2,000 443
Higher than €2,000 427
Many of the homes are rented out fully furnished, but a good 
(double) income seems to be a prerequisite for renting in this 
market. On the private rental market, one must either have a 
high income or spend a huge part of one’s income on rent. Many 
newcomers f irst enter the market by taking an expensive rented 
property and then look for an owner-occupied property.
A similar shortage of affordable homes applies to the owner-
occupied sector.
Purchase price Number of dwellings on offer
Up to €200,000 1,757
Between €200,000 and €400,000 2,201
Higher than €400,000 1,210
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The accessibility of the more expensive owner-occupied homes 
is currently being eased by the low mortgage interest rates. This 
compensates for the recent stricter requirements applied by 
mortgage suppliers. But the high debt will remain, while interest 
rates may rise in future.
On the demand side, however, a large number of home-
seekers are dependent on the social housing sector. According 
to current policy this sector is intended for households with an 
annual income of up to around €35,000. But here, the door is 
only opened a crack. In 2014 some 11,000 social rented dwellings 
were on offer, but 4,000 of these were student apartments and 
2,700 were allocated directly to high-priority candidates or by 
institutions. The remaining supply amounted to 4,300 social 
rented dwellings – and this has led to an explosive growth in 
application and waiting times. In 2014, each of these dwellings 
had 180 candidates on average. And when dwellings, for which 
application time or residential time do not apply (as part of the 
stock that is distributed by lottery), the chance of being allocated 
a home was actually 1 in 865. The Dutch Postcode Lottery offers 
better chances of winning something.
Amsterdam inside and outside the southern ring road: 
Two worlds?
Access to the city is not equally diff icult in all districts. When 
the urban renewal process began in the mid-1970s, the 19th-
century neighbourhoods around the city centre were in a poor 
state. The slogan ‘building for the neighbourhood’ meant the 
process of renewal was aimed chiefly at established residents. 
Individual rent subsidy and rent transition contributions gave 
residents access to the newly built and renovated homes that 
the housing associations were able to build here while drawing 
on substantial public grants. But rent increases prompted a flow 
of mostly larger families to the Westelijke Tuinsteden and to 
Amsterdam Noord.
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The inflow of new residents began with the introduction of 
owner-occupied homes in the 19th-century districts at the start of 
the 1990s. The additions to the housing stock in these areas have 
since then mostly involved owner-occupied properties. The inflow 
of the middle and higher income groups and the influx of students 
also changed the stock of shops and hospitality establishments. 
Goodbye milkman and hello ice-cream parlour, goodbye local 
pub and hello brasserie. The process of gentrif ication, beginning 
in the city centre, moved from neighbourhood to neighbourhood: 
De Pijp, Westelijke Eilanden, Weesperzijde, Helmersbuurt, all the 
way to Indische Buurt and De Baarsjes. All of these districts are 
within cycling distance of the centre, the universities and cultural 
amenities. The fall in car ownership shows that the car is not a 
precondition for a more chic residential environment.
The southern part of the A10 ring road and the IJ seem to form 
the dividing line between the areas where more prosperous buy-
ers are creating a demand, and where they are not. Here are some 
more f igures. Land register records for sold homes show that, 
within the ring road, the sales price of owner-occupied homes 
is above €3000/m2 in all districts. With some exceptions like 
the Bos en Lommer, Indische Buurt, Kattenburg and Betondorp 
neighbourhoods. Outside the ring road, the opposite applies. 
Everywhere, the sales price per square metre is below €3,000, 
with the exception of a few rich enclaves, such as the Zuidas, the 
village of Sloten, the large Rieteiland and Steigereiland-Zuid on 
IJburg, and the houses along the pittoresque dikes in Amsterdam 
Noord.
Rights, privileges and accessibility
Is this pattern actually a problem? Does a ‘right to the city’ exist? 
In recent decades much has been written about the ‘right to 
the city’ (recht op de stad, droit à la ville, Recht auf Stadt). In a 
nutshell, this is the right to participate in the specifics of the city: 
in encounters and the process of emancipation.
272  
Officially, the Netherlands has ‘freedom of establishment’: you 
can settle where you like – although in practice this means you can 
live where you can afford it. The right to the city is supplemented 
by the right to education, employment, housing and mobility.
There is also the right to state assistance for groups who, due 
to circumstances, cannot arrange these provisions themselves. 
But rights can collide. One person’s right may mean the other 
person’s injustice. The number of homes, training and educa-
tion places and well-paid jobs is limited. The state has the task 
of achieving the most balanced possible society. If this aim is 
reached, it results in a just city.
In her book The Just City, published in 2011, Susan Fainstein 
cites three characteristics of the just city: diversity, democracy 
and justice. According to her, Amsterdam scores better on these 
joint characteristics than London or New York do. Important 
factors contributing to this include the large social housing sec-
tor and the land lease system. The social housing sector enables 
access to the housing market to be kept open for lower-income 
groups. The land lease system gives the municipality, as owner 
of the land, the possibility to use the redistribution of land lease 
incomes to promote mixed use buildings and to prevent the 
rise of segregated districts. Both the extensive social housing 
sector and the land lease system are now being buried by the 
right wing of the political spectrum. A slow dismantling is 
underway. The question is whether there is still any reason 
for optimism in the current situation. A stronger dependence 
on market mechanisms, which has so strongly inf luenced the 
developments in New York and London, can also gain ascend-
ancy in Dutch cities if the laissez-faire approach continues to 
grow – making just distribution of living space impossible.
The task for the future: Balance in the city
The government, and certainly local government, has only 
limited means for steering society towards social justice and 
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sustainable development, and thus for keeping the city in bal-
ance. A number of areas require active intervention by the state.
Diversity and the prevention of segregation – The modern Western 
European city has few ghettos or gated communities. But a further 
concentration of rich and poor now threatens. In Amsterdam, one 
can see growing differences between the neighbourhoods within 
and outside the ring road (with the exception of Amsterdam Noord). 
If no public policy is implemented in this area, this becomes a self-
reinforcing phenomenon. An active land policy, programming of 
the urban development and policy agreements regarding the social 
rented housing sector are spatial planning instruments that the 
state can apply to promote diversity and to oppose segregation.
The ‘sense of home’ in the city – The charm of a city like Amster-
dam lies in its relatively small scale and its well defined public 
space. There are of course major urban amenities and institutions 
such as universities, national museums and important pop venues, 
but they are within cycling or tram distance of the residential areas. 
Some urban planners believe that cities need to grow in order to 
be internationally competitive and to score better in international 
leagues of competitive cities. But then the human scale is mostly 
lost and the distinctiveness with regard to other cities disappears.
A city for residents and visitors – This remains a difficult balanc-
ing act. The charm of the city attracts many visitors from outside 
the city. Hordes of tourists on hired bicycles sway through the 
public space. Crowd control is a new sport for municipal officials. 
Of course, tourism is an important economic factor. But too many 
excursion agencies, stag parties, major events in public spaces, 
Airbnb’s and unrestrained building of new hotels will lead to a 
Venetian scenario, where the living city is replaced by stage scenery 
and tourists f iling past this. A spreading of tourist facilities would 
limit the nuisance for the residents of the city centre. Excesses such 
as party bikes, booze boats and stag parties can at least be limited.
Equal treatment of newcomers settling in the city – Politicians 
want to maintain a safety net for established residents, with afford-
able housing, and when facilitating newcomers they mostly focus on 
wealthier households. But asylum seekers, young people wishing to 
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leave home, students from outside Amsterdam and people with a job 
in the growing services sector should have the same possibilities for 
finding their own niche. And if they do not have this, then the state 
should help out and promote the coming together of old and new.
Reinforce the social rented housing sector – The Netherlands, 
especially Amsterdam, has a large number of social-sector homes 
in comparison to other countries. The current stock is occupied 
by a wide diversity of income groups. A one-parent family on state 
benefits next door to a student who dropped out of his studies and 
is now a successful internet entrepreneur. The often small-scale new 
construction and renovation projects of the recent past contribute to 
this situation. Count your blessings! The important result of all this is 
not housing for the poorest of the poor, but mixed neighbourhoods. 
This is why municipalities should offer space for social housing in 
more expensive areas, too, and housing associations should not only 
sell homes in the neighbourhoods with the highest yields.
‘The big cities are doing well,’ is an oft-heard statement. This 
not only applies to public spaces but also to the economic po-
tential and the reasonably relaxed coexistence of the population 
groups. We should urge government at all administrative levels 
to use all available means to keep things this way.
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34. More than just housing
The importance of housing associations for a 
sustainable city
Jeroen van der Veer and Dick Schuiling
In the Netherlands, a policy has been implemented at national 
level that aims to shrink the social rented housing sector. 
However, the housing associations and a social housing sec-
tor of substantial size play a crucial role in the development 
of Amsterdam as a sustainable city. A change in thinking is 
required, away from shrinkage of the social housing sector and 
towards a dynamic balance in the long term. Collaboration at 
local and regional level remains essential here, as indicated by 
the agreements made between tenants, the municipality and 
housing associations in June 2015.
2.4 million social rented dwellings
There are 2.4 million social rented dwellings in the Netherlands, 
rented out by 360 housing associations and private non-profit 
organisations, all under state supervision. This corresponds to 
31 percent of the national housing stock. This means that, in 
relative terms, the Netherlands has the largest social housing 
sector in Europe. The proportion of social rented housing in the 
larger cities is even higher: 46 percent of the Amsterdam housing 
stock consists of association homes, 24 percent of private rented 
homes and 31 percent of owner-occupied homes.
The average rent for all association homes in Amsterdam 
amounted to €485 per month as per 1 January 2015 (not including 
any individual housing benefits). The rent of social rented homes 
after a change of tenant is, on average, around 100 euros higher. 
In addition, every year housing associations offer some 2,000 free 
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market rental homes in Amsterdam. Almost 35 percent of these 
homes have a monthly rent of under €971 and are thus accessible 
to middle-income households. The average rent of these homes 
is around €840. This is relatively affordable. In the private rental 
sector, the rents are much higher on average, namely €2,120 (ac-
cording to the supplier Pararius).
The volume of the association sector, its distribution across the 
city and the mix of income categories have been able to prevent 
the emergence of major concentrations of poverty and deprived 
neighbourhoods. In fact, since the 1920s, Amsterdam, with the 
architecture of the Amsterdam School, has been seen as a mecca 
of social housing. Especially after the Second World War, the city 
experienced major growth in housing associations.
In the Netherlands, the government now aims to reduce 
the social rented housing sector in favour of the private sector 
(rented and owner-occupied homes). The social rented housing 
sector, so the idea goes, should confine itself to its core task of 
providing housing for people with low incomes. In other Western 
countries, too, we see reforms in the welfare state leading to a 
reduction of the target group for social housing. A recent study 
of spatial segregation indicates this to be a European trend (see 
the contribution by Sako Musterd in this volume).
The influence of the European Union: Shrinkage of the 
social sector and landlord levy
The European Union does not concern itself directly with housing 
policies, but it influences this policy in the Netherlands through 
its competition policy. The European Union plays an important 
role in three issues relating to housing: a stronger curtailment 
on the low-income target group; the separation between state 
and market; budget agreements and spending cuts.
Since the mid-1990s housing associations have been f i-
nancially independent and no longer receive state subsidies. 
Consequently, the funding of social housing has no longer formed 
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part of the national budget and the conditions for accession to 
the eurozone could be met. Since then, housing associations, 
as hybrid organisations, have been using income from market 
activities – such as the building of owner-occupied homes, the 
sale of social rented homes and the renting out of private-sector 
rented homes – to invest in social housing.
In 2005 the European Commissioner for Competition, the 
Dutch VVD politician Neelie Kroes, sent a letter to the Dutch gov-
ernment with complaints about unfair competition within the 
private sector. This was because housing associations borrowed 
money on the capital market. The Social Housing Guarantee 
Fund is a joint fund that guarantees the interest and repayment 
obligations of the associations. Local and national government 
provide a ‘back-up’ for this guarantee, and it is thus regarded 
by the European Commission as ‘state support’. The European 
Commission believes that state support should be limited to the 
low-income groups and, in the reasoning of the Commission, 
the social rented housing sector was too big with respect to the 
size of the target group. It was recommended to privatize a large 
share of the social rental housing. Moreover, the European Com-
mission had diff iculties with the hybrid character of the housing 
associations and advocated a strict separation of activities for 
the target group and market activities. Ultimately, the budget 
agreements in the context of the European Union resulted in 
spending cuts in the social housing sector.
In 2009, in a European decision, the European Commission 
forced the Netherlands to set a national income threshold 
for social housing tenants. As per 2011 access to the social 
rented housing sector is limited to households that earn less 
than €35,000 per year before taxes, although in the past the 
sector was always broader and also offered accommodation to 
medium-income households. In a city such as Amsterdam, it 
is also diff icult for families with an income of up to around 
€50,000 to f ind an affordable rented home. (Temporarily 10% of 
new lettings may be allocated to households earning between 
€35.000 and €40.000).
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The division required by the European Commission was 
cemented in national legislation. In addition, the task package of 
the associations was reduced. In the new Housing Act that came 
into force on 1 July 2015, the number of activities that associations 
are allowed to carry out was strongly limited. This involves, 
among other things, the efforts of associations to provide housing 
for middle-income groups, project development and improving 
and maintaining the liveability of neighbourhoods. Moreover, 
associations must make a strict separation between their social 
activities on the one hand and their market activities on the 
other. Although it cannot be denied that this legislation provides 
a partial answer to the excesses and scandals that have plagued 
the housing association sector, with major risks in, for instance, 
the f ield of derivatives and project development, it now seems 
that the pendulum is swinging the other way. Urban renewal and 
the construction of mixed neighbourhoods are being hindered 
by the legislation.
Another agreement at the European level assumed a budget 
def icit that would be no higher than 3 percent of the GDP. In 
the Netherlands, the government achieved this by withdrawing 
money from the social rented housing sector, namely by means of 
the ‘landlord levy’. Since 2013, social rented homes with a monthly 
rent of less than €710 are taxed with a levy that will amount to 
€1.7 billion in 2017 and €2 billion in 2018. The levy is applicable 
to all landlords that own more than ten social rented homes 
and is based on the value of the home. In international terms, 
this levy is unprecedented, because the building of social rented 
accommodation is no longer subsidised in the Netherlands, and 
instead landlords – and thus also landlords of social rented homes 
– must pay for part of the state deficit. In recent years the rents of 
social rented homes have risen more strongly, partly due to the 
landlord levy. The affordability is thus coming under pressure, 
also because housing benef its (a rent subsidy for low-income 
tenants) do not fully compensate for rent between €628 and €710.
Despite this, housing associations are improving the quality 
of their homes by investing in renovation and new construction. 
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Investments in quality also improve safety. In this respect, 
associations are replacing old boilers and gas heaters in order 
to prevent carbon monoxide poisoning, and they are making 
homes more energy-eff icient. From July 2011 to December 2014 
the Amsterdam housing associations realised almost 27,000 
‘energy label steps’ in the existing housing stock. However, the 
landlord levy is putting such investments under pressure.
Housing associations involved in neighbourhood 
sustainability
The broad range of tasks taken on by housing associations in 
combination with the realisation of mixed neighbourhoods 
has favourably inf luenced the development of Amsterdam 
in recent times. Associations are involved in neighbourhood 
sustainability in close collaboration with the tenants and local 
government. Ever since 1994 performance agreements have been 
made between the associations, the municipality and tenants 
in Amsterdam.
In recent decades, housing associations and the municipality 
have invested in urban renewal in districts such as Zuidoost, 
Noord, Nieuw-West and Indische Buurt. The quality of the 
housing stock has been improved through renovation and 
demolition/new construction and a mix of social rented hous-
ing, owner-occupied homes and private sector rented housing 
has been created in these neighbourhoods. Urban renewal does 
not only mean improving the quality of the housing stock, but 
also that of facilities and amenities, such as the building of 
multifunctional centres with welfare and health facilities. This 
policy of urban renewal and liveability has worked. The satisfac-
tion levels of residents in parts of Bos en Lommer, Indische 
Buurt and Bijlmermeer improved substantially between 2001 
and 2015.
Housing associations are also involved in the transforma-
tion of empty off ice buildings (some 15 percent of the stock 
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in Amsterdam). One example is the repurposing of the GAK 
building beside the A10 motorway, carried out by Stadgenoot 
and AM, where 651 urban studios for starters and students were 
realised. The social rented homes of Stadgenoot in this building 
are being used as accommodation for young people and also for 
refugees. The Elsevier building in Bos en Lommer, also situated 
alongside the A10, has been rendered suitable for students and 
entrepreneurs on behalf of DUWO and Rochdale.
In the future too, collaboration at local and regional levels 
between tenants, municipalities and housing associations will 
remain crucial. In June 2015 the Tenants Association of Amster-
dam, the Amsterdam housing associations and the Municipality 
of Amsterdam made new collaboration agreements for 2015-2019, 
centring on the affordability of housing. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve a sustainable and dynamic balance in the social rented 
housing sector. Any sale, demolition or liberalisation of social 
housing must, in the long run, be brought into balance with 
the new construction of social rented housing so that suff icient 
affordable homes are retained.
Shrinkage of the social housing sector is not a matter of 
course
Foreign specialists visit Amsterdam because they see the social 
housing sector in the Netherlands as a model for emulation. 
Especially in Asia, the growth of the cities and the poor living 
conditions of workers are creating an increasing need for the 
construction of social housing. In China, the privatisation of 
construction of social housing (by the government and facto-
ries) began in 1978, but now the state is making a U-turn. The 
construction of 36 million social rented homes is planned for the 
period 2011-2015. In Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, 0.7 percent of 
the homes are in the social sector, and in this city the purchase 
price of an owner-occupied home is, on average, around f ifteen 
times the gross annual income. Due to these huge affordability 
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problems, Taipei City plans to build 50,000 social rented homes in 
the coming eight years. But alternatives for providing affordable 
housing are now being sought in European countries, too. In 
Spain, the economic crisis had led to many people no longer 
being able to pay their mortgage. More than 150,000 families 
have lost their homes. Now support for the creation of housing 
associations is arising in various Spanish cities, including Madrid 
and Barcelona.
Social rented housing remains in demand – in Amsterdam 
too. Every year the city grows by 10,000 residents, including 
people on low incomes. Seen from this perspective, a major 
shrinkage of the social rented housing sector seems undesirable 
in the long term. Creative solutions are required, such as the 
transformation of off ice buildings and a more flexible approach 
to the existing stock of social rented housing. Furthermore, 
it is sensible for housing associations to continue to test the 
boundaries of the (new) law, so that their broad approach to 
their task, for instance in the f ield of liveability, can be con-
tinued – which should of course take place in collaboration 
with other parties.
The Dutch landlord levy is disastrous for the viability of the 
social rented housing sector. We can identify a paradox here: 
government policy forces the housing associations to maximum 
rent increases, while at the same time the government believes 
that housing associations should focus only on renting out social 
rented housing to people with low incomes. The landlord levy 
should thus be abolished as soon as possible.
The authors
Jeroen van der Veer is policy advisor and vice director at the 
Amsterdam Federation of Housing Associations This paper 
doesn’t necessarily represent the viewpoints of the Amsterdam 
Federation of Housing Associations (AFWC), since it has been 
written on personal title.
282  
Dick Schuiling is a retired assistant professor of urban planning 
at the University of Amsterdam and from 2000 to 2008 chairman 
of the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Associations (AFWC).
Further reading
Amsterdamse Federatie van Woningcorporaties. http://www.
afwc.nl/
Boelhouwer, Peter & Hugo Priemus. 2014. ‘Demise of the Dutch 
social housing tradition: Impact of budget cuts and political 
changes’, in: Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 
29: 221-235.
Chen, Jie, Mark Stephens & Yanyun. Man. 2013. The Future of 
Public Housing, Ongoing Trends in the East and the West. 
Heidelberg: Springer.
Fainstein, Susan S. 2010. The Just City. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press.








Every self-respecting city has defined its CO2 targets and a sustain-
able energy policy. This is because energy from coal, mineral oil and 
natural gas (fossil sources) accounts for the majority of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The Covenant of Mayors (the European partner-
ship of local and regional governments), following the line of the 
European Union, has set targets for 2030 and aims to reduce CO2 
emissions by 20 percent as compared to 1990 levels, to save 20per-
cent of energy and to generate 20 percent renewable energy. In fact, 
a number of Dutch municipalities aim for more. The Municipality of 
The Hague is following the national policy that aims for a 30 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions and 20 percent for energy savings and 
energy from renewable sources. Amsterdam aims for a 40 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2025 with respect to 1990, while 
Rotterdam aims to emit no less than 50 percent CO2 reduction by 
2025. Haarlem is even aiming for carbon neutrality by 2030.
So the ambitions and goals are looking good. But things 
are less clear when it comes to realising them. How can these 
targets be achieved, and what effects will we see in a city that 
has renounced fossil energy? How will residents and businesses 
experience all these changes? Is it f inancially feasible? And if so, 
why are things going so slowly?
The future picture
Currently the energy demand of private end-users in North-
western Europe comprises heat for home heating and hot water, 
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electricity and transport fuel. The demand for heat is the largest. 
Natural gas is currently being used for home heating and tap-
water heating in the Netherlands. Most people also use natural 
gas for cooking. Electricity consumption is increasing because 
people are buying more electrical appliances. Even the most 
energy-eff icient refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, dish-
washers, laundry dryers and TV sets require (a lot of) electricity. 
Lighting forms just a fraction of electricity consumption. Most 
cars are still powered by petrol or diesel. This brings not only 
the problem of CO2 emissions but also the emission of small par-
ticulates, which can cause diseases. This is especially a problem 
in inner cities and close to motorways. The energy consumption 
patterns of businesses are very different, so this article confines 
itself to private energy consumption.
In the energetic city of the future, households´ energy de-
mand will not differ very much of the demand today. However, 
natural gas, coal and mineral oil will no longer be used. This 
will have major consequences for the methods of home heating. 
The most important and most widely available source of heat is 
the sun. Solar heat will be ‘harvested’ wherever this is possible, 
using roofs, walls, windows, greenhouses, asphalt and (sea) 
water. Public spaces will be augmented with greenhouses that 
harvest heat in summer and then use it in winter to heat homes. 
Heat will be stored underground. The trend to heating with 
very low temperatures, which is already becoming evident, 
will bring radically different methods to those in use today. 
The metal heating radiators that still disf igure most rooms 
in homes and require up to 80°C to function will have disap-
peared. Rooms will be heated with heat distribution systems 
in the f loor, the wall or the ceiling which can still create a 
pleasant indoor climate using very low temperatures (30°C). 
An additional benef it is that, in the case of a heatwave, people 
will also be able to cool their home, which is especially good 
for older people and young children. To summarise: the heating 
system in the energetic city is not only sustainable, but also 
increases comfort.
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In some urban districts, a new infrastructure has been created 
for the transport of waste water. All the waste now entering the 
sewers will instead be channelled to the local digester. This innova-
tion means that kitchen waste no longer has to go into the organic 
waste bin. Toilets are flushed using air, as in an airliner, which also 
brings signif icant fresh water savings. In addition, waste from 
parks, woods, verges and gardens is used for small-scale production 
of heat and electricity for domestic energy consumption.
In many neighbourhoods, it is not possible to harvest and store 
suff icient solar heat. The shortfall in solar heat is made up for 
by using electricity. The number of electric cars has increased 
dramatically, and so electricity consumption in the energetic city 
has risen accordingly. This is why all available space is used for 
solar PV panels; in many cases these are super-lightweight and 
integrated in roof coverings, as well as on tram stops, bus shelters 
and above motorways and railway lines. As is already possible, 
solar PV is used for the production of both electricity and heat. In 
addition to solar PV, large and small wind turbines form a familiar 
part of the cityscape, especially in the immediate surroundings of 
the city. Energy from waste and biomass is essential. But despite 
all this, the energetic city cannot meet the full electricity demand 
of its inhabitants in this way. After all, the sun does not shine 
in the evening, when electricity consumption is at its highest. 
And the wind does not blow all the time. Self-suff iciency is pos-
sible thanks to major advances in the f ield of energy storage. At 
neighbourhood level, there are many storage facilities for surplus 
electricity. Electricity is not only stored in rechargeable batteries, 
but also, as the technology becomes progressively cheaper, in 
energy carriers such as hydrogen, (green) gas and methanol.
The energetic city with its concentrated demand for sustainable 
electricity also presents the electric car as the most important 
option for storing electricity. In addition to battery-driven electric 
transport, the possibilities include the hydrogen car and also 
cars and buses fuelled by gas and vegetable oil. The fuel cell has 
superseded the ineff icient internal combustion engine. Cars are 
connected to the electricity grid at car-parks close to businesses, 
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large shopping centres and in residential districts. The cars store 
surplus electricity and in peak periods they help to meet the city’s 
electricity demand. So does this mean that even more cars will 
be on the roads in the sustainable city than is already the case? 
No. The capacity of an electric vehicle is so large that a small 
percentage of the total of road vehicles in the Netherlands can 
meet the electricity (storage) needs of Dutch consumers.
Feasibility
If one considers the energy system of the future city for a moment, 
it becomes clear that this will have huge societal consequences. 
The current practice of centralised and large-scale production 
and supply of energy from far outside the city will make way for 
decentralised generation and supply at neighbourhood level. 
The energy sector as we now know it will cease to exist, at least 
for private end users. The energy system will be integrated with 
sectors that are currently quite separate. The energetic city has 
decentralised urban agriculture and communal gardens, de-
centralised sewage treatment, waste processing and a transport 
system, all integrated with the local energy facilities.
This will bring far more social benefits than in the current, 
unsustainable, situation. Despite this, energy companies will 
probably not invest in this new system. This is because in a social 
and political sense it is a complex system in which many differ-
ent parties will need to share the costs and benefits. Moreover, 
investments in this system will have a longer payback time than 
venture capitalists are prepared to accept nowadays.
Nonetheless, there is enough money available to invest in a 
system such as this. After all, millions of consumers regularly pay 
their monthly energy bills. On average, they pay around €1,700 for 
energy every year. If we include related expenses such as sewer-
age charges, water tax and suchlike, consumers often pay €2,000 
a year, even though they could not pay this in advance for a longer 
period. Assuming a payback time of f ifteen years and current low 
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interest rates, around one million households in the Amsterdam 
metropolitan region could together invest more than €30 billion 
to make their energy facilities sustainable, without actually hav-
ing to pay more than they would otherwise. On the contrary, 
their energy payments currently disappear into the pockets of 
investors in internationally operating energy companies. If this 
sum were to be invested in decentralised, renewable energy 
systems owned by the end users, then the money would stay 
in the community. Moreover, this would provide an incredible 
economic boost: of each invested euro half would immediately 
benefit (regional) employment. This is of course subject to the 
condition that banks and authorities are prepared to loan the 
necessary sums to the local energy cooperatives.
One would expect the technical and financial feasibility of the 
transition to a sustainable energy system for residential districts 
in the Netherlands to have already been researched. After all, 
billions are spent in the search for solutions for the climate 
problem and a sustainable energy supply. But in fact only one 
example is known. The neighbourhood initiative DE Ramplaan, 
in a district of typical older buildings in the west of Haarlem, has 
had two scenarios calculated in technical and f inancial terms. 
This revealed that the scenario involving a switch to sustainable 
electricity using sun, wind and biomass in combination with heat 
pumps and heat output systems with very low temperatures in 
homes would earn back its costs for the residents within f ifteen 
years. In the second scenario, which also uses solar heat from 
nearby greenhouses and barns, as well as energy obtained from 
waste water, the payback period is about twenty years.
What is possible in this urban district is probably possible in 
every average urban district in Northwestern Europe.
Obstacles
Just because something is technically and f inancially feasible 
does not mean it will immediately happen. There are all kinds of 
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social barriers. To begin with, there are the vested interests for 
which a system change forms a threat. Perhaps more important 
is that the current system is so f irmly established that it hinders 
people in imagining that it could be totally different. Current 
practice narrows peoples´ thinking; in consequence, the most 
obvious questions – is this major step possible and what would 
it cost? – are not asked. Moreover, managers at government and 
company level are encouraged to stay on well-trodden paths and 
to shelve ‘wild ideas’. Unfortunately, this is also increasingly true 
of universities.
The high levels of ambition regarding sustainable energy are 
still not widely shared by municipal policymakers. It should be 
a matter of course that, when plans for new or renovated build-
ings are being discussed, south-facing roofs should be included 
wherever possible. Yet, unfortunately, urban planners are also 
moved by other considerations than sustainability. It should be a 
matter of course that, where municipalities have authority over 
buildings, they make the roofs of these buildings available to 
citizens’ initiatives for the generation of sustainable electricity. 
Yet, which municipality with high sustainability ambitions has 
already taken this simple step? Obviously, there is still a huge 
gulf between the targets set by urban authorities and their deeds 
in practice.
A suggestion
There can be no doubt that the breakthrough to the energetic city 
will be achieved sooner or later. If the Netherlands continues at its 
current pace the targets for sustainability of energy supplies will 
not be achieved. However, just a single small breakthrough can 
already lead to major changes. If a single neighbourhood-linked 
energy system became reality, that would be enough to trigger 
a breakthrough. Perhaps energy-oriented authorities, munici-
palities, national government and the European Union can make 
agreements with residents’ initiatives about how to achieve this.
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The f ifth theme is urban representation, in both senses of the 
word: ‘representation’ as imagination and identity on the one 
hand, and as a representative function in relations with other 
parties on the other. This section opens with a speech given 
during the Holland Festival 2015 by the Mayor of Amsterdam, 
Eberhard van der Laan, about the ideal European city. Following 
this, Michael Wintle opens our eyes to striking buildings in the 
city of Amsterdam, which can reveal to us how local, national 
and continental identities are interwoven. Patricia Pisters offers 
a very different kind of visual exploration that compares the 
f ilmmaker Eddy Terstall with Spinoza in her essay ‘An eye for 
freedom’. Luiza Bialasiewicz highlights the problems involved 
in using the city for the rebranding of the nation-state, using 
Krakow and the rebranding of Poland as a full-fledged European 
nation as examples.
The other three contributions address the theme of diplo-
macy. Herman van der Wusten sees the city as backdrop in the 
diplomacy of states. Claske Vos, in contrast, examines diplomacy 
between European cities and Virginie Mamadouh focuses spe-
cif ically on partnerships between cities.
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36. The dreamed European city 
(urbo kune)
Eberhard van der Laan
During the Holland Festival in June 2015 the Mayor of Amsterdam, 
Eberhard van der Laan, talked about his vision of the future capital 
of Europe. This speech formed part of ‘ein tag und eine stunde in 
urbo kune’, a 25-hour event that took place in the Muziekgebouw 
aan ’t IJ in Amsterdam. Urbo kune means ‘the common city’ in 
Esperanto, and it was inspired by the ‘Manifesto for the founding 
of the capital of the United States of Europe’ by the Czech architect 
Jan Tabor. ‘Ein tag und eine stunde in urbo kune’ is an artistic ex-
ploration of a cultural capital of Europe with music performances, 
exhibitions and lectures. The Mayor of Amsterdam was asked if 
he could provide a description of his ‘dreamed European city’. He 
gave his answer in a speech at the start of the event. We reproduce 
the text here in English translation:
Gesinjoroj,
Elkore Bonvenaj, Mi estas feliĉa esti ĉi tie (Ladies and gentlemen, 
a warm welcome to you, I am happy to be here).
Since my Esperanto is rather limited, I will switch to Dutch for 
the rest of the speech.
Asking the Mayor of Amsterdam what his ideal European city 
looks like is rather like asking an Italian chef what kind of cuisine 
he thinks is the best.
In my almost f ive years as Mayor I have often sung the praises 
of Amsterdam. And this was always in front of an appreciative 
audience, because most Amsterdam citizens are totally in love 
with their city. It is less usual that I am asked to talk about my 
city as part of an art project. It may only be a modest part of a 
25-hour art event, but I am very honoured.
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Jan Tabor, the spiritual father of urbo kune, sees the United 
States of Europe as an inevitable part of the future. And this 
requires a European capital, too. This ideal European capital 
will take shape in these coming 25 hours. When I look at the 
programme, it seems to be a city in which art and culture play 
a great role. A city where there is time for discussion, reflection 
and leisure. You will experience an ‘urbanist opera’, I read some-
where. What I am going to say, as part of this opera, will not be 
a song of praise to Amsterdam. Not because Amsterdam would 
not be the dreamed capital of Europe. Because it is, of course. 
Amsterdam is an international city. A city where the citizen has 
always stood on a pedestal, in higher regard than king or bishop. 
A city with 18,000 merchant’s houses and not a single palace 
or cathedral. A city where, in the 17th century, all the world 
came together, from merchants to religious refugees. From that 
17th-century melting pot blossomed science, art and innovation 
like never before. And all this in a culture of tolerance, of live 
and let live. Simply by virtue of this DNA, Amsterdam is a prime 
example of the dreamed capital of Europe. Small enough not to 
be threatening in the geopolitical sense, with more than enough 
history and culture to be atmospheric and inspiring, egalitarian 
and tolerant enough for all Europeans to feel at home here, and 
international enough to be the ideal gateway to Europe, regard-
less of whether you are coming here for business or pleasure. 
In short, you will not be getting that song of praise to this city 
today, but I think we can agree that Amsterdam is one of the 
cities that really deserve the label of European capital.
European cities, cities in Europe
Not so long ago I had the honour of chairing a symposium 
about the future of the city, at which Edward Glaeser, Harvard 
professor and author of works such as Triumph of the City, and 
Joan Clos, former Mayor of Barcelona and currently chair of 
UN Habitat, each held a speech. A man of academic research 
 295
and a man of practice, but also an American and a European 
vision of the city. In basic terms, Glaeser’s message, interspersed 
with illustrations and f igures that supported his position, was 
that the success of the city begins and ends with people. The 
greater the number of people living together in a small area, the 
more successful it is. In his view, it is of secondary importance 
whether this area contains outstanding modern urban plan-
ning or historical buildings. Glaeser believes one shouldn’t be 
too sentimental about a city losing its population, as was the 
case with Detroit in the United States, for instance, after the 
collapse of the automobile industry there. People go where 
work and amenities can be found. Joan Clos disagreed with 
this. European cities are the most liveable cities in the world 
precisely thanks to urban planning and historical heritage. This 
is what attracts people. The megacities in India, China, South 
and Central America are experiencing explosive growth in a 
chaotic manner, and this is putting considerable pressure on 
liveability and sustainability.
I thought back to this symposium and I realised that the 
most attractive and successful European cities unite both of 
these factors. They are a magnet for people because work can be 
found there, especially in the sectors that occupy little space but 
actually benefit from many different people in a small area, so 
that exchange of ideas can take place. This includes the services 
sector, the f inancial sector and the creative sector. At the same 
time, they offer good quality of life and are attractive because 
people have thought about issues such as preservation of herit-
age, green areas, mobility and increasing density.
But there is something else that characterises European 
cities, something even more important. In my eyes, European 
cities are above all the domain of the free citizen. In the 19th 
century, the century of industrialisation, the West experienced 
a period of turbulent expansion. The population of Europe 
grew quickly and people moved to the cities in great numbers 
to f ind work and opportunities for personal development. 
But these cities were quite incapable of keeping up with the 
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growth. This is why our 19th-century ancestors were highly 
familiar with most of the problems now confronting growth 
metropolises in countries like India, Nigeria and Indonesia: 
Overpopulation, pollution of drinking water, air and soil, 
deadly epidemics, lack of social facilities, abominable working 
conditions and unhealthy basement f lats. At the time, these 
problems seemed more or less insoluble. Social order appeared 
to be unsustainable.
This is one important reason why European governments, 
from the end of the 19th century onwards, focused major atten-
tion on urban development. The governments were pressured to 
do this and influenced by society, by free citizens and workers. 
They did this by guaranteeing utilities, reducing pollution of the 
living environment, investing in housing, education, social facili-
ties and amenities and transport infrastructure. As a result of 
all this, the European cities not only became living monuments 
to free citizenship, but also bastions against the uninhibited 
effects of market forces and globalisation. Safe havens in an 
insecure world. In the 20th century this led to a successful bal-
ance between civic sense and the state. The two were in line with 
each other and reinforced each other.
The 21st century will be the century of the city. In Europe, 
cities are now, just as 150 years ago, focal points of growth and 
innovation. That is good news after decades of urban population 
shrinkage and impoverishment. The city is ‘in’. The American 
philosopher Benjamin Barber believes that mayors should rule 
the world. The current Dutch government has decentralisation 
as its mantra and will soon be presenting its national Urban 
Agenda. Cities are the solution to almost everything, but at 
the same time new tasks are arising for the cities. To give one 
example: how do you keep the city in balance? How do you give 
space to this accelerating growth in terms of population and 
innovations, without people being disadvantaged in various 
ways? Disadvantaged because they fall behind in socio-economic 
status, because property prices spiral upwards, or because citi-
zens increasingly feel a stranger in their own city. The future 
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belongs to the smart city, but only if a responsible government 
ensures a fair and level playing f ield in which all free citizens 
can act with economic and social freedom. This requires an 
inclusive application of technology. I always f ind it important to 
stress that the term ‘smart city’ is primarily about people, about 
people solving problems that people are faced with – and only 
then about technology.
The century of the city is certainly no exclusively European 
phenomenon. On the contrary. At the moment Beijing – and 
that maybe true of New Delhi or Mumbai too – is engaged in 
becoming what New York was in the 20th century, London in 
the 19th, Paris in the 18th, Amsterdam in the 17th and Madrid 
in the 16th: the vibrant focal point of international trade. There 
are cities that have grown from a population of eight million to 
twenty million in the space of ten years, and the end is certainly 
not in sight.
It should be understood that the typical 19th-century urban 
problems I just described now also apply to fast-growing cit-
ies such as Mexico City, Mumbai and São Paulo. My concerns 
about the tasks now facing us are nothing in comparison to 
the concerns of the so-called megacities. As Mayor, mindful of 
the Amsterdam DNA that combines curiosity with commercial 
spirit, I pay working visits to these cities. My jaw drops when I 
see the wealth of their history and culture, and I am seriously 
impressed by the rapid economic progress being achieved. But I 
always get a little homesick. Homesick for our continent that is 
able to minimise social differences. Homesick for our continent 
where self-willed or ‘troublesome’ journalists, artists and blog-
gers don’t end up behind bars. Homesick for our continent where 
salmon once more swim in the River Rhine, where our children 
don’t even know what acid rain is, and where we don’t need to 
wear surgical masks whenever we leave our house. Homesick for 
our continent where, however imperfect they may be, democracy, 
human rights and independent judges have authority. Where in 
a city of thousands of demonstrations during my time as Mayor 
alone, some people still bear a grudge against the municipal 
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council because on one occasion a demonstrator was wrongly 
arrested (who was afterwards showered with f lowers and 
apologies).
And then I haven’t even mentioned all the European art, 
culture and preserved history. As is typical for homesickness, 
there is an element of idealisation here. But I view myself as 
truly fortunate to be a resident of Europe. And I ask myself the 
question: why does Europe have so little self-confidence?
Europe in the world, the world in Europe
The Union that once began as a collaboration between six 
countries in the area of coal and steel, under the motto of ‘no 
more war’ (which in fact was highly successful) has evolved over 
sixty years into an association of 28 Member States, and has 
now reached a crossroads. Support for an institutional Europe – 
characterised by conflicts on national interests, by bureaucratic 
legislation and by an excess of lobbyists – is falling. This union 
in the continent that, it should be remembered, is the cradle of 
democracy and of free and equal citizens, still has very little 
democratic content. A sense of community is imposed by a f lag, 
an anthem and a language that no one speaks (I saw a lot of 
perplexity at the start of my speech...). Shared values don’t need 
to be sought in such symbols of uncertainty, while in fact existing 
historical values provide so much more reason for self-assurance 
and confidence. The strength is currently to be found in towns, 
cities and regions, and above all in their inhabitants. In virtually 
all international comparisons, European cities lead the f ield in 
terms of quality of life and innovation. This, I am convinced, 
is to a great extent thanks to our democratic tradition and our 
way of looking after each other. Perhaps the only thing we are 
lacking is confidence in our own democracy. Powered by this 
self-confidence, our continent could also be a responsible con-
tinent, just as Amsterdam is trying to be a responsible capital. A 
capital that doesn’t aim to keep all knowledge and prosperity for 
 299
itself, prompted by the memory of when, in the post-war period, 
the city was poor and unattractive, but was kept on its feet by 
the rest of the country.
The Union too, if it wants to take the right path at this cross-
roads, would have to focus on the free and equal citizens of 
Europe who carry the European values in their hearts. Such as 
the inhabitants of Athens, the city where democracy was born, 
the inhabitants of Amsterdam, originating from all parts of the 
world and with their 17th-century DNA of tolerance, the inhabit-
ants of Paris, from where the revolutionary ‘liberty, equality 
and fraternity’ conquered the world, the inhabitants of London, 
home to the Churchill spirit, the inhabitants of Berlin, with the 
Wall as a historic European monument, the inhabitants of Ma-
drid, Rome, Oslo and Prague and all the other cities and towns 
and regions that make Europe into this magnif icent mosaic.
To conclude
Back to the ideal European capital of the United States of Europe. 
Does this automatically have to be the f inest city, or indeed a 
f ine city at all? In the United States of America, Washington 
was specially built by the founding fathers as a capital in a hot 
and steamy swamp, purposely not intended to become the most 
attractive or the most American city. Likewise the ideal capital 
of Europe, needs not have to be the most attractive or the most 
European city. Let Brussels remain as the European capital. 
Amsterdam and all the other dreamed capitals are really too 
nice for this role.
The author
Eberhard van der Laan is the Mayor of Amsterdam since 2008.
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Glaeser, Edward. 2011. Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest 
Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and 
Happier. New York. The Penguin Press.
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37. Interlocking identities
Amsterdam, the Netherlands and Europe in the 
built environment of the capital
Michael Wintle
Architecture can capture and project identity. Kings and presi-
dents try to secure their legacy with palaces and museums in 
prominent places; eminent citizens project their achievements 
and wealth by building imposing residences; even ordinary 
citizens instinctively choose dwellings which they think reflect 
their style and taste. And the same is true of cities, especially 
capital cities. Amsterdam, like other European capitals, presents 
itself by commissioning its built environment at various levels 
and in successive periods, especially its public buildings.
There is a common popular assumption that political identi-
ties are singular, f ixed items; you have one, and it involves loyalty 
and allegiance to a particular body or unit, most usually a nation 
state. If you are Dutch, then your primary loyalty or identif ica-
tion is with the Netherlands, and sharing that identity with 
something else – another country for example – will weaken 
or even damage your Dutch identity. Half-measures are signs of 
weakness: you can only have one identity, and it is the same for 
everyone. Remember the trouble Princess Maxima got into when 
she had the cheek to suggest in 2007 that there was no single 
Dutch national identity? Perhaps the most notorious perceived 
clash of identities happens when national and European identi-
ties collide: many would take the view that the more you identify 
with Europe, the less strong your national identity becomes.
If that kind of view characterises populist rhetoric, then it is 
far too simplistic. Our identities always involve loyalties to all 
sorts of different things, like family, gender, age group, ideology, 
religion, region, country, continent and much else. In addition 
those loyalties change over time in themselves and in relation 
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to others, but together they make up a complete, total identity 
which is the sum of those many different allegiances. Some 
strands may be more important than others, but identities are 
invariably multiple.
Here I shall illustrate this by looking at the way three kinds 
of identity not only coexist, but actually support each other in 
Amsterdam. Those three forms are ones which might be seen as 
being especially mutually incompatible: the local identity of the 
city of Amsterdam, the national identity of the Netherlands, and 
a European identity. Amsterdam is a particularly good but by no 
means unique example: a similar exercise could be conducted in 
London, Lisbon, Vienna, or other capitals. In Amsterdam I will 
show how these three kinds of collective identity have worked 
together and strengthened each other over time. This mutual 
support system has been going on for centuries, and I shall high-
light it by looking at the way the three identities are broadcast on 
many of the buildings in the centre of the city: the visual culture 
which surrounds us all the time has been and still is immensely 
important in reinforcing messages like this. These images in 
stone, adorning the built environment of the capital, actively 
support a three-level identif ication with the town, the country 
and the continent. Amsterdam is displayed and honoured as the 
great trading port and capital city; the Netherlands is reflected 
as a f ine nation and country and a productive economy; and 
Europe is revealed as the best continent in the world: different 
from and superior to the rest of the world.
Take the example of the Royal Palace on the Dam, or the 
Town Hall as it was when it was built, around 1650, by Jacob 
van Campen, and his sculptor Artus Quellinus. In the west 
tympanum, shown in Figure 1, the four continents of the world 
are shown bringing their tribute to the maid of Amsterdam, who 
is supported by the two river gods below, the IJ and the Amstel. 
To the left of Amsterdam we see Europe, wearing rich clothes 
and a crown (queen of the world), with various symbols of her 
superiority: a warhorse to show her strength in war, a bull linking 
her with the ancient world through the myth of Europa and the 
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Bull, a horn of plenty and bunches of grapes to show her natural 
riches and sophistication, and books to show her learning and 
wisdom. Africa, further to the left, is represented by a naked 
(and therefore primitive) woman; she has an exotic lion and 
elephant with her, and is bringing ivory and bales of goods as 
tribute. To the right of Amsterdam, we see Asia, accompanied by 
a camel and wearing a turban; she has (as always) a censer and 
some Turkish tulips, reminding us of the tulip fever of 1636-37. 
On the extreme right is America, with a feather headdress and 
a crocodile, tobacco, sugar and silver-mining. Amsterdam is of 
course the star of this show, but she is the capital of the Dutch 
Republic, a great trading nation with a worldwide network, and 
she is herself part of Europe, the best and most powerful queen of 
the continents. This is a piece of Eurocentric, Dutch, Amsterdam 
promotion, and it is an image found all over the Netherlands in 
the 17th century in architecture, books, paintings, sculpture, and 
many other forms of applied art. Identifying with Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands and Europe goes perfectly together, and indeed 
the three levels strengthen each other.
This kind of imagery is found all over the city, and was not 
confined to the Golden Age: there are many examples from other 
periods, especially in the heyday of modern imperialism, from 
the 1880s to the First World War. The frontage of Central Station, 
Figure 1 – Artus Quellinus, Amsterdam and the continents, c. 1648, 
frieze in the west (rear) tympanum of the Royal Palace, the Dam, 
Amsterdam.
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built in the 1880s, has a series of sculptures in relief by Ludwig 
Jünger. Mirroring the Royal Palace version of more than two 
centuries before, there is a central f igure of the Amsterdam maid 
and her two rivers (Figure 2, at the top), and in the panel to the 
left Europe and Africa are bringing her tribute (Figure 2, below). 
Figure 2 – Ludwig Jünger, Amsterdam and the continents, central and 
left tympani, Central Station façade, Amsterdam, 1880s.
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Europe has books of learning, a jar of wine or oil, and grapes for 
sophistication in agriculture and diet, while Africa brings ivory, 
a lion and an exotic bird. On a third panel to the right (not shown 
here), are Asia and America, just as on the Royal Palace. There 
is a conscious repetition of the imagery here, again with the 
three main elements of identif ication, only this time the whole 
station building and its decoration is a celebration of the modern 
Dutch nation state, and its European status in the world; again, 
Eurocentrism is in the service of the Netherlands and especially 
of Amsterdam, and the combination works perfectly.
Throughout that period of later imperialism, many new build-
ings were commissioned in Amsterdam to glorify the town’s 
commercial, political and cultural achievements, such as the 
Shipping House, built on the Prins Hendrikkade during the First 
World War, or the Colonial Institute (renamed the Royal Tropical 
Institute in 1949) on the Mauritskade, built between 1912 and 1926. 
The latter is copiously decorated with plaques and illustrations on 
both the inside and especially the outside of the building, and the 
designers had a clear message to send out: this is a celebration of 
the great Dutch empire, controlled from here in Amsterdam, and 
of European achievements set off against the primitive exoticism 
of the East. Again, the civic, the national and the Eurocentric 
combine in force to strengthen each other. Above the front en-
trance stand three female statues by Willem M. Retera (Figure 
3): in the centre there is the Netherlands, with a freedom bonnet; 
the crowned f igure of Europe appears on the left; and on the 
right we see a personif ication of the East Indies, in the form of 
an attractive, available exotic dancer from the distant, colonial 
archipelago. The Orient is summoned up in fantasy, but a fantasy 
concerned with communicating an identity for Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands and Europe, all supporting each other.
In the early 20th century a whole host of Amsterdam buildings 
continued to trumpet out the trinity of city, nation and continent, 
most of them built by the architects of the Amsterdam School, who 
with their decorative style dominated much of public architecture 
in the period between 1914 and 1930, especially in the capital but 
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also elsewhere in the Netherlands (and indeed further af ield). 
Besides the Shipping House by J. van der Mey, and the Stock 
Exchange by H.P. Berlage, one could also point to the massive 
bulk of ‘De Bazel’ on the Vijzelstraat, built in 1924 by K.P.C. de 
Bazel as the headquarters of a colonial bank (De Nederlandsche 
Handelmaatschappij). All these edif ices celebrate the city, the 
Figure 3 – Willem M. Retera, statues over the entrance to the Royal 
Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, c. 1920.
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nation and Europe, and all support each other. A less well-known 
example is the Hotel NH Carlton Amsterdam (Figure 4), also on 
the Vijzelstraat, originally constructed to help with the shortage of 
hotel accommodation for the Amsterdam Olympic Games of 1928. 
It is festooned with all sorts of stylised and exotic images of all parts 
of the world: to welcome all the competing nations at the games, we 
Figure 4 – Theo Vos, sculptures of the continents on the Hotel NH 
Carlton, Vijzelstraat Amsterdam, c. 1928.
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have Orientalism run riot. On the elevations facing the Muntplein 
and the Vijzelstraat, there are sculptures by Theo Vos of the four 
continents: from left to right, Europe with her bull, America with a 
bison, Africa with a lion, and Asia with an elephant. The imagery is 
not quite so detailed here, but it slots seamlessly into that powerful 
tradition of decorating the public built environment of Amsterdam 
by celebrating the capital, the country, and the continent all in one. 
That combination has been an essential component of the visual 
culture of the city for four centuries, and it is a perfect example 
of how – well before the time of the EU – identification with the 
civic, the national and the European displays not only a peace-
ful coexistence, but can palpably strengthen and reinforce the 
separate strands into a cohesive whole. Identities can be seen to 
have worked together here, as they still can, linking Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands and Europe.
The author
Michael Wintle holds the chair of Modern European History 
at the University of Amsterdam, where he is head of the De-
partment of European Studies. He currently works mainly on 
European identity and Eurocentrism, and has published widely 
on Dutch and European history.
Further reading
Vanvugt, Ewald. 1998. De maagd en de soldaat: koloniale monu-
menten in Amsterdam en elders, Amsterdam, Jan Mets.
Wintle, Michael J. 2012. ‘Visualizing Commerce and Empire: 
decorating the built environment of Amsterdam’. in: Marco 
de Waard (Ed.) Imagining Global Amsterdam. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press. 67-82.
(All the photographs were taken by the author.)
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38. An eye for freedom: Spinoza and 
Terstall in Amsterdam
Patricia Pisters
In 2005, in a jam-packed cinema in Tunis, I saw the Dutch 
movie Simon (2004) by Eddy Terstall. The movie was part of a 
f ilm festival organised by the European embassies, at which 
each country showcased their best movie from the past year. 
Terstall was present at the screening, and introduced the f ilm 
in fluent Arabic and French. He warned the audience that the 
f ilm – which is about the universal themes of friendship, love 
and death – may appear rather exotic to many of the Arabic 
and European audience members, as in Simon these topics are 
explored within the city boundaries of a liberal Amsterdam, 
where there is a tolerant attitude to sexuality and soft drugs, 
gay marriage is a commonly accepted fact and assisted dying 
is a legal option enabling someone who is facing the prospect 
of unbearable suffering to terminate their life in a dignif ied 
way. It just so happened that the Spanish offering at the same 
festival was the movie The Sea Inside (Mar Adentro, dir. Alejandro 
Amenabar, 2004), based on the true story of a quadriplegic who 
loses his battle with the Spanish legal system and the Catholic 
church for the right to terminate his life.
Spinoza’s heir
The contrast between the different approaches to the same 
problem could not have been displayed more clearly. These f ilms 
show that, even within the European Union, there are still major 
cultural differences when it comes to morality (including sexual 
morality) and ethical dilemmas. Simon addresses a range of dif-
ferent taboo topics, and is a movie which perhaps could not have 
310  
been made anywhere but in 20th-century Amsterdam. With the 
emphasis he places on freedom of speech and lifestyle, Terstall 
could be considered an heir to the ideas of Baruch Spinoza, the 
philosopher born in 17th-century Amsterdam, who considered 
freedom to be an important prerequisite for ethics and politics. 
Although Terstall never explicitly invokes his fellow townsman, 
he states in his book Ik loop of ik vlieg (‘I Walk or I Fly’, published 
in Dutch) that he wants to show through his movies that free 
thought and action is a hallmark of civilisation that is worth 
drawing attention to. In that sense, his f ilms can be considered 
Spinozan treatises in defence of freedom. Below you will f ind 
some observations on the natural aff inity that exists between 
these two free-state thinkers.
To start with, both Spinoza and Terstall view Amsterdam as 
a city that exemplif ies the way that freedom and tolerance can 
lead to great prosperity and a healthy society. Although Spinoza 
was cut off by his Jewish community in Amsterdam, and his 
writings were largely published anonymously or posthumously 
and for a long time were forbidden throughout Europe, in his 
Theological-Political Treatise (1670) he sang the praises of Am-
sterdam as a f lourishing city in which people ‘of every nation 
and creed’ lived together in harmony and were equal in the eyes 
of the law. Spinoza cited Amsterdam as proof of the success of 
freedom of thought and expression. Although Spinoza did not 
consider this freedom to be boundless, his philosophy centred 
on the struggle for freedom of thought and expression. In his 
f ilms, Terstall shows what the contemporary free state of the 
Netherlands looks like. In the wake of growing secularisation 
and the breakdown of traditional religious and socio-political 
barriers that unfolded from the 1960s onwards, the Netherlands 
began to look more and more like Spinoza’s ideal of the free state. 
The titular character in Simon, played by Cees Geel, is a tough-
looking guy with a sharp sense of humour who runs a coffee shop 
in Amsterdam. Camiel (Marcel Hensema) is Simon’s friend and 
the story’s narrator; he is a dentist and, in the course of the story, 
gets married to estate agent Bram (Dirk Zeelenberg). Simon has 
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two children from his relationship with a Thai woman, both of 
whom moved in with him after her death. When Simon learns 
that he has terminal cancer, he decides not to wait for the end, 
but opts for a gentle death at a moment of his own choosing, 
surrounded by his friends, ex-girlfriends and family. Camiel and 
Bram will go on to look after the children. Terstall’s f ilms tend to 
feature an eclectic cast of people from all different walks of life, 
ethnic backgrounds and denominations. The urban landscape – 
Amsterdam’s in particular – is the backdrop against which they 
lead their lives freely and openly.
For Spinoza, freedom was not determined by the principle 
of free will, a point on which he disagreed with his teacher and 
contemporary, René Descartes. Spinoza considered Descartes’ 
theory – that there was a specif ic part of the brain (the pineal 
gland) that was the seat of free will, and that it was this that gave 
people the ability to act at their own discretion – to be a bizarre 
and completely inadequate idea. Spinoza believed that freedom 
is achieved by arriving at an understanding of the true causes of 
our emotions, and recognising the necessity of certain events by 
placing them in a broader context. For example, Spinoza stated 
that someone who is mourning the loss of something will be less 
sad when they come to realise that the loss was inevitable. In 
his Ethics, the philosopher gives countless examples of insights 
which will lead to greater understanding, and by extension to 
greater freedom. Placing this in a contemporary context, we 
can look to Simon for an illustration of the life-and-death ethi-
cal dilemmas that are raised by the debate on assisted dying, a 
debate that had not yet arisen as such in Spinoza’s time.
However, Simon’s choice to terminate his own life can be 
regarded as a Spinozan acceptance of the necessity of dying, and 
the subsequent freedom to deal with this in a dignif ied manner. 
Viewed from this angle, assisted dying is not the imposition of 
(Cartesian) free will and thereby a denial of the will of God. 
But making this active choice cannot be seen as a moral duty 
or dogma either – indeed, this is essential if one is to have the 
freedom to arrive at a well-considered ethical decision on one’s 
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own terms. Simon powerfully shows how this choice is made, tak-
ing into account the broad range of different emotions involved 
in the process. A belief in freedom even when faced with non-
negotiable situations, a freedom bounded by the vulnerability of 
human existence but unimpeded by dogmas – that is the second 
similarity between Terstall and Spinoza’s worldviews.
Finally, there is a third similarity. It may seem that both 
Spinoza and Terstall are making a case for pure individualism, 
in which everyone is free to do whatever they want. But both of 
them are aware that freedom is subject to conditions that relate 
to the individual’s responsibility to the collective and the politi-
cal domain. For example, in his treatise on freedom of speech, 
Spinoza states – under the adage ‘live and let live’ – that it is 
impossible to keep the peace if people are not willing to contain 
certain areas of freedom in order to ensure that others do not 
suffer from it. People should be able to express differences of 
opinion, with other people as well as the state, but these discus-
sions should be driven by rational considerations rather than 
lies, anger, hatred or other negative emotions that do not lead to 
constructive thoughts. Ultimately, the purpose of every political 
entity (which, according to Spinoza, can never be represented by 
one single person or institution) is to increase individual free-
dom; in a free society, people are also responsible for looking after 
each other. Empathising with other people’s emotions is a key 
part of Spinoza’s life philosophy. In Spinoza’s time, his insights 
were not exactly part of the political mainstream, nor did they 
accord with the opinion of the masses. In the year 1672 – referred 
to in Dutch history as the ‘disaster year’ – Spinoza was deeply 
shocked by the gruesome murder of the De Witt brothers. His 
landlord only just managed to prevent him from taking a placard 
to the site of the lynching bearing the words ‘ultimi barbarorum’ 
(‘you are the greatest of barbarians’). It is diff icult to dispel the 
emotional charge that builds up around freedom, politics and 
the voice of the people and redirect that energy into the rational 




Terstall, too, has actively engaged with the political dimensions 
of an open and free society. A few months after the premiere 
of Simon, another gruesome event took place in Amsterdam: 
the assassination of f ilmmaker Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh was 
known for his outspoken opinions, and had made a movie about 
the radical side of Islam. He was murdered by a young man who 
had converted to fundamentalist Islam. In Allerzielen (‘All Souls’, 
2004), a collection of short f ilms paying tribute to Van Gogh, 
Terstall was one of the f ilmmakers who made a clear case for 
freedom of speech, free from the fear of violent retribution. In 
his f ilm Vox Populi (2007), he went on to show how politics, the 
voice of the people and the opportunistic hijacking of populist 
opinion (as measured by vox populi and constant polls) in politi-
cal agendas is resulting in a political climate in which frustra-
tion, fear and the daily talking points are increasingly putting 
freedom under pressure. Terstall’s protagonist in the f ilm, the 
politician Jos Franssen (Tom Jansen), ends up withdrawing from 
politics. The movie is a comment on the wider dissatisfaction 
that characterises the contemporary political climate in the 
Netherlands and the rest of the world, where dogmatic forms of 
religion and political rhetoric driven by negative emotion still 
make it diff icult for Spinoza’s ideal of a free state to become a 
reality.
Freedom continues to be the most important goal. In increas-
ingly pluralistic urban societies, safeguarding freedom will 
become more and more complicated. Emotions, aroused by 
conflicting interests and ideas, will always play a part in the 
pursuit of freedom and, in a globalised world, are running higher 
than ever, as evidenced by the plethora of recent attacks on free 
speech and thought. If Spinoza had been alive today, he may 
also have become a f ilmmaker: he did, after all, work as a lens 
grinder and, as a philosopher, was keenly aware of the role the 
imagination plays in broadening one’s mind. After the attacks on 
the Charlie Hebdo journalists in Paris, he would probably have 
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gone out to demonstrate with a ‘Je suis Charlie’ sign as well. But 
he would also have urged people to try to understand the anger, 
hatred and frustration of the attackers – not to condone their 
actions, but to acknowledge the ways in which freedom and 
necessity can sometimes meet in the cruellest of ways. In his 
last movie, Terstall was inspired by the tolerant, spiritual side 
of Islam. Meet Me in Venice (2015) is a road movie about a father 
(Mauro/ Beppe Costa) and a daughter (Liza/Roberta Petzoldt) 
who meet for the f irst time in 28 years. Their journey from Am-
sterdam f inishes in Istanbul with a visit to a dervish ceremony, 
and makes reference to a poem by the Persian Sufi poet Rumi, in 
which he advises the reader to ‘become nothing’. This f ilm, too, is 
centred on freedom and the quest to arrive at an understanding 
of emotions and necessity. But nowhere does Terstall convey a 
Spinozan message of freedom and tolerance more clearly than 
at the end of Vox Populi. The politician leaves the Netherlands 
and, looking down from the plane on the flatlands and reflecting 
on the ideal of a national free state, he says: ‘Let it be a country 
in which you can practice your faith or have no faith, without 
fear; let it be a country above whose gateways are written the 
words “male, female, gay, straight, white, black – they are all 
equal, always”; ensure the economy keeps turning, but without 
the weak getting caught in the cogwheels.’ That this ideal is not 
easy to achieve, is brittle in places and can only ever exist in a 
fragile state of equilibrium is another point on which Terstall 
and Spinoza agree, and is the very reason that the search for the 
ideal free state is one that should never be given up on.
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39. An urban geopolitics
(or, the perils of using the city to rebrand the state 
– and Europe)
Luiza Bialasiewicz
Over the past decade, the term ‘urban geopolitics’ has entered the 
policy as well as academic lexicon. In an op-ed piece published in 
the summer of 2012, Saskia Sassen prognosticated the emergence 
of a new sort of ‘urban geopolitics’, noting that from tackling 
environmental questions to countering the threat of terrorism, in 
the decades to come it would be urban actors and city networks 
that would become key geopolitical actors and sites of geopolitics. 
‘Major cities will not replace any of the other geopolitical actors,’ 
she argued, ‘but they will play a role, both as actor and as the site 
for major challenges.’
In Sassen’s work, just as in the writings of most other commen-
tators deploying this term, the city becomes a geopolitical actor 
as/when it takes on what are considered the ‘hard’ geopolitical 
roles of the state: the defence of boundaries, the securing of 
territory, the management of f lows of people and goods. And 
European cities are, indeed, increasingly doing all of these things: 
from the adoption of urban anti-terrorism strategies (e.g. London 
for the 2012 Olympic Games), to the roles that many cities have 
been forced to take in order to face sudden mass arrivals of 
migrants (e.g. Rome in the summer of 2015).
But geopolitics is not just about the management of space and 
populations. It is equally importantly about representing spaces 
and populations; about telling stories about what spaces are 
(and, even more importantly, what they should be), and about 
who belongs where. In that sense, the growing popularisation of 
the term ‘urban geopolitics’ only partially engages the various 
ways in which European cities today are, indeed, becoming 
geopolitical actors. Such discussions frequently fail to pay heed 
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to the powerful ways in which cities have begun to craft distinct 
‘geopolitical imaginations’ not just for themselves but also for 
their constituent states – and what this might mean for the 
refashioning of identitary narratives in today’s Europe.
Geographers have long analysed such spatial imaginations, 
highlighting how they have been fundamental to sustaining, 
for instance, the visions of European colonial empires and their 
claims to territories in Africa or Asia, framing these latter as part 
of an extended motherland/patrie. Yet such imaginations are 
never only about claims to space; they also recount a particular 
narrative about who the people of a state are: a ‘chosen’ people, 
the paragon of democratic virtue, the embodiment of civilisa-
tional progress etc. In other words, geopolitical imaginations 
tell a particular story about a state, its past, its present, and 
its future mission/destiny (in ways very similar to nationalist 
myth-making, but it is important to separate and distinguish 
the two).
What happens when cities suddenly take on this task? In a 
number of recent European urban policy documents, cities are 
being given just this role: in the latest EUROCITIES calls for an 
Urban Agenda for the EU, cities are seen as the key ideational 
sites for the shaping of an ‘inclusive European identity’, and 
should play a ‘key role in combatting racism and discrimination’. 
The 2015 Vienna Declaration by the Mayors of the EU’s Capital 
Cities invokes cities as ‘a major pillar supporting the concept 
of a united Europe’. Cities today should be shining examples of 
what Europe is and especially, what it should be; they should tell 
a particular story about the European project.
This role assigned to – and actively seized by – cities is not 
entirely new. Its best known recent examples can be seen in the 
attempts by cities of the former Soviet Bloc to restyle themselves 
as ‘fully European’ following the collapse of the communist re-
gimes after 1989. Whether in Krakow, Prague or Budapest (or in 
part even in cities further East, such as L’viv), the 1990s witnessed 
a both discursive but also very material and physical rebrand-
ing of these cities’ urban landscapes. The key impetus of such 
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rebranding was the assertion of these cities’ full Europeanness, 
full belonging to a ‘European urban experience’ from which they 
had been ‘kidnapped’ by the Iron Curtain and 40-some years of 
state socialism.
How was such rebranding accomplished, allowing for these 
cities’ geographical ‘drift’ from Eastern Europe to Central 
Europe, to Europe, as various commentators in the early 1990s 
noted, tongue in cheek? Part of it relied, of course, on a dis-
cursive rewriting of their urban histories, just as the national 
states were busy rescripting their national founding myths and 
pantheons. This included both rehabilitating events and f igures 
that may have been suppressed by state socialist regimes, but 
also attempting to reconnect these urban histories to wider 
European developments and trajectories. In many parts of 
Eastern Europe, this included new attention to common legacies 
of European imperial formations, the Austro-Hungarian one in 
particular (‘We were all the same Imperial subjects once upon 
a time’, sighed Habsburg nostalgics from L’viv to Budapest to 
Prague).
But such discursive geopolitical reimagining was just one part 
of the equation. The rebranding of these cities as fully European 
also required interventions of ‘material geopolitics’: that is, a 
physical remaking of urban landscapes – the creation of new 
spaces, but also the rebranding and repurposing of existing ones 
– in order to tell a new story about the city and its geopolitical 
identity. The remaking of urban heritage landscapes was key to 
this endeavour, materializing in concrete built form the ‘truth’ 
of the new geopolitical narrative about the city’s historical (and 
thus current) Europeanness.
What should be noted is that such interventions were almost 
never solely urban endeavours. And here lay their ‘geopolitical 
innovation’: many such projects were actively captured, sup-
ported and promoted by the national states. Their genius? Since 
a ‘European city’ can only lie in a ‘European state’, these cities’ 
rediscovered Europeanness also confirmed the post-communist 
states’ full Europeanness.
320  
There are wider lessons to be learned here, however, for this 
has not just been a crafty tactic of Eastern European cities try-
ing to become ‘more European’. Across Europe – East, West, 
North and South – over the past two decades cities have been 
increasingly deployed as a way of rebranding states and the 
EU itself. City landscapes and (some) urban populations, and 
their supposed ‘traditions’, ‘cultures’ and ‘urban modes of be-
ing’ have been galvanised to tell new and different geopolitical 
stories about the state – and about Europe. This ranges from the 
valorisation of the urban as a site where diversities (religious, 
national, socio-economic) ‘have learned how to coexist’, or the 
hailing of cities as places of refuge for new migrant populations, 
telling a very distinct geopolitical story of cities as somehow 
inherently ‘hospitable’ (think of the geopolitical stories told 
about ‘multicultural metropolises’ like Amsterdam, Berlin, 
London or Paris).
Perhaps the best known – and certainly most extensive 
– means through which such symbolic story retelling has 
occurred has been through the European Capitals of Culture 
programme, f irst launched 50 years ago (1985), which by now has 
touched-down in over 50 European cities. The explicit aim of the 
programme is to ‘highlight the richness and diversity of cultures 
in Europe through its cities’ and as such ‘celebrate the cultural 
features that Europeans share’. The theme of cultural diversity is 
central to the initiative, with cities seen as somehow best able to 
express and showcase Europe’s diversity and Europeans’ capacity 
for coexistence.
Yet such initiatives have not been unproblematic, as lofty as 
the sentiments may be. I’d like to bring in closing one example 
that has attracted extensive popular and scholarly attention, and 
that I believe highlights some of the dangers of urban geopolitical 
agendas. I refer to the rebuilding and rebranding of parts of the 
Polish city of Krakow’s former Jewish district, Kazimierz, as part 
of its European Capital of Culture programme in the year 2000, 
one of the most widely publicised parts of the initiative in the 
international press. The Capital of Culture initiative’s emphasis 
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on Krakow’s Jewish heritage was presented as a vital marker of 
the city’s multicultural and multi-religious past, and thus by ex-
tension its European heritage. ‘Multiculturalism’ was popularly 
seen as a ‘European thing’ by post-communist urban elites, and 
in the case of cities like Krakow (but also Budapest and Prague), 
a selective rediscovery of an urban Jewish heritage became an 
important tool to this end. Beyond the questions raised by the 
physical interventions into the district’s architecture as part 
of the Capital of Culture initiative, and the ‘authenticity’ of the 
reconstructed Jewish religious sites and gathering spaces, what 
many commentators saw as even more problematic was the sud-
den ‘valorisation’ of a Jewish past in a city and country where 
that past had been so tragic – and the use of the urban Jewish 
past to tell a new, rehabilitated story not just about Krakow, but 
also about Poland: multicultural, diverse, accepting, and thus 
fully European (while creating what Ruth Ellen Gruber termed 
‘virtually Jewish spaces’ or ‘Disneylands of Judaism’, with no 
living Jews).
History has taught us the potential perils of state geopoliti-
cal agendas. We must be much more careful when vesting such 
symbolic capacities in cities as well. An urban geopolitics is 
not by def inition necessarily ‘better’ than a national one. The 
geopolitical identitary stories that cities tell about themselves 
(or that are told about cities by the national state, or by European 
bodies and organisations) are not necessarily any less exclusiv-
ist, or any less reliant on highly selective versions of the urban 
past and present. Urban geopolitical imaginations are not by 
def inition any more democratic or pluralist than national ones.
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40. Decor and decorum in diplomacy
Herman van der Wusten
The Dutch Presidency of the European Union in the f irst six 
months of 2016 was largely based in Amsterdam, at the Marine 
Etablissement, the capital city’s historical naval dockyard. This 
location – which is currently well-designed for security and has 
good transport links by road with Schiphol Airport – was the 
site of ministerial councils and other meetings, with the festive 
highlights being held at the nearby National Maritime Museum 
(Scheepvaartmuseum). Incidentally, the European Councils 
and other European institutions remained in their usual loca-
tions – which, in most cases, will be Brussels. According to Iver 
Neumann, author of Diplomatic Sites (2013), the choice of these 
locations and the way that they are designed is all part of the art 
of diplomacy, i.e. serves to facilitate and maintain international 
political ties. Politicians tend to perform the most visible roles 
on this pre-planned diplomatic stage.
In the dominant diplomatic tradition, diplomacy forms part of 
the system of nation states and is largely confined to the capital 
cities (disregarding the unique situation in the Netherlands, 
where there is a split between Amsterdam as capital city and 
The Hague as the seat of government). The average capital city 
tends to have a fairly clearly-delineated area in which political 
functions are concentrated, with prominent addresses for the 
head of state and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who play the 
main roles in off icial dealings with the members of the local 
diplomatic corps. Partly for this same reason, embassies tend 
to all be based in the same area.
Incidentally, in the history of Europe, it took a considerable 
amount of time before state diplomacy assumed the classic form 
which is now considered the leading tradition. It is curious that 
the key diplomatic entities from before that time – cities and the 
Pope – now are once again reprising this role, for example when 
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it comes to issues such as climate change. They are even joining 
forces to do so, with NGOs, which act as an additional force, 
mobilising awareness and support. Their public meeting in July 
2015 in the Vatican ended in an ‘agreement’, but was clearly also 
intended to point the way for the UN Climate Change Conference, 
dominated by nation states, held in Paris in late 2015. Inciden-
tally, in addition to all the meetings of national representatives 
from the EU Member States, the Marine Etablissement was also 
the site of a Mayors’ Meeting, bringing together the mayors of 
the EU capitals.
Over time, the way in which diplomacy is conducted has 
undergone tremendous changes as a result of the overall in-
crease in international relations and the instant availability of 
information from everywhere to everyone via new, and increas-
ingly fast, forms of media. All this has resulted in a growing 
interest in what is happening in the world of diplomacy, and a 
clamour for greater openness. In a lot of ways, diplomacy has 
lost its exclusive character. It largely takes place on a stage that 
has been designed with an appropriate decor for the perfor-
mance, but in order to be effective it also needs a certain level 
of secrecy. It is becoming more and more diff icult to f ind the 
right balance between the two. In many situations, diplomatic 
efforts require a certain level of decorum – i.e. an appropriate 
degree of restraint and adherence to protocol – but this is not 
always benef icial for diplomacy’s effectiveness, either in public 
or behind closed doors. Striking the right tone at the right mo-
ment is an art in and of itself – it always has been, and it is so 
now more than ever.
Cities that specialise in diplomacy
Much diplomatic activity is still concentrated in cities, and more 
specif ically in cities that explicitly specialise in diplomacy. In 
addition to the capital cities, these are the seats of important 
international institutions – New York and Geneva in particular 
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at the global level. At the macro-regional level, these institu-
tions tend to be based in capital cities, and their presence can 
supersede even the importance that the diplomatic function 
of being a nation’s capital confers on a city. Brussels is the best 
example of this. If we look at things in this way, we are essentially 
considering the presence of diplomatic posts – the off ices of 
diplomats – to be an indicator of the level of diplomatic activ-
ity. While this is not entirely inaccurate, it does not reveal the 
complete picture.
More than any other group of public servants, diplomats are 
by definition mobile, which means that diplomatic practice can, 
for brief periods of time, perfectly well take place away from its 
regular location. However, if we look for example at those places 
in which multilateral agreements have been concluded over time, 
we see that there has been, and remains, only limited flexibility 
in terms of location for these important types of diplomatic activ-
ity. Of the nearly six thousand multilateral agreements that have 
been ratif ied in the past four centuries, it turns out that, of those 
in which the location could be determined, 76% were signed in 
capital cities.
Of course, these types of agreements have also come into 
being outside of cities from time to time: in castles, at battle-
grounds and in locations that resulted from all sorts of priorities 
and considerations as to what would constitute the ideal place 
(halfway between the different parties; exemplifying a posi-
tion of power that had been obtained; at a beautiful location; 
at a place of historical signif icance; somewhere as remote as 
possible).
The comparative advantage of seats of government as loca-
tions for international diplomatic activity is further augmented 
by the creation of particularly favourable conditions. For a 
number of years, The Hague has been working on optimising 
its so-called International Zone. This has partly been driven 
by the need to manage security risks as effectively as possible 
while maintaining an open living environment. All in all, this 
can increase the quality of the zone and contribute to the further 
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expansion of the city’s role on the international stage. This is a 
long-term approach to setting the stage for diplomatic activity. 
And when effective solutions are found, sometimes the thought 
is entertained of marketing this design to other cities as well.
Iver Neumann emphasises that diplomats choose the sites for 
international relations and prepare them with a view to the ef-
fect that is to be achieved. Aesthetic considerations are employed 
in a functional way as part of this process. The effect must be 
felt by the participants – but now, more and more, directly and 
indirectly (i.e. through the media), spectators are involved as 
well. However, the idea is one that, in and of itself, has a long 
history. Byzantine diplomacy in Constantinople, for example, 
employed a great deal of pomp and circumstance. In the 1,000 
years before its fall in 1453, the Byzantine Empire maintained 
relations with its many neighbours and neighbours’ neighbours. 
The Byzantine rulers’ sophisticated attempts to wow their guests, 
with an ornately-decorated urban setting unrivalled in its splen-
dour and a code of behaviour aimed at enforcing respect, played 
an important part in this. Neumann considers diplomacy to be 
a display of the sublime.
Latter-day changes to the environment in which diplomacy 
takes place, in particular the pressure of public opinion and the 
omnipresence of the media, have led to new forms of diplomatic 
display: different decors, different decorum. While the city as a 
site of diplomatic activity has by no means been relegated to the 
background, it does sometimes seem that, in urban diplomatic 
settings, the ‘sublime moment’ has. This may be related to the 
fact that many urban sites are diff icult to manage and keep 
secure, and due to the disturbance to residents that can be 
caused by mass orchestrations of political events. The severe 
congestion in the entire Randstad conurbation caused by the 
2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague served to illustrate 
this. To explore this issue in some more detail, I will compare 
diplomatic practice in the EU with the meetings held by what 
has, at different points in time, been known as the G6, G7, G8 
and G7 again.
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Summits and their diplomatic flavour
The constitutional treaties on European cooperation bear the 
names of the cities in which they came about as a result of 
multilateral negotiations (Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, 
Lisbon). With the exception of Rome, these locations relate to the 
rotating Presidency of the European Union and the organisation 
that preceded it, and to the city in which the Presidency was 
based by the time that the long-term preparations had progressed 
to the stage of f inal negotiations on a treaty.
Those long-term preparations have increasingly come to be 
concentrated in Brussels, which, under the Treaty of Nice, has 
been the seat of the European Council since 2002. This idea was 
not only championed by the Belgian lobby, but also supported 
by practical considerations: the need for permanently-available 
facilities and established meeting protocols. These came in 
very handy only recently. Between mid-June and mid-July 
2015, four European Council meetings and nine meetings of 
the Eurogroup (the f inance ministers of the eurozone) were 
necessary in order to prevent, for the time being, a resurgence 
of the crisis surrounding the situation in Greece – and it was 
clear that even these extensive talks were extremely unlikely 
to be the end of it.
These sorts of events in Brussels have come to follow f ixed 
patterns of regulated publicity, with press opportunities when 
the delegates enter the conference venue – the schedules of 
which have been announced, down to the minute, in advance, 
often along with a basic gist of the information that will be 
given – more in-depth press conferences with the participants 
at the end of the conference which are also carefully regulated, 
and live tweeting during the meetings, primarily to announce 
the moment that a meeting is concluded or adjourned. If you are 
looking for the sublime, the group photo amid a panoply of flags, 
with carefully orchestrated positions for all the attendees, is the 
closest you will get. The team photos of the football teams at the 
start of the season look playful by comparison.
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The G6/G7/G8 meetings reveal a systematic shift in preference 
away from urban meeting locations and toward non-urban ones. 
At the instigation of Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt (the French 
and German leaders at the time), the leaders of what were ini-
tially six major economies convened in 1975 for a fairly informal 
gathering aimed at discussing the most pressing economic issues 
of the day (at the time, the world was still in the throes of the f irst 
oil crisis). It was to become an annual event, with slight varia-
tions in the number of core members and including, eventually, 
the President of the European Commission, as f ixed attendees, 
as well as a variable number of invited guests, depending on 
the agenda.
The f irst G6 Summit took place in Rambouillet, f ifty kilome-
tres outside Paris. After that, the meetings went on to be held 
in a wide range of different places – at f irst primarily in the 
capital cities or other major cities, but more recently often in 
remote luxury resorts which appear to have been selected for 
their natural beauty, security opportunities and their ability to 
hold demonstrations at arm’s length. This change clearly came 
into being following the violent disturbances in Genoa in 2001. 
During riots involving 200,000 protesters, one person was killed. 
The change in the choices of location can be clearly seen when 
we look at the subsequent locations that were selected in the UK 
and Germany. Before Genoa, three meetings had taken place in 
London and one in Birmingham, two in Bonn, one in Munich 
and one in Cologne. The meetings following on from Genoa took 
place at Gleneagles in Scotland, on the shore of Lough Erne in 
Northern Ireland, in Heiligendamm in deepest Mecklenburg 
on the Baltic Sea coast, and recently in Schloss Elmau outside 
Garmisch in Bavaria.
The G7 Summit in Elmau in June 2015 was guarded by a 
massive police presence: more than 17,000 German police off ic-
ers provided the core security, with a further 2,100 colleagues 
available at the nearby Austrian border. The protests remained 
predominantly conf ined to the city centre of Munich, about 
100 kilometres away. Extensive negotiations were held with the 
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organisers in advance about these protests, and what would and 
would not be allowed. A total of 5,000 journalists travelled to 
Elmau to report in-depth on the summit.
At the luxury resort, informal pictures were taken by the 
Chief Official White House Photographer Pete Souza, which were 
published straight away. Souza and his staff take these types of 
photos on a constant basis – up to 20,000 per week. On the most 
popular of these photos from Elmau, we see Obama from behind 
as he leans back on a bench with his arms stretched out on the 
backrest, looking out onto a stunning mountain panorama in the 
distance. We are outside in a rolling meadow. Chancellor Angela 
Merkel is standing in front of him, addressing him (and partly 
addressing us too). They are most likely discussing the climate, as 
that was the main topic of the f inal declaration of the summit. In 
his photos, Souza is constantly looking for the sublime moment.
The sublime in diplomacy and the city
The Marine Etablissement, the EU Presidency’s main working 
site, was the property of the Ministry of Defence, but soon the 
Ministry will withdraw. It will instead be redeveloped as a prime 
location in the city centre, a permanent decor for the sublime. But 
this stage will then be exclusively set for urban life itself. As far 
as the EU Presidency was concerned, the interest in the sublime 
remained confined to the nearby National Maritime Museum. 
On future occasions the Byzantine example of the sublime in 
diplomacy within the city will perhaps even have to be increas-
ingly confined to settings away from the city altogether.
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41. Urban diplomacy in Europe
Mutual engagement or business-minded 
pragmatism?
Claske Vos
Over the past few decades, the role that cities play in interna-
tional politics has increased. In an age in which people, goods, 
money and information are more than ever transcending na-
tional boundaries, cities serve as platforms for the discussion 
of shared international issues. Mayors appear at big conferences 
on climate and sustainability and compete for the right to host 
international events such as the Olympics or the European 
Capital of Culture. Where originally diplomacy was primarily 
the domain of states, nowadays it is also familiar territory for 
cities. This diplomacy does not only manifest itself globally but 
also at the European level. New partnerships are established in 
which European cities join forces to promote shared interests. 
It is partly because of these developments that the EU regards 
cities as important partners for the European agenda setting 
and devising strategies for addressing this agenda. However, 
the question is whether this type of urban diplomacy can be an 
avenue for closer European cooperation. Does it attest to a shared 
engagement with European issues, or is it mainly a platform for 
business-minded pragmatism?
The diplomatic positioning of cities
Traditionally, diplomacy has mainly been linked to the state, 
serving as a means to keep the peace, defeat common enemies 
and promote trade. As far back as Ancient Greece, ambassadors 
were used as representatives of the Greek city-states outside 
city boundaries. During the Renaissance, Venice and Milan 
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regularly organised diplomatic missions abroad, and in the 
19th century diplomacy became the domain of the European 
nation states. Nowadays, states no longer have the monopoly 
on social, economic and political activity, and a large range of 
other players are active in the f ield of diplomacy. For example, 
cities increasingly act as representatives on issues that can be 
promoted and addressed at an international level. It is no wonder 
that diplomacy has become an important part of urban policy. 
Cities tend to be the hubs where businesses settle, the economy 
flourishes, migrants meet and young people engage in creativity 
and innovation. Cities have increasingly become the logical locus 
of international cross-fertilisation.
The value of urban diplomacy for European cooperation
It is partly because of these developments that the EU sees 
cities as important partners for European agenda setting and 
devising strategies for tackling European issues. Partnerships 
between cities can construct important international bridges, 
making it possible to address issues that transcend European 
boundaries. One of the f irst initiatives in this context was the 
European Capital of Culture programme. In 1985, the Greek 
Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri, proposed that European 
cities be given a key role in representing European cultural 
diversity. In so doing, she aimed to confront an issue that the 
European Community was struggling with at the time: citizens 
did not feel enough of a connection with the European Com-
munity. The European Capital of Culture programme could 
serve to raise awareness of Europe’s cultural richness and 
thereby strengthen people’s identif ication with Europe. Over 
the years, this intergovernmental programme became one of 
the European Commission’s f lagship cultural initiatives, and 
was further formalised. A rotation system was introduced, ena-
bling countries – both Member States and candidate Member 
States – to take turns nominating cities. In addition, certain 
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criteria were introduced that cities were required to meet if 
they were to be eligible to bear the title: they needed to invest 
in civic participation and have a clear notion of the European 
dimension of the city.
In addition to the European Capital of Culture initiative, 
since the mid-1990s the European Commission has supported a 
wide range of partnerships between cities. An example of this 
is the EUROCITIES network. The objective of this network of 
European cities is to strengthen the role of local governments at 
the European level. In doing so, it aims to influence EU legisla-
tion in order to be better able to address issues at a city level. 
The European Commission funds the activities of this network, 
and is closely involved in tackling social issues in particular. 
Another example is the establishment of the Covenant of Mayors, 
under which local and regional governments work to increase 
energy eff iciency and the use of sustainable energy sources in 
the areas they oversee. The 5882 mayors who are signatories to 
the Covenant are aiming to achieve a 20% reduction in European 
carbon emissions by 2020.
These examples demonstrate that the European Union 
supports urban diplomacy as a way of f inding solutions to 
specif ically European issues. The EU becomes involved with 
existing partnerships to tackle relevant European issues in 
situations where the national governments of Member States 
(or candidate Member States) are taking a less proactive ap-
proach. It follows from this that the European interest in urban 
diplomacy is functional in nature. This is also ref lected by 
the EU Urban Agenda that was drawn up by the Commission 
in 2014. This agenda emphasises the signif icance of cities in 
addressing issues relating to the economy, climate, environ-
ment and society at large. However, the question is whether 
European cities share this ambition. For them, what benef it 
is there in participating in European initiatives and working 
together with the European authorities? What goals do they 
hope to achieve, and do these tally with those of the European 
Commission?
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The value of European cooperation for cities
There is no single answer to the above questions. The ways in which 
different cities use diplomacy at the European level and to what 
ends depends to a great extent on their social, economic and cul-
tural characteristics, the socio-economic means at their disposal 
and their general level of self-sufficiency. Cities that are strongly 
dependent on others (such as national and European government 
agencies) to meet certain needs tend to be vocal proponents of 
cooperation. But the opportunities for cooperation tend to be 
limited in these cases, as the city itself will have relatively little to 
offer. A city with a lot of potential for innovation, a strong economic 
position and a highly international complexion, on the other hand, 
will benefit less directly from this cooperative way of meeting its 
needs, but will have what it takes to gain international prestige, 
play a pioneering role and exert influence on decision-making at 
the European level. Participation in European cooperation projects 
is also determined by the city’s role in the country that it is in. Cit-
ies that play a key role in representing the national interests of this 
country are more likely to be utilised to support the foundations 
of the state than to contribute to European integration.
Amsterdam is an example of a city with a clear focus on Europe 
and the European Union. The Mayor regularly goes on working 
visits to Brussels, a representative of the city is permanently 
stationed in Brussels and a European Strategy has been drawn up 
with the objective of making Amsterdam into a so-called ‘smart 
global hub’. Amsterdam is promoting itself at the European level 
because it wants to establish an international reputation for itself 
as a business hub and breeding ground for the development of 
knowledge, innovation, sustainable urban development, active 
citizenship and participation, as is stated in the ‘Amsterdam In-
ternational Responsible Capital City 2014-2018’ policy document:
Amsterdam is an international city that is open to new 
developments: a proud, compact and ‘smart’ metropolis that 
has much to offer Europe, but that also has strong connections 
with the rest of the world. This position can be strengthened and 
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expanded, with the European Institutions in Brussels (policy/
regulations) and the European cities (knowledge networks, busi-
ness relations) as the most important target groups. Amsterdam’s 
ambition of positioning itself as a responsible capital city is borne 
out by the role it assumes on the European stage: playing the 
lead and setting the example in some areas, sometimes playing 
a supporting role, but always endeavouring to connect people.
European cooperation enables Amsterdam to put itself on 
the map and enter into new partnerships with other European 
pioneers. The city is looking for ways to capitalise on its already-
strong position; it operates independently, and is only partly 
reliant on the EU.
In many other European cities, the situation is different – and 
this is perhaps particularly true for cities located in countries that 
are still in the process of transitioning from socialist societies to 
liberal democracies and are not – or not yet – members of the 
European Union. Belgrade is one such city. It, too, is vying for 
the position of European Capital of Culture, is participating in 
European urban partnerships such as EUROCITIES and is part of 
a range of different EU-funded programmes. However, its position 
with respect to Europe is different from that of a city like Amster-
dam. Belgrade is not a pioneer, but operates from the side lines. As 
a city from a candidate Member State, it has very little influence 
on the European agenda. In addition, the city is struggling with 
the legacy of Yugoslavian socialism and recent conflicts which 
have led national interests to take precedence over European 
ones. The city is literally still ‘under construction’ and has a lot 
of catching up to do. Its residents tend to look back nostalgically 
on the days when the city f lourished as a cosmopolitan hub, 
inextricably linked to the rest of Europe. It was during that time 
that the cultural and artistic avant-garde emerged in Belgrade, the 
major cultural institutions flourished and the economy boomed. 
During the wars in the nineties, the city was cut off from the 
outside world, the avant-garde was forced underground and 
the economy collapsed. The aftershocks from this situation can 
still be felt today, particularly at the national level. The country 
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remains inward-focused rather than looking out beyond its own 
horizons. The city is having a diff icult time making the leap to 
reconnecting with Europe and the rest of the world.
Yet the city is still diplomatically active in Europe. The former 
avant-garde has continued to rebel against the establishment, 
and with the help of foreign investors has begun turning its 
back on the government’s isolationist approach. Former links 
with other European cities are in fact playing a major part in 
this. In the absence of economic means, the city also f inds itself 
having to take part in competitions and European projects in 
order to acquire funding that can be invested in gentrif ication, 
art and culture, innovation and social facilities. For example, 
Belgrade has (unsuccessfully) tried to become the European 
Capital of Culture in 2020 in order to draw tourists to the city, 
put Serbia on the map in Europe and give the city a new impetus 
during a time of austerity. Cooperation at the European level 
thus becomes a way of increasing the city’s self-suff iciency and 
promoting the national interest while getting out from under the 
yoke of the state and once again playing a role at the European 
level. For a city like Belgrade, urban diplomacy is vital – there 
is no alternative.
Mutual engagement or business-minded pragmatism?
This brief outline demonstrates that European cities have 
different priorities and motivations for becoming involved in 
European diplomacy. What they have in common is that these 
choices cannot be disentangled from local, urban interests. In 
that sense, European cooperation is not the end goal for these 
cities, but is primarily a means to an end. Where the European 
agenda chimes with the local agenda, there is a benefit to work-
ing together. Ultimately, cities mainly want to communicate 
their own ambitions at the European level. Some cities, like 
Amsterdam, are successful at putting their own interests onto 
the European agenda. Other cities, like Belgrade, are forced to 
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adopt measures from the European agenda to increase their 
chances of being awarded funding for local projects.
For both the EU and cities, pragmatic considerations are key 
to the decision to work together at the European level. They need 
each other to achieve certain goals. Does this result in a some-
what superficial form of European cooperation, dominated more 
by pragmatism than idealism? It does seem that way. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of engagement 
in the processes of European unif ication. Pragmatism is itself, 
by def inition, one of the hallmarks of diplomacy: maintaining 
contacts with the outside world in order to safeguard one’s own 
interests. It was also the guiding principle in various aspects of 
European integration, with the interests of the Member States 
constantly being weighed up as part of the process of determin-
ing the contents of European cooperation. This pragmatism does 
not preclude genuine mutual engagement; in fact, it is one of 
the prerequisites for more in-depth involvement in the future.
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Over the (ir)relevance of the paradiplomacy of 
European cities
Virginie Mamadouh
Town twinning has a boring image. People tend to be rather 
derisive about it: ‘gesture politics’, ‘junkets to distant locations 
for mayors and municipal off icials keen to travel. In other words: 
irrelevant, ineffective and corny. It therefore came as quite a 
surprise when, early in 2015, Amsterdam’s plans to twin with Tel 
Aviv and Ramallah caused a real stir. Clearly the concept had 
some relevance after all.
Amsterdam, Tel Aviv and Ramallah: a ménage à trois?
After the local elections in March 2014, the Amsterdam city 
council decided to review the city’s international policy, resulting 
in the ratif ication of the ‘Amsterdam International Responsible 
Capital City 2014-2018’ policy document. In addition, at the 
instigation of the liberal party Democrats 66 in the city council, 
plans were made to explore the possibility of a partnership with 
the Israeli city of Tel Aviv. However, the idea had to be put on 
hold in the summer of 2014 due to the hostilities in Gaza. In 
January 2015, talks resumed, but at the request of left-wing party 
GroenLinks, the Municipal Executive wished to explore the 
possibility of a partnership with a Palestinian city as well. The 
choice fell on Ramallah, the de facto capital of the Palestinian 
National Authority.
The relationship between these cities, and the states of which 
they form part – or, more precisely, the question of whether twin-
ning with these cities would legitimise them and their politics or 
could in fact be a way to promote alternatives – was the central 
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issue in the political and societal debate that ensued about 
Amsterdam’s town twinning plans. In the motion presented 
to the City Council, the Municipal Executive emphasised the 
benefits for the cities involved. They could learn from each other 
about tolerance and dialogue (the Arab and Jewish communi-
ties in Tel Aviv, and the Muslim and Christian communities in 
Ramallah serving as examples for Amsterdam), city marketing 
and branding (with Amsterdam being the one to serve as an 
example for the other two), economic growth (Amsterdam has 
much to learn from Tel Aviv – which is second only to Silicon 
Valley as the start-up capital of the world – and could invest in 
Ramallah’s potential, with its highly educated population) and 
urban planning (Ramallah needed Amsterdam’s expertise). They 
did not go into explicit detail about what Ramallah and Tel Aviv 
could gain from each other. They did, however, highlight the 
positive attitudes of the representatives of the three countries 
involved.
In the discussion that took place in Amsterdam, the advocates 
of the twinning emphasised the potential for exchange and 
fostering mutual understanding, while the sceptics argued that 
it would lead to the ‘importation’ of conflicts, which was liable 
to polarise people in Amsterdam. And, they asked, what would 
we do if Israel were to intensify its policy of occupation, or if 
Ramallah were to elect a Hamas mayor? Some were against a 
twinning agreement altogether, as it could be interpreted as a 
legitimation of Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the 
Palestinian Territories (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank).
For the proponents of twinning with Tel Aviv, there was a kind 
of selective outrage. They felt there was a double standard at 
work. Criticism of Israel was considered a reason not to twin with 
Tel Aviv, but no one seemed to be critical of the political stances 
of the other countries in which the city had twin towns (China, 
Turkey, Morocco…). Many Jewish locals felt personally offended. 
Ronny Naftaniel (who was until recently the president of the 
Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel, CIDI) was 
in charge of the campaign in favour of the twinning. Criticism 
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of a possible twinning was equated with an out-and-out attack 
on Israel’s right to exist. But opponents feared that entering into 
a twinning agreement with an Israeli city would antagonise 
Amsterdam’s Muslim population.
However, the ménage à trois idea – intended as a compromise 
to address the sensitivities of Dutch supporters of both the 
Israeli and the Palestine causes – was considered unacceptable 
in Ramallah. A partnership with an Israeli city was out of the 
question for the Palestinian movement, which was calling for a 
boycott of all off icial Israeli institutions. The City of Ramallah 
stated that it was abiding by the Olive Declaration of December 
2014. Drawn up in Seville during the United Nations-sponsored 
International Conference of Governments and Civil Society 
Organizations in Support of Palestinian Rights, this declaration 
calls on local governments to ‘not contract (…) with parties and 
not twin (…) with cities that support or benef it from occupa-
tion or violate related prohibitions under international law’. 
For this reason, while twinning with Amsterdam was welcome, 
twinning with Tel Aviv was unacceptable. Where Amsterdam 
celebrated Tel Aviv as the ‘Amsterdam of Israel’ (international 
and cosmopolitan, ethnically diverse, gay-friendly and tolerant, 
creative and politically more inclined towards the parties that 
are critical of Netanyahu’s policies), the Palestinians underlined 
the city’s provenance (built at the expense of destroyed and 
ethnically-cleansed Palestinian villages and the city of Jaffa) and 
its central position in ‘Israel’s regime of oppression, colonisation 
and apartheid’. In this context, Israeli start-ups – which are often 
associated with military technology and applications – are not 
considered examples to be emulated.
The Mayor of Amsterdam was very much in favour of the 
double twinning, but only D66 and CDA representatives in the 
city council were on board with the idea. VVD supported a twin-
ning with Tel Aviv, but not with Ramallah. The left-wing parties 
(GroenLinks, PvdA, SP and Partij voor de Dieren) wanted to 
hold off altogether for the time being. On 1 July, the Amsterdam 
city council made the decision to refrain from entering into a 
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twinning agreement and, instead, to further research alternative 
possibilities for cooperation. A visit by the Mayor to both cities 
was scheduled for the autumn to this end. ‘We can date Tel Aviv 
instead, we don’t have to get married,’ said Marjolein Moorman, 
the leader of Amsterdam’s PvdA party, in an interview with the 
NRC Handelsblad daily newspaper.
Town twinning and urban diplomacy: A long history
Relationships between cities come in many different forms. In 
the modern system of nation states that took shape in Europe 
following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation state 
increasingly became the container for a political, social, eco-
nomic and cultural community which was, increasingly, clearly 
separated from the rest of the world by rigid national boundaries. 
The nation state began to monopolise the relationships with 
those abroad, and controlled cross-border movements more and 
more tightly. Cities increasingly came under the authority of the 
state; local governments increasingly became the enactors of 
central-government policy and had less and less autonomy to 
develop their own policies.
However, cities never ceased to maintain their external ties. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, when the major social and 
political movements were looking for solutions for problems 
caused by industrialisation and urbanisation, emancipation 
and combating poverty, local administrators met to exchange 
ideas and experience relating to hygiene, housing and public 
health, city administration, public utilities and spatial plan-
ning (think of the garden cities, for example). There was an 
international network of local authorities which, following the 
1913 Ghent World Fair, formally established itself as the Union 
Internationale des Villes: ‘Local authorities of all nations unite!’ 
Though it was predominantly a European movement, in the 
1920s it was supported by the major American philanthropic 
foundations (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller). However, attempts 
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to obtain off icial recognition from the League of Nations (the 
precursor of the United Nations) fell flat because it was reluctant 
to give legitimacy to local authorities, as this would damage the 
sovereignty of the nation states which, of course, constituted the 
membership of the League of Nations.
After the Second World War, bilateral twinning agreements 
really began to take off. Through twinning arrangements, 
local politicians hoped to make a contribution to a lasting 
peace. National governments often encouraged twinning 
arrangements to foster understanding between citizens in 
different countries. In the US, President Eisenhower promoted 
citizen diplomacy and the establishment of ‘sister cities’. In 
Western Europe, the French-German partnership between 
De Gaulle and Adenauer promoted town twinning between 
French and West-German cities. British and Dutch cities were 
also very involved with the initiative. Following the fall of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, pan-European 
town twinning was stimulated by the powers that be as a 
tool for a peaceful transition and as a symbol of European 
reunif ication. This ‘message of peace’ is the reason that the 
European Communities, and later the European Union, have 
always encouraged twinning links.
Through the second half of the 20th century, twinning 
agreements and similar partnerships became increasingly 
frequent and diverse. In the 1980s, local development coopera-
tion between local authorities on opposite sides of the equator 
became increasingly popular. The same happened later with 
the exchange of skills and expertise as part of ‘Local Agenda 21’, 
the contributions of local governments to the United Nations’ 
Agenda 21 action plan for sustainable development. The f ight 
against the apartheid regime also featured the establishment 
of twinning links, in the case of Amsterdam with the port city 
of Beira in Mozambique, which had lost a lot of traff ic follow-
ing the worldwide boycott of South Africa. The twinning links 
with cities in Nicaragua (Amsterdam–Managua) had a similar 
political objective. In this case, it was about expressing support 
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for the Sandinistas, at a time when the US – the Dutch govern-
ment’s primary military partner – was supporting the Contras. 
In the past f ifteen years, new objectives have become important. 
Cultural partnerships – aimed at the countries of origin of large 
migrant groups – began to come into fashion. But economic 
partnerships became even more important, with the emphasis 
being on shared economic interests, import-export, exchange of 
knowledge, investments, etc.
The economic benef its of town twinning are extensively 
debated. Other objectives – such as the exchange of knowledge 
and expertise – are also diff icult to evaluate, and this is even 
more true for its potential impact on peace. Nevertheless, time 
and again participants have found that twinning links bring 
people closer together. The people involved in this type of ex-
change get a special glimpse into the daily life of someone from 
a different cultural background, and that often ends up being a 
formative experience. The personal friendships that come about 
in this process can permanently alter people’s perceptions of 
the political developments in each other’s countries. However, 
this is mainly the case in smaller towns, whose inhabitants are 
less likely to come into contact with people from a wide range of 
other cultures by other means. In a city like Amsterdam, town 
twinnings barely register on people’s radar, because the likeli-
hood of becoming directly involved is very small and they have 
a lot of other opportunities to meet people from other countries 
and become acquainted with their cultures. But even in these 
cases, long-term twinning links bring specif ic benefits through 
their sustained engagement with specif ic places elsewhere.
Pertinent and alternative?
The paradiplomacy of cities often dovetails seamlessly with the 
foreign policy of the country of which they are a part; only very 
rarely will there be discrepancies, such as when American cit-
ies became involved in climate policy after the US government 
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decided to retreat from the Kyoto protocol – or when Dutch 
local authorities declared themselves nuclear-free while the 
Dutch government was allowing American nuclear weapons to 
be stored on Dutch territory. Or nowadays, when European local 
authorities are declaring themselves TTIP-free zones in protest 
against the transatlantic trade deal that the EU and the US are 
negotiating. Mayors are presenting themselves as rescuers when 
states are failing, because they are both too small and too big for 
policy to be effective and too far removed from their citizens: 
see the Global Parliament of Mayors inspired by the American 
political theorist Benjamin Barber. Often, urban paradiplomacy 
is presented as an alternative to conventional inter-state rela-
tions: closer to the day-to-day life of citizens, more informal, 
more practical and therefore a source of hope when inter-state 
relations are at a seeming impasse, such as between Israel and 
the Palestinian National Authority.
In other words, if the gap between citizens on both sides 
of the barrier/wall that bisects Israel and the West Bank gets 
wider and wider, any opportunity for interaction – whether 
this be through town twinning or otherwise – is like oxygen: 
a promise for different ways of engaging with each other, and 
a reminder that our interaction with those abroad need not 
be monopolised by the nation states. There is a wide range 
of other mental blockages that call for the establishment of 
new twinning links: the polarisation between north and south 
within the eurozone (f inancial crisis) and between old and new 
Member States (internal migration), or the imbalance of power 
between the European Union and its neighbouring countries 
in Eastern Europe and in the southern Mediterranean (refugee 
crisis). Even in an era in which satellite television, the internet 
and social media are freeing individuals from a state monopoly 
on international relations, the tried-and-tested model of town 
twinning is not a bad way to bring schoolchildren, athletes 
and dance companies closer together, and to liberate citizens 
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Part 6
Cities in administrative and policy networks
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The sixth topic focuses on the role of the city in administrative 
and policy networks. In other words, it is about municipal 
authorities and their relationship to other administrative 
levels. Martijn van der Burg and Anne van Wageningen discuss 
how the city was used under Napoleon’s policy as a tool for 
European integration. P.W. Zuidhof makes a case for cities as 
sites of resistance against the neoliberal policies of national, 
European and international governments. Lia Versteegh shows 
how Dutch local governments are using the so-called ‘bed, 
bath and bread’ arrangement to address the issue of asylum 
seekers whose application has been dismissed and no longer 
have permission to remain in the country, but who are stay-
ing nonetheless. Monica den Boer examines the potential of 
cooperation between local governments, and between local 
governments and the European authorities, in the area of 
security.
The other contributions focus on European urban policy. 
Thea Dukes looks back on the political battle surrounding 
the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, when funding awarded 
by the European Commission led to conflict in Amsterdam 
Southeast that exacerbated racial tensions, but ultimately 
resulted in increased civic participation. Federico Savini 
discusses the lack of attention given to the peripheral areas: 
in his view, there is no such thing as ‘the city’, and many 
suburban and peri-urban areas need to be involved more in 
the European Union’s urban policies. Wouter van der Heijde 
contrasts two interpretations of the Urban Agenda for the EU: 
does it constitute an attempt to create more policy about cit-
ies or more policy generated by working with cities? Whether 
these two processes can mutually reinforce each other and 
how the adoption of the Pact of Amsterdam during the Dutch 
Presidency of the European Council in 2016 will impact the 
relations between cities and states is diff icult to predict, but 
in the f inal contribution, Anne van Wageningen looks ahead 
to the next f ifteen years and envisions an urban secession.
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43. The city as a tool to promote 
European integration: 
Napoleonic Amsterdam
Martijn van der Burg and Anne van Wageningen
In the period from the French Revolution (1789) until the Congress 
of Vienna (1814-15) Europe underwent an extensive reorganisation. 
The patchwork of early modern states made way for a more modern 
system of nation states. At the time, it was not the European Union 
itself, but one of the major European powers – France, to be more 
precise – that was the driving force behind European integration. 
Between approximately 1799 and 1815, France was ruled by Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Later in his life, as an exile on the island of St Helena, he 
declared that he had striven to found ‘a grand federative European 
system (…) conformable to the spirit of the age, and favourable to 
the progress of civilisation.’ From the perspective of Paris at the 
time, integration was inextricably bound up with ‘modernisation’, 
i.e. the transition from a traditional to a modern form of society.
The goal was the unif ication of Europe along the lines of the 
French model. The Napoleonic regime attempted to impose its 
own state institutions top-down on the subjected populations of 
Europe, in part because it saw itself as the driving force behind 
the modernisation of the continent. And the Napoleonic model 
of modernisation, directly or indirectly, did indeed leave its mark 
beyond the French borders. Among other things, modernisa-
tion took the shape of a modern governance system involving 
a hierarchical structure very much inspired by the French one.
Of course, these developments had major consequences for 
the capital of the Netherlands, Amsterdam. The years around 
1800 were not exactly the city’s heyday. It was a period in which 
the city lost many of its residents. Where during the Golden Age 
it had had a population of 220,000, by the end of the Napoleonic 
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era this number had dwindled to around 180,000. Compared with 
other cities, this was a tremendous decline in population. At the 
same time, Amsterdam’s place on the global stage was chang-
ing. The city was increasingly embedded in larger structures. 
Amsterdam had always been fairly autonomous: as the most 
powerful city in the province of Holland, it had enjoyed a lot of 
influence both within the Dutch Republic and beyond. Even after 
the Batavian Revolution of 1795, Amsterdam was still able to play 
a central role. Although The Hague became the seat of the new 
central government, Amsterdam remained influential. Under 
Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon’s brother, who was King of Holland 
between 1806 and 1810) Amsterdam even became the King’s place 
of residence. New national institutions, such as the precursors of 
the Rijksmuseum and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, based themselves in Amsterdam.
In spite of Amsterdam’s decline, the French (who annexed the 
Netherlands in 1810) still held the city in high regard. That was 
understandable: there was still a great deal of capital to be found 
there. Amsterdam’s still affluent and influential elite enabled it to 
weather the economic crisis in Europe reasonably well. More im-
portantly, after Paris (with a population of 600,000) Amsterdam 
was the largest city in Western Europe (if we choose to exclude the 
UK from this category, which most Brits will probably not object 
to) – a fact that is probably less commonly known today. In order 
for the Napoleonic integration of the Netherlands to succeed, it 
was vital that Amsterdam was successfully integrated – of that 
the regime was sure. Under Napoleon I, Amsterdam remained 
the capital following the annexation, just like Rome – though 
both took second place to Paris, of course. Napoleon had elected 
to have three capitals in his new empire.
Institutional integration
The Napoleonic regime saw the potential in Dutch cities to 
be engines for successful administrative integration and 
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possibly cultural integration too. The dense urban network in 
the Low Countries – Holland in particular – could speed up 
the implementation of a uniform system. Of course, the process 
of modernisation that was embarked upon led to its fair share 
of clashes between different administrative, legal and cultural 
traditions. One of the major effects of King Louis Bonaparte’s 
reign was the introduction of a single executive authority at all 
administrative levels, entirely subordinate to the central govern-
ment. The king considered this French approach to be superior 
to the Dutch system, which he felt was characterised by a large 
degree of passivity. He was frustrated with the passive resistance 
of the old Dutch elite, which only wanted a modern approach to 
governance if it did not differ too much from their own traditions. 
This was also the case during the annexation of the Netherlands 
by France (or the réunion, as the regime called it).
Furthermore, institutional integration turned out to be prob-
lematic in practice because cooperation between the different 
authorities did not always work very well. Other state institu-
tions, such as the army and the police, often interfered with 
governance. The French authorities agreed that the integration 
of Amsterdam, and by extension North-western Europe, was the 
French Empire’s number one priority, but were unable to achieve 
consensus as to which strategy to use.
Cultural integration
Institutional integration was one thing; cultural integration 
was an altogether different story. Napoleon’s attitude towards 
the Dutch was ambivalent in that regard. He had a certain 
respect for the former Dutch Republic and its history, but he 
looked down on its administration and politics. For this reason, 
Napoleon had different opinions on the Dutch depending on 
the context. He had, incidentally, always been very negative 
about the people of Amsterdam, whom he considered to be 
arrogant. The conf ident Dutch believed that the works on 
352  
science and art that were written in their own language made 
Dutch worthy of being protected by the Emperor, just as he also 
protected the Italian language. And Napoleon did indeed allow 
the Dutch to retain their language. Charles-François Lebrun, the 
Governor-General of the Dutch departments, who lived in the 
Royal Palace on Dam Square (known at the time as the Place 
Napoléon, Napoleon Square), operated on the principle that the 
local circumstances should always be taken into consideration. 
Lebrun, along with many other Napoleonic administrators in the 
region, endeavoured to reconcile local and national interests, 
as they believed this was the only way that integration could 
end in success.
Governor Lebrun’s approach to integration was one that 
William I was later to employ, albeit in his own way. William 
had to f ind a middle ground between the ideal of a return to 
the pre-revolutionary past on the one hand and the desire to 
preserve the revolutionary Napoleonic legacy on the other. This 
could only be achieved either by attenuating the Napoleonic 
institutions, or by reintroducing the old structures alongside 
them. After Napoleon, local and provincial authorities, as well 
as independent state institutions, were able to regain part of 
their autonomy. In the longer term, this development often 
turned out to be counterproductive. Since the time of William 
I, the reforms to the system of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
were a slow and diff icult process. Johan Rudolph Thorbecke 
was the one who, with the 1850 Province Act (Provinciewet) 
and the 1851 Municipal Government Act (Gemeentewet), did 
away with the ‘mixture of antiquated Dutch and Napoleonic-
French elements’ once and for all. In doing so, he removed a 
lot of the contradictions that had existed within the Dutch 
constitutional administrative system. This historical example 
shows that making a real choice – in favour either of modern 
uniformity or traditional pluriformity – increases the effective-
ness of governance.
Although Napoleon very much preferred a top-down ap-
proach to governance, administrators in the regions often 
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considered cities to be essential tools for forging European 
integration. Amsterdam, in particular, was regarded as a stra-
tegic centre and testing ground for the durable integration of 
the country into the French Empire. Perhaps the European 
Union should take a similar approach. The EU undertakes a 
lot of initiatives and has a lot of policy documents that assign 
local governments a signif icant role in the process of European 
integration. Napoleon’s off icials already knew that integration 
is most effective when local communities are actively involved. 
The most successful Napoleonic administrators entered into a 
dialogue with the local administration, which tended to consist 
of the old elite. However, the current structure of the European 
Union – with prominent roles given to the delegates from 
the Member States in each decision-making process – leaves 
little hope of the cities entering into a dialogue with the EU 
independently, let alone being involved in decision-making. 
It seems that both Napoleon and the EU can be considered 
ambivalent towards the cities, and somewhat inconsistent in 
their approach to them. While viewing cities as playing a major 
role, at the same time both their styles of governance betray a 
centralist approach.
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44. The European city as a 
bulwark of resistance against 
neoliberalisation
P.W. Zuidhof
The European Union conquers the city
Soon the European Union will be visiting your city too. That is 
the message of the Urban Agenda that was recently drawn up by 
the European Union. The EU tends predominantly to be associ-
ated with ‘Brussels’, supranational bureaucrats and the political 
tug-of-war between Member States and heads of state. In a city 
you only really tend to run into the European Union when, in the 
context of the rotating presidency, the European Council sets up 
shop there, such as happened in Amsterdam during the f irst six 
months of 2016. Currently, we only think of the ‘European city’ as 
the site of international treaties or important policy proposals: 
Rome, Schengen, Dublin, Maastricht, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, 
Bologna, Nice, Lisbon. However, this is changing with the arrival 
of the Urban Agenda, which was published by the European 
Commission in July 2014.
The key principle behind the Urban Agenda is that many of the 
economic, environmental and social policy challenges faced by 
the European Union apply mainly to urban contexts. It therefore 
makes sense to involve cities more intensively in the implemen-
tation of policy and ensure that this policy better reflects the 
urban reality. With this initiative, the European Union seems 
to be making a conscious attempt at sidelining the national 
level of Member States and making direct policy interventions 
where they can have an immediate impact. At the same time, 
it is bringing its policy closer to citizens. This proposed change 
of scale in EU policy raises the question of how it imagines the 
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European city. How does the European Union legitimise its urban 
policy, and what political rationale can be inferred from it? And 
how well does the political rationale propagated by the EU stand 
up when compared to the everyday reality of urban life? When 
EU policy ventures into the city, what reaction can be expected?
The European Union and the city: A rescaling of 
neoliberal policy
The EU lays out the key idea behind its vision on the city as 
follows: ‘Cities play a key role in implementing EU policy, includ-
ing the Europe 2020 strategy.’ This reveals that the EU does not 
formulate specif ic urban policy as such, but sees the city mainly 
as a fertile microcosm for the implementation of existing EU 
policy. The Urban Agenda, then, mainly seems to be a rescaling 
of existing supranational policy. The 2010 Toledo Declaration, 
which preceded the Urban Agenda, assigned cities a similar 
strategic role in achieving the Europe 2020 objectives: ‘Cities and 
towns are vital for achieving the general objectives and specif ic 
headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy.’ In other words, 
European policy puts the city exclusively in the service of the 
Europe 2020 objectives. From the EU’s perspective, the European 
city is primarily a place in which to create smart, sustainable and 
inclusive economies which contribute to increased employment, 
higher productivity and greater social cohesion.
I would argue that, by making urban policy all about the 
Europe 2020 targets, the city is – intentionally or unintentionally 
– co-opted into a neoliberal policy framework. In this context, 
‘neoliberal’ means that the interests of the economy and market 
forces represent the core value, legitimation and rationale un-
derlying the policy. The reason to call Europe 2020 ‘neoliberal’ 
is that this policy is predominantly legitimised by reference to 
economic or market criteria. Like its predecessor, the Lisbon 
Agenda, the Europe 2020 strategy is informed by the notion that 
Europe is competing economically with the rest of the world – a 
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notion that has only been reinforced by the 2007 f inancial crisis 
and its continuing impact on the euro crisis. Where the Lisbon 
Agenda aimed to overcome the crisis by making Europe the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge economy, with the Europe 
2020 strategy attention is shifting to a competitive economy 
focused on smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The strategy 
is not neoliberal so much because of the economic goals being 
pursued, but essentially because the policy is based on economic 
values, with non-economic measures also being motivated by 
economic criteria. The EU is not striving to bring about smart, 
sustainable and inclusive cities as a goal in and of itself, but 
because they are seen as a driver for further economic growth. 
In this type of policy, economic growth is seen as both the core 
value and the vehicle of the policy, which means that policy is 
focused entirely on an economic rationale.
In order to get some insight into how, under the banner of 
‘Europe 2020’, the European Union’s urban policy is taking a neo-
liberal turn, it is helpful to compare it with the urban policy that 
was being pursued under the Cohesion Policy. It has been noted 
before that the Europe 2020 strategy, like the Lisbon Agenda, 
seems to be the product of a mixed, hybrid political rationale. 
On the one hand, it is informed by typical market goals such 
as economic growth and competitiveness, but it also contains 
more socially-orientated goals such as job creation, sustainability 
and social cohesion. What is the relationship between these 
two different sets of criteria? The Cohesion Policy was initially 
primarily focused on employing initiatives like the Structural 
Funds to help regions and cities that were at risk of falling behind 
as a result of the establishment of the single market. In other 
words, the social rationale mainly existed as a way to redress 
an imbalance that had been created by the market rationale. 
Europe 2020 turns this relationship on its head, making the 
social rationale subordinate to the market rationale. Cities need 
to become smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive to be 
competitive, and it is only through economic growth that social 
objectives can be achieved. In this situation, the market rationale 
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determines the social rationale. Another difference is that, under 
the Cohesion Policy, cities were primarily recipients of funding, 
whereas in Europe 2020 the city is primarily mobilised as the 
executor of policy. Cities are not viewed as the passive objects of 
social policy, but as active tools in making this policy a reality. 
These are two examples of how, with the rescaling of the Europe 
2020 strategy, the city is incorporated into a predominantly 
neoliberal policy rationale.
The European city: Neoliberal or post-neoliberal?
How will cities respond to the proposed rescaling of the Eu-
rope 2020 strategy and the concomitant neoliberalisation of 
urban policy? The Urban Agenda will be able to count on the 
broad overall support of local authorities – not only because 
they contributed to the drafting of the policy via consultation 
forums such as the CITIES Forum or the Covenant of Mayors, 
but above all because it chimes with an existing neoliberal ap-
proach to policy already present in cities themselves. Many cities 
are happy to get on board with the idea of strengthening their 
economic competitiveness and innovative capacity, becoming 
more sustainable or combating poverty, and have embraced the 
sort of neoliberal policy approaches that are associated with it, 
such as city marketing or policies aiming at attracting businesses 
(known as business location policy). However, since the onset of 
the f inancial and economic crisis and the ongoing repercussions 
felt in the euro crisis, it appears that cities are becoming the main 
bulwark of resistance against the advance of neoliberalisation. 
Neoliberalism is often viewed as the cause of the crisis, for exam-
ple due to the large-scale deregulation of the f inancial markets. 
The austerity measures that were implemented in response to 
the crisis, and the euro crisis in particular, are often interpreted 
as a continuation of neoliberalism. Where the EU Member States 
are offering little or no resistance to ongoing neoliberalisation, it 
is primarily the cities that have developed into the new centres of 
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resistance. This can be best illustrated using two examples which 
show that the city is both a site of resistance and a site of change.
The most visible examples of urban resistance to neoliberalism 
are the public protests that have taken place throughout Europe 
and the rest of the world since 2011. Inspired by the occupation of 
Tahrir Square in Cairo, similar ‘occupations’ followed in Europe, 
for example the so-called indignados in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol 
square or in Syntagma Square in Athens. Following the example 
of Occupy Wall Street as an expression of explicit resistance 
to neoliberalisation, similar demonstrations took place in 
numerous European cities. The protests are often sparked off 
by locally-specif ic problems or events, such as anger about high 
unemployment rates, austerity measures or reforms triggered 
by the euro crisis. Although there are signif icant differences 
between these different social protests, Marlies Glasius and 
Geoffrey Pleyers point out that they are all characterised by 
a general appeal to the values of democracy, social justice and 
dignity. Protesters will occupy a square or streets in the city as 
a way to reclaim those values. In so doing, they make use of a 
shared repertoire of practices and rituals, ranging from setting 
up temporary campsites, instituting democratic consultation 
forums and alternative ways of organising and sharing resources, 
promoting the platform on social media and using expressions 
of solidarity such as ‘we are X’, through to a wide range of 
creative and performative actions that give expression to the 
shared values. In other cases, such as the recent occupation of 
the University of Amsterdam, these techniques are used not as 
a way to reclaim public space, but instead public institutions.
With their emphasis on social justice, democracy and dignity, 
it makes sense that the best explanation for these social protests 
is that they are a response to neoliberalisation gone too far. The 
protesters are opposing a political zeitgeist that is dominated 
by market standards, and for this reason are trying to breathe 
new life into democratic decision-making processes. With their 
campsites and sharing economy, they are challenging a society 
that is dominated solely by the market. Where market standards 
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are robbing people of their dignity, activists try to reclaim it 
through peaceful and active protest. The many different creative 
expressions of protest, such as an indignado in Barcelona holding 
up a sign with the words No som mercaderia en mans de politics 
banquer (‘We are not goods in the hands of politicians who work 
for the banks’), are often aimed at disturbing a political and 
policy discourse that is peppered with market terminology like 
‘competitiveness’ and ‘innovative growth’. Instead of making use 
of the traditional national political centres, the protesters are 
transforming their own squares and cities into a new ‘polis’ and 
political community in order to put up a barricade against the 
further undermining of politics and democracy by the market.
However, the city is not only a bulwark of resistance to neo-
liberalism, but also the site of experimentation with political 
change. Just as the protest movement itself is experimenting 
with alternative forms of consultation and organisation, cities, 
too, are more creative when it comes to f inding new political 
solutions. For example, Madrid and Barcelona have elected 
(female!) mayors with roots in the indignado movement who 
are making the city into the f irst front for political innova-
tion. It is also telling that it was the Amsterdam city council, 
rather than the national government, that passed a motion 
in July 2015 against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (better known as the TTIP) and the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement instrument that forms part of this agree-
ment (better known as ISDS), because these would once again 
render political power subordinate to the requirements of the 
market. It is cities that are experimenting with initiatives for 
sharing or participation economies, alternative approaches 
to combating poverty, employment policy and housing policy 
in order to lift them out of the inf luence of the market. In 
the absence of a new overarching ideology, the alternatives to 
neoliberalisation have to be developed on a small, local scale. 
This is why stakeholders within cities and institutions are 
trying to cast off the shackles of market forces and reclaim 
their own living environments.
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For a long time, the city has been fertile, but also resistant, 
ground for neoliberalisation. I would therefore advise the Council 
not to harness the city’s dynamism to rescale neoliberalisation, 
as the Urban Agenda is proposing. After the havoc wreaked by 
the euro crisis, Europe needs – above all – cosmopolitan cities 
that are doing the opposite, and are instead contributing to the 
regeneration of democracy, social justice and dignity.
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45. About bed, bath and bread
Municipalities as the last resort for rejected 
asylum seekers
Lia Versteegh
There is a clear difference in the interpretation of humanitarian-
ism between the Dutch state and Dutch municipalities in rela-
tion to the plight of rejected asylum seekers. Where the central 
government does not consider it necessary to provide them with 
shelter, Dutch municipalities are offering a minimum safety 
net, through their so-called ‘bed, bath and bread’ arrangements.
Asylum procedures
Asylum seekers in the Netherlands can be granted asylum in 
the event that they require protection, for example because 
they are being persecuted for their religion, political beliefs 
or background. The obligation on the part of the Netherlands 
to grant asylum in these situations is based on international 
treaties. Over the past f ifteen years, the European Union has 
established many rules to protect people seeking asylum in the 
EU. The most important document in this context is the 2003 
Dublin Regulation, which determines which EU Member State 
is responsible for processing an asylum application.
After receiving an asylum application, the Dutch Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service (IND) will assess the risk that the 
asylum seeker would face if they returned to their country of 
origin, but it will also take into account whether the asylum 
seeker has family in the Netherlands and if they are in ‘a situ-
ation of disproportionate hardship’. If, in the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service’s view, this is not the case the Dutch 
government is no longer obliged to provide them with shelter and 
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housing. Rejected asylum seekers have a right to appeal if their 
application is rejected. If the judge upholds the decision made by 
the IND, the asylum seeker is required to voluntarily leave the 
Netherlands within a certain period. He or she must do so from 
a location in a municipality designated by the government. The 
Ministry of Security and Justice’s Repatriation and Departure 
Service, the body responsible with implementing the govern-
ment’s so-called return policy, goes on to review whether forced 
departure needs to take place. This service registers the actual 
departure of rejected asylum seekers. If rejected asylum seekers 
do not depart voluntarily, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee 
and the Aliens Police can deport them. If the asylum seeker or the 
government of their country of origin do not cooperate in their 
departure, the only remaining recourse of the asylum seeker is 
to fall back on the humanity of the municipalities, which provide 
shelter through the municipal ‘bed, bath and bread’ arrangement. 
It should be added that, for families with underage children, 
there are special family locations available where they can stay 
if they refuse to participate in voluntary departure.
Legal inequality
The policy on the ‘bed, bath and bread’ facilities is different in 
each Dutch municipality, and lies outside the control of the 
national government. This means that the national government 
does not know which rejected asylum seekers are homeless and 
which are staying in municipal shelters. They may travel from one 
municipality to the next to make use of the municipal services 
that exist there. The majority of municipalities subsidise a recep-
tion location, with the organisation tasked with implementing 
the policy, in cooperation with social care organisations, provid-
ing night shelter, breakfast and supper. The municipality may 
also opt to be in charge of a reception location itself, in which 
case rejected asylum seekers may receive support directly from 
the municipalities. These differences in policy result in legal 
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inequality and legal uncertainty for rejected asylum seekers, as 
it offers no surety that a municipality will provide them with 
shelter at all, and policies vary from one municipality to the next.
European frameworks: The Social Charter and the 
European Court of Human Rights
In this context, the question arises as to whether rejected asylum 
seekers in the Netherlands might be entitled to protection any-
way, even though their applications has been rejected. European 
law does not address the situation of rejected asylum seekers, as 
they fall under national law. Under Dutch law, a rejected asylum 
seeker does not have any rights and must leave the Netherlands 
immediately. In other words, the Dutch central government does 
not provide ‘bed, bath and bread’. In these situations, Dutch 
municipalities offer help on humanitarian grounds; in doing so, 
they feel supported by a ruling by the European Committee of 
Social Rights appointed by the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers (note: not the European Union), which was established 
under the European Social Charter and monitors compliance 
with the Charter. Under the Dutch Constitution, the Netherlands 
is not obliged to comply with the Social Charter, as it is not a 
binding international treaty. However, the rights set out in the 
Social Charter have been incorporated into the Dutch system 
and apply to Dutch citizens and to those who are staying in the 
Netherlands legally – in other words, not to rejected asylum 
seekers. Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers investigated 
a complaint made against the Netherlands about the issue of 
whether the Dutch government, by refusing to provide food and 
shelter to rejected asylum seekers, had violated articles of the 
Social Charter.
The complaint against the Dutch government had been lodged 
by an NGO, the Conference of European Churches. In April 2015, 
the Committee of Ministers formally ruled in a resolution that 
the Social Charter applies to rejected asylum seekers, as water, 
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food and clothing are ‘closely linked to the most fundamental 
rights of (…) persons, as well as to their human dignity’, and 
that the right to housing and protection against homelessness 
applies in order to prevent those concerned from being placed in 
a situation of extreme helplessness. According to the Committee, 
the right to life and human dignity not only includes the right 
to shelter, food and clothing, but also the right to a safe place 
to sleep. The denial of this right to emergency assistance would 
harm rejected asylum seekers in the Netherlands more than 
conferring these rights would burden the Dutch government. 
With this ruling, the Committee ruled against the Netherlands 
and in favour of the rejected asylum seekers’ representatives. The 
ruling all but unleashed a revolution. The Committee not only 
deemed the Social Charter to be applicable in this situation – i.e. 
to people who are residing in the Netherlands illegally – but it 
also used a broad interpretation of the term ‘human dignity’.
Incidentally, back in November 2014, in anticipation of the 
ruling by the Committee of Ministers, the Dutch Central Ap-
peals Tribunal had already issued a preliminary ruling stating 
that Dutch municipalities were required to support rejected 
asylum seekers by providing food, clothing and shelter. The 
Dutch government was far from happy with the resolution by the 
Committee of Ministers, and felt that the Committee had used 
far too broad an interpretation of the rights of rejected asylum 
seekers. In response, the Dutch cabinet decided in April 2015 that 
the temporary shelter of rejected asylum seekers by municipali-
ties had to stop, and that the government would only provide 
f ive reception locations in Dutch municipalities. The emphasis 
should very much be on a quick return to the rejected asylum 
seeker’s country of origin; shelter should not last for more than 
a few weeks. According to an article published in the Volkskrant 
daily newspaper on 29 April 2015, several Dutch municipalities, 
contrary to the state’s stance, did not consider it ‘humane’ to 
‘put or leave rejected asylum seekers out on the street’. They 
therefore refused to cooperate with the Dutch cabinet’s plans 
to bring about accelerated deportation, and instead offered bed, 
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bath and bread. This means that many Dutch municipalities are 
choosing to provide greater levels of support and shelter than the 
Dutch state is in favour of.
Municipalities were not happy with the solution proposed 
by the government, as it would require the many reception 
locations to be closed, but also because it would make rejected 
asylum seekers homeless, as they are often unable or unwilling 
to cooperate in their return to their country of origin. And that 
would mean that the municipalities would still have to provide 
shelter. The strange thing about this situation is that the Dutch 
state is trying to avoid the responsibility for the provision of 
shelter, while the Dutch court (the Central Appeals Tribunal) is 
complying with the ruling by the Committee of Ministers and 
taking the side of the Dutch municipalities. The Dutch cities 
are aware that, no matter what the courts or the Dutch political 
sphere may decide, they are ultimately the ones who will be 
saddled with looking after rejected asylum seekers.
The legal route which would be open to rejected asylum 
seekers after that is via the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, which adjudicates cases according to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The rulings of the European Court 
are binding for the Dutch state. The European Convention on 
Human Rights covers not only civil and political rights, but also 
the right to housing. A rejected asylum seeker could follow this 
route as a way of enforcing their right to shelter. A procedure 
could be initiated with the European Court to this end, provid-
ing that the highest legal authority in the Netherlands has f irst 
issued a ruling with a negative impact on the rejected asylum 
seeker. So far, no case of this kind has been brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights.
Cities provide humanitarian shelter
The above reveals that the so-called return policy is an Achil-
les’ heel in the Dutch asylum policy. At the political level, the 
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protection of rejected asylum seekers has been provided for 
neither by the Dutch nor the European authorities. At the legal 
level, both the Dutch courts and the European Committee of 
Ministers are taking a progressive line, but under the Dutch 
Constitution the Dutch government cannot be forced to comply 
with the stance of the European Committee. For this reason, legal 
protection for rejected asylum seekers can be expected neither 
from the central government nor from the local authorities 
in the Netherlands. The only protection that rejected asylum 
seekers can hope for is from those Dutch municipalities that are 
offering bed, bath and bread facilities on humanitarian grounds. 
These facilities are not offered by all municipalities, and can 
vary from one municipality to the next, which results in legal 
uncertainty on the part of rejected asylum seekers and can lead 
to unequal treatment compared to rejected asylum seekers in 
other municipalities where such facilities do not exist. To prevent 
this, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) must 
establish a uniform policy for municipal bed, bath and bread 
arrangements. It is also clear that the approach of the local gov-
ernments runs counter to the national stance on rejected asylum 
seekers. As long as no ruling has been issued by the European 
Court of Human Rights that obliges the government to assume 
responsibility for the necessary provisions for rejected asylum 
seekers, the municipal facilities – no matter how insuff icient 
they may be – are unfortunately very much necessary.
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46. Safe cities in Europe: Making 
the leap to sustainable 
connections
Monica den Boer
The city is often regarded as a dystopia. The city never sleeps. 
There is constant movement in the streets. Glaring lights shine 
everywhere. Tall buildings loom like taut sails in the wind. The 
city dizzies people, disorientates and hypnotises them. This is 
how Fritz Lang, the maker of the 1927 movie Metropolis, depicted 
the city of 2026. Now, almost a century after the f ilm’s creation, 
the city is actually associated with many positive things. Cities 
provide spaces for innovation, recreation, greening, sustain-
ability and creativity. And yet studies on cities also present a 
gloomier picture. Cities are afflicted by structural issues such 
as poverty, social inequality, unemployment and inadequate 
housing. These issues are detrimental to the quality of life and 
safety in cities. After all, the wealthier and more spacious cities 
are, the less safety is an issue for them.
This dichotomy visible in and between cities is a cause for 
concern. First of all, there is the inequality that exists between 
different cities. Instead of joyful synergy or healthy competition, 
cities f ind themselves struggling with an imbalance between 
growth and contraction, between economic attraction and de-
cline. Cities are being hit by the massive cuts to public spending 
that have taken place in the past few years, putting signif icant 
pressure on public services. In 2012, one in four Europeans lived 
in poverty or were at risk of poverty. Of Europe’s 500 million 
citizens, 125 million are struggling with socio-economic short-
ages on a daily basis. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of 
Europeans living in poverty increased by 10 million. Cities are 
therefore dealing with a growing need for public funding for 
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benef its, public services and health care, and doing so in the 
face of shrinking budgets.
Cities are faced with a wide range of problems, such as immi-
gration, the ageing population, unemployment, social marginali-
sation, poverty, unaffordable housing, congestion and pollution. 
Although no direct causal link can be drawn between these 
problems and the increase of criminality and unsafe streets, they 
are certainly indicators that weigh negatively on safety in cities. 
What is also tricky is that these are stubborn problems. People 
who are living in poverty now will pass this problem on to future 
generations, providing the problem with a structural, long-term, 
cumulative character. Women, children, single-parent families, 
low-skilled workers, migrants and other vulnerable groups such 
as the disabled are all risk groups for poverty. Underinvestment 
in educational opportunities for children in particular will lead 
to higher public expenditure in later stages of the life cycle – in 
concrete terms, more government intervention in the areas of 
housing, employment and health care. And, as Thomas Piketty 
teaches us, the gap between rich and poor is growing. Cities are 
structurally affected by this, and will have to develop integrated 
policies to address the issue. The Association of Netherlands 
Municipalities (VNG), for example, is using a range of different 
interventions to address safety, such as tackling radicalisation, 
creating safe houses, managing public space and working with 
ex-convicts and juvenile delinquents.
The Urban Agenda has barely addressed the issue of safety 
explicitly. There appears to be a lacuna here. The document has 
acknowledged that decentralised governments have to deal 
with European policy relating to the ‘area of freedom, security 
and justice’ (AFSJ). The European Union is aware of security 
issues that transcend city boundaries, such as radicalisation, 
human traff icking, organised crime and civil rights. The Dutch 
Presidency of the Council welcomed urban creativity and in-
novation, in part to combat violence and effectively promote 
the integration of new EU citizens. However, the topic of safety 
has drawn insuff icient attention. The Urban Agenda has not 
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explicitly addressed the question of how cities can take concrete 
administrative action to give further direction to international 
cooperation on safety and security issues. Fortunately, avenues 
do exist for a more dynamic interaction between the Urban 
Agenda and inter-city partnerships in the area of safety.
Safety on the Urban Agenda of the European Union
The European Commission’s Urban Agenda mentions urban 
innovation in the areas of energy, transportation and IT. The 
Urban Agenda also refers to the goal of making cities more 
resilient, especially in view of threats relating to climate, energy, 
health and infrastructure. Given the major consequences that 
calamities, crises and failure of public utilities can have on the 
day-to-day life of city dwellers and on safety and crime, it is 
rather surprising that these problems are not explored in the 
Urban Agenda. In addition to concentrating on creating ‘smart 
cities’, there should be a greater focus on ‘safe cities’.
The European agenda does focus at length on the develop-
ment of urban knowledge, including on topics such as safety 
and crime prevention. In this context, the European Urban 
Knowledge Network is an excellent example of knowledge 
sharing and mutual enrichment by cities. The aim is for cities 
and surrounding municipalities to work together more, which 
can be promoted through greater synergy and more funding for 
ambitious projects within metropolises and urban agglomera-
tions. Various partnerships have already been established in the 
south of the Netherlands – including with Belgium – to combat 
problematic drug use and the related environmental issues. In 
the future, cities will increasingly be the testing grounds for 
European policy. A European Innovation Partnership with smart 
cities and communities can be a good basis for tackling security 
issues that transcend city boundaries. Partnerships between 
cities could strive to exchange knowledge more often, share 
expertise and establish long-term administrative relationships.
372  
Cities are vulnerable because they can be confronted with 
crises and calamities, such as the bombings in Madrid (2004) and 
London (2005). The SafeCity project sees the use of information to 
predict unsafe situations and facilitate preventative measures as 
playing a major role. But as with many other projects supported 
by the European Union, safety seems to be approached primarily 
from a technological angle. There seems to be far less attention 
given to how cities deal with safety and security challenges on 
an administrative level.
State or city: Subsidiarity and managing safety and 
security
Traditionally, the area of safety and security falls to the Member 
States to address, but since the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, 
many strategies that relate to safety and security – including 
crime prevention – are developed jointly (i.e. at the commu-
nity level). Although the principle of subsidiarity stipulates 
that urban policy does not fall under the competence of the 
European Union, three-quarters of European regulations are 
implemented at the local and regional levels. This creates an 
opportunity to explicitly put the topic of safety on the agenda of 
cities and partnerships between cities. At the same time, local 
safety practices could be reviewed in the light of the normative 
framework laid down in European privacy law and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. This might include policy practices relat-
ing to wide-ranging issues such as surveillance, prostitution, 
human traff icking and drugs, shelter for asylum seekers, access 
to benefit records or providing f ingerprints when applying for 
identity cards. Europe is becoming increasingly important as a 
policy partner for decentralised governments.
In any case, where the domain of safety and security is 
concerned, European regulations will have more and more of 
an impact at the local level. So far, the European Union has 
given little consideration to the question of whether cities have 
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suff icient funding, expertise and human resources to be able 
to implement new regulations imposed by the EU at the decen-
tralised level. In order to be involved as a fully-fledged partner, 
cities could take a more proactive approach (exerting influence, 
lobbying, participating in decision-making), also with a view 
to absorbing and implementing regulations and funding from 
the European Union, as well as bringing about organisational 
changes to the administrative apparatus. This would result in a 
gradual ‘Europeanising’ of local governments.
Local governments are also increasingly faced with cross-
border police and judicial cooperation, for example in the case 
of cannabis cultivation or football hooligans, but also for disaster 
and crisis management. The European Commission can in fact 
initiate proceedings against Member States for non-compliance 
with European regulations on police and judicial cooperation. 
It can even ask the Court of Justice to impose a f ine or penalty 
payment on the central government. If the violation has been 
committed by a local government, the central government can 
hold the local government responsible or recover damages from 
them. Cities are ill-prepared for these kinds of eventualities.
Safety as a connection
Marginalisation, safety fears and crime are issues that transcend 
city boundaries. With the prospect of continuing urbanisation, 
more citizens will want to move to the cities. With their role as 
economic engines, cities have a magnetic pull on people looking 
for employment and education. This also means that cities f ind 
themselves faced with a higher proportion of highly educated 
citizens, who tend to be empowered and engaged. This requires 
a change in governance, including where safety and security is 
concerned. A patriarchal, top-down form of government is less 
and less suited to an informed, active citizenry. Alternative forms 
of cooperation are very much necessary. Governments – includ-
ing local governments – will increasingly be able to position 
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themselves as ‘directors’, providers of a platform, agenda setters 
or motivators. Of course, it is important to invest in cooperative 
relationships between all administrative levels, from local to 
European levels. And cooperation between cities needs to be 
actively pursued as well. An example of this in the context of the 
European Union is the Cities Conference on Foreign Fighters to 
Syria, which was held in 2012 by the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network. At this conference, local officials and experts discussed 
the impact of various anti-terrorism measures at the local level, 
and how to handle those going to f ight in Syria before, during 
and after their journeys. The European Cities Against Drugs 
network is also an excellent example of cooperation between 
250 local authorities in combating drug abuse, with its activities 
including an annual Mayors’ Conference. It is easy for local gov-
ernments to get on board. The platform aims to present a clear 
and consistent stance on drug policy, support and enhance the 
exchange of information and expertise between policymakers 
and professionals at the local level, disseminate information 
about evidence-based practices, develop a network of contacts 
at all relevant administrative levels, and organise conferences 
and seminars.
In addition to taking note of good examples and exchanging 
information – including where this relates to safety and security 
– cities should be involved a lot more often at all stages of the 
decision-making process on topics that affect them. In addition 
to active participation, cities should be given the opportunity, as 
part of the process of drafting new regulations, of undertaking 
reviews of the likely impact of new measures on the city. For now, 
the European Union itself is working towards putting improved 
regulations and more practicable f inancial instruments in place, 
and offering a platform for urban creativity and knowledge 
development. An important challenge for the European Union 
is not to lump all cities in together. Some cities are flourishing, 
while others are struggling.
Finally, the Urban Agenda is lacking an external dimension. 
After all, the European Union is active in a lot of Third World 
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countries, in which urbanisation and safety are pressing issues. 
The issue of safety and security is taking on a hybrid character, 
moving through ‘glocal’ connections. For example, many of the 
European External Action Service’s efforts have to do with civil 
protection and civil crisis management, as well as contributing 
to good governance. Now that urban warfare is threatening to 
spread to Europe too, it is advisable to stay alert to the relation-
ship between the safety of European city dwellers and conflicts 
elsewhere in the world, and to continually be on the lookout for 
possible contagious effects. European cities can play a central 
role in the transfer and use of knowledge to benef it cities in 
Third World countries. The Urban Agenda makes no mention 
of this external dimension. It is high time that integrated con-
nections be created in the f ield of security, both within and 
outside Europe.
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47. URBAN Bijlmermeer
How a European programme became the catalyst 
for a ‘black revolution’ in Amsterdam Southeast
Thea Dukes
Twenty years ago, Amsterdam’s Bijlmermeer neighbourhood 
spent months in the throes of a conf lict surrounding the 
European Commission’s URBAN programme. Some talked of 
a ‘black revolution’. Local (‘black’) groups felt overlooked by 
the programme’s decision-making structure, and demanded 
the opportunity to have their say. They used a black-white 
dichotomy as a lever to enforce a breakthrough within URBAN 
Bijlmermeer, but, more than this, they were seeking to achieve 
the emancipation of the ‘black’ population and bring about an 
actual improvement in their situation. Ultimately, their efforts 
were successful: not only was the structure of the programme 
drastically revised, but progress was also made with respect to 
increasing participation by the local population in the district 
on the whole.
The summer of 2015 marked the 20-year anniversary of this 
conflict. In commemorating it, a heroic role was ascribed to the 
Zwart Beraad (sometimes translated as ‘Black Consideration’, 
‘Black Deliberation’, ‘Black Assembly’ or ‘Black Caucus’) group 
in particular. However, it is unclear to what extent the outcome 
of the conflict can be attributed to the URBAN programme or 
the Zwart Beraad group.
The URBAN programme: funding for disadvantaged 
areas
In 1995, Amsterdam’s Bijlmermeer neighbourhood was assigned 
funding by the European Commission as part of the URBAN 
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Community Initiative as a contribution to the socio-economic 
regeneration of this section of Amsterdam Southeast, which 
was described as a ‘disadvantaged area’. The neighbourhood 
consisted exclusively of high-rises, and housed a population of 
approximately 50,000.
This area-based urban programme involved a considerable 
sum of money. Amsterdam was assigned 4.8 million euros in sub-
sidies from two of the European structural funds (the European 
Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund). 
However, the condition for this subsidy was that co-f inancing 
had to be found. The Netherlands Ministry of the Interior, which 
was responsible for the co-f inancing, therefore doubled this 
sum from the funding pot set aside for the so-called big cities 
policy (grotestedenbeleid) that was in effect at the time. At the 
same time, regional and local government, public institutions 
and private individuals also invested in the programme. The 
condition of the co-f inancing applied at the project level as well: 
a project was only eligible for URBAN funding if a co-f inancier 
could be found. The URBAN programme was able to leverage 
total investments to the tune of around 66 million euros. At the 
local level, the f inancial responsibility for how the URBAN funds 
were to be distributed fell to the City of Amsterdam. The district 
of Amsterdam Southeast was responsible for the development 
of the programmes and projects.
The funds had to be used by the end of 1999, and an organi-
sation had to be set up to allocate the money to projects that 
f itted within the European policy framework. To be eligible 
for URBAN funding, project proposals could be submitted that 
were then assessed according to a number of different criteria. 
The decision-making structure that was established to this 
end, in line with European guidelines, consisted of two com-
mittees: a Supervisory Committee which was in charge of the 
implementation of the programme, and a Steering Committee 
which was authorised to assess the project proposals that were 
submitted and allocate the URBAN funding. Ethnic, religious 
and neighbourhood organisations were not represented on these 
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committees. This was striking, as local participation, including 
residents’ organisations, was an important condition of the 
URBAN programme.
Protest from below and the threat of a ‘black revolution’
Shortly after the start of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, 
a storm of protest was unleashed among some sections of the 
population of the Bijlmer, who felt that the organisational set-up 
of the programme did not take their interests into consideration. 
On 6 February 1996, a number of ‘worried Bijlmer residents’ or-
ganised a protest meeting to debate the organisational structure 
of the URBAN programme. Their criticism was mainly centred 
on the decision-making structure, not so much because of the 
under-representation of the local population in general, but 
above all because of the under-representation of ‘black’ people. 
At this meeting, which was attended by virtually the entire dis-
trict administration, the non-white district councillors came in 
for strong criticism. They were accused of having seriously failed 
to live up to their responsibility to voters – non-white voters in 
particular – in having unquestioningly accepted the flawed way 
in which the URBAN programme was organised.
Although the URBAN programme was the catalyst for the 
conflict, the root cause was much deeper. Quite apart from the 
organisation of the URBAN programme, there was criticism 
of the lack of any participatory structure for ethnic groups in 
decision-making processes in the Southeast district, of the 
under-representation of the black population in all important 
positions within the district administration, and of the inad-
equate communication between the district administration and 
migrant groups. In addition, many felt that the socio-economic 
problems that Bijlmer residents were struggling with, such as 
unemployment, debt (including rent arrears), crime, drug abuse 
and the deterioration of the neighbourhood, were being insuf-
f iciently addressed.
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The (‘black’) councillors took the criticism to heart, and joined 
forces in what became known as the Zwart Beraad. The group 
soon came into conflict with ‘white’ district councillors who 
did not share their point of view. This so-called ‘black and white 
conflict’, then, was not only a conflict between the local popula-
tion and the district administration – within the administration, 
too, a f ierce battle erupted. The tensions ran so high that the 
URBAN programme ended up being put on hold for months to 
allow the conflict time to calm down.
The conflict, which was widely reported in the local and 
national media, appeared to spread beyond the boundaries of the 
city district. The Dutch government was concerned that tensions 
would escalate, and the National Security Service (BVD, now the 
General Intelligence and Security Service, or AIVD) monitored 
the developments closely. The possibility of ties with radical 
separatist organisations in the US was considered. The Black 
Consideration group fed this fear with highly combative rhetoric. 
It referred to the ‘anger’ that existed among the lower classes in 
the Bijlmer. The neighbourhood, they said, was a powder keg and 
a time bomb. There was said to be intensive contact with black 
politicians in The Hague and Rotterdam in order to broaden the 
row to a national level. The movement was said to be striving 
for ‘Black Power’, and there were predictions of war breaking 
out in the Bijlmer when the Netherlands became President of 
the European Community on 1 January 1997. In other words, a 
black revolution appeared to be imminent.
The URBAN Bijlmermeer programme reformed
In order to resolve the impasse, substantial changes to the organi-
sational structure of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme were 
proposed at the administrative level. The Steering Committee was 
replaced with the Uitgebreid Bestuurlijk Overleg Bijlmermeer (Bijlm-
ermeer expanded administrative consultation, or UBO), and seats 
were reserved on both the UBO and the Supervisory Committee for 
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representatives of ethnic minority groups and religious organisa-
tions. Projects that were submitted had preferably to be developed 
from the bottom up and to reinforce the multi-ethnic community.
The URBAN Bijlmermeer programme has often been described 
as an important catalyst for the project of emancipating the local 
population. It is unequivocal that the programme heralded an 
increase in civic participation in the neighbourhood. However, 
this is only partly thanks to the programme. After all, where 
the European Commission had praised the programme for the 
scope it gave for participation by the local population, the initial 
decision-making structure proved otherwise. In addition, the 
stringent framework of the URBAN initiative turned out to be too 
restrictive for grassroots initiatives, with supplementary forms 
of funding being needed in order to realise these.
The meaning of ‘black’
One final question remains: to what extent can the increase in 
local participation in fact be attributed to the efforts of the Black 
Consideration group? Without attempting to downplay the signifi-
cance of their role, the group’s image does require some nuancing.
First of all, there was not really one united ‘black’ front. In 
reality, multiple groups that portrayed themselves as the repre-
sentatives of the ‘black’ Bijlmer residents were involved in the 
conflict: the ‘worried Bijlmer residents’ (who later came together 
in the ‘Allochtonen Breed Overleg’, ABO), the Black Consideration 
group and the Platform Bijlmer. These different ‘black’ groups had 
their own agendas and fought against the local establishment, as 
well as with each other. The members of the ABO and the Black 
Consideration group were predominantly Afro-Surinamese and, 
with one exception, male. The members of the Platform Bijlmer 
came from a range of different ethnic groups.
An interesting point that should be mentioned separately in 
this context is a problem that many of the people involved in the 
black-and-white conflict struggled with: their political loyalty 
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versus their ethnic loyalty. This loyalty problem led to rifts within 
local political parties. In 1994, the representation of D66 in the 
district council was pulled apart along ethnic lines. The party’s 
national executive threatened to disband the local branch 
and the D66 group in the Southeast district council, though 
ultimately this did not happen. The ‘black’ faction continued 
under the D66 banner, while the ‘white’ faction became part 
of Leefbaar Zuidoost (‘Liveable Southeast’). Within the Labour 
Party (PvdA), too, there was the risk of a rift between the ‘black’ 
faction, who were part of the Black Consideration group, and a 
mixed group led by party luminary Wouter Gortzak. The ‘black’ 
members from the latter group primarily viewed themselves as 
PvdA members. Within the centre-right VVD party, on the other 
hand, the black-and-white divide did not play a role.
Secondly, the meaning of ‘black’ was not unequivocal, but 
highly diverse. Juxtaposed with ‘white’, ‘black’ was shorthand for 
colonial suppression, disadvantage, discrimination and a certain 
approach to conducting politics. In addition, ‘black’ referred 
to ethnic groups from a range of different countries of origin; 
there was a normative distinction between the ‘right’ and the 
‘wrong’ black people (token black people, ‘Bounties’, etc.), and 
other political divides often lurked behind the term ‘black’.
Finally, support from constituents was considerably less 
substantial than was being suggested. ‘Black’ parties had found 
in each other a common rhetoric that created the suggestion that 
an unprecedented popular revolt was under way – when in fact, 
the movement remained restricted to a relatively small, though 
very active and politically engaged, group of participants.
This goes some way towards qualifying the role of the Black 
Consideration group. However, this does not mean that the con-
flict, in which it played a fundamental role, was a mere rhetorical 
battle, yielding no real results. On the contrary: the organisa-
tional structure of the controversial URBAN programme was 
modif ied to include representatives of ethnic groups; there was 
a signif icant increase in the number of ‘black’ politicians on the 
district council after the district elections thanks to preferential 
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votes within the regular political parties; the district council got 
its f irst ‘black’ president in 1998, and promoting participation 
and the ‘multiculturalisation’ of the administrative organisation 
became key policy priorities.
Greater attention must be paid to local diversity
In principle, intervention from Brussels at the local level present-
ed unexpected possibilities for the socio-economic regeneration 
of Amsterdam’s Bijlmermeer neighbourhood. If the conditions 
for participation in the programme’s decision-making structure 
had been more attuned to the cultural diversity of the area, the 
time, money and attention that had to be expended on resolving 
the conflict may have been better directed, for example toward 
the implementation of the programme.
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48. A Europe of peripheries
Federico Savini
Europe is a diversif ied territory made of towns, cities, agglom-
erations, conurbations and regional networks. The very notion 
of a ‘European city’ might seem obsolete with respect to the 
kaleidoscopic and undef ined urban structure of Europe. The 
fuzzy boundaries of urban areas in the EU have been politically 
def ined, and statistically homogenised in the past decades in 
order to set the stage for a common European urban policy 
framework. The past programmes of urban restructuring and re-
gional growth (URBAN I-II, TEN-T etc.) have been largely tailored 
to a clear identif ication of a European urban-regional network 
made of nodes and corridors. The European city has no par-
ticular perimeter or recognisable morphological physiognomy. 
What characterises the European city is a way of governing, a 
particular form of governability, a tradition of policymaking 
and a multi-scalar organisation of governance. It is not a spatial 
character per se. The main problem of today’s urban policies 
is the misconception, certainly inherited from two decades of 
urban policymaking, that ‘urban’ is synonymous with ‘city’, and 
that an urban policy is a policy that targets to the ‘city’. Urbanity 
is not exclusively a feature of what we imagine as fully f ledged 
cities. Today’s urban areas are instead increasingly characterised 
by polycentric organisation of functional and lived space, which 
often combines historically consolidated cores with emerging 
postmodern zones of social and economic dynamism.
The hundreds of thousands of commuters from the hinter-
lands of Milan, Paris, Athens or London, as well as the mass 
of people that every morning move across regional clusters of 
activities, aptly demonstrate this new polycentrism. European 
citizens are highly mobile and distributed. The wealthy Brianza 
in the Lombardy region, as well as the widespread urbanisa-
tion between Cologne and Bonn, are less ‘urban’ than the inner 
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quarters of any European historical city. Yet, it is there that 
important sectors of the urban economy and population of the 
EU are today located, from chemical companies to clusters of 
high-level scientif ic research and large residential areas. Yet 
non-urban (i.e. suburban spaces) are also areas of marginalisa-
tion and exclusion. The large pockets of poverty in East London 
districts, as well as the housing estates of the fringes of Budapest, 
still seem to suffer a submissive position towards their urban 
cores, and to the economic and governmental headquarters of 
Europe. These are also the f irst spaces to suffer from austerity 
policies, and from the lack of investments and jobs. The majority 
of the European population live in such non-urban spaces, not 
in urban cores. The urban periphery is also the nest of the EU’s 
cultural value, as demonstrated by the Stelling van Amsterdam 
(the defence line of Amsterdam), the châteaux on the Loire, and 
the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape.
Why does it make sense to think about the suburban, the 
non-urban and other peripheral spaces in order to reconstruct 
a cohesive Europe? The main challenge of an urban agenda for 
policymaking is to emancipate the ‘urban’ from the ‘city’, to em-
brace a wider and more inclusive definition of the European city, 
and to establish a broad policy framework able to adapt to the 
variegated territorial manifestations of European city-zenship.
An urban agenda for balanced urban development?
The European institutions have recently started to recognise this 
need of diversif ication of urban policies and interventions. Yet 
this process has not yet crystallised into a genuine and innova-
tive framework of urban and territorial cohesion that is able to 
include the periphery of cities. While outer areas are certainly 
identif ied as core targets for investments and social regenera-
tion, they are still framed as fully functional and dependent on 
the well-being of the urban core. Nonetheless, there are several 
indications that a truly sustainable urban development model 
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for Europe cannot further overlook the different forms of urban 
organisation and ignore them as socio-economical entities. 
The Cities of Tomorrow conference (2011) as well as the Leipzig 
Charter (adopted in 2010 by the European Ministers), the Toledo 
declaration (by the EU Urban Development Ministers, 2010), 
and the Territorial agenda of the EU 2020 research programme 
of the European Commission all underline that the European 
urban system is polycentric, fragmented and diversified, with 
small, medium and large communities. The European Parliament 
elected in 2014 has confirmed that
functional urban areas in the EU are not limited only to big 
cities but also include a unique polycentric structure built 
around large, medium-sized and small towns and cities and 
peri-urban areas, thus going beyond the traditional admin-
istrative borders to encompass various territories linked by 
their economic, social, environmental and demographic 
challenges (Draft Report on the urban dimension of EU 
policies, Committee on Regional Development, 2014/2213.
INI. p. 5 item B.)
These in-between spaces, medium- and small-sized urban com-
munities are functionally linked to larger city cores. Yet they 
have their own specif icity and their own position within the 
European multi-level governance, which is still dominated by 
regional governments and large municipal authorities. The urban 
challenges of Europe – including the key challenges expressed 
in the future urban agenda – need to show sensitivity to the 
asymmetric development between these urban formations, and 
to appreciate the potential of in-between spaces and peri-urban 
areas. In practice, Europe shows a wide array of best practices on 
this aspect, most of which have built on self-organising regional-
ism between municipalities and proactive local governments. 
The best examples are those that build on the idea of European 
citizenship, smart specialisation within the European market 
and socio-cultural characterisation to establish cohesive urban 
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networks. The regions of Lisbon, Lyon, Turin or Eindhoven (to 
name a few) have built upon a sentiment of inclusiveness in 
the European social, cultural and economic space, found their 
specialised character, valorised their cultural and industrial 
heritage and stimulated important redistributive policies. Others 
regions are instead still largely focused on mono-centric develop-
ment patterns, often sustained by institutionally fragmented 
governance and divided between leading and following munici-
palities. Paris and Amsterdam metropolitan areas are examples 
of the latter.
The notion of periphery, to indicate outer areas, is well known 
in European circles, yet it is biased towards a nationalistic and 
international def inition. It is used to identify the marginal re-
gions of the European Union. The new Member States in former 
Eastern Europe do get substantial subsidies and funds from the 
EU to boost economic development and they are becoming 
prominent targets of European economic policies. This is not the 
right scale to use this term. The Polish, Rumanian or Hungarian 
city centres are less peripheral than the suburban banlieues of 
Paris or Marseilles, or the sprawling areas of Naples. While the 
concept of periphery was traditionally used to emphasise the 
socio-economic asymmetries between the highly developed and 
the less developed regions of Europe, the contemporary notion 
of periphery shall emphasise the diversif ied urban territory 
rather than an East-West and a North-South divide. In doing so, 
it should better tailor urban policies within each region of Europe.
In the last 20 years of urban policy in many European states, 
the urban periphery has become an important geographical, 
social and political target for policymaking and policy analysis, 
but this awareness among academics and practitioners has not 
been recognised within European policy levels. EU institutions 
do naturally tend to look at the systemic interdependencies 
beyond Member States, at a large scale, and thus tend to prob-
lematize the interregional relations. Regions are still targeted 
as aggregated statistical units or as solid administrative spaces. 
As such, the EU is not yet geared to appreciate the internal 
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nuances of regional urban systems, despite the fact that these 
nuances are the key variables for both European problems and 
opportunities. Furthermore, European policies addressed to 
problematic poorer areas tend to be diff icult to coordinate, both 
horizontally towards integrated policy actions and vertically 
through the alignment of national, local and EU policies. This is 
due to the mismatch between the spatial logics of EU policies and 
the real socio-spatial development of city-regions. The former 
is being built on the political and economic leadership of core 
cities, while the others are increasingly being developed along 
polycentric patterns of functional distribution.
A new urban policy process?
A policy for the European city needs to appreciate the large 
variety of socio-spatial relations in urban areas, and valorise 
the potentials of peripheral, marginal, suburban and peri-urban 
spaces. This is possible only through a process which valorises 
bottom-up inputs and existent successful experiences in urban 
regions and that enable the sharing of knowledge between local 
administrations. This also requires a political sensitivity towards 
the new urban equilibrium of Europe. This is much more a politi-
cal and institutional question rather than a matter of statistical 
organisation and data management.
The very idea of the ‘periphery’, the ‘sub-urban’ or the 
‘peri-urban’ is politically constructed in the multi-scalar 
process of European policy making. As such, it ref lects mental 
representations of the European Union by its citizens and 
inhabitants. The European Union provides several ways to 
understand marginal and excluded areas, often def ined ac-
cording to measurable socio-economic standards. Yet these 
def initions underlie social and psychological elements, which 
need to be appreciated in the way they manifest themselves 
in political action. In the urban and regional spaces of the EU, 
the urban tension between central and peripheral areas is not 
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merely a local matter. It affects, and is affected by, the multi-
scalar articulation of the European space, which is founded 
on principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Centrality 
and ‘peripherality’ are political categories. By conceiving the 
periphery as a marginalised space (a space of exclusion or 
dependence from the core), the EU is perpetually reproduced 
as non-cohesive space. The main challenge for policymak-
ers today is thus to understand the symbolic and political 
iconography that is used for interventions on the periphery. 
Encouraging the prominence of urban cores, and arguing 
for their wealth for the cohesion of Europe, means to further 
promote a conflictual view of polycentrism. And this is the 
death of any idea of cohesive development.
The effects of this asymmetric conception of European urban 
areas are very evident today. The geography of emerging political 
movements oriented towards hyper-localism and anti-European 
feelings has a relatively clear spatial pattern. The recent electoral 
success of (neo)nationalism has found its electoral base outside 
the urban cores. Euro-scepticism has recently increased in pe-
ripheral territories of Europe and current research also reports 
spatially polarised patterns of trust in different EU regions. The 
ongoing economic crisis, and the EU’s subsequent responses, tend 
to be increasingly delegitimised by emergent groups because of 
their spatial selectiveness. Central areas are said to benefit from 
institutionalised links with EU institutions and to benefit the 
most from scarce EU resources. These policies generate a sense 
of political exclusion and f ierce political discontent. The wave 
of anti-European movements cover transversally most Member 
States, including France, Italy, Greece, the UK, Spain and the 
Netherlands. Separatism is in many cases, but not always, 
connected to sentiments against the ideas of globalisation and 
internationalisation. These movements accuse globalisation 
and international competition to be (re)producers of exclusion 
from the political arenas and from the labour markets, as well as 
residential exclusion between the wealthy core and the poorer 
outer areas. The EU is perceived as either a passive actor or at 
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times an active enemy of local specialisation and of the territorial 
potential of growing peri-urban areas.
Only by re-placing the urban periphery at the centre of the 
European urban agenda it is possible to truly set the conditions 
for addressing important EU problems and to re-establish a 
European citizenry of diversif ied communities. The nature of 
polycentric regions contains the seeds for smart specialisation, 
social cohesion and social development. Tailor-made develop-
ment policies of the urban periphery and the understanding 
of the wide variety of cultural identities and indigenous com-
munities is a necessary condition to enable diversif ied regional 
economies and dynamic urban environments.
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49. An Urban Agenda for the 
European Union: About cities or 
with cities?
Wouter van der Heijde
In any discussion about cities that takes place in Brussels, the 
‘Urban Agenda’ for the European Union is sure to be mentioned. 
Is this agenda a programme with priorities for European cities or 
an approach to involve cities in the European debate? And did 
both tracks come together during the Dutch presidency of the 
European Union in 2016.
The debate about cities has a long history in Europe. Much 
of what the European Union does affects cities, but cities are 
often not directly involved in the shaping of initiatives that 
come out of Brussels. And yet the main societal challenges in 
Europe such as work, energy, immigration, etc. are frequently 
metropolitan projects. What is striking is that there is much talk 
about cities and not so much with cities themselves, while cities 
are increasingly important for economic growth, sustainability 
and innovation. Already approximately 67 percent of Europe’s 
GDP is generated in urban areas.
The three goals of the Urban Agenda for the EU
Generally speaking, the European Urban Agenda has three goals. 
The first is to set the agenda for cities within the European Union. 
Much of what the EU does is not specif ically focused on cities, 
even though more than 70 percent of Europeans live in cities 
and cities contribute signif icantly to the European economy. At 
the same time, cities are also concentrations of problems. This 
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combination means that cities require extra attention and, for 
example, easier access to European subsidies.
The second goal of the European Urban Agenda is to ensure 
better coherence in European policies that affect cities. EU poli-
cies are usually generic in nature, but they do have implications 
for cities. Placing a greater emphasis on the city would make it 
clear where the problem lies. For example, clean air and cars with 
low emissions are both regulated by the EU, but the regulations 
are not synchronised. The result is that cities cannot meet the Eu-
ropean air quality standards because the European source-based 
policy on vehicles takes effect later than the air quality standards. 
An Urban Agenda should prevent this from happening.
And third, the European Urban Agenda aims to ensure that all 
the substantive issues that are important for cities are brought 
together. This type of programme with priorities is probably what 
f irst comes to mind when one hears the term ‘agenda’.
Many players, many visions
Many players are involved in the European Urban Agenda. The fo-
cus of the Urban Agenda as well as the objectives and instruments 
to be worked out will be slightly different depending on the person 
you speak to. In other words, the process is well underway. Below, 
I summarise the most important players and their positions.
In 2014, the Member States adopted the conclusions of the 
European Council urging them and the European Commission 
to develop an Urban Agenda. At several ministerial meetings, 
the topic of cities in Europe was put on the table. In 2011, the 
European Commission published the report ‘Cities of Tomor-
row’, which outlines the challenges facing European cities and 
sets out a vision of the development of smart, sustainable and 
inclusive cities as well as benchmarks of urban development. 
The report also describes measures to strengthen the European 
urban network. In 2015 the European Commission took an 
important step by publishing the results of a consultation on 
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EU urban policy. The consultation identif ies the main objectives 
of the European Union (the so-called Juncker priorities) that 
have an urban dimension: 1) Jobs, Growth and Investment; 2) 
Digital Single Market; 3) Energy and Climate; 4) Migration; and 5) 
Democratic Change. In addition, the European Commission has 
indicated how it will approach the EU Urban Agenda. Moreover, 
the name of the directorate-general responsible for regions and 
cities has been changed to DG Regional and Urban Policy.
The European Parliament also has an opinion about cities 
in Europe. It has called on the European Commission and the 
Member States to step up the pace of the Urban Agenda. It too 
believes that cities should be more involved in the European 
Union’s initiatives. The Parliament has asked the Commission 
to examine the effects of EU initiatives on cities from a more 
comprehensive perspective and to invest more in the exchange 
of knowledge and best practices between cities.
Cities are also making themselves heard – both through the 
Committee of the Regions, which formally represents cities and 
regions in Brussels, and via urban networks. The Committee 
adopted among others a proposal by the mayor of Delft to write up 
an advisory report on the need for an EU Urban Agenda. EUROCI-
TIES, an important voice of cities in Europe, is closely involved 
in all these developments. EUROCITIES issues statements and 
lobbies on behalf of the cities. And then there are the mayors of the 
capital cities within the European Union that are also contribut-
ing to the debate. Since 2012, these mayors have been meeting on 
a regular basis in the presence of the European Commissioner for 
Regional and Urban Policy. At their last conference in Amsterdam, 
they expressed their support for a European Urban Agenda.
Partnerships
Various instruments have been devised to achieve the differ-
ent objectives of the European Urban Agenda. For example, 
within the European Commission, an urban lead (an urban 
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representative) might be appointed to direct more attention to 
cities. And urban proofing (an impact assessment) of EU policy 
will involve systematically assessing the effects of new European 
initiatives on urban areas. This requires more and better data 
about cities in Europe, because much of the existing statistical 
information is not gathered at the city level. Another idea has 
been recently implemented: a website with European initiatives 
that have an urban dimension which shows at a glance exactly 
how and in what areas Europe and cities affect each other.
In order to further develop the priority themes of the Urban 
Agenda, partnerships are established in which players interested 
in a particular theme work together in developing them. In this 
way, like-minded people can f ind each other and share knowl-
edge and expertise. The partnerships should contribute to better 
EU legislation, lead to the better use of EU funding, and ensure 
a better sharing of knowledge base and knowledge exchange.
As is common, each actor has its own list of priority themes. 
The Commission would like to focus on smart, green and in-
clusive cities. Among the Member States, the main topics are 
youth unemployment, affordable housing, energy eff iciency of 
built-up areas, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, etc. EUROCI-
TIES is concentrating on jobs, refugees, migration within the 
European Union, air quality, sustainability and energy, and 
affordable housing. Eventually an agreement was reached on 
twelve priority themes that the partnerships will focus on. This 
decision was not taken by the cities themselves.
The Urban Agenda in Amsterdam
Did the different ambitions and interpretations of the EU Urban 
Agenda converge in 2016 within the Pact of Amsterdam that 
formally establishes the Urban Agenda for the EU? And what 
role will cities play in this? During the presidency of the Neth-
erlands in the f irst semester of 2016, all the off icial meetings in 
the Netherlands took place in Amsterdam. A number of these 
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meetings were about the EU Urban Agenda, some were about 
cities (such as the informal ministerial meeting that agreed on 
the Pact of Amsterdam), others were with cities (such as the 
mayors’ conference where there was direct dialogue between 
the capitals and the European Commission). In addition, there 
were meetings with city dwellers themselves who put forth their 
own ideas on an Urban Agenda in Europe.
All the players involved did not follow exactly the same line 
in Amsterdam, but there is nothing wrong with that. Europe 
thrives on diversity and on providing its own interpretation to 
developments, and there is no reason to believe that it will be 
any different with the European Urban Agenda.
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50. 2031: The year the city 
disbanded the state
Anne van Wageningen
The die is cast. What everyone had been expecting for so long has 
occurred. The joint convention of mayors of Europe’s major cities 
has declared that all affairs will now be handled between the 
European Union and the major cities. This declaration of separa-
tion was released just before the f irst summit of the Council 
of heads of state and government leaders. With this move, the 
major cities have in one stroke sidelined their own nation states.
The convention was summoned on the basis of an initiative 
of EU capitals to meet more often to exchange knowledge, share 
ideas and discuss urban challenges and problems they had in 
common. By 2015, it had become clear that not only the capitals 
but also the major cities were dealing with comparable adminis-
trative problems. Consequently, a group of European cities came 
into being that soon began exchanging knowledge, expertise and 
ideas. But they did not stop at this. The group began to lobby the 
institutions of the European Union, in particular the European 
Commission. States declared that they did not want to deal 
with this group because, in their opinion, municipalities could 
represent their interests within the appropriate constitutional 
framework in their own state. It was in response to this declara-
tion that the convention of European mayors was ultimately 
established.
And now in 2031 the convention has taken the ultimate 
political step of burying the nation state, without further ado. 
This step was elucidated by the spokesman of the convention 
with the following pronouncement: ‘People do not live in states, 
they live in cities.’ The German city states in particular – Berlin, 
Bremen and Hamburg – have expressed their full confidence in 
this step. They already have a signif icant amount of experience 
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with enacting legislation and working with their own judicial 
system. Venice, Genoa and Amsterdam also foresee few problems 
and consider this a normal step from a historical point of view. 
Barcelona and San Sebastian/Donostia have also joined the con-
vention. They recognise that the old state system no longer bears 
any relation to urban citizenship. They add that the governance 
of the city has f inally been given back to the residents rather 
than being transferred by a historical aberration from the alleged 
ownership of one faraway monarch to another, equally distant 
government. When asked to comment, Paris declared that it did 
not see what had changed, as the governing had always been 
conducted from Paris. Vienna remarked that it had already been 
a city without an empire for more than a century.
During the convention, the major cities had already identif ied 
many common topics for which the Member States had done too 
little, not just at the state level but also at the European level. 
The growing polarisation of society, the influx of tourists, public 
and private housing, migration from within and outside the 
European Union, the energy transition, environmental issues, 
and the effects of failed f inancial policies were all visible on 
the squares and streets of major cities – and not in government 
buildings.
Urban innovation and activism
Dutch city councils let it be known that developments had 
already for some time been pushing the Netherlands in the 
direction of independent city states and urban agglomeration. 
They had made clear that they were unable to solve acute so-
cial problems on the street or in households solely within the 
framework of the state, which simply passed the buck. By around 
2015, municipalities had already been made responsible for the 
social domain, which included social support, home safety, youth 
welfare, labour market reintegration and adequate education. 
As the expansion in their responsibilities was not accompanied 
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with an expansion in f inancial resources, cities began to work 
more closely with neighbouring municipalities. It all began with 
the exchange of knowledge, but it soon led to the merging of 
municipal services to make better use of the limited f inancial 
resources they had.
This collaboration was also intensif ied in the area of spatial 
planning. Municipalities were forced to react to developments 
in the tourist sectors. Popular cities such as Barcelona, Paris, 
Venice and Amsterdam saw their city centres change signif i-
cantly: both the number of hotels and the number of residents 
who put their houses up for rent increased dramatically. And 
residents who could no longer rent a house in the ever-expanding 
city centre were obliged to move to the outskirts. Because these 
developments occurred so rapidly, huge infrastructural problems 
arose. Of course, cities benef it in all sorts of ways from tour-
ists, namely through the creation of jobs and a rise in revenues 
from tourism taxes. Amsterdam was one of the f irst cities in 
Europe that made a tax deal with an intermediary platform for 
individuals renting their houses to tourists. But the income for 
municipalities was insuff icient to solve the problems that arose, 
including the f inancing of more public transport and bike paths 
to transport workers to the city where they used to live. And in 
this way another taboo was gradually lifted: that of municipali-
ties developing more and more new categories of tax revenue.
In addition to the tourist tax and the property tax, munici-
palities have become increasingly innovative in the levying of 
other taxes. It began with the decision to raise the tourist tax 
in response to the increasing flow of tourists. The tax did not 
have the desired effect, as the tourists continued coming. What 
the tax did result in is more f inancial resources for the popular 
municipalities. In the Netherlands, the property tax had been 
one of the few taxes that municipalities could levy themselves. 
Inspired by the example of London, cities began to experiment 
with toll charges. Amsterdam introduced a toll charge to f inance 
extra infrastructural facilities intended to shorten the commute 
between the suburbs and the capital city. These projects were 
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taken up by Amsterdam in collaboration with other municipali-
ties in the region such as Almere, Amstelveen, Purmerend and 
Zaandam. In reaction to the convention, these municipalities re-
marked that when it came to infrastructural problems, they dealt 
with Amsterdam more often than they did with the state. The fact 
that the metro f inally connected their cities to Schiphol Airport 
had only been made possible by f inancing by the municipalities 
and by European Union regional funds. These funds were a new 
financial instrument based on a veiled tax in the form of fines the 
EU levied on states that violated the Stability and Growth Pact or 
that persistently failed to meet the obligations of EU membership.
Urban policy and global problems
A very different urban problem arose around 2015. The arrival of a 
stream of people from mainly Syria, Yemen and Eritrea seriously 
tested the improvisational talent of cities. Many asylum seekers 
were able to stay in Europe on the basis of the refugee status 
they received. And those whose requests for asylum had been 
rejected were off icially deported, although if they did not have 
any identif ication from their country of origin they were simply 
put out on the street and not, according to a spokesman from 
the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, ‘in the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands’. Municipalities had to deal with both groups 
(refugees and asylum seekers). The state had come up with an 
arrangement in 2014 in which f ive municipalities would provide 
emergency shelter, but this only seemed to add an extra element 
to the increasing disparity between Dutch municipalities. The 
rest of the European Union faced similar problems. Hungary 
criminalised the irregular entry of asylum seekers, but this did 
not alter the fact that Budapest had to do something about the 
stream of refugees. By contrast, in Germany the state and cities 
were much more able to work together.
In almost all Member States of the European Union, the 
problem of the asylum seekers generated similar policy issues. 
 403
Extra schooling for children had to be organised in addition 
to extra housing, integration and language courses for adults, 
and retraining of professional skills acquired in their country of 
origin. Due to the rise of all sorts of nationalist parties, politicians 
at the state level did not dare to touch these dossiers, as a result 
of which municipalities had to solve these matters themselves.
Looking back on it now, one can say that it was the asylum 
seekers who ushered in the renaissance in public housing. The 
municipal housing association was re-established and new types 
of social housing were built. Architects seized the opportunity to 
combine environmental objectives with energy-neutral housing, 
also primarily because the new houses had to be built cheaply. 
The demand for large numbers of new houses unleashed an 
innovative force in the entire European Union that roused the 
continent from a long and peaceful winter sleep.
The energy transition also needed just such a spark. State policy 
had been languishing and lacked innovative power. The transition 
to clean energy was, moreover, being hampered by the large coal 
and gas plants and by state interests. Municipalities throughout 
Europe moved back to establishing municipal energy companies, 
which focused on wind and solar energy. Innovative capacity was 
thus brought back to the level of municipalities, according to the 
spokesperson for energy policy and transition at the convention.
Reactions of EU institutions and Member States
The European Commission has declared that it is still consid-
ering the situation. It acknowledges that it already maintains 
active relations with municipalities in various ways and that a 
signif icant amount of regional subsidies and policy decisions 
are coordinated together with municipalities. The Commission 
is, however, very much aware that the European Union is still 
governed by the joint Member States that meet in the Council.
The European Parliament has said that it is following develop-
ments with great interest and that this matter is in theory an 
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internal affair of the Member States. The Parliament has declared 
that genuine democratic control within the European Union is 
of the utmost importance. It is therefore prepared to continue 
to guarantee and exercise democratic control over European 
Union territory if national parliaments are no longer able to 
fulf il this task.
In a press release, the Council has distanced itself from the 
convention. It considers the legal integrity and sovereignty of 
the Member States as immutable and not up for discussion. The 
French president reaff irmed the Council’s statement, noting 
that France is one and indivisible. She also let it be known that 
the prefects are monitoring the situation and, where necessary, 
would take all the decisions in the interests of the state. The 
German chancellor asserted that she did not wish to go back in 
time a full century and pointed out that the Federal Republic 
of Germany has a constitution that allows it to operate strong 
and stable state institutions in a democratic setting. She also ex-
pressed her intention to put this matter on the agenda of the next 
Franco-German summit. The Dutch Government Information 
Service, meanwhile, has announced that the festivities organised 
for the 450th anniversary of the Act of Abjuration will be kept 
very sober. Amsterdam, however, sees no reason to cancel the 
festivities. The mayor of Amsterdam stated that he considered 
the f ireworks in the city to be a f itting way to mark and usher 
in the new beginning.
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